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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the characteristics and legal implications of International Regime 
Theory with special focus on fisheries on the high seas on the basis of a critical 
examination of the 1995 UN Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (SSA). The theoretical framework adopted in this investigation 
suggests that the emerging international regime for fisheries on the high seas relies on 
four interconnected elements: first, a scientific and diplomatic consensus about the 
nature of specific issues regarding fisheries; secondly, a core of informal and formalized 
principles, norms and rules contained mainly in the 1995 SSA, as well as in other 
related international legal instruments; thirdly, a set of organizations and decision­
making procedures that constitute the operation of the international regime; and fourth, 
a set of compliance and enforcement mechanisms to help international society to 
manage the problem of fisheries as a global common.
These four elements characterise the continuous process of development and refinement 
of International Environmental Law to protect the environment in particular in relation 
to conservation of the living resources of the sea. The thesis also considers the way in 
which the regime can operate as an institution able to influence the behaviour of States 
and their subjects to manage the international problem of fisheries on the high seas.
The findings of this investigation yield both theoretical and pragmatic results. First, the 
application of the theoretical framework can enhance understanding of the problems and 
potentialities of the International Law for the protection and management of the global 
commons and, in particular, of fisheries on the high seas. Secondly, the theoretical 
framework offers explanations as to the manner in which the emerging new 
international regime for fisheries is limiting and reshaping the legal principle of freedom 
of fishing on the high seas. Further, as this thesis aims to demonstrate, state sovereignty 
is not incompatible with international progress in solving common problems.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: a new international regime for fisheries on the high seas
1.1 The crisis of fisheries management
The considerable biological diversity of seas and oceans provides medicines, raw 
materials and highly nutritious food1. The world’s fishery resources are an important 
source of protein as well as employment and economic revenue . Since the 17th 
century, the principle of freedom of the seas dominated the use of the oceans and their 
resources. Beyond the 3 to 12 nautical miles narrow limits of national jurisdiction, the 
resources were open to all comers. With declining catches per vessel in the traditional 
grounds, the fishermen either moved to new areas or adopted more intensive techniques. 
In more recent years, the pace of exploration and exploitation was expedited by the 
development of automotive power, synthetic fibres in nets and refrigeration equipment .
This evolution had three major consequences. First, the generalised depletion of 
conventional stocks; second, the global extension of fishing efforts to new, less 
conventional species as well as to far distant waters and species found at greater depths 
(lower trophic levels), and third, the increased conflict between the local fishermen of
1 It is widely accepted that diversity at higher taxonomic levels is much greater in the sea than on land or 
in freshwater. Most of the fundamental patterns of organization and body plan, i.e. the different basic 
kinds of organism that are distinguished as phyla, originated in the sea and remain there, but only a subset 
of them have spread to the land and into freshwaters. See Elliot A. Norse, Global Marine Biological 
Diversity (Washington, Island Press, 1993), pp. 9-11. See also B. Groombridge and M.D. Jenkins (ed.), 
The Diversity of the Seas: A Regional Approach, (Cambridge, World Conservation Press, 1996), pp. 4-13.
2 Fisheries operations have been identified as the first of the five activities, which are seen as the most 
important agents of present and potential change in marine biodiversity at genetic, species and economic 
levels. The others are: chemical pollution and eutrophication; alteration of physical habitat; invasion of 
exotic species; and global climate change. See National Research Council, Understanding Marine 
Biodiversity (Washington, National Academy Press, 1995), pp. 8-15. See also A. Charlotte de Fontaubert 
et al., Biodiversity in the Seas: Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity in Marine and 
Coastal Habitats, (Gland and Cambridge, IUCN, 1996), at 6.
3 Fishing methods known from remote prehistory, however, still coexist with the dominant and 
sophisticated methods developed in the industrial age. After the Second World War, the fisheries saw 
their greatest ever rate of expansion on the world scale. See James R. Coull, World Fisheries Resources 
(London, Routledge, 1993), 50-53.
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the coastal states and the distant water fishermen from foreign states fishing close to 
shore. This led to increasing claims by coastal states to extended jurisdiction4.
The major maritime powers generally succeeded in maintaining the principle of 
freedom of the seas, which benefited their military and fishery interests, during the First 
United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea5 and the Second United Nations 
Conferences on the Law of the Sea6 held in 1958 and 1960 respectively. But the 
pressure for extended jurisdiction was inexorable and, even while the negotiations at the
n
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea were still under way in the 
1970’s, a regime of a 200 mile extended fisheries zones was widely established resulting 
in a redistribution of access to the seas’ wealth8.
The choice of 200 miles, obviously, has no relevance to the habits of fish. Some species 
are sedentary like oyster and clams, while others, like tuna and salmon, swim vast 
distances and are found both inside and outside a 200-mile limit. Given the wide 
diversity of the resource, there is also no direct connection between the size of a 
fisheries zone and wealth of resources. Among the most fertile areas are the continental 
shelves rich in demersal stocks or ground fish such as cod and haddock and the up 
welling currents inhabited by pelagic species, for instance, those feeding on the surface 
such as herrings and sardines. Temperate zone waters tend to contain relatively large
4 One unfortunate and unforeseen result of extending jurisdiction over fisheries to 200 nautical miles is 
the emergence of conflicts between States and within States, the latter involving fishers of all types, 
fisheries administrations and scientists. See J. R. McGoodwin, Crisis in World’s Fisheries. People, 
Problems, and Politics (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 106.
5 UNCLOS I at Geneva adopted in 1958 the four conventions which form the core of generally accepted 
rules of the law of the sea concerning maritime zones: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone; the Convention on the High Seas; the Convention on the Continental Shelf; and the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.
6 UNCLOS II was convened to discuss the problem of the breath of the territorial sea. By only one vote 
the Conference failed to adopt a compromise formula providing for a six-mile territorial sea plus a six- 
mile fishery zone.
7 UNCLOS III had its beginning in the Sea Bed Committee established in 1967 by the United Nations 
General Assembly following a proposal by Arvid Pardo, in order to examine the issue of the deep sea bed 
lying beyond the limits of national jurisdiction over the continental shelf.
8 Although the real leader was Canada, the EEZ was developed largely to further the aspiration of 
developing countries for economic development and control over their natural resources, particularly fish 
stocks, which in many cases were largely exploited by the distant-water fleets of developed states. R. R. 
Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999).
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populations of few individual species; while outside up welling areas like those found in 
Peru, tropical waters have large numbers of species though small populations of each9.
Fishing grounds represent the best-known example of a potentially open-access 
resource. In the open ocean, the stocks are diffused. Some high seas species have 
schooling habits but their locations entail high search costs. Others seldom aggregate 
and can only be taken by gear that filters great quantities of water. Taking into account 
the fact that if more fish are caught by one party this implies that less fish are available 
for all others, all fishers have an incentive to increase their fishing effort beyond the 
point where the market price for the fish equals the marginal cost of harvesting10. Effort 
is expended to the level where market price equals the average cost of production. The 
scarcity value of the resource is ignored. The potential result is over fishing and such 
depletion of the stock that it can no longer sustain itself. A recent example is the 1992 
declaration of a moratorium on fishing for endangered species and straddling stocks 
such as cod and flounder off the Canada’s Grand Banks in the North Atlantic, once one 
of the richest fishing grounds. The moratorium put nearly 30,000 Newfoundland’s 
workers out of work, and has incited a conflict between Canada and Spain, whose fleets 
continued to fish just beyond Canada’s 200-mile limit11. The Black Sea, the 
Mediterranean, the Eastern Indian Ocean, and the Southeast Atlantic are other examples 
of commons that have been severely affected by the uncoordinated economic activity of
1 9several countries . Nearly 1 billion people depend on fish for their primary source of 
protein and demand for food fish is projected to increase from about 75 million tonnes 
in 1994/95, to 110-120 million tonnes in 201013. According to FAO, the marine catch
9 E. S. Iversen, Living Marine Resources. Their Utilisation and Management, (New York, Chapman and 
Hall, 1996), at 105
10 Tom Tietenberg, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (New York, Harper Collins, 1996), 
at 277.
11 Jean-Pierre Reveret, La Pratique des Peches, (Paris, L'Harmattan, 1991), pp. 51-53; Russell and 
McConnell, 'After the Collapse', Dalhousie Law Review, 18 (1995), pp. 5-28, at 11; L. O'Reilly Hinds, 
'Crisis in Canada's Atlantic Fisheries', Marine Policy, 18 (1995), pp. 271-283; J. Ruitenbeek, The Great 
Canadian Fishery Collapse: Some Policy Lesson', Ecological Economics, 19 (1996), pp. 103-126.
12 M. J. Peterson, 'International Fisheries Management', in P. M. Haas, R. O. Keohane and M. Levy (ed.), 
Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995), pp. 249-307, at 267.
13 UNEP’s Millennium Report on the Environment, Global Environmental Outlook, (London, UNEP and 
Earthscan, 1999), p. 45.
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could be sustainably increased by about 10 million tonnes a year but only through 
careful management and continued increases in aquaculture14.
The total world production of fish increased at a rate of about 6 percent per year from 
the 1950s until the collapse of the Peruvian anchoveta fishery in the early 1970s. After 
that setback, with some minor fluctuations, production continued to grow until it 
reached a peak of 100 million tonnes in 1989. However, the overall growth rate declined 
to 2.5 percent per annum. World production fell to 97 million tonnes in 1990 and has 
remained at that level for both 1991 and 1992. During the past two decades, the catch of 
a large number of demersal stocks like Atlantic cod, Cape hakes, saithe, haddock and 
Atlantic red fishes, has declined significantly, due largely to continued, heavy over 
fishing15.
Although there are instances of stock rehabilitation through the adoption of 
conservation measures, these are relatively scarce in most areas of the world. By 
contrast, production of oceanic pelagics like tuna, cephalopods and other shellfish has 
shown a steady increase. While the overall marine catch has successively decreased 
from the peak year of 1989 (86.4 million tonnes), the productivity of fisheries of inland 
species rose dramatically during the 1980s, to 15 million tonnes in 1991 (15 percent of 
total production). Much of this rise is accounted for by nine major species the catch of 
which was less than 500,000 tonnes in 1970 but over 5.5 million tonnes in 1990. These 
species have been produced almost entirely by aquaculture and most of the growth has 
occurred in China16.
A significant aspect of these developments is the change in the value of a catch. Except 
for tuna, the species whose catch has been growing are relatively low priced. Most of
14 FAO, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, FAO, Rome, 1997, p. 11
15 J. Chaussade, La Mer Nourriciere: Enjeu du XXIe Siecle, (Paris, University de Nantes et CNRS, 1994), 
p. 31.
16 The collapse of several fish stocks and the absence of a comprehensive global legal regime for fishing 
together with the controversy surrounding the principle of freedom of the high seas, have resulted in 
conflicts over marine living resources. See FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, Rome, 
1995. See also B. Holmes, The Rape of the Sea’, New Scientist, 14 February 1998, at 4; P. Weber, 
Abandoned Seas: Reserving the Decline of the Oceans, Worldwatch Paper 116, (Washington, 
Worldwatch 1995); A. P. McGinn, Rocking the Boat: Conserving Fisheries and Protecting Jobs, 
Worldwatch Paper 142, (Washington, Worldwatch Institute, 1998).
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the shoaling pelagics, for example, are used for fishmeal. On the other hand, the species 
whose catch has been falling are mostly high valued. The net result is that the increase 
in total quantity of catch has not been matched by a commensurate increase in economic 
value. Over fishing of the high-valued stocks has lead to their depletion and, with 
decreased supplies, to price increases17.
It is relevant that a very small number of countries have an extraordinary influence on 
total world production. The effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a management 
regime, to which the fishery operations of these countries are subjected, can have a 
major impact on global production. According to the FAO, in 1993, twenty countries 
accounted for 80 percent of the total world marine catch: China, Peru, Japan, Chile, 
United States of America, Russian Federation, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea Republic, 
Norway, India, Iceland, Philippines, Korea Democratic Popular Republic, Denmark, 
Spain, Taiwan, Canada, Mexico, and Vietnam, the first six of these identified above
1 ftaccounted for more than 50 percent . The clustering by countries and by species is 
interrelated. For the three major developed countries, most of the increases were due to 
two species: Alaska pollock and Japanese pilchard. There has been an even greater 
dominance of individual species in the catch of two of the three major developing 
countries: for Peru, 90 percent of the catch in 1991 was from anchoveta and South 
American pilchard; for Chile, 81 percent was from those two species and Chilean jack 
mackerel19. These are all species whose abundance tends to fluctuate widely.
Estimating future production levels is an exercise subject to many uncertainties. Past 
estimates of the annual potential supply of fish from all sources have ranged from 100 
to 120 million tonnes. It is now evident that the marine capture fisheries are adversely 
affected at extraction levels in excess of roughly 80 million tonnes. The greatest 
prospects for increasing fish supplies for food are to be found in the use of small 
shoaling pelagics for direct human consumption. Presently these species are used for
17 ‘Overfishing. Causes and Consequences’, The Ecologist, Special Issue, 25 (1995) FAO, n. 16 above, at 
7-26; The Marine Ecosystems Index shows that the average change in population of 102 species of 
marine fish, reptiles birds, and mammals from all around the world has declined by about 35 percent since 
1970. See also Jonathan Loh, Jorgen Randers et al., Living Planet Report -  1999, (Gland, WWF 
International, 1999), p. 8.
18 FAO, supra, note 16, pp. 7-26.
19 Ibid, p. 26
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producing fishmeal, for pig and poultry production as well as for aquaculture. The 
remaining option for an increase in fish supplies would be that the present condition of 
over fishing prevails and that the majority of the marine catches increases would come 
from fishing further and further down the "food chain". The limit of exhaustion, as has 
occurred in one or two areas, is a fishery that is almost entirely a "trash" fishery of 
mixed juveniles and other small-sized species, which provide direct feed for larger 
species. That is to say that the wild production from the marine areas could end up 
being nearly all utilised to grow two or three species in captivity. The impact of this 
would be the loss of the present wide spectrum of food items that the existing 1,000 
commercial species now provide and their replacement mostly by a few species 
differentiated only by their flesh colour and their texture20.
Beyond the issues related to the food and nutrition problems, which are likely to emerge 
from the supply constraints of the fisheries’ sector, those related to resource and 
environmental management also require urgent and adequate policy responses. The 
most important impact of the likely supply-demand gap and the consequent projected 
increases in the real price of fish is the stimulation such price effects will provide in 
maintaining the excessive levels of fishing intensity and the continuation of over
91fishing . It is clear that, without directed government intervention to protect and 
manage fisheries, the resource base will continue to degenerate at a rate corresponding 
to the increases in real prices of fish. This will continue to occur until governments 
establish effective controls over the rate and the type of exploitation of the fishery 
resources. A number of leading economists agree that market mechanisms alone cannot 
solve the environmental problem, which is one of the most serious problems in the
99world . The problems of fisheries management illustrate well this assumption.
20 C. Safina, The World’s Imperilled Fish’, Scientific American, November 1995.
21 T.H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulations’, in A. Markandya and J. 
Richardson (ed.), Environmental Economics, (London, Earthcan, 1993), pp. 271.
22 See Chapter 3, Section 2.1. The common position among economists is that growth can be reconciled 
with the protection of the environment. However, attention shall be focused on how to minimize the 
adverse effect of increasing production on the environment and not on the fact of increasing production as 
such. See Carla Ravaioli (ed.), Economists and the Environment, (London, Zed Books, 1995); see P. 
Samuelson (p. 36), J. K. Galbraith (p. 61), J. OConnor (p. 20) and N. Georgescu-Roegen (p. 55).
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Retting has identified the three most common factors affecting the choice of 
management regime for fisheries. The first is the biological approach, which is the one 
that is more extensively accepted and applied. Fishers expect that protecting fish stocks 
can extend their fishing probabilities in the future. The problem is that fishers are 
obliged to discard a part of their catch because fishing gear kills more fish than it 
harvests. The second are perceptions of social equity and cultural heritage, principles of 
justice and morality, ethics preferences and religious practices, which differ both within 
and between countries, from country to country and even from region to region. The 
third is the political acceptance of management regulations because such regulations are 
adopted and implemented within a legal system induced by political concerns23. This 
last factor is widely relevant for the theory of international environmental regime.
A feature highlighted by the economic analysis of renewable resource problems is that 
the economic conditions for efficient resource exploitation can only be developed by 
suppressing the complexity of fish population growth. The population growth models 
applied by fishery biologists are far more complex than the approximations employed 
by economists. As Rees has pointed out, for some economists, the objective is to 
maximize the difference between the costs of fishing and the revenue derived from 
selling the catch rather than to maximise the weight of fish which can be landed24. 
Therefore, a rational management strategy based not on profit but on food production, 
would involve the control of fishing effort in order to maximize the sustainable fish 
yield per annum.
The roots of the modem literature on fishery economics can be found in an article by 
Scott Gordon published in 1954 in the Journal o f Political Economy entitled "the 
economic theory of a common property resource: the fishery". In this seminal article, 
Gordon presented a theory of the fishing industry, "applicable generally to all cases 
where natural resources are owned in common and exploited under conditions of 
individualistic competition". In the opinion of Gordon, the bioeconomic equilibrium of 
the fishing industry may be approached in terms of two problems. The first is to explain
23 R. B. Retting, Management Regime in Ocean Fisheries’, in D.W. Bromley (ed.), The Handbook of 
Environmental Economics, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1996), pp. 433-452, p. 433.
24 Judith Rees, Natural Resources, (London, Routledge, 1990), p. 289
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the nature of the equilibrium of the industry as it occurs in a situation which exploitation 
of a common property resource is uncontrolled or unmanaged. The second is to indicate 
the nature of a socially optimum manner of exploitation, which presumably is what 
governmental management policy aims to achieve or promote. According to Gordon’s 
model, after an initially profitable period, commercial fisheries would usually struggle 
along with too many vessels chasing too few fish .
According to Amason, today the essential problem faced by fisheries management is 
how to provide incentives to producers so that the socially optimal harvest and stock 
level are maintained. The choice of policy instruments depends upon their economic 
efficiency, their informational feasibility and the costs of their administration and 
enforcement . The problems associated with fishery management have much in 
common with those of developing policies for environmental controls. In the case of 
fisheries the externality comes through the additional costs imposed by firms on one 
another through the effect of their activities on the stock. The fundamental externality of 
common-property fisheries is that relating to straddling and highly migratory stocks, 
externality derives from the resource base itself. The resource stock is a major factor in 
each firm's productivity. Thus each firm’s harvesting activity imposes a production 
diseconomy on the others. The result is a tendency towards excessive fishing effort and 
over exploitation of the resource27. That is to say that firms do not account the socially 
optimal value to the stock and, in the case of an open-access fishery, place a zero 
valuation on future stock. Thus the fishery management problem is one of compelling 
producers to take into account the socially optimal, so called ‘shadow price’, for stock. 
They should behave as if they had to rent the stock at the socially optimal shadow price. 
The concept of ‘resource rent’ was employed by Gordon in 1954. Since then, the
25 According to Gordon, fishery resources are unusual in the fact of their common property nature and the 
problems associated with depletion and over exploitation of fisheries are in reality manifestations of the 
fact that the natural resources of the sea yield no economic rent. See H. Scott Gordon, The Economics 
Theory of Common Property Resources’, Journal of Political Economy, 52 (1954), pp. 124-142, at 124. 
In 1931 Harold Hotelling warned about the disappearing supplies of minerals, forests, and other 
exhaustible assets that were being selfishly exploited at too rapid rate, exploitation of which thus 
demanded regulation. See H. Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 39 (1931), p. 137.
26 Ragnar Arnason, Minimum Information Management in Fisheries’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 
23 (1990), pp. 630-653, at 630.
27 Ibid, p. 630
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problem of common-property fisheries has generally been seen as one of dissipation of 
resource rents and the objective of fisheries management as restoration of these rent28.
More recently, a relevant critique of the traditional theory of fishery economics has been 
provided by James Wilson. The force of his critique lies in a concern with the 
unrealistic aspects of the traditional model: first, in the way fish populations are 
represented; secondly, in the assumptions concerning fishermen’s behaviour and thirdly, 
in the disregard for transaction and informational costs associated with fishery 
policies . According to this author, "unlike the stable single-species system of accepted 
bioeconomic theory, fisheries tend to be highly variable, multiple-species systems with 
biological and social dynamics that are imperfectly understood and parameters which 
are difficult to measure30. As a result these fishery systems present difficult problems in 
public policy making under conditions of uncertainty.
Models which include more complex assumptions about fisher’s behaviour, multi­
species fisheries and uncertainty are analytically intractable. A solution to the fisheries 
problems will come about only following the development of more adequate conceptual 
tools, institutions and policies. Simulation models representing the population dynamics 
of multi-species fisheries and their interaction with the level of fishing effort can be 
developed to assess the impact on the fishery of a discrete number of alternative policy 
scenarios31.
Churchill and Lowe have defined the basic characteristics of fisheries, which have 
profoundly influenced legal regulations, both at the national and international level. 
These characteristics of fisheries regarded as a common property resource are: 1) a 
tendency for fish stocks to be fished above biologically optimum levels; 2) a tendency 
for more fishermen to engage in a fishery than is economically justified; 3) a likelihood
28 Ibid, pp. 651-652
29 James A. Wilson, The Economical Management of Multispecies Fisheries’, Land Economics, 58 
(1992), pp. 417-434, at 417.
30 Ibid.
31 James A. Wilson, Chaos, Complexity and Community Management Fisheries’, Marine Policy, 18 
(1994), pp. 291-305.
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of competition and conflict between different groups of fishermen; and 4) the necessity 
for any regulation of marine fisheries to have a substantial international component32.
Straddling and highly migratory fish stocks have been severely reduced or depleted 
worldwide, illustrating the non-sustainable nature of today’s exploitation of the high 
seas33. Many demersal resources found on the high seas above the continental shelves, 
for instance straddling stocks, are fully fished if not over fished and in some cases this 
has led to political friction, i.e. concerning Grand Banks cod, Alaska pollock and 
Chilean horse mackerel34. In 1994 the FAO identified the major issues and problems 
that have impeded the establishment of responsible fisheries in the high seas and the 
need for a negotiated solution:
"to improve co-operation for the compilation of reliable data, stock 
assessment and management on the whole distribution range of 
resources; to improve state control on their fishing vessels to operate 
on the high seas and regulate reflagging; to improve enforcement 
capacity of regional arrangements; to address effectively the issue of 
regulation of effort and resource allocation; to define the potential role 
of market regulations in management of multispecies and ecosystems; 
and, to analyse the potential role and agree on possible ways of 
implementing cautious management approaches compatible with 
sustainable fisheries development”35.
Most of these issues are addressed in Agenda 2136 and have provided the basis for the 
establishment of an intergovernmental conference under the auspices of the United 
Nations for dealing with the problems related to the conservation and management of
32 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, supra, note 8, p. 224.
33 Patricia Bimie has pointed out that although from its earliest inception, technology and freedom of the 
seas has proved a mixed benefit in fisheries exploitation, management and conservation, it became 
apparent that both freedom of the seas and the activities of many fishermen required drastic restriction, 
taking into account that attempts for sustainable management and conservation were largely unsuccessful 
for over a century. Patricia Bimie, ‘New Technologies: Effects on the Developing Law of Fisheries’, in 
Jean-Pierre Beurier, Alexandre Kiss and Said Mahmoudi (eds.), New Technologies and Law of the 
Marine Environment, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000), pp. 23-39. See also Gdrard Biais, 
‘Progress scientifique et gestion des peches’, in Beurier et al (eds.), ibid, pp. 3-21
34 Evelyne Meltzer, ‘Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish stocks: the 
Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries’, ODIL, 25 (1994), pp. 255-344, at 123.
35 FAO Fisheries Department, World Review of Highly Migratory Species and Straddling Stocks, (Rome, 
FAO - FTP No. 337, 1994), p. 65.
36 Agenda 21 Paragraphs 17.1 and 17.50. All Agenda 21 references are to Stanley Johnson, The Earth 
Summit. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (London, Graham & 
Trotman, 1993), unless otherwise indicated.
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straddling and highly migratory fish stocks . This conference adopted, on 2 August 
1995, the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (hereafter referred to as ‘the 
1995 SSA’)38.
Vogler has identified those negotiations as the beginning of a new international 
environmental regime for fisheries on the high seas39. The International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis has also recently incorporated straddling fish stocks as a 
"natural resource regime type" in the new "International Environmental Regimes 
Database"40. International Regime Theory provides the most improved and valuable 
model for the institutional approach for the study of the global commons, and in 
particular, for the study of fisheries on the high seas41.
1.2 International regime theory and international law
Regime analysis has emerged as an enduring research approach based on common and 
comparable conceptualizations of the major issues that allow for competition among 
theoretical statements and provide a sound basis for empirical testing. Many of the
37 Burke drawn attention to the fact that if a regulatory and enforcement system for fishing beyond 
national jurisdiction was not established, growing pressures could lead to unilateral and perhaps extreme 
measures. See William Burke, UNCED and the Oceans’, Marine Policy, 17 (1993), pp. 519-533, at 533.
38 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks. Reproduced in 3 4 1.L.M. 1542 (1995).
39 John Vogler, The Global Commons. A Regime Analysis, (Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 1995), 52. 
See also John Vogler, Environment and Natural Resources’, in Brian White, Richard Little and Michael 
Smith, (eds.), Issues in World Politics, (London, Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 242.
40 H. Breitmeier et al., The International Regimes Database as a Tool for the Study of International Co­
operation, (Laxembourg, IIASA, WP-96-160,1996), p. 27.
41 According to Colburn, “the international community has adopted an important new treaty that 
represents a pivotal opportunity to crystallize an effective regime of global fisheries management”. See 
Jamison Colbum, Turbot Wars: Straddling Stocks, Regime Theory, and a New UN Agreement’, in 
Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, 6 (1997), 323-366. Slaughter et al. argue that legal scholars 
engaging in this process have reached beyond Institutionalism. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. 
Tulumello and Stephan Wood, 'International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation 
of Interdisciplinary Scholarship' AJIL, 92 (1998), pp. 367-397, at 376. See also Robert Knecht, ‘A 
Perspective on Recent Developments that Could Affect the Nature of Ocean Governance Regimes’, in 
Seoung-Yong Hong, Edward Miles and Choon-ho Park (eds.), The Role of the Oceans in the 21st Century, 
(Hawaii, The Law of the Sea Institute, 1994), pp. 177-195.
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investigations into the collective action dilemmas that confront the members of 
international society have been conducted within the literature on International 
regimes’. An important feature of globalization is the growing number of global regimes 
that are being formed42.
Based upon the ideas developed by scholars working in this relatively new discipline, 
the parameters of which increasingly overlap with international law43, a preliminary 
examination of international regime formation is undertaken in this section. Many 
different questions have been raised, for example, under what conditions and through 
what mechanisms do international regimes come into existence? Do regimes persist 
even when the circumstances in which they came into existence change? What 
consequences of regimes in terms of state behaviour and problem solving can be 
observed? What long-term effects do regimes have on national political systems and the 
structure of world politics?44.
The concept of ’regime’ has been elaborated by social scientists since the 1970’s in an 
attempt to foster rule-governed action within the international system. Further, regime 
thinking has provided the ’dominant paradigm’ for theoretical debates on international 
co-operation and, more recently, for environmental issues45. Krasner has provided the 
standard definition of regime:
"regimes are sets of explicit principles, norms, rules and decision­
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in
42 P. Wagner, The State and Environmental Challenges: a Critical Exploration of Alternatives to the State 
System’, Environmental Politics, 4 (1995), pp. 44-69.
43 Alan Boyle has stressed the role of soft law as an element in international law making as well as its 
relevance to the work of international organizations and international regime formation. According to 
Boyle, States are not necessarily free to disregard applicable soft-law instruments because even when they 
are not incorporated into a treaty, these instruments may represent an agreed understanding of its terms. 
“Thus, although of themselves these instruments may not be legally binding, their interaction with related 
treaties may transform their legal status into something more”. Alan Boyle, ‘Reflections on the 
Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’, ICLQ, 48 (1999), pp. 901-913, at 906.
44 Oran R. Young, Resource Regime, Natural Resources and Social Institutions, (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1982), at 105. See also Oran R. Young, International Co-operation, Building Regimes 
for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989) 98.
45 Pierre de Senarclens, 'Regime Theory and the Study of International Organizations', in International 
Social Science Review, UNESCO, 138 (1993)
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terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choice"46.
Regime is not a term which is universally accepted and is subject to much discussion in 
international relations. The debate about international regimes is very susceptible to 
controversy. According to the late Susan Strange, one of the most cited critics of 
international regime theory, the regime concept is a fad, imprecise and value-biased47. 
Further, it overemphasises the static and underemphasizes the dynamic element of 
change in world politics, and is rooted in a state-centric paradigm that limits vision of a
A Q
wider reality . Moreover, according to the same author, international regimes lead to a 
study of world politics that deals predominantly with the status quo and ignores the vast 
area of non-regimes that lie beyond the ken of international bureaucracies and 
diplomatic bargaining49.
Notwithstanding this criticism, the most recent contributions to international regimes 
theory are more comprehensive and consider both regime formation and regime 
consequences. The original concern of regime analysis was to demonstrate that 
institutions and international rules are necessary ingredients of any theory of world 
politics. Now it is assumed that international regimes become effective in the absence of 
a hegemony and that international institutions and international rules direct actor’s 
behaviour toward desired objectives in various areas, including, indeed, the 
environment. Further, international regimes foster learning on the part of participating 
actors and restructure domestic institutions50.
46 Stephen D. Krasner, ’Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: regime as intervening variables’, in 
Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983).
47 Susan Strange, Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’, in Stephen Krasner (ed.), 
International Regimes, p. 348.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid, p. 349. For further critiques, see Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘The Force of Prescriptions’, International 
Organizations, 38 (1984), pp. 685-708; and Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International 
Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State’, International Organizations, 40 (1986), pp. 753- 
775.
50 M. Zoum, 'Bringing the Second Image (Back) In. About the Domestic Sources of Regime Formation’, 
in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 282-311, at 282
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Regime theorists are located within the two broad schools of liberalism’ and ’realism’ in 
the study of International Relations. Although there is a lack of consensus as to whether 
it is possible to regard realism as a single coherent theory, this approach of international 
relations theory maintains that states remain the primary actors in world politics and that 
the central focus of analysis should be on the power and interests of States competing in 
an anarchical international political system and on the identification and explanation of 
patterns of conflict and co-operation between States51. In the liberalism approach, the 
market constitutes the most effective means for organizing economic relations, and the 
price mechanism operates to ensure that mutual gain, and hence aggregate social 
benefit, tend to result from economic exchange. The liberalism approach embodies a set 
of analytical tools and policy prescriptions that enable a society to maximize its return 
from scarce resources52.
Despite the shared theoretical assumptions, liberal institutionalists and realists adhere to 
very different assessments of regimes. Liberal institutionalists focus on the way that 
regimes allow states to overcome the obstacles to collaboration imposed by the anarchic 
structure of the international system. Realists, by contrast, are interested in the way that 
states use their power capabilities in situations requiring co-ordination to influence the 
nature of regimes and the way that the costs and benefits derived from regime formation 
are divided up.
Although liberal institutionalists and realists acknowledge that regimes are an important 
feature of the international system and draw on similar tools of analysis, they reach very 
different conclusions about the circumstances in which regimes emerge. For liberal 
institutionalists, the need for regimes arises because there is always a danger in the 
anarchic international system that competitive strategies will trump co-operative 
strategies. By contrast, realists link the emergence of regimes to situations where there 
is a mutual desire to co-operate, but where anarchy generates a problem of co­
51 Andrew Hurrell, International Political Theory and the Global Environment’, in Ken Booth and Steven 
Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), pp. 129-153
52 Robert Gilpin, Three ideologies of Political Economy’, in R. Little and M. Smith (ed.), Perspectives in 
World Politics, (London, Routledge, 1994), p. 439.
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ordination. Therefore, realists assume that there is no incentive to defect once co­
ordination has taken place53.
Although the concept of the regime is recent in social science and international 
relations, it fits into a long-standing tradition of thought about international law. But 
international law deals with regimes as a corpus of legal rules relating to a particular 
matter, as in ’the human rights regime’ or ’the Law of the Sea regime’. According to 
Vogler, this is an overlapping but not coincident use of the term because of the stress 
that regime analysts have placed upon informal practices and agreements54. The same 
author has pointed out that what is required is a wider view encompassing implicit 
understandings between a whole range of actors who would not necessarily be states, 
claiming that, in essence, a regime is an institution that might comprehend some legal 
rules and some types of formal organisation but going well beyond them55.
Lynne Jurgielewicz claims that the legal scholar L. F. E. Goldie introduced the concept 
of regimes into international law over a decade before it was introduced into the 
international relations literature by Ernst Haas56. This claim has been opposed by 
Slaughter et al., which credit John Ruggie with originating the concept of international 
regimes57. A more interesting point is that, as a paradox, lawyers are rediscovering their 
own concept of regimes which differs from that used by political scientists. This thesis 
will demonstrate that regimes are formed on a foundation of a treaty or treaties 
concluded between states or international organizations; that their objective is to realize 
either the shared interests of the states concerned or the general interests of the 
international community as a whole; that members states are required to fulfil non 
reciprocal obligations toward the regime; and that regimes have self-contained
53 Stephen D. Krasner, ’Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights’, in Rittberger, Regime Theory, supra, 
note 50, p. 139.
54 John Vogler, The Global Commons, supra, note 39, p. 58.
55 Ibid.
56 Lynne Jurgielewicz, Global Environmental Change and International Law: Prospects for Progress in 
the Legal Order, (New York, University Press of America, 1996), pp. 116-117.
57 Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., ‘International Law and International Relations Theory’, supra, note 41, p. 
378.
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procedures to settle claims and disputes among members58. Contributing further to the 
debate, Michael Byers has pertinently pointed out that,
“regime theorists and institutionalists have not, for the most part, 
demonstrated that regimes and institutions actually make a difference; 
that they qualify the application of power in some significant way. 
Nevertheless, these scholars clearly sense that normal State behaviour 
does give rise to legal obligation, that some regimes and institutions 
represent a transformation of power of the kind that they have 
traditionally studied, into another kind of power -and that this other 
kind of power, the power of rules’, subsequently affects what States 
say and do”59.
International law describes the impact of the rule of law in terms of the benefits of 
order, the cost of violation and the extent to which it provides an order based on the co­
ordination of interests and patterned expectations60. International law consists of both 
rights and duties that apply to international actors. In contrast, international regime 
theory seeks to specify far more precisely actual content of the functional benefits 
provided by rules and institutions. It stresses their impact in overcoming the assurance 
problem and affecting the pattern of costs by means of the reduction of uncertainty, the 
facilitation of communication, the promotion of learning and the transmission of 
knowledge and information61. Further, regime theory seeks to demonstrate in far tighter 
and more rigorous terms how co-operative behaviour can arise between self interested 
actors and thereby to specify the conditions which facilitate the emergence of rules and 
institutions. To sum up, the most distinctive contribution of regime theory to 
international law is its development of the idea of reciprocal benefits shared by all 
States involved in the regime, rather than on the traditional emphasis placed on justice.
Hurrell has identified the importance of international law in international regime theory 
as providing a framework for understanding the process by which international rules
58 Shinya Murase, Perspectives from International Economic Law on Transnational Environmental 
Issues, RCADI, 283 (1995) 413-414.
59 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules. International Relations and Customary 
International Law, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 31. See also Michael Byers, 
Taking the Law out of International Law: a Critique of the Iterative Perspective’, HIU, 38 (1997).
60 Robert Beck, Anthony Clark Arend and Robert Vander Lugt (eds.), International Rules. Approaches 
from International Law and International Relations, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 292.
61 A. Hurrell, ’International Society and the Study of Regimes', in Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory, supra, 
note 50, pp. 49-72, at 57.
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fsf)and norms are constituted and a sense of obligation generated in policy-makers . 
According to him, "international law provides the essential bridge between the 
procedural rules of the game and the structural principles that specify how the game of 
power and interests is defined and how the identity of the players is established"63. 
Following this line of argument, Keohane highlights the utility of establishing relatively 
clear rules for international regimes, that can be valued in the process of creating a 
demand for the maintenance of international regimes64. John Setear has pointed out that 
IRT, as applied to international politics by institutionalists, offers the best explanation of 
the functions that the law of treaties performs, and the best explanation why the law of 
treaties is structured as it is65. Setear also argues that, to the extent there is a divergence 
between what IR theory predicts and the legal doctrines, the doctrines should be 
modified to conform with the rationalist design hypothesis because rationalist 
institutionalists provides a normative theory concerning how international arrangements 
should be organized66.
Further interdisciplinary research on the inter-relationship of international law and 
international relations has the greatest potential for improving the analysis of 
international environmental politics67. Slaughter uses IRT in pointing to a broader 
definition of international law which takes account of the fact that individuals and 
groups operating in domestic and transnational society are the primary actors in
62 Ibid, p. 72.
63 Ibid.
64 Robert O. Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes’, in Rittberger, Regime Theory, supra, note 
50, p. 36. According to Muller, a regime exists when principles, norms, rules and procedures regulating 
relationships between States can be identified and when the regime controls enough variables in a given 
issue area to affect (if obeyed) parties’ behaviour by channelling or terminating unilateral self-help with 
regard to the regulated variables. See Harald Muller, The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules 
by Governments. The Case of Security Regimes’, in Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory, supra, note 50, pp. 
361-388, at 361
65 John Setear, ‘An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and 
International Law’, HILJ, 37 (1996).
66 John Setear, ‘Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: the Rules 
of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility’, Virginia Law 
Review, 83 (1997), pp. 8-10.
67 Research on the formation of international environmental regimes has significantly contributed to the 
understanding of international co-operation although this work is embedded in pre-existing efforts and 
has not provided the stimulus for a new research programme. ZUm has pointed out that a driving force for 
new avenues in the analysis of International Regime Theory is the research on regime effectiveness and
international relations; that they are represented in some manner by governments; and 
that intergovernmental relations favour what states want (preferences) rather than what
/TO
they can get (power) . Focusing on the theory of international legitimacy, Bodansky 
claims for establishment of stronger, more authoritative and internationally legitimate 
institutions which are better able to respond to environmental problems, and explores 
the possible sources of authority and legitimacy in state consent, democracy, public 
participation and scientific expertise69.
Regarding the effects of international regimes, researchers have found that decision­
makers perceive the formation of regimes in general as a kind of confidence-building 
measure which is likely to add to the improvement of overall relations70. In addition, 
once firmly established and operative, international regimes can pave the way towards 
conflict resolution since, in the long run, commonly agreed upon and jointly observed 
principles, norms and rules may become internalized into the laws and practices of 
states, so that the original differences of position about a given object of contention 
vanish over time. Consequently, international regimes may cause a reshaping of 
interests among the participating States and actors.
International regimes commonly emerge in response to particular problems such as 
environmental deterioration, natural resources depletion, border conflicts, etc. 
Therefore, effectiveness is a matter of the degree to which a regime ameliorates the 
problem that prompted its creation. A legal definition of effectiveness postulates that the 
measure of success is the degree to which conflicts become regulated by the rule of law, 
commonly reflected in contractual obligations, and the extent to which contractual 
obligations are met, substantive provisions implemented, rules complied with, policies 
adopted, and so on. A political approach directs attention to behaviour and behavioural 
change and conceives international regimes as a function of a specific constellation of
on international networks. See Michael Ziim, The Rise of International Environmental Politics: A 
Review of Current Research’, World Politics, 50 (1998), pp. 617-649, at 649.
68 Anne-Marie Slaughter et al, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory’, supra, note 41, p. 
378.
69 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?’, AJIL, 93 (1999), pp. 596-623.
70 V. Rittberger, 'Research on International Regimes in Germany', in Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory, 
supra, note 50, pp. 3-22, at 19.
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actors, interests and interactive relationships. Effective regimes cause changes in the 
behaviour of actors and in patterns of interactions among them in ways that contribute 
to the management of targeted problems71.
A relevant matter for international law is that international regimes are determinants of 
the willingness and ability of States to implement the legal provisions of international 
regimes in dealing with a variety of actors operating under a specific institutional 
arrangement or jurisdiction72. Mayer, Rittberger and Zum have provided the rationale 
for advancement of research in the formation, properties and effects of international 
regimes: first, regimes are normatively appealing as a significant element of 
international order which is of practical relevance for international law; second, regime 
analysis constitutes the framework for research programmes which has improved the 
understanding of international institutions; third, important aspects of regimes, i.e. the 
content and the consequences of regimes, are still heavily under-researched; and fourth, 
development of strategies and the conducting of comparative research to obtain further 
knowledge are valuable73.
A combination of different approaches to the study of a specific international regime 
can thus be adopted. The threat that fisheries now present to the world’s oceans has led 
to urgent calls within the international community for improvement in international 
fisheries management; there now seems to be a consensus among fishing nations that 
global corrective actions are both necessary and apparent74. Based on the contributions 
made by various scholars’ to research on international regime theory, this thesis puts 
forward a theoretical framework within which the emerging international environmental
71 Oran R. Young, International Governance. Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, (Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 195-211.
72 Patricia Bimie, International Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs’, in 
Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), The International Politics of the Environment, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 51.
73 P. Meyer, V. Rittberger, and M. Zum, 'Regime Theory; State of the Art and Perspectives', in Rittberber 
(ed.), Regime Theory, supra, note 50, pp. 391-430, at 427.
74 This consensus has been reached mainly at UNCED. See Agenda 21, Chapter 17; and Peter Sand, 
‘International Law on the Agenda of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: 
Towards Global Environmental Security?’, Nordic Journal of International Law, 60 (1991), pp. 5-18. For 
further developments, see Chapter 2.6 of this thesis. See also Thomas Homer-Dixon, ‘Physical 
Dimensions of Global Change’, in Nazli Choucri (ed.), Global Accord. Environmental Challenges and 
International Responses, (Cambridge and London, MIT Press, 1995), pp. 43-66, at 57; and Hayward 
Alker and Peter Haas, ‘The Rise of Global Ecopolitics’, in Choucri (ed.), Ibid, pp. 133-171, at 164-165.
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regime of fisheries on the high seas, focusing on the 1995 SSA, can be analysed and 
conclusions drawn.
1.3 The framework for analysis
Multilateral agreements and international institutions alone are not able to solve 
environmental problems. At the level of international society, three fundamental 
conditions have been identified for the effective management of common environmental 
problems. First, scientific concerns about a specific area must be of sufficient gravity to 
incite states to dedicate scarce resources to the resolution of problems. Secondly, states 
must be able to endorse credible commitments that incorporate jointly enacted rules, 
without the debilitating fear of free-riding or cheating by others. Thirdly, states must 
possess the capacity to make domestic adjustments for the implementation of 
international agreements and to encourage the participation of actors in civil society to 
play an effective role in the policy making and implementation processes75. Further, 
state sovereignty is not inconsistent with international progress in solving common 
problems.
The main aim of this thesis is to highlight the characteristics and legal implications of 
international environmental regimes with particular reference to high seas fisheries by 
analysing the 1995 SSA. The emerging international regime for fisheries on the high 
seas relies on four inter-connected elements. First, a scientific and diplomatic consensus 
about the nature of particular issues regarding fisheries, as a precondition for the 
formation of the international regime; secondly, a core of informal and formalized 
principles, norms and rules contained in the 1995 SSA as well as other related 
international legal instruments; thirdly, a set of organizations and decision-making 
procedures that constitute the operation of the international regime, and fourth, a set of 
compliance and enforcement mechanisms to help international society to manage the 
problem of fisheries as a global common. These four elements characterise the 
continuous process of development and refinement of International Environmental Law.
75 See Robert Keohane, Peter Haas and Marc A. Levy, ‘The Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Institutions’, in Haas et al, Institutions, supra, note 12, pp. 3-24, at 21.
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The major purpose of this thesis is to analyse the recent developments and to explain 
why a new international environmental regime for fisheries on the high seas is 
emerging. Further, it will consider the way in which the regime will operate as a social 
institution able to influence the behaviour of States and their subjects, as well as other 
actors in order to address the complex problems of international fisheries conservation 
and management. The thesis is presented in seven chapters. In the introductory chapter, 
two matters are examined: first, the crisis in fisheries management which has led to the 
depletion of many fish stocks and elicited a strong reaction from the international 
society concerning the urgency and necessity of adopting corrective actions; secondly, 
an overview of international environmental regimes with reference to the limitations in 
the present development of international law. Focusing on the general literature 
concerning international environmental regimes, it is suggested that with regard to the 
global commons, much more needs to be known about the interactions between the 
international and domestic legal systems and that on this particular issue, formation of 
international environmental regimes can be of crucial importance.
In Chapter 2, the preconditions for an international regime for fisheries on the high seas 
are examined, namely both a scientific and a diplomatic consensus. Before an 
environmental problem appears upon any political agenda, it must have scientific 
backing. Once the problem is placed on the political agenda, nonetheless, disagreement 
about the specific scientific issue may still remain. The main proposal advanced in this 
chapter is thus that the formation of an international regime will remain obscure as long 
as there are differences about the scientific aspects of the issue among scientists or 
among the States concerned. According to international environmental regime literature, 
it is essential to build consensus on the nature and identification of the specific problem 
under consideration, the data collection process and the method of data interpretation, to 
be included in the agreement, in this case, the 1995 SSA.
Negotiation and adoption of legal agreements constitute an important part of the normal 
process of regime formation in international society. This process is centred on efforts 
to negotiate the terms of a legal package of mutually acceptable provisions to be laid 
down in an institutional arrangement. This second precondition, focused on the 1995 
SSA, is explored in Chapter 3. Giving due consideration to the work of a number of 
leading theorists, it is postulated that legal principles and norms do not exist in a
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vacuum and can be clarified through their interconnection with other related issues and 
conventions in the international system. This clarification and refinement of new legal 
concepts related to the environment, will be an important part of creating a more 
effective world order for the environment in the decades ahead .
Chapter 4 considers the importance of the perception of international co-operation. As 
of today, the primary organizational unit for exercise of political and jurisdictional 
functions is the nation-state but the world is not wholly organized around political 
jurisdictions and governments. Arrangements for institutionalized collaboration on 
specific issues and areas are characterized by complex interdependence involving 
international, regional, governmental and non-governmental organizations. The need for 
collaboration arises from the recognition that the costs of national self-reliance are 
usually excessive. One historically unprecedented feature is the rise of environmental 
regimes designed to increase welfare by relying on scientific and technological 
knowledge. Employing some of the ideas of the global theorists in the regime literature, 
this chapter will examine the actors and mechanisms for international co-operation for 
the management of high seas fisheries in the context of the existing and the new 
subregional and regional fisheries management organizations required by the 1995 SSA. 
It is suggested that co-operation is a catalytic element in creating and maintaining the 
stability of international environmental regimes.
Domestic small-scale regimes as well as those for the global commons require 
mechanisms for the making of collective choices. Such choices may involve day-to-day 
application of the rules or much more extensive consideration of changes in the rules 
themselves and even the norms and principles that define the regime. Chapter 5 
evaluates the decision-making procedures of the 1995 SSA, pointing out the 
fundamental problems, which can affect the effectiveness of those provisions. The set of 
decision-making procedures adopted by the Agreement adds new concepts and practical 
measures aimed at facilitating the conservation and management of the stocks 
concerned.
76 Lynton Keith Caldwell, International Environmental Policy. Emergence and Dimensions, (Durham and 
London, Duke University Press, Second Edition, 1990), p. 128.
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Regimes with strong compliance mechanisms can be expected to alter considerably the 
behaviour of regime participants. On the other hand, weak monitoring and compliance 
mechanisms will alter behaviour only moderately. The 1995 SSA has incorporated 
innovative provisions that would be likely to implement the general principles of 
conservation and management of SFS and HMFS, while adding new concepts aimed at 
facilitating the conservation and management of the stocks concerned. These innovative 
provisions include new duties for flag States, as well as new duties arising from port 
states jurisdiction extending the scope of these, and procedures for boarding and 
inspecting, all of which are examined in Chapter 6.
The final conclusion and a summary of the findings are presented in Chapter 7. Each of 
the seven chapters attempts to increase our knowledge about the relationship of 
international law within International Regime Theory. Furthermore, they will seek to 
elucidate the reasons and the mechanisms by which an international environmental 
regime is now in process of formation for the conservation and management of fisheries 
on the high seas.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (hereafter referred to as ‘the 
1982 UNCLOS’) did not make specific provision for a number of valuable stocks which 
occur both within and between the Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ) and the high seas, 
that is, straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks77. The intensive and 
lawless exploitation of fish stocks has led to the depletion of many stocks both in the 
high seas and in the EEZs. Patricia Bimie has pointed out that between the conclusion 
and the entry of force of UNCLOS, new principles, norms and concepts emerged from 
State practice evidenced in national laws and in relevant international agreements, but it 
is not yet possible to determine which, if any, of these are crystallising into general 
principles of law . In fact, the depletion of fish stocks is causing broader changes in the 
ocean environment and has the potential to create major disorder in the world's
77 The urgent need for a rational system of fisheries management has been identified since UNCLOS I. 
See Robin Churchill, Kenneth Simmonds and J. Welch (eds.), New Directions in the Law of the Sea, 
(New York, Dobbs Ferry, 1973), vol. IH.
78 Patricia Bimie, ‘The Challenge of Applying UNCLOS in a Post UNCED Context’, in Joseph Norton, 
Mads Andenas and Mary Footer (eds.), The Changing World of International Law in the Twenty-First 
Century: A Tribute to the Late Kenneth R. Simmonds, (The Hague, Kluwer, 1998), pp. 3-43, at 42.
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7Qinternational system . It can be concluded that if international society is to prevent 
extensive upheavals, then its members have to build a new international regime or set of 
international regimes for fisheries on the high seas.
The global commons, like fisheries on the high seas, may be seen at once and the same 
time, as belonging to everybody and to nobody. By their very nature, global commons, 
areas or resources, do fall under sovereign jurisdiction. That international society has 
been able to adopt the 1995 SSA is thus a positive development. Before the adoption of 
this agreement, international regulation was fragmented and thus incapable of averting 
the worldwide collapse of fish stocks in the 1990’s but this new multilateral treaty is at 
the heart of a new international environmental regime for fisheries on the high seas. 
However, ensuring that the regime enters into force and is widely applied presents a 
great challenge for international environmental law and the regime itself in the 21st 
century.
By focusing upon the legal analysis of the 1995 SSA and the theoretical dilemmas 
relating to international environmental regimes, this thesis seeks to contribute to the on­
going discourse as international society attempts to construct an effective international 
regime to address the challenges of fisheries as a global common. The theoretical 
approach of IR can furnish and enhance understanding of the problems and 
potentialities of International Environmental Law for the protection and management of 
the global commons and in particular, of fisheries on the high seas. Slaughter et al. 
argue that,
“the use of IR is valuable to the extent that it sharpens our 
understanding of the function of particular institutional arrangements.
It represents an improvement over descriptive projects that provide 
much information about how institutions are structured but fails to 
analyze the functions they perform. A more precise understanding of 
the functions performed by various treaty provisions and institutional 
features can help international lawyers and policy makers think
79 Jean-Pierre Beurier, ‘Resources communes et exploitation dconomique: la rupture. L’exemple des 
peches en haute mer\ in Michel Prieur and Claude Lambrechts (eds.), Les hommes et Uenvironnement. 
Quels droits pour le vingt-et-unieme siecle?. En hommage a Alexandre Kiss, (Mankind and the 
Environment. What Rights for the Twenty-first Century? Essays in Honour of Alexandre Kiss), (Paris, 
Editions Frison-Roche and Universite Robert Schuman de Strasbourg, 1998), pp. 529-539.
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concretely about the requisite elements of an effective international 
institution”80.
Furthermore, the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis offers explanations of the 
manner in which the newly emerging international regime for fisheries is limiting and
01
reshaping the principle of freedom of fishing on the high sea . This specific process has 
been helped during the last decade by the ending of the Cold War which brought 
readjustment and a novel redistribution of power among states , and on the other hand, 
by a change, during the last years of the twentieth century, in the methods relating to the 
creation of international law. As far as international law is concerned, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations has been able to reach agreement on a variety of 
important documents leading to a slow accretion of new rules, or agreed interpretation 
of old rules83. As Edith Brown-Weiss has pointed out,
“in international law today, the sharp lines between public and private 
international law are blurring, the divide between international law 
and domestic law is fading and the difference between the 
effectiveness of legally binding and nonbinding instruments in 
international law in changing behaviour is under deserved scrutiny84.
80 Slaughter et al, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory’, supra, note 41, pp. 376-377.
81 Dolliver Nelson, ‘Certain aspects of the Legal Regime of the High Seas’, in Yoram Dinstein (ed.), 
International Law at a Time of Perplexity. Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, (Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1989), pp. 519-538. Nelson maintains that the process of increasing limitation of the freedom of 
fishing on the high seas during the past half century could be viewed from two standpoints: firstly, the 
protection of the interest of the coastal state in adjacent high seas areas; and secondly, the conservation of 
the living resources of the high seas in the interests of the international community. See also Dolliver 
Nelson, ‘The Development of the Legal Regime of High Seas Fisheries’, in Alan Boyle and David 
Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development. Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 113-134. On the same line of thought, see 
Bimie, ‘New Technologies’, supra, note 33. Orrego stresses that freedom of fishing has been restrained in 
various ways because of its negative implications in relation to the goals of orderly access and 
conservation. Francisco Orrego, The Changing International Law of High Seas Fisheries, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 13.
82 Jessica Mathews, ‘Power Shift’, Foreign Affairs, 76 (1997), pp. 50-66, at 51. See also Michael Barnett, 
‘Bringing in the New World Order. Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations, (Review Article), 
World Politics, 49 (1997), pp. 526-551; and James Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World 
Politics’ in James Rosenau and Emst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-29.
83 Louis Shon, ‘Enhancing the Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Crystallizing 
International Law’, in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st 
Century. Essays in Honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski, (The Hague, Kluwer, 1996), pp. 549-561. The 
considerable impact of the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal on the Law of the 
Sea, will undoubtedly continue to shape the evolution of the law of the sea as part of international law. 
See Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Law of the Sea. Some Reflexions’, 
in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed.), Ibid, pp. 439-485.
84 See Boyle, ‘Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’, supra, note 43.
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Moreover, with the revolution in information technology, international 
law will likely extend to widespread international monitoring and 
tracking of various kinds of transactions and legal obligations. But the 
most important role for international law in global society that is both 
integrated and fragmented may be as the expression of fundamental 
norms (or values) among peoples, including care for the interests of 
future generations”85.
As this thesis aims to demonstrate, an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the 
global commons and in particular to the study of customary international law may offer 
many ideas and insights both to international lawyers and to international relations 
scholars. An interdisciplinary approach to customary process understood as a regime or 
institution, may change the way we think, first, about ‘system consent’, that is, the idea 
that States have consented to the entire process of customary international law rather 
than to each individual rule by which they are bound; and second, about the role of 
shared understandings of legal relevance which enable States, judges and other 
international actors to distinguish behaviour that contributes to the customary process 
from behaviour that does not . The complex interactions between treaty law and 
customary international law87 is particularly relevant in the case of the law of the sea, 
fragmentation of which, according to Mendelson, is due in part to the uniqueness of 
geographical situation, along with the remarkable technological and political changes88. 
An available tool and potentially generic application to avoid fragmentation can be 
found in Article 31.3.C of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which 
could encompass the relationships between treaty and custom in a cross-sectoral 
context89.
85 Edith Brown-Weiss, ‘The Changing Structure of International Law’, in Prieur and Lambrechts (eds.), 
Les hommes et / ’environnement, supra, note 79, pp. 3-15, at 6.
86 On this relevant contribution to both international law and international relations, see Byers, Custom, 
Power and the Power of Rules, supra, note 59, pp. 204-206.
87 According to Lukashuk, substantial changes in the inter-relationship of the two elements of custom 
have taken place: preceding widespread practice ceased to be an indispensable requirement for the 
creation of customary norms and on the other hand, opinio juris has assumed prime significance. See Igor 
Lukashuk, ‘Customary Norms in Contemporary International Law’, in Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of 
International Law, supra, note 83, pp. 487-508.
88 M. H. Mendelson, ‘Fragmentation of the Law of the Sea’, Marine Policy, 12 (1988), pp. 192-200.
89 Philippe Sands, ‘Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization of International 
Law’, in Boyle and Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development, supra, note 81, pp. 
39-60. Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads as follows: “General rule 
of interpretation 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context
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Chapter 2 
The UN Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
Introduction
This chapter examines in six sections the emergence of fisheries in the high seas as an 
issue in international law and international institutions. These sections obviously 
overlap to some extent, but they describe the developments which led to the UN 
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and 
subsequently to the adoption of the 1995 SSA. The first section considers the 
insufficiencies of the 1982 UNCLOS regarding straddling stocks and the pressure from 
some coastal States for the adoption of more specific global regulations of fisheries on 
the high seas. The chapter then examines the gradual emergence during the 1990s of a 
scientific and diplomatic consensus through the specific stances adopted by coastal 
States and the conflicts arising from the over-exploitation of fisheries in those parts of 
the high seas which he beyond the EEZs but which had an impact on stocks within the 
EEZs. Thus, sections two and three examine the specific legislation adopted by Chile 
and Canada in their unilateral attempts to introduce measures for conservation and 
management of straddling stocks. The dispute between Spain and Canada, concerning 
the detention by Canada of the Spanish fishing vessel the Estai’, referred by Spain to the 
ICJ in 1995, which highlighted international concern about the potential conflicts 
regarding fisheries on the high seas, is analysed in section four. The development of 
concern regarding the scientific basis of international fisheries management is examined 
in section five. This scientific concern provided the basis for the international consensus 
that materialized in adoption of Agenda 21 which, in turn, provided the context within
for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related 
to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the 
parties so intended”. Text as available in electronic form on 25 February 2001, on the Web Site, 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm
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which decision-makers were able to act. Finally, section six outlines the accommodation 
of the dynamics of two great groups of States -the coastal states and, on the other hand, 
the distant water fishing nations (hereafter DWFNs), which influenced the adoption of 
the 1995 SSA during diplomatic negotiations within the Conference convened for this 
purpose by the United Nations.
One of the main conclusions to be drawn from this chapter is that the absence of 
international institutions addressing the global issue of fisheries on the high seas 
generated a ’’contractual environment" which in turn led at last to the willingness of 
States to undertake the credible commitments under UN auspices, necessary for the 
emergence of an international environmental regime for fisheries on the high seas.
2.1 International pressures for collective regulation of fisheries
Although international fisheries have created problem for States for centuries and 
attracted the attention of the international community since the 19th century90, in the 
decade following the adoption of the 1982 UNCLOS, fishing on the high seas became 
an acute major international problem. Article 116 of the UNCLOS recognised the right 
of nationals of all States to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject to only some 
general limitations and requirements such as the duty to take conservation measures and 
to co-operate with other States in taking such measures for their respective nationals91. 
Coastal States were accorded sovereign rights including the right to explore, conserve 
and manage the living resources within 200 miles of the EEZ92. Coastal States began to 
complain that fleets fishing on the high seas or DWFSs were reducing catches within 
their national jurisdiction and undermining their efforts to conserve and revitalize fish 
stocks within their EEZs93. More specifically, the problem focused on fish stocks that
90 See Thomas Wemyss-Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, (Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood 
and Sons, 1911), in particular Chapter III.
91 UNCLOS, Art. 117.
92 Coastal States were accorded rights within these not only for themselves to engage in fishing but also to 
say which other States could do so. It should be noted that the first 12 miles of 200 miles of the EEZs is 
Territorial Sea.
93 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, ‘Toward an Effective Management of High Seas Fisheries and the Settlement 
of the Pending Issues of the Law of the Sea’, ODIL, 24 (1993), pp. 81-92.
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straddled the boundaries between the EEZ’s of coastal States and the boundaries of 
EEZ’s and the high seas, such as pollock in the Bering Sea, highly migratory species 
like tuna and swordfish and cod off Canada's eastern coasts94.
According to the FAO, commercial fishing operations are exceeding the ocean's 
ecological limits to sustain fisheries, unravelling an intricate web of marine life that 
makes the sea a vital part of the earth's life support system. Forty four percent of all fish 
stocks are now fully exploited, 16 percent overexploited, 6 percent depleted and 3 
percent slowly recovering from over fishing95. In a third of the world's major fishing 
regions, the annual catch is down 20 percent or more from its peak years96. It has been 
concluded that without sweeping changes in current fishing practices and remedial 
action to allow endangered fish stocks to regenerate, the world's fisheries face possible 
collapse, from which they might never recover except by introduction of acquacultured 
stocks, to the extent possible97.
By mid 1993, Canada had declared a moratorium on cod fishing off its Atlantic coast 
until stocks were able to regenerate, putting between 20,000 and 30,000 fishers out of 
work98. In the United States, fisheries for Atlantic haddock, cod, flounder and Pacific 
salmon virtually collapsed99. Iceland cut back its domestic fishing by 50 percent 
because of depleted stocks100. Meanwhile, unregulated foreign fleets continued to fish 
just outside of coastal States jurisdictions101.
94 Douglas Day, ‘Addressing the Weakness of High Seas Fisheries Management in the Northwest 
Atlantic’, Ocean and Coastal Management, 35 (1997), pp. 69-84. See also David Symes, ‘North Atlantic 
Fisheries: Trends, Status and Management Issues’, Ocean and Coastal Management, 35 (1997), pp. 51- 
67.
95 FAO, State of World Fisheries, supra, note 16, p. 11.
96 Ibid. See Chapter 1, Section 1.
97 Catherine Floit, ‘Reconsidering Freedom of the High Seas: Protection of Living Marine Resources on 
the High Seas’, in Jon Van Dyke, Durwood Zaelke and Grant Hewison (eds.), Freedom for the Seas in the 
21st Century. Ocean Governance and Environmental Harmony, (Washington, Island Press, 1993), pp. 
310-326, at 317. See also FAO, State of World Fisheries, supra, note 16, p. 12; and Agenda 21, Chapter 
17.
98 W. Schrank, Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction. Origins of the Current Crisis in Atlantic Canada's 
Fisheries', Marine Policy, 19 (1995), pp. 285-294, at 291.
99 Evelyne Meltzer, ‘Global Overview’, supra, note 34.
100 Ibid, p. 279.
101 David Symes and Kevin Crean, ‘Historic Prejudice and Invisible Boundaries: Dilemmas for the 
Development of the Common Fisheries Policy’, in Gerald Blake, William Hildesley, Martin Pratt,
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In May 1994, FAO Fisheries Department published a "World Review of Highly 
Migratory Species and Straddling Stocks" providing information about the major 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, region by region, identifying the species 
involved, the fisheries, the status of the stocks and the management problems102. It has 
been estimated that to rehabilitate fisheries to the 1970 abundance levels and catch rates 
would require the removal of 23% of the existing Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) of 
the world’s fleet, approximately 5.8 million GRT, at the cost of around US $73,000 
million (replacement value), and that the levels of government subsidies currently are at 
about US$ 54,000 million/year103. Concluding that many of these resources have been 
severely reduced or depleted, which according to this study illustrates the non- 
sustainable nature of exploitation of the high seas, it finds that nonetheless the situation 
can improve if solutions are found and political resistance is overcome to enable the 
putting into place of systems for collect-data, promote collaborative stock assessment, 
and elaborate and enforce management measures at an international level104.
Meanwhile, diplomatic confrontations between coastal States and DFWNs continued. 
Coastal states claimed that the high social and economic cost to their home States of 
fishermen who were put out of work in order to preserve fish stocks could not be 
supported if foreign fleets continued to fish without restrictions on the high seas. Russia 
mounted military surveillance to keep Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Polish boats from 
over fishing pollock in the hotly contested so-called Peanut-Hole, a small area of 
international waters in the Sea of Okhotsk surrounded by Russian seas. In the South 
Pacific, island states tried to stop Taiwanese and Korean fishers poaching tuna. At the 
same time, DWFNs pointed to research that suggested coastal States were not 
sustainably managing stocks within their zones105.
Throughout the world’s oceans, a number of DWFNs were reluctant to co-operate and to 
comply with conservation measures recommended by coastal States. The failure to
Rebecca Ridley and Clive Schofield (eds.), The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources, 
(London, Graham and Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), pp. 395-411.
102 FAO, FTP No. 337, supra, note 35, p. 65.
103 Ibid, p. 1.
104 Ibid, at 65. For further details, see Chapter 4, Section 6.
105 E. Meltzer, 'Global Overview’, supra, note 34, p. 321.
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agree on conservation measures for high seas fishing and the absence of enforcement 
measures beyond the EEZ led to a high level of uncertainty and political friction. 
Important and, in most cases, severe conflicts occurred concerning straddling stocks for 
cod in the Grand Banks/Flemish Cap areas of the Northwest Atlantic between NAFO 
members and the USA, Korea, Mexico, Panama, Chile and Spain; for tuna in the East 
Central Pacific bringing the USA into confrontation with some of the coastal States of 
Central and the West Coast of South America; for jack mackerel, Spanish sardine, 
southern poutassou and southern blue whiting in the Southeast Pacific and Southwest 
Atlantic; and for Alaska pollock in the Northeast Pacific/Bering Sea (the so-called 
"Doughnut Hole")106
From the beginning of the 1990’s, the global environmental issues of fisheries depletion 
on the high seas and straddling fish stocks steadily became well-established in the 
international political agenda. The implications of these issues have been widely 
illustrated by two findings that revealed the consequences of certain human activities 
within the ocean’s natural systems. First, scientists agree that the oceans are being 
seriously over fished and that world fisheries are under great pressure107. Secondly, 
scientific experts recognise that depletion of fish stocks on the high seas can change the 
natural equilibrium in ocean ecosystems and can have social and political impacts upon
10Rthe world’s population . In the last decades, governments which have been reluctant to 
face up to fisheries restructuring, preferred to ignore the problem or even to subsidise 
new fisheries development. However, the warning made clear that if the members of the 
international society did not change their practices for harvesting of fish on the high
106 Edward Miles and William Burke, Pressures on UNCLOS Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: the 
Problem of Straddling Stocks’, ODIL, 20, (1989), pp. 343-357, at 344.
107 The condition of world fisheries in the 1990’s has left little doubt that world fisheries are under great 
stress. World Resources Report 96, Chapter 13 on Water and Fisheries, document in electronic form as 
available on http://www.wri.org. on 17/06/97 and The Ecologist, supra, note 12, at 58. See also Daniel 
Botkin and Edward Keller, Environmental Science. Earth as a Living Planet, (New York, John Wiley and 
Sons, 1995), pp. 523-525 and Alastair Couper, ‘Ocean Uses, Environment and Management’ in Ian 
Douglas, Richard Huggett and Mike Robinson (eds.), Companion Encyclopaedia of Geography. The 
Environment and Humankind, (London, Routledge, 1996), pp. 508-525.
108 FAO Report, Rome, 1995, supra, note 16. See also John Everett (ed.), Fisheries (Chapter 16), in 
Robert Watson, Marufu Zinyowera et al. Climate Change 1995. Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of 
Climate Change: Scientific Technical Analyses, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 
515-537 and Greenpeace International Statement in Recognition of the “International Year of the Ocean”, 
document in electronic form as available on http://www.greenpeace.org, on 06/05/98 that recognised a 
global fisheries crisis.
seas and address the issues in an effective manner, then substantial disorder and 
interferences could take place in international relations109.
Advocates of the DWFNs relied on freedom of fishing, without adequate consideration 
of competing values; while advocates of coastal States disregarded the possibilities of 
accommodation, insisting on their own dogmatic beliefs and ethical principles which 
were not shared in all cultures110. Thus, the issue of high seas resources management 
has come to the forefront of international attention despite the fact that such fisheries 
produce only 10 percent of the world food supply. The United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED)111, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992,
119focused on the issue when developing Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 , which provides for
the protection of oceans, elaborating in Programme Area 17C the framework of an 
international programme for the conservation of marine living resources on the high 
seas. In 1992, FAO organized a Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing113. 
Agenda 21 had recommended the convening of an intergovernmental conference on 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, under United Nations auspices, with a view 
to promoting effective implementation of the provisions of UNCLOS114. This 
conference, which was supported by the UN General Assembly115, began in New York, 
in July 1993.
109 M. J. Peterson, International Fisheries Management’, in Haas et al., Institutions, supra, note 12, p. 304.
110 William Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 349.
111 Alicia Barcena, ‘UNCED and Ocean and Coastal Management’, Ocean and Coastal Management, 18
(1992), pp. 15-33.
1,2 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, relating to ‘Protection of the Oceans, all Kind of Seas, including Enclosed and 
Semi-enclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas and the Protection, Rational Use and Development of their Living 
Resources’.
113 FAO, “Report of the Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing and the Papers Presented at the 
Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing”, UN Doc. A/Conf. 164/INF/2,14 May 1993, reproduced in 
Jean Pierre Levy and Gunnar Schram (eds.), United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Selected Documents, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), pp. 
273-371.
114 Agenda 21, Para. 17.49.
115 It is relevant that the UNGA Resolution 47/192 on the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks reaffirmed that the work of the Conference should be fully 
consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS, in particular the rights and obligations of coastal States and 
States fishing on the high seas and that States should give full effect to the high seas fisheries provisions 
of the Convention with regard to fisheries populations whose ranges lie both within and beyond EEZs and 
to highly migratory fish stocks. Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during its 
Forty-seventh Session, Vol. I, 15 Sept.-23 Dec. 1992, General Assembly Official Records, Forty-seventh 
Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/47/49), United Nations, New York, 1993.
At this stage, many countries were still reluctant to accept the need for a legally binding 
agreement. But as discussions progressed, most coastal States realized that the time had 
come for a significant international agreement and the DWFNs understood clearly that it 
was time to either play by a set of internationally agreed upon regulations or face 
anarchy on the high seas. Other contributory factors in the negotiating process were the 
political and legal implications of regional or localized conflicts, to which the most 
relevant, the ‘Estai Case\  drew particular attention, and, on the other hand, the 
unilateral attempts of coastal States, in particular those of Canada and Chile, to regulate 
fishing on the high seas.
2.2 The concept of the "Presential Sea"
Latin America countries have contributed considerably to the evolution of new concepts 
in the Law of the Sea. Chile and Argentina, in particular in the 1950s, contributed to the 
elaboration of the concept of "patrimonial sea" and the legal concept of the "continental 
shelf'116. On 18 August 1952, Chile, Ecuador and Peru issued the "Santiago 
Declaration", the first international instrument to proclaim a 200-mile zone in the form
117of a so-called “patrimonial sea” . The Montevideo Declaration and the Declaration of 
Lima have contributed to the development of the concept of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone118.
116 The concept of the Continental Shelf in the 1982 UNCLOS has significantly changed from that laid 
down in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. Two significant changes were made in 
the UNCLOS: the first was the extension of the continental shelf to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, if and where it extends beyond 200 miles; the second was the introduction of a revenue-sharing 
system under which a coastal State which exploits the non-living resources beyond 200 miles must make 
payments or contributions in kind for distribution to States Parties to the Convention on the basis of an 
equitable sharing criteria, according to a formula set out in Article 82. On the other hand, by 1993, at least 
two States, Ecuador and Chile, had made specific claims involving limits beyond 200 miles. These claims 
received protests from France, Germany and the Unites States, which stated that they had not followed 
the conditions for measuring the continental margin as set out in Article 76.4 of UNCLOS. See 
Publication by DOALOS, Office of Legal Affairs, The Law of the Sea. Practice of States at the Time of 
Entry into Force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (New York, United Nations 
Publications, 1994), p. 168.
117 Vicente Marotta Rangel, O Novo Direito do Mar em a America Latina’, Revista da Facultade de 
Direito, Universidade de Sao Paulo, 17 (1982), pp. 97-132, at 106.
118 Julio Barberis, Les Regies Specifiques du Droit International', RCADI, Tome 235-IV, The Hague, 
1992, at 219-220. See also F. M. Armas, 'Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Stocks in Latin 
American Practice and Legislation: New Perspectives in Light of Current International Negotiations', 
ODIL, 26 (1995), pp. 127-150.
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2.2.1 Origin and scope of the concept
Since the adoption of UNCLOS in December 1982, Latin American and Caribbean 
countries have evinced a serious interest in the interpretation and implementation of the 
provisions of this Convention. As a result of this process, a genuine effort is being 
developed in that region to adopt and implement national legislation in accordance with 
the Convention and new legislation is being enacted in a number of countries119. This is 
the case of Chile which in 1991 adopted the highly contentious Fisheries Laws 19.079 
and 19.080 amending the General Law on Fishing and Aquaculture (Ley General de 
Pesca y Acuicultura)120 and introducing the controversial concept of the “presential sea”
191or “mar presencial” . Affirming the concept of presential sea, these laws, which apply 
to straddling stocks, highly migratory species, anadromous species and marine 
mammals, permit the Chilean Ministries of Agriculture and Foreign Affairs to establish 
standards for conserving and managing common stocks and associated species found in 
the EEZ as well as on the high seas. Under these internal laws, Chile is allowed to 
restrict the landing of fishing and the servicing in Chilean ports of distant water fishing 
vessels that have violated conservation and management measures for high seas marine 
resources adjacent to and beyond Chilean national jurisdiction122. By adopting these 
laws, the concept of the presential sea acquired legal status in Chile and became an 
official government policy. It should be noted, however, that the scope of these laws, in 
terms of practical application, has been rather modest.
During the period of pre-dissolution of the USSR, Chilean fishermen and the Chilean 
Navy perceived the fact of the Soviet fishing trawler fleet off its coasts as a military
1 99threat and detrimental to the future development of Chile's fishing industry . Thus, the
119 The Law of the Sea. Practice of States, Publication by DOALOS, supra, note 116, p. 169.
120 Fisheries Laws No. 19.079 and No. 19.080 of 1991 Amending General Law on Fishing and 
Aquaculture, (Ley General de Pesca y Acuicultura), Diario Oficial de la Republica de Chile (Chile's 
Official Gazette), Santiago de Chile, 6 September, 1991. For further details regarding Chilean Legislation 
see Barbara Kwiatkowska, '200-Mile Exclusive Economic/Fishery Zone and the Continental Shelf - An 
Inventory of Recent State Practice: Part 1', IJMCL, 9 (1994), pp. 199-318, at 216.
121 Confusing to non Spanish speakers, the word “Presencial” can be translated as ‘to be present’ or ‘to 
see and be seen’.
122 Diario Oficial de la Republica de Chile (Chile's Official Gazette), Santiago de Chile, 6 September, 
1991.
123 The Soviet fleet was reported to have the highest catch levels of all the DWFNs arousing national 
concern in Chile. However, no specific actions taken by Chile against the Soviet fleet have been reported.
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origin of the concept of the presential sea has been attributed to Jorge Martinez a high- 
ranking naval officer from Chile, a country in which the military forces have exerted 
considerable political influence in the last two decades124. The concept of the presential 
sea aims to imply a feeling of “presence” and evidences the desire to assert the 
‘presence’ of Chile in some parts of the high seas as well as Chile’s interest in being 
involved in the high seas activities engaged by other States throughout the region125.
According to Orrego Vicuna, a Chilean legal scholar, the presential sea encourages the 
coastal State to undertake economic activities in the high seas in order to promote 
national economic development and to ensure that activities on the high seas do not 
affect, directly or indirectly, such development. Furthermore, the concept of the 
presential sea is related to the concept of national security for purposes of protection of 
the national interest126. Although an expression of the special interest of Chile as a 
coastal State, the new concept of the presential sea could also apply to many other 
geographical situations throughout the world. According to Orrego Vicuna’s definition, 
the concept involves three main elements, as outlined bellow:
First, participation in, and surveillance of, activities undertaken by other states in high 
seas areas of particular interest to the coastal State. In this regard, it is not a question of 
excluding any State from such areas, but, on the contrary, of ensuring the active 
inclusion of the coastal State concerned. According to this idea, there is no question of 
exclusive coastal State rights involved in this concept, or the drawing of new maritime 
boundaries in a legal sense; neither should participation in such activities be understood 
as a kind of compulsory intervention by the coastal state in activities undertaken by 
other countries127.
See Meltzer, ‘Global Overview’, supra, note 34, at 269. See also Orrego Vicuna, The Changing 
International Law, supra, note 81, pp. 110-111.
124 Jorge Martinez, El Mar Presencial: Actualidad, Desafios y Futuro', Revista de la Marina, Santiago, 
Chile, 82 (1991), pp. 1-20.
125 Ibid, p. 18.
126 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Towards an Effective Management of High Seas Fisheries and the 
Settlement of the Pending Issues of Law of the Sea, ODIL, 24 (1993), pp 81-92.
127 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, 'The "Presential Sea": Defining Coastal State's Special Interest in High Seas 
Fisheries and other Activities', German Yearbook of International Law, 35 (1992), pp. 264-292, at 289.
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Secondly, Orrego argues that the presential sea concept encourages the coastal State to 
undertake economic activities in the high seas in order to promote national development 
and to ensure that other activities are conducted in a way that avoids direct or indirect 
harmful effects upon this development. According to Orrego, this element involves the 
undertaking of legitimate forms of competition, while at the same time requiring the 
development of more active forms of co-operation and other measures in order to 
prevent adverse effects upon the interest of the coastal State128.
Thirdly, in Orrego’s view, the concept of the presential sea is related to a broad view of 
national security, understood not in a strictly military sense but in terms of protection of 
the national interest, including the economic dimension referred to above, with 
particular reference to the EEZ and the territorial sea129. In order to buttress the legal 
basis of the concept, the author claims that the presential sea expressly safeguards the 
legal status of the high seas and is entirely consistent with the international law of the 
sea, and expresses his hope that the concept will lead to a number of changes in the law 
of high seas fisheries, not only because it represents the expression of the interests of 
many developing countries but because it also responds to the pressing and potential 
needs of developed countries130.
2.2.2 Reactions and criticisms
Chile deployed considerable diplomatic effort to obtain international acceptance of the 
idea and insisted that the object of the concept was not to assert a jurisdictional claim 
over areas of the high seas but to impose some control on foreign fisheries fleets which 
could have undermined or violated international conventions on fisheries conservation. 
Notwithstanding this explanation, strong opposition to the concept was expressed by 
France, Belgium and Spain as well as by the concerned members of the EC itself. The 
EC emphasized the indispensability of sound regional fishery co-operation, stressing 
that the presential sea was not a recognized concept of international law and had no
128 Ibid., p. 269.
129 Orrego, supra, note 126, p. 88.
130 Ibid.
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| foundation in UNCLOS131. Some authors claimed that if the concept of presential sea
| were to be adopted by coastal States, the traditional freedom to fish on the high seas
might be severely compromised132. However, other authors have pointed out that as 
technological, economic, social and political changes are altering our relation to the sea, 
the freedoms of the seas, although still a relevant concept, is not unlimited and is more 
akin to the same kind of freedom that individuals enjoy in a national society133.
In addition to the question of fisheries on the high seas, other legitimate activities of the 
coastal State in that area, such as search and rescue, marine scientific research, security 
of navigation, meteorological reporting and pollution control beyond the EEZ, have 
been recognized under international law. However, these measures must be exercised 
within a framework of co-operation with other States, not unilaterally. Regarding the 
conservation and management of marine living resources on the high seas, States must 
co-operate with each other with a view to taking the measures necessary for the 
conservation of the resources concerned and co-operate also to establish regional or 
subregional fisheries organizations to this end134. International acceptance of the 
concept of the presential sea would unilaterally extend Chile’s regulatory authority to 
high seas areas adjacent to its EEZ and permit exercise of its functional jurisdiction for 
enacting conservation and management measures, for enforcing those measures, and for 
controlling marine scientific research in the high seas areas adjacent to its EEZ.
The continued progressive depletion of fish stocks has evidenced that it is impossible to 
manage fisheries within the EEZ if they are not correspondingly managed beyond its 
limits. Tullio Treves has pointed out that the concept of presential sea represents a 
‘statement’ of the pressures on the freedom of the seas and that this freedom is not
131 Barbara Kwiatkowska, The High Seas Fisheries Regime: at a Point of No Return?’, IJMCL, 8 (1993), 
pp. 327-359, at 341. See also Barbara Kwiatkowska, ’Creeping Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles in the 
Light of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice’, 22 ODIL (1991), pp. 153-175.
132 Christopher Joyner and P. N. de Cola, Chile’s Presential Sea Proposal: Implications for Straddling 
Stocks and the International Law of Fisheries’, ODIL, 24 (1993), pp. 99-121.
133 R. P. Anand, Changing Concepts of Freedom of the Seas’, in Van Dyke et al., Freedom for the Seas, 
supra, note 97, pp. 72-88, at 83.
134 UNCLOS, Art. 118.
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unchangeable135. According to Treves, the assertion of the presential sea concept may
be interpreted as the starting point of a new attempt by coastal States to extend their
1jurisdiction to the high seas .
2.2.3 The impact of the concept
Although recognising that the presential sea doctrine can eventually have jurisdictional 
implications if mechanisms for international co-operation are non-existent or 
ineffective, Orrego has strongly insisted that the concept represents a new approach 
under international law that does not have jurisdictional content137. Nevertheless, the 
concept of the presential sea not only has jurisdictional implications for the future, but 
also has such implications for the present138. In addition, Dalton has defined the 
presential sea as "a type of contiguous zone to the EEZ in which the state may prevent 
infringements of its fishing, research and resource exploitation interest in the EEZ"139.
The presential sea concept adopted by Chile clearly signified a unilateral effort to 
preserve fisheries of the high seas by creating an expansive ‘shielding’ zone in the 
adjacent areas of the high seas. Notwithstanding this, the presential sea was an 
important step on the route to challenging the management and conservation of fish 
stocks on the high seas. The concept of the presential sea opened new frontiers for the 
development of international law and operated to place significant pressure towards a 
change in the limits and legal regime of the high seas140. It is relevant that, as further 
discussed below, Chile, along with Canada and New Zealand, played a leading role in 
the demarche for the recognition of the special interests of coastal States in preserving 
the marine living resources on the high seas during the diplomatic negotiations
135 Tullio Treves, Codification et Pratique dans le Droit de la Mer, RCADI, The Hague, Tome 223-IV, 
1990, p. 235.
136 Ibid.
137 Orrego, supra, note 127, p. 276.
138 Thomas A. Clingan, 'Mar Presencial (The Presential Sea): Deja Vu All Over Again?-A Response to 
Francisco Orrego Vicuna, ODIL, 24 (1993), pp. 89-98, at 95.
139 Jane Dalton, "The Chilean Mar Presential: A Harmless Concept or a Dangerous Precedent?, 8 IJMCL,
(1993), pp. 397-411.
140 Kwiatkowska, ‘Point of No Return’, supra, note 131, p. 341.
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conducted within the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks. However, it should be noted, that as the UN Conference got under way, the 
presential sea concept was put on hold by the Chilean government, evidencing its 
intention not to pursue unilateral solutions if other viable solutions were adopted under 
international law141.
2.3 Canada’s fisheries regulations
Canada’s activities in relation to the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans have 
contributed to highlighting the vital role that the marine environment has played in the 
development of Canada. Thus, this country exercises jurisdiction over very extensive 
sea areas in regional settings that differ widely in their physical, economic, political, 
strategic and social characteristics. As a result, Canadian oceans policy has been 
developed in a large number of separate departments in response to particular events 
and to meet their own objectives. First declaring a 100 n.m. Arctic Waters Pollution 
Control Zone in 1970142, Canada went on to declare a 200 n.m. Exclusive Economic 
Zone in 1977143. The second attracted widespread support from developing States 
during the UNCLOS negotiations144. An attempt at formulating a national oceans policy 
was made in 1987 with the publication of an "Ocean Policy for Canada" by the 
Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Federal Agency assigned the lead 
role in oceans policy development145.
141 Speech by the President of Chile, Mr. Eduardo Frei, Escuela Naval, Valparaiso, Chile, 2 May 1994. 
Quoted by Francisco Orrego Vicuna, The Changing International Law, supra, note 81, p. 111.
142 William Schrank, ‘Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction: Origins of the Current Crisis in Atlantic Canada’s 
Fisheries’, Marine Policy, 19 (1995), pp. 285-299.
143 According to Lennox O’Reilly Hinds, the unilateral declaration by Canada in 1977 of a 200 n.m. 
Exclusive Fishing Zone is directly responsible for the development of the Canadian industry that has 
occurred since. This author maintains that Canada’s failure to include the extension of the Shelf (the Nose 
and Tail) within its jurisdiction at that time, and limited progress made on an international agreement on 
straddling stocks since then, suggests that the sustainability of Canadian investments in the sector were 
later in serious question. See Lennox O’Reilly Hinds, ‘Crisis in Canada’s Atlantic Sea Fisheries’, Marine 
Policy, 19 (1995), pp. 271-283.
144 Douglas Day, ‘Tending the Achilles’ Heel of NAFO: Canada Acts to Protect the Nose and Tail of the 
Grand Banks’, Marine Policy, 19 (1995), pp. 257-270.
145 Douglas Day, ‘Public Policy and Ocean Management in Canada’, Marine Policy, 19 (1995), pp. 251- 
256, at 251. More recently, in 2000, the Canadian Federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has initiated a 
public process of consultations in order to adopt the Canada’s Oceans Strategy. The Discussion Paper
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2.3.1 The crisis of Canada’s Atlantic Fisheries
Canada’s Atlantic fisheries are in a state of acute crisis because of a severe reduction in 
ground fish populations146. The collapse of the Canadian east coast fishery was first 
recognized in 1989 when the biomass estimates of the Northern Cod stock were found 
to be dramatically below their previous levels147. The ground fish fisheries in the waters 
around Newfoundland exploit three main species groups: the gadoids (cod, haddock, 
pollock and hake), the flatfishes (plaice, yellowtail flounder and halibut) and other 
species such as redfish and grenadiers. The relative importance of the different species 
and stocks has varied over time, but recently the last three have been the most 
important148.
The possible causes of the stock decline in the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Ocean have 
been identified as follows: the Canadian offshore trawling fleet; the foreign fishery 
outside 200 miles; seals; shortage of prey species; and environmental factors such as 
decreasing water temperatures and oceanic salinic changes149. However, it is not 
possible to determine the relative importance of each factor and it is not clear when the 
decline took place150.
The straddling stocks issue is a fisheries management problem for a number of countries 
such as Canada where the continental shelf extends beyond the Economic Exclusive 
Zone since fish tend to congregate in that shallow area151. Following the extension of 
jurisdiction by Canada, fishing in the Northwest Atlantic was administered under the
'Toward Canada's Ocean Strategy’ can be consulted, in electronic form, as available on 25 February 
2001,on the Web Site http://www.oceanscanada.com/english/index.htm
146 Richard Apostle and Knut Mikalsen, ‘Lessons from the Abyss: Reflections on Recent Fisheries Crises 
in Atlantic Canada and North Norway’, Dalhousie Law Journal, 18 (1995), pp. 96-115.
147 William Schrank, supra, note 142.
148 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 'Groundfish Stocks Status Report', Ottawa, Canada, 1987.
149 The Canadian case, widely discussed, is a potent warning that fisheries management policies must 
acknowledge explicitly the economic and social impacts of these policies and make adequate provision 
for local involvement in decision-making and resource control. See Lennox O’Reilly Hinds, ‘Crisis in 
Canada’s Atlantic Sea Fisheries’, Marine Policy, 19 (1995) 271-283; and Jack Ruitenbeek, ‘The Great 
Canadian Fishery Collapse: Some Policy Lessons’, Ecological Economics, 19 (1996) 103-109. See also 
Section 1, Chapter 1.
150 Dawn Russell and Moira McConnell, ‘After the Collapse’, Dalhousie Law Journal, 18 (1995), pp. 5- 
36.
151 Carlyle Mitchell, ‘Fisheries Management in the Grand Banks, 1980-1992 and the Straddling Stock 
Issue’, Marine Policy, 21 (1997), pp. 97-109.
auspices of the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) 
denounced in 1978 after the negotiation of a new Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization (NAFO) which was established in 1979152. NAFO regulates straddling 
stocks beyond the 200-mile limit153. In 1994, the Canadian Government proposed new 
legislation enabling it unilaterally to assert its enforcement jurisdiction beyond 200 
miles. On 12 May 1994, the Canadian Parliament passed this legislation amending the 
existing Coastal Fisheries Protection Act (CFPA)154. This legislation was directed 
principally at stateless vessels and flags of convenience vessels155. Notwithstanding this, 
in March 1995, after a dispute over turbot allocations, the Canadian Government further 
amended its legislation to extend its application to NAFO members, Spain and 
Portugal156.
2.3.2 The Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act
The purpose of the CFPA was to enable Canada to take the urgent action necessary to 
prevent further destruction of straddling stocks on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland 
and to permit their rebuilding, while continuing to seek effective international solutions 
to the depletion of those stocks by foreign vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area 
in a manner that undermined the effectiveness of sound conservation and management
152 Michael Sean Sullivan, The Case in International Law for Canada’s Extension of Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Beyond 200 Miles’, ODIL, 28 (1997), pp. 203-268, at 212.
153 This issue will be discussed in Chapter 4, Fisheries Management Organizations’.
154 ‘Canada: Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as Amended in 1994’, Reproduced in I.LM, 33 (1994) 1383.
155 Michael Sean Sullivan, supra, note 152, at 220. Regarding the role of Canada in developing the theory 
of preferential right, see Laurent Lucchini, 'La loi Canadienne du 12 Mai 1994: la logique extreme de la 
thdorie du droit preferentiel de lEtat cotier en haute mer au titre des stocks chevauchants', AFDI, 40
(1994), pp. 864-875, at 865; Francis Regaldies, “La nouvelle loi Canadienne sur la protection des peches 
coheres: ldgitimitd n’est pas ldgalitd’, Espaces et Ressources Maritimes, 8 (1994), pp. 252-272; Jean-Luc 
Prat, ‘La loi Canadienne du 12 Mai 1994 sur la protection des peches coheres ou l’unilateralisme 
Canadien reactivd’, Espaces et Ressources Maritimes, 8 (1994), pp. 273-305; William Abel, ‘Fishing for 
an international norm to govern straddling stocks: the Canada-Spain dispute of 1995’, University of 
Miami Inter-American Law Review, 27 (1996), p. 553.
156 Richard Southcott and James Wooder, ‘Canadian Maritime Law Update: 1995-1996’, Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce, 28 (1997), pp. 469-483.
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1 S7measures . The core of the Act provides as follows: “no person, being aboard a foreign 
fishing vessel of a prescribed class, shall, in the NAFO Regulatory Area, fish or prepare 
to fish for straddling stocks in contravention of any of the conservation and 
management measures adopted by Canada”158.
The Act is complemented by provisions which enumerate the straddling stocks which 
are subject to conservation and management measures. The Act allows fishery officers, 
the officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or any person authorized by the 
Governor in Council to board and inspect any fishing vessel found within Canadian 
fisheries waters or the NAFO Regulatory Area. According to the Act, the NAFO 
Regulatory Area on the high seas encompasses the waters of the Northwest Atlantic 
Ocean north of 35°00' north latitude and west of a line extending due north from 35°00' 
north latitude and 42°00' west longitude, thence due west to 44°00' west longitude, and 
thence due north to the coast of Greenland. The area covers also the waters of the Gulf 
of St. Lawrence, Davis Strait and Baffin Bay south of 78°10' north latitude159.
The provisions allowing Canada to inspect, arrest, seize and forfeit-fishing vessels on 
the high seas is the most controversial provision of the Act, relevant to international 
law. A protection officer is allowed to arrest without warrant, any person who the 
officer, on reasonable grounds, suspects has committed an offence under the Act and he 
can use force "on reasonable grounds", to disable a foreign fishing vessel. The officer 
may seize any fishing vessel, including fish, tackle, rigging, apparel, furniture, stores 
and cargo, by means of which, or in relation to which the officer believes, on reasonable 
grounds, the offence was committed160.
157 A precedent of the CFPA may be found in the US legislation, similarly phrased, to enable it to exercise 
trade sanctions, refusal of fishing permits in the US EEZ, refusal to admit fish exports from States that 
undermine fisheries legislation, etc. See the US Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA), Public Law 104-297, an 
act to provide for the conservation and management of the fisheries, and for other purposes, which 
became law on October 11, 1996. The SFA amended the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act, Public Law 94-265 and includes numerous provisions requiring science, management 
and conservation action by the US National Marine Fisheries Service. J. Feder version (12/19/96), 
information in electronic form as available on 10 May, 2000, on the Web Site 
http://www.nmfs.gOv/sfa/magact/magl.html#s2
158 CFPA, Section 5.2.
159 CFPA, Art. 2.
160 CFPA, Arts. 7 and 9.
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2.3.3 The theory of the “preferential right”
The amendment of the Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act represents a practical 
expression of the theory of the "preferential right" of coastal States. Therefore, it is 
relevant to analyse the impact of this theory on the law of the sea, with particular 
reference to the developments leading to the adoption of the 1995 SSA. The Convention 
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, which was 
adopted in Geneva on 29 April, 1958 and entered into force on 20 March, 1966161, had 
already recognized the special interest of coastal States in the maintenance of the 
productivity of living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea 
(Art. 6.1). Furthermore, according to this Convention, any coastal State may adopt 
unilateral measures of conservation appropriate to any stock of fish or other marine 
resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea, provided that 
negotiations to that effect with the other states concerned have not led to an agreement 
within six months (Art. 7.1). The special interests of coastal States were thus referred to 
but lacked any appropriate means of implementation162. In the 1982 UNCLOS, 
however, no reference is made to this "special interest" of coastal States.
The preferential right is based on two grounds: first, the "consistency principle", i.e. the
need to ensure consistency between the regime for conservation and management of
living resources in the high seas and the measures taken by coastal states for
conservation and management of those resources in their EEZ; and secondly, the
alleged "unilateral power" of coastal States to take measures when negotiations with
distant fishing states regarding conservation and management measures for high seas 
1 6^stocks have failed . Whether the "consistency principle" could be perceived as 
testifying a new legal concept of a coastal State’s special interest beyond the 200 
nautical miles, reflecting general or sub regional customary law, is an open question164. 
In any case, according to Article 116 of UNCLOS, it seems clear that the right to fish on
161 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Geneva, 29 April 
1958, in force 30 September 1962, reproduced in 450 UNTS 82.
162 Orrego Vicuna, The Changing International Law, supra, note 81, p. 20.
163 Andrd Tahindro, ‘Conservation and Management of Transboundary Fish Stocks: Comments in Light 
of the Adoption of the 1995 Agreement for the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’, ODIL, 28 (1997), pp. 1-58, at 16.
164 Kwiatkowska, ‘Point of No Return’, supra, note 131, p. 334.
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the high seas is not unlimited. It is limited by treaty obligations, by other related 
provisions of UNCLOS165 and in particular, by the rights, duties and interests of coastal 
States provided for in Articles 63.2, 64 and 67 of UNCLOS.
The alleged "unilateral power" of coastal States to extend their jurisdiction over 
straddling stocks may find a basis in article 63.2 of UNCLOS which provides that the 
coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks shall seek either directly or through 
appropriate sub regional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures 
necessary for the conservation of those stocks in the adjacent area. In this regard, the 
Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act is very skilful in warding off possible 
criticism by declaring that its purpose is to enable Canada to take the urgent action 
necessary to prevent further destruction of straddling stocks in both Canadian fisheries 
waters and the NAFO Regulatory Area166. Thus, the Canadian Coastal Fisheries 
Protection Act can be distinguished from the Chilean Presential Sea concept on the 
grounds that the latter is unilateral national measure while the former enables the 
unilateral enforcement of NAFO measures in NAFO Regulatory Areas of the high seas.
A question not resolved by UNCLOS was how the apparently superior right of the 
coastal State might be implemented in the specific context of straddling stocks. 
According to Burke, assuming that the States concerned have not been able to conclude 
an agreement on conservation of fisheries in the high seas, one interpretation of Article 
116 is that the coastal State would be then considered authorized to establish 
conservation measures applicable to the stock as a whole, including the high seas 
component and to demand that high seas fishing States comply with those measures167. 
However, in Burke’s opinion, in addition to the obstacles presented by the legislative 
history of UNCLOS and the conflicting political interests of coastal and fishing States,
165 Part VII, Section II, Articles 116-120 of UNCLOS establishes specific provisions regarding the duty of 
States to adopt measures for the conservation and management of the living resources of the high seas. In 
addition, according to Article 87 of UNCLOS, the freedoms of the high seas, that is to say, the freedom of 
navigation; the freedom of overflight; the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; the freedom to 
construct artificial islands and other installations; the freedom of fishing; and the freedom of scientific 
research, shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise 
of the freedoms of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under UNCLOS with respect to 
activities in the Area. See Section 2, Chapter 3.
166 CFPA, Art. 3.
167 William Burke, ‘Unregulated High Seas Fishing and Ocean Governance’, in Van Dyke et al. (eds.), 
Freedom for the Seas, supra, note 97, pp. 235-272, at 247.
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"one further obstacle remains to any unilateral regulation of adjacent high-seas fisheries
[that] must be noted: there is no basis in any source of law that would permit unilateral
1 68enforcement of exclusively prescribed management measures beyond an EEZ" . 
Given its sui generis juridical nature, the EEZ could have been an area of the high seas 
in which certain rights were accorded to the coastal State by way of exception to the 
fundamental principle of the freedom of the high seas, but in fact, quite a different 
pattern is followed in Part V of UNCLOS in which the EEZ area, no longer regarded as 
part of the high seas, is subject to the specific legal regime established in that Part169.
2.3.4 The doctrine of abuse of rights
Burke has suggested that a possible legal basis for extending coastal State jurisdiction 
beyond 200 miles may be found in the doctrine of abuse of rights, a general principle of 
the international law of torts170. Article 300 of UNCLOS (Good Faith and Abuse of 
Rights) provides that States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed 
under that Convention and exercize the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in 
the Convention in a manner that would not constitute an abuse of right. Thus, the way 
was open to Canada to allege that the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act was a response to 
the actions of Spain, one of the EC member States, regarding fish stocks off Canada’s 
fisheries zone that evidenced a lack of good faith. However, at the time of the adoption 
of the Act, UNCLOS was not yet in force and the same author accepts that there is room 
for dispute about whether the doctrine of abuse of rights is a recognized principle of 
customary international law171.
On December 11, 1995, the Canadian government announced that the Coastal Fisheries 
Protection Act would be integrated into a new fisheries act. The Bill C-29, relating to 
enforcement of NAFO conservation and management measures outside the 200-mile 
zone, would be retained. Rather than being based on sovereign rights, Canada’s claim is 
based on the perception of the special interests that coastal States have in the
168 William Burke, Fishing in the Bering Sea Donut: Straddling Stocks and the New International Law of 
Fisheries’, Ecology Law Quarterly, 16, (1989), pp. 285-312, at 303.
169 E. D. Brown, The Law of the Sea, (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1994, Vol. I), pp. 218-219.
170 Burke, The New International Law, supra, note 110, p. 142.
171 Ibid.
54
exploitation and conservation of straddling fish stocks, resulting from the obligations 
contained in articles 63.2, 116, 56 and 87 of UNCLOS. It is unlikely that the extension 
of jurisdiction to the high seas would be recognized in international law absent 
subsequent amendment of UNCLOS or conclusion of a separate treaty. The 1995 SSA 
in Article 23 contains provisions affirming that port States have the right and the duty to 
adopt regulations, in accordance with international law, to promote the effectiveness of
179subregional, regional and global management and management measures . However, 
according to the Agreement (Art. 20), in the case of straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks, such measures must be adopted by regional or subregional fishing organizations 
or arrangements and not taken unilaterally by coastal and port States173.
2.3.5 A diplomatic strategy
Some authors have claimed that the extended fisheries jurisdiction was part of Canada’s 
global diplomatic strategy of responding to the straddling stocks issue. In Keiver's 
opinion, the Canadian response to the straddling stocks issue involved a two-track 
strategy of multilateral negotiation and unilateral action: the first strategy, multilateral, 
consisting of the so-called "legal initiative" with the objective of fostering negotiations 
in the framework of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks; the second strategy, to act unilaterally, resulted in the 
enactment of domestic legislation to allow unilateral enforcement action against non- 
NAFO member vessels and subsequently Spanish and Portuguese vessels174. Fauteux 
places the adoption of the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act amongst Canada's numerous 
efforts to break the international community’s inertia in dealing with the over­
exploitation of high seas living resources175. Coming from the same direction, Orrego 
maintains that coastal States’ recent claims can be identified as an inducement to enter 
into new arrangements within which the relevant interests can be accommodated in a 
manner compatible with current environmental realities at a time when the role of
172 See Section 3, Chapter 6
173 See Section 5, Chapter 4
174 Michael Keiver, The Turbot War: Gunboat Diplomacy or Refinement of the Law of the Sea?’, Les 
Cahiers du Droit-Universite Laval, 37 (1996), pp. 543-587, at 546.
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international law on this matter is changing and Chile’s and Canada’s actions therefore 
cannot be regarded as a process of nationalization of the high seas . States seek to 
maximise their interests by offering the same rights to others that they seek for 
themselves. However, as Michael Byers points out, through manipulating a negotiating 
process by first denying reciprocity, States can cause others to change position and thus 
can develop, maintain or change customary rules, or use the customary process to
177further their positions in the negotiation of treaties
2.4 The ‘Estai’ Case
The Spanish-registered vessel ‘Estai’ was fishing on 9 March 1995 on the Grand Banks, 
some 245 n.m off the Canadian coast, that is to say, in international waters, outside 
Canada's exclusive economic/fisheries zone. After a Canadian patrol vessel fired shots 
across the bows of the Estai, the Canadian authorities boarded the vessel, arrested the 
captain, seized his vessel and towed it to St. John's, in Newfoundland, Canada. The 
vessel was retained until its owner deposited a caution of $500,000 and the master was 
released upon the payment of bail of $8,000.
2.4.1 The origin of the Canadian position
The origin of the Canadian position in this case lays in the insufficiencies of the 
international regime for fisheries on the high seas and, in particular, the international 
regime for straddling fish stocks178 on the one hand and, on the other, the domestic 
fishing regulations laid down in the 1994 Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, which 
enabled Canadian Fisheries officials to board and arrest any non-NAFO member’s 
fishing vessel. Thus, Canada justified its action as a necessary and inevitable response
175 Paul Fauteux, L'initiative juridique cannadienne sur la peche en haute mer', ACDI, 1993, pp. 33-87, at 
83-85.
176 Orrego Vicuna, The Changing International Law, supra, note 81, pp. 116 and 118.
177 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, supra, note 59, p. 101.
178 Peter Davies, "The EC/Canadian Fisheries Dispute in the Northwest Atlantic", ICLQ, 44 (1995), pp. 
927-939, at 928.
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to over fishing and the Spanish Fishermen’s disregard for the need to conserve fish 
stocks on the Grand Banks179.
The day following the arrest, the European Commission sent a Note of Protest to the 
Canadian Government stating that: a) the violent arrest of the Estai’ constituted an 
illegal act, and was totally unacceptable; b) the arrest of a vessel in international waters 
by a state other than the flag-state was an unjustifiable violation of both the NAFO 
Convention and customary international law; c) the Canadian action undermined all the 
efforts of the international community to achieve effective conservation through 
enhanced co-operation; d) it constituted an illegal act against the sovereignty of an EC’s 
Member State, which had clearly endangered the lives of the crew and the safety of the 
Estai’; e) the immediate release of the vessel was demanded as well as the repair of the 
damage caused, the ending of harassment of vessels flying the flag of Community 
Members states, and the immediate repeal of the Canadian fisheries legislation180.
On 16 March 1995, the European Parliament adopted Resolution B4-022 condemning 
the Canadian Government as the perpetrator of an illegal act in international waters, and 
urged the European Commission and the Council to maintain a firm attitude in defence 
of the principles of the Law of the Sea and of the rights of the EC fishing fleet, and to 
take legal action against Canada. Canada refused to negotiate within NAFO, stated that 
it would accept only bilateral negotiations with the European Community and reserved 
the right to take any action that may be deemed appropriate. Maintaining its proceedings 
against the Estai’ and its master, the Canadian Government rejected the EC’s Note, 
reiterated its unilateral prohibition of fishing until the end of the year, justified the 
legality of its fishing regulations and threatened the EC with the continuing harassment 
of vessels flying the flag of its Member States. Indeed, on 26 March, Canada’s patrol 
vessels harassed several Spanish trawlers on the high seas, cut the fishing gear of the 
vessel "Pescamar-Uno", and tried to arrest the vessels "Verdel" and "Magic-IV".
179 Keiver, ‘The Turbot War’, supra, note 174, p. 547.
180 Demanda de Espana contra Canada ante la Corte Intemacional de Justicia (Application of Spain 
against Canada before the International Court of Justice), Information y Documentation, Revista 
Espanola de Derecho Intemacional (Spanish Review of International Law), 47 (1995), pp. 287-309.
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Nevertheless, even following these developments, the EC Council was unable to adopt a 
firm condemnation of Canada because the United Kingdom vetoed it181.
2.4.2 Spain’s Application to the ICJ
On 28 May 1995, Spain brought a case against Canada in the International Court of 
Justice. While expressly reserving the right to modify and extend the terms of its 
Application, as well as the grounds invoked and the right to request the appropriate 
provisional measures, the Kingdom of Spain asked the ICJ to declare that:
a) the legislation of Canada, in so far as it claimed to exercise jurisdiction 
over ships flying a foreign flag on the high seas, outside the exclusive 
economic zone of Canada, was not opposable to the Kingdom of Spain;
b) Canada was bound to refrain from any repetition of the reported acts, 
and to offer to the Kingdom of Spain the reparation that was due, in the 
form of an indemnity the amount of which must cover all the damages 
and injuries occasioned; and c) the boarding on the high seas, on 9 March 
1995, of the ship Estai’ flying the flag of Spain, and the measures of 
coercion and the exercise of jurisdiction over that ship and over its 
captain, constituted a concrete violation of the aforementioned principles 
and norms of international law182.
The Application of Spain to the World Court stated that the dispute between the 
Kingdom of Spain and Canada, going beyond the legal framework of fishing, seriously 
affected the basic principle of the freedom of the high seas and, moreover, represented a 
very serious infringement of the sovereign rights of Spain. In addition, Spain alleged 
that Canada had violated principles and norms of international law as follows:
a) the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag-State on the high seas over 
vessels flying its flag, a principle adopted in article 6.1 of the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the High Seas; b) the freedom of navigation on 
the high seas (art. 2, 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and arts.
87 and 90 of UNCLOS); c) the freedom of fishing on the high seas; d) 
the prohibition on subjecting any part of the high seas to the sovereignty 
of any state; e) the illegality of extending the right of hot pursuit; f) the 
prohibition of imprisonment for violation of fisheries provisions, in the 
absence of agreement to the contrary among the States concerned; g) the
181 Jose Antonio De Yturriaga, The International Regime of Fisheries. From UNCLOS to the Presential 
Sea, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), pp. 243-244.
182 ICJ, Communique No. 95/8, 29 March 1995.
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obligation on States to co-operate on the conservation of the living 
resources of the high seas; h) the prohibition on use of threats, or armed 
force in international relations; i) the obligation to settle disputes by
peaceful means, and not to endanger peace, security and justice; j) the
non-acceptance of resort to domestic legislation to justify the violation of 
international obligations; and k) the principle of good faith in respect of 
international law1 3.
2.4.3 The Agreement EU-Canada
On 16 April 1995, the European Community and Canada reached agreement on the 
adoption of proposals amending the NAFO conservation and management measures. 
This Agreement considerably develops measures relating to the inspection of vessels,
the transmission of information from inspections and catch reporting, increasing the
inspection presence, a hail system and mesh size. Further, it implements a pilot project 
for observers and satellite tracking and sets up a special class of major infringements 
which includes refusal to co-operate with an inspector or an observer who misreports 
catches and mesh and hail system violations and interference with the satellite tracking 
system. In addition, in the light of their mutual interest in conservation, both parties 
reaffirmed their commitment to a total allowable catch of 27,000 tonnes for Greenland 
halibut for 1995 in NAFO sub-areas 2 and 3, and agreed to introduce management 
arrangements for quotas for Greenland halibut184.
Although in the minutes no allusion is made to specific international legal instruments, 
the Agreement is relevant to the protection and conservation of marine biodiversity. On 
the other hand, the Agreement evidenced the increasing awareness in the international 
context of the need to implement conservation measures for fisheries. According to 
Freestone, this settlement of the dispute over the Estai’ brought some comfort to both 
sides: first, the EU maintained its formal position that the arrest outside 200 miles was 
illegal; secondly, Canada agreed to repeal its 1995 provision which permitted 
prosecution of Spanish and Portuguese vessels in international waters185.
183 ’Agreed Minute on the Conservation and Management of Fish Stocks’. Reproduced in (1995) 34 ILM 
1260.
184 Demanda de Espana contra Canada, supra, note 180, pp. 293-296.
185 David Freestone, The EU/Canada Fishery Agreement', EELR, (1995), pp. 270-272.
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Following this Agreement reached with the European Union, Canada in its response to 
the Spanish application, on 21 April 1995, objected to the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the case, 
pleading that the Court lacked jurisdiction because of Canada’s declaration of 10 May 
1994 whereby it had excluded from the Court’s competence "those disputes arising out 
of or concerning conservation and management measures taken by Canada with respect 
to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area and the enforcement of such measures, 
according to article 19 of Canada’s Coastal Fisheries Protection Act"186.
2.4.4 The decision of the ICJ
The ICJ admitted the Spanish application and, taking into account Canada’s refusal to 
accept the jurisdiction of the Court, decided that the question of the jurisdiction of the 
Court to entertain the dispute had to be separately determined before any proceedings 
on the merits could be instituted. It fixed time-limits for the pleadings on this subject 
and reserved the subsequent procedure for further decision187. It would have been 
extremely convenient if the World Court adjudicated on the legality or illegality of the 
controversial provisions of the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, giving an objective and 
informed view on the issue188. As Sullivan has said, it is unlikely that Canada’s direct
enforcement actions against the Estai would survive scrutiny by the International Court
1 80of Justice or any other Tribunal . To deal with disputes concerning fisheries in the 
future, the Judges of the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea at their second 
meeting in February, 1997, created a special standing Chamber on Fisheries Matters 
which will deal with any disputes which the parties agree to submit to the Tribunal 
concerning the conservation and management of marine living resources190.
186 Yturriaga, The International Regime, supra, note 181, pp. 249-250.
187 ICJ Reports, Order of 2 May 1995, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, Spain v. Canada.
188 Yturriaga, The International Regime, supra, note 181, p. 257.
189 Sullivan, supra, note 152, p. 248.
190 International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, Press Release 5, 3 March, 1997, issued by the Registry. 
Document in electronic form available on http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/ITLOShome.htm on 
12/ 11/00
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The Canadian action has been both justified and deplored depending on the view taken 
by the commentator concerning interpretation of Articles 116-119 of UNCLOS. In 
December 1998, the International Court of Justice declared that it had no jurisdiction to 
adjudicate upon the dispute on the basis that the dispute between Spain and Canada was 
a dispute “arising out o f ’ and “concerning conservation and management measures 
taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area” and “the 
enforcement of such measures”191. The Court declared that the dispute came within the 
terms of the reservation contained in Canada’s Declaration of 10 May 1994 in which 
Canada stated that the Court had compulsory jurisdiction over disputes other than 
disputes arising out of or concerning conservation and management measures taken by 
Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area and the 
enforcement of such measures192. Although the ICJ declared that it had no jurisdiction 
in this case, in stressing conservation and management measures rather than sovereignty 
issues, the decision can be seen as an impetus to the development of the international 
law of fisheries193.
Keiver has suggested that in regard to the arrest of the 'Estai', the Canadian government 
might seek to rely on the alternative defence of necessity as legal justification for its 
unilateral action regarding the conservation measures194. However, as Miles and Burke 
have pertinently pointed out, nothing in the 1982 UNCLOS or in customary law 
authorizes one high seas fishing State to take action on the high seas to enforce a 
conservation obligation owed to it by another state195. In the end, the Canada-EU turbot
191 ICJ, Press Communique 98/41 of 4 December 1998, Case Concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. 
Canada).
192 ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada). Jurisdiction of the Court, 4 December 1998, General List 
No. 96. Document in electronic form as available on 10/05/00 on http://www.icj-cij.org/
193 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Christopher Gregory Weeramantry strongly advocated that “upon the 
interpretation of the reservations clause which is indicated above, the Court is not in a position to reject 
the Spanish Application in limine on the basis of manifest l^ck of jurisdiction. There may well be no 
jurisdiction, and there may just as well be jurisdiction. The issue can only be determined once it is known 
whether the facts bring the case within the general submission to jurisdiction, or within the reservations 
clause. Until these are known, the Court is not entitled to reject Spain's Application”. See Dissenting 
Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada). Jurisdiction of the 
Court, 4 December 1998, General List No. 96, document in electronic form as available on 10 May, 2000 
on http://www.ici -cii. org/
194 Keiver, supra, note 174, p. 564.
195 Miles and Burke, supra, note 106, pp. 351-352.
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dispute did help Canada to achieve two of its fisheries policy goals. First, the 
development of an effective system of surveillance, control and enforcement in the 
NAFO Regulatory Area196. Secondly, the establishment of effective international rules 
and mechanisms for conservation and management of straddling fish stocks in the high 
seas areas, which were mostly materialized in the FAO Compliance Agreement and, in 
particular, in the 1995 SSA197. Thus, the politically-charged “Turbot War” between 
Canada and the European Community served as a diplomatic catalyst for production of 
a positive legal outcome198.
2.5 The scientific consensus
The consequences of the misuse of science with resultant detriment to the living world 
have severely affected society and the environmental movement. But science has the 
power to reveal much information about the structure and processes of nature. These 
effects of science upon society explain the importance of analysing the organization and 
undertaking of environmental-related scientific processes199. The need for new 
techniques for monitoring environmental change has fostered the formation of new 
linkages and relationships among scientific associations, national governments and 
international organizations200. Agreement among scientists and science organizations on 
the scientific aspects of an environmental issue is crucial to the formation of a new 
international regime and affirm the implementation of international conventions.
196 Freestone, supra, note 185, p. 271.
197 Yann-Huei Song, The Canada-European Union Turbot Dispute in the Northwest Atlantic: An 
Application of the Incident Approach’, ODIL, 28 (1997), pp. 269-311, at 297.
198 Christopher Joyner and Alejandro Avarez, The 1995 Turbot War: Lessons for the Law of the Sea’ 
IJMCL, 11 (1996), pp. 425-458, at 456.
199 Science certainly has a solid contribution to make to understanding, preventing and solving 
environmental problems, irrespective of the normative character of environmental problems. Peter Sloep 
and Maria van Dam-Mieras, ‘Science on Environmental Problems’, in Pieter Glasbergen and Andrew 
Blowers (eds.), Environmental Policy in an International Context. Perspectives, (London, Arnold, 1995), 
at 58. However, environmental problems do not present themselves solely in terms of pure and self- 
evident physical facts; they need to be understood in social terms, Angela Liberatore, The Social 
Construction of Environmental Problems’, Ibid, at 59.
200 Timothy O’Riordan, ‘Environmental Science on the Move’, in Timothy O’Riordan (ed.), 
Environmental Science for Environmental Management, (London, Longman, 1996), p. 10.
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In response to the increasing number of international environmental agreements that 
have been concluded since the beginning of the 1970s, several analysts have highlighted 
the importance of the role played by transnational scientific and technical groups in 
international environmental issues201. Most environmental issues have first been 
discussed primarily in scientific conferences, at the international or regional level, 
before becoming the subject of formalized international treaties and conventions arrived 
at through negotiation. Many of the recommendations on science for Agenda 21, for 
instance, are based on the Agenda of Science for Environment and Development into 
the 21st Century (ASCEND 21), an international conference held by the International 
Council for Science (ICSU)202 in Vienna in November 1991. In addition, regarding 
science for sustainable development, UNCED collaborated with a number of UN and 
related agencies including UNESCO, the UN Centre for Science and Technology, FAO, 
UNEP and the World Bank203.
Given that scientific analyses have been developed to explain environmental politics, 
they have contributed much to the emergence of a fisheries regime on the high seas204. 
There are some notable features that distinguish the scientific approach from that of 
neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists. As a contrast to neorealist theory, which 
stresses the difficulties in securing international co-operation, the scientific approach 
addresses some factors that might explain why international co-operation has sometimes 
been easier to achieve than realists would expect. It is also useful in identifying why
201 Paul Johnston, Dave Santillo, Ruth Stringer, Julie Ashton et al., Greenpeace Report on the World's 
Ocean, Greenpeace Research Laboratories Report, May 1998, University of Exeter, U.K; William J. 
Broad, The Universe Below: Discovering the Secrets of the Deep Sea, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 
1997) and A. Couper, The Times Atlas of the Oceans, (New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983).
202 ICSU is a non-governmental organization, founded in 1931 to bring together natural scientists in 
international scientific endeavour. It comprises 98 multi-disciplinary National Scientific Members 
(scientific research councils or science academies) and 26 international, single-discipline Scientific 
Unions to provide a wide spectrum of scientific expertise enabling members to address major 
international, interdisciplinary issues which none could handle alone. ICSU also has 28 Scientific 
Associates. Information available on http://www.icsu.org on 10 May, 2000.
203 Pamela Chasek, The Negotiating System of Environment and Development’, in B. I. Spector, Gunnar 
Sjostedt and I. William Zartman (eds.), Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (London, Graham, Trotman and Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1994), pp. 21-41, at 33.
204 Sigmund Engesaeter, ‘Scientific Input to International Fishery Agreements’, International Challenges, 
13 (1993), 85-106; Anne Platt McGinn, Safeguarding the Health of Oceans, (Washington D.C., 
Worldwatch Institute, Paper 145, 1999) and Anne Platt McGinn, ‘Charting a New Course for Oceans’ in 
State of the World 1999, a Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, (New 
York, Norton and Company, 1999).
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neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists over-emphasise the unity and dominance of 
states as actors notwithstanding the fact that international co-operation has strong 
international links and operates both within the state and outside it, in universities and in 
non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations as well as States.
2.5.1 Role of epistemic communities in promoting consensus
According to neoliberal institutionalist models, co-operation is generated simply by 
abstracted States. Neoliberal institutionalists suggest that interdependence between 
states in a particular area often, but not always, makes state strategies to secure co­
operation viable, but they still assume an international structure largely defined by 
anarchy205. By contrast, according to epistemic community models, co-operation is 
generated by specifically identified agents, which leaves some actors greater freedom of 
action in propagating co-operation. ’Epistemic community’ models, developed in 
particular by Peter Haas, are the most recent and currently prevalent way of theorising 
scientific co-operation and scientific consensus in international environmental issues.
An epistemic community has been defined as "a network of individuals or groups with 
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within their domain of 
expertise”206. They adhere to the following: 1) shared values and principled beliefs; 2) 
shared causal beliefs or professional judgement; 3) common notions of validity based on 
inter subjective internally defined criteria for validating knowledge; and 4) a common 
policy project207. This definition leaves open the nature of professional knowledge. 
Knowledge is defined as the sum of technical information and of theories about that 
information which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested 
actors to serve as a guide to development of public policy designed to achieve some 
social goal. Knowledge incorporates scientific notions relating to the social goal. These
205 James E. Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: a 
Comprehensive Survey, (New York, Longman, 1997), p. 59.
206 Peter Haas, Words Can Hurt You: or, Who Said What to Whom About Regimes’, 10, 36 (1982), pp. 
207-243.
207 Ibid.
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communities are themselves politically motivated and goal-seeking. The knowledge 
they generate tends to lead them to share common beliefs about a particular problem208.
Thus, the knowledge generated and controlled by epistemic communities becomes 
politically important and influential when the consensus among the epistemic 
community is sufficient to be convincing to the external political community. But this is 
not always the case. Much of the environmental legislation and many of the 
international agreements enacted in the 1980’s preceded the surge in public interest in 
industrialised countries concerning environmental issues. When epistemic communities 
are involved in international environmental negotiations, they have encouraged 
behaviour that is different from previous patterns of collective action. Having stable 
access to decision-makers and keeping opponents cornered, epistemic communities can 
influence adoption of international arrangements that will develop and will endure.
Based on these assumptions about information searching and common interests of 
members of an epistemic community, Peter Haas has suggested ten propositions that 
may improve such processes and their applications. These ten propositions are:
1) crises precipitate searches for new authoritative sources of policy 
advice; 2) epistemic communities, once identified and mobilised, may be 
both potent actors and provide the appropriate level of analysis for 
understanding international environmental co-operation; 3) rough 
technical consensus established within the community will be its 
principal claim to authority; 4) access to international and domestic 
authorities will contribute to influence policy formulation and 
enforcement; 5) scientific advice is most effective when provided 
through domestic channels; 6) consolidated bureaucratic power 
reinforces this influence at both the international and the national levels;
7) expanded domestic support reinforces bureaucratic consolidation; 8) 
the manner in which matters are sequenced can play an important role in 
the negotiations; 9) not all environmental problems require standards and 
regulation; some cases may be best managed through insurance funds;
10) this process of co-operation is reversible. If the knowledge base of 
the epistemic community collapses, then the epistemic community’s 
reputation for a monopoly on uncertainty reduction will be vulnerable2 .
208 Peter Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes’, World Politics, 32, (1980), 
pp. 357-405, at 367-368.
209 Peter Haas, Dbtaining International Environmental Protection Through Epistemic Consensus’, 
Millennium Journal of International Studies, 19 (1990), pp. 348-359, at 352-354.
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2.5.2 Events preceding consensus at UNCED
The efforts to advance the translation of scientific information, discovery and analysis 
into programmes to mitigate environmental pressures at the global level were adopted as 
institutional arrangements by the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm210. Thus, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), was created to promote contributions by relevant international scientific and 
other professional communities to the acquisition, assessment, and exchange of 
environmental knowledge and information and, as appropriate, to develop the technical 
aspects of the United Nations systems programmes211. Four tasks were defined during 
the conference, as follows:
1) research, to create new knowledge of the type specifically needed to 
provide guidance in the making of decisions; 2) monitoring, to gather 
certain data on specific environmental variables and to evaluate such data 
in order to determine and predict important environment conditions and 
trends; 3) information exchange, to disseminate knowledge within the 
scientific and technological communities and to ensure that decision­
makers at all levels shall have the benefit of the best knowledge that can 
be made available in the forms and at the times in which it can be useful; 
and, 4) evaluation and review, to provide the basis for identification of 
the knowledge needed and to determine that the necessary steps be 
taken212.
UNEP has developed a ’slippery slope’ strategy, in particular in several regional marine
91o
agreements . This involves initially committing states to broad arrangements with few 
obligations, but subsequently developing more effective and restrictive protocols 
achievement of which would have been politically unrealistic at the outset. At the same 
time, UNEP has helped to build support for subsequent conventions through the
210 See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), Stockholm, 5-16 
June 1972 (New York, 1973), UN Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 Rev. 1. For a good account of the Conference, 
see Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, supra, note 76, in particular Chapters 2 and 3.
211 See Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law. Frameworks, Standards and 
Implementation, Vol. I, (Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 35-39.
212 UNGA Res. 2997 (XXVII), 15 Dec. 1972.
213 See Patricia Bimie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1992), pp. 309-320. See also Sands, Principles, supra, note 211, pp. 296-308.
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judicious use of its financial resources in support of environmental monitoring programs 
and contributions by scientific and technical experts214.
An epistemic community, as a group of individuals, exists over fisheries on the high 
seas which has been able to gain an authorized position in policy-making fields in the 
major states involved, and on the other hand, to influence the adoption of international 
arrangements, both binding and non binding. This epistemic community is scattered 
throughout several agencies. Some of the regional fisheries commissions rely on 
scientific advisory committees, which has had the effect of encouraging member
91 Sgovernments to promote national science. However, governments respond unevenly . 
Fisheries Commissions have organized their sources of scientific advice in different 
ways. Some employ in-house scientists (ICCAT); other use outside bodies (ICES, 
NAFO, NEAF, EC); and some (IWC) have a scientific committee composed of 
scientists from delegations of States. The epistemic character of a community of 
scientist concerning a specific environmental issue refers not to an international body or 
agency but to the branch of modal logic that deals with the formalization of 
epistemological concepts such as knowledge, certainty, precaution and ignorance. The 
scientific expertise of this epistemic community on fisheries on the high seas, through 
its main agencies ICES, PICES and FAO, in particular regarding the crisis of fisheries 
management216, strongly influenced Agenda 21 and the adoption of the 1995 SSA.
The International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) is a collaborative body 
drawing scientists from the states bordering the Northern Seas which began co­
ordinating studies of fisheries in 1902. The role of ICES is crucial in the North Atlantic 
Sea and the Baltic Sea for technical advice and the promotion of joint science. The 
ICES annual report covers the status of each of 124 species and provides advice on 
harvest amounts, gear, and effort control within a multispecies or ecosystem context. 
The advice of ICES is used by national governments for setting a total allowable catch 
for stocks within national jurisdiction, and by the states engaged in harvesting shared 
stocks, pursuant to conventions217. The biological advice given by ICES has
214 Haas, supra, note 209, p. 353.
215 See Peterson, supra, note 12, p. 273.
216 See Chapter 1, Section 1.
217 ICES is officially recognized as the advisory body pursuant to the 1980 Convention on Future 
Multilateral Cooperation in the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries and has influenced the early development of
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traditionally been related either to the amount of fish that can be taken or the gear that 
should be used as well as the socio-economic aspects218.
A parallel organization was established in 1990 in the framework of the 1992
9 1 0Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean , 
adopted by Canada, Japan, the Russian Federation and the USA, and entered into force 
the 21 February 1993. The North Pacific Marine Science Organization, PICES or 
Pacific ICES’, provides assistance and scientific information to the North Pacific 
Anadromous Fish Commission, established under the provisions of Article VIII of the 
Convention. PICES, however, has no explicit role under the Convention. The scientific 
expertise of PICES provides the Commission with assessment research and allowable 
catches of the stocks, and data from States not members of the North Pacific 
Anadromous Fish Commission NPAFC. It also provides data to the statistical 
yearbook220.
2.5.3 The role of FAO
With regard to fisheries, the role of the FAO is derived from its Constitution. Article 1.2 
requires this organization to promote and recommend national and international action 
with respect to the conservation of natural resources and the adoption of improved 
methods of agricultural production. With regard to fisheries, the competence of FAO 
derives from Article XVI, which includes fisheries and marine products in the concept 
of ’agriculture’. Article IV authorizes FAO, by a two-thirds majority, to submit 
conventions on fisheries subjects to its members. Further, FAO has established a 
Committee on Fisheries (COFI) and various committees of fisheries experts, appointed 
by the Director General to advise him.
the whaling conventions, as well as the 1972 Oslo Convention on Dumping (Annex IV, No. 3). See 
Jorgen Wettestad, ‘Science, Politics, and Institutional Design: the Case of the North East Atlantic Land- 
based Pollution Regime’, 18 Marine Policy (1994), pp. 219-238, at 223. For general information about 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES), see http://www.ices.org
218 G. Senior, Fisheries in the Future: Sustainability or Extinction?', Marine Policy, 20 (1996), pp. 91-97.
219 Handbook of the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission, Vancouver, Canada, 1997.
220 NPAFC Annual Report 1996, Vancouver, Canada, 1997 at 36-37.
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Despite the efforts of FAO, fisheries have continued to decline for several reasons: the 
inadequacies of scientific knowledge and management theory; advice given by scientists 
has not been followed; there has been no attempt to limit the number of vessels having
access; and finally, because of the lack of fully international inspection and
0 0 1enforcement . Notwithstanding the serious limitations in the information available, 
FAO reviews, every two years, the state of the world’s fisheries in an authoritative 
report. The FAO analyses with respect to scientific and economic aspects have been 
influential during the negotiations leading to the adoption of almost all the international 
legal instruments concerning fisheries.
In addition, FAO has promoted the adoption of various international legal instruments 
which include the 1994 FAO Compliance Agreement222, the 1995 Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries223 as well as other international instruments relevant for fisheries 
on the high seas224. During the negotiations for the adoption of the 1995 SSA, the 
authoritative participation of FAO has been very useful in highlighting problems of 
excess fishing capacity on the high seas225.
The global scientific consensus with regard to the sustainable use and conservation of 
marine living resources of the high seas was manifested in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, 
which acknowledged over-utilisation of resources and the inadequacy of the 
management of high seas fisheries, including the adoption, monitoring and enforcement 
of effective conservation measures. The problems were identified by Agenda 21 as 
unregulated fishing, overcapitalisation, excessive fleet size, vessel reflagging to escape 
controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and lack of sufficient co­
221 Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 211, pp. 501-502.
222 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures 
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. Text reproduced in 33 ILM 968 (1994).
223 FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Rome, 1995.
224 Ellen Hey, ’Global Fisheries Regulation in the First Half of the 1990’s’, IJMCL, 11 (1996), pp. 459- 
490.
225 David Doulman, Structure and Process of the 1993-1995 United Nations Conference on Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 898, Rome, December 1995. 
See also S. H. Marashi, Summary Information on the Role of International Fishery and Other Bodies with 
regard to the Conservation and Management of Living Resources of the High Seas, FAO Fisheries 
Circular No. 908, Rome, 1996 and Report of the Twenty-First Session of the Committee on Fisheries, 
FAO Fisheries Report No. 524, Rome, 1995.
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operation between states particularly for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. 
Such co-operation should address scientific knowledge regarding inadequacies in 
fishing practices, biological information, fisheries statistics, improvement of systems for 
handling data, multi-species management, relationships among species, especially 
depleted species, and the identification of the potential of under-utilised or unutilised 
populations .
Based on this scientific consensus, UNCED recommended the states to convene, as 
soon as possible, an intergovernmental conference under United Nations auspices, for 
the effective implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
Law of the Sea on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Species227.
2.6 Diplomatic consensus: coastal and fishing States
Persuasion and reconciliation of conflicting interests is the substantive matter of 
diplomacy. The continuing expansion of the international community has imposed 
diverse demands on the contemporary diplomacy228. Alterations in major political 
groupings and ongoing efforts by regional and global negotiating mechanisms to 
maintain minimum levels of international order are the main changes affecting the 
conduct of diplomacy at the end of the twentieth century . Regarding international 
conferences, a distinction is accepted between unanimity, which requires a positive 
approval of all parties and, on the other hand, consensus, which requires the absence of 
substantive objection. Consensus is the most frequently used decision rule in 
international politics. Two major factors, that can positively influence the construction 
of the new regime, drove states to achieve diplomatic consensus in order to conclude a 
multilateral agreement aimed at the coordination and regulation of fishing activities in
226 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, 45.
227 Agenda 21, Chapter 17.49.e.
228 Nigel Howard, ‘Negotiation as Drama: How “Games” Become Dramatic’, International Negotiation, 1 
(1996), pp. 125-152.
229 L. Bjorkbom, 'Resolution of Environmental Problems: the Use of Diplomacy', in John Carroll (Ed.), 
International Environmental Diplomacy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 107.
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the global commons: i) pressures and measures for collective regulation of fisheries 
arising from developing and developed countries alike; ii) the growing and well- 
founded awareness of the extent of fisheries resource depletion in common areas.
Regarding environmental diplomacy, the agenda formation involves several stages by 
which an international issue becomes recognized or emerges onto the political arena; is 
framed for study and debate by the relevant policy communities, including epistemic 
communities; and consolidates on the international political agenda in order to start 
negotiations and decision-making processes. Without rigorous scientific assessment, 
global issues such as depletion of high seas fisheries may emerge only slowly. This is 
why scientific consensus and epistemic communities sharing understanding of the 
problem and policy responses have proved especially influent in environmental 
diplomacy.
2.6.1 Framework of environmental diplomacy
After the first major post-war high-level global conference to discuss environmental 
questions held in Stockholm in 1972, environmental diplomacy has involved an 
increasingly wide range of actors, including States, new intergovernmental 
organizations, the United Nations, international institutions, secretariats, elected 
conference officials and non-governmental organizations. They are the elements in the 
process of negotiating regimes. The relationships between these elements include: co­
ordination, implementation, interdependence and delegation of responsibilities230.
A central aspect of environmental diplomacy is that nature is challenging the definition 
of sovereignty and defying the conventional boundaries established by states . The 
Chernobyl accident clearly illustrated how the physical environment is now integrated 
with human technology on a global scale. The growing attention to planetary ecological 
problems is beginning to pose a serious problem for the traditional theory of 
sovereignty. As Camilleri and Falk point out, the principle of sovereignty is an
230 Chasek, supra, note 203, p. 42.
231 John Carroll, ‘Introduction’ to John Carroll (ed.), supra, note 229, p. 3.
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impediment to actions designed to ameliorate critical ecological dilemmas232. 
Furthermore, according to the same authors, sovereignty is itself a major contributing 
cause of the environmental problems which confront humanity, for technologies of war 
and nuclear technologies attain and could attain high levels of destructiveness not just 
for States but for the biosystem of the earth itself233.
Like climate change, the diplomatic question of straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks is one of a number of important environmental issues that clearly illustrate the 
interests at stake of a wide range of states and groups of States, and the necessity for 
managing and conserving the global commons. The implications for sovereignty of the 
issues of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks have appeared on the international 
political agenda since the late 1980s as a result of the increasing pressures on the 
exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, and the appearance of a 
number of conflicts between coastal and DWFNs234.
2.6.2 The Canadian lega l initiative’
In 1990, Canada launched its so-called legal initiative’235 and convened the 
International Conference on the Conservation and Management of the Living Resources 
of the High Seas which was held in St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada, from 5-7 
September of that year236. This initiative involved consultations with like minded’ 
States, the organization of subsequent conferences and the publication of scientific and 
legal articles. This Conference was attended by legal and scientific experts from 15
232 Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty?. The Politics of a Shrinking and 
Fragmenting World (Aldershot, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1992), p. 179.
233 Ibid.
234 See Sections 1 and 3 of this Chapter.
235 On diplomatic efforts of Canada regarding SFS, see Section 3 of this Chapter.
236 Because of the grave situation facing Newfoundland fishermen in the Northwest Atlantic, Canada 
began to raise the question of conservation and management of high seas fisheries in the United Nations 
in 1990, when it started to prepare for UNCED. Moritaka Hayashi, ‘The Role of the United Nations in 
Managing the World’s Fisheries’, in Blake et al., The Peaceful Management, supra note 101, pp. 373-393, 
p. 377.
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countries (Argentina, Australia, Cape Verde, Chile, the Cook Islands, Iceland, 
Mauritius, Morocco, New Zealand, Peru, Senegal, the United States, Uruguay, and the 
former USSR). The subject of discussion was the problem of straddling stocks in 
connection with the Law of the Sea237.
In this Conference, the experts agreed on four fundamental principles: 1) distant water 
fishing States should co-operate with coastal States; 2) members of regional fishing 
organizations have the duty to ensure their vessels respect conservation measures and do 
not "reflag"; 3) distant water fishing states should ensure that their fishing activities do 
not endanger stocks within the coastal State’s competence; and 4) the managing regime 
for straddling fish stocks on the high seas should be co-ordinated with measures adopted 
for stocks within the coastal states EEZs, the so-called the "consistency rule". This rule 
requires that in the case of straddling stocks, the management regime applied to the 
portion of the stock beyond 200 miles should be consistent with the management regime 
of the coastal State applicable to its 200-mile EEZ/EFZ. The two last principles (3 and 
4) were not adopted unanimously because they raised the controversial issue of coastal 
State sovereignty over the management of fish stocks within the EEZ238.
2.6.3 The ‘Santiago Text’
The next conference, convened by the United Nations, was held in May 1991, in 
Santiago, Chile. The Delegates to this conference adopted "the Santiago Text" on the 
basis of recommendations of experts from Canada, Chile and New Zealand, taking into 
account the conclusions of the St. John’s Conference. The Santiago Text emphasized 
three main issues: first, the coastal State’s special interest; secondly, the co-ordination of 
conservation measures between the high seas fishing States and coastal States, and 
thirdly, protection from the negative impact on resources within the EEZ of high seas 
fishing activities239.
237 "La Conference de St. John's recherche des solutions juridiques a la surpeche en haute mer", 
Gouvemement du Canada, Communique No. 188 du 4 Septembre 1990.
238 Fauteux, supra, note 175, p. 55.
239 Keiver, supra, note 174, p. 542.
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The Santiago Text was re-examined and discussed again in Geneva, in September 1991 
during the third session of the preparations (Prep-Com) for UNCED240. In this Prep- 
Com, the Santiago Text was entitled "Document L.16". However, before the third Prep- 
Com, the United Nations Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UNOALOS) 
convened a Meeting of the Group of Technical Experts on High Seas Fisheries on 22-26 
July 1991 with a view to drafting guidelines to assist states in improving the level of co­
operation in the conservation and management of all such fisheries. The Group of 
Technical Experts suggested specific guidelines, which included the obligation to co­
operate, which should be articulated more fully between States; the obligation to settle 
disputes in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS and define the responsibilities 
of fisheries organizations concerned with high seas fisheries. It should be noted that the 
Guidelines did not, as did the St. John’s Conference, confirm the "consistency rule"241.
On 6-8 May 1992, in Cancun, Mexico, the International Conference on Responsible 
Fisheries adopted a Declaration calling upon States to resolve as soon as possible, the 
differences which still existed on the proposal made at the Prep-Com and to convene an 
intergovernmental conference on high seas fisheries, as a prelude to the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development242. In June 1992, UNCED concluded in 
Agenda 21, that:
States should take effective action, including bilateral and multilateral 
co-operation, where appropriate at the sub regional, regional and global 
levels, to ensure that high seas fisheries are managed in accordance with 
the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
In particular, States should convene, as soon as possible an 
intergovernmental conference under United Nations auspices, taking into 
account relevant activities at the sub regional, regional and global levels, 
with a view to promoting effective implementation of the provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. The conference, drawing, inter 
alia, on scientific and technical studies by FAO, should identify and 
assess existing problems related to the conservation and management of 
such fish stocks, and consider means of improving on fisheries among
240 Fauteux, supra, note 175, pp. 56-57.
241 Kwiatkowska, The High Seas Fisheries’, supra, note 131, p. 346.
242 N. Bonucci, 'An International Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing', RECIEL, 2 (1993), pp. 242- 
251.
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states, and formulate appropriate recommendations. The work and results 
of the conference should be fully consistent with the provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular, the 
rights and obligations of coastal states and states fishing on the high
243seas .
On 22 December 1992, in its 93rd meeting, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 47/192, establishing the Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Species. This Resolution reaffirmed in paragraph 2 that the 
conference should draw on scientific and technical studies of the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) to identify and assess existing problems related to the conservation 
and management of such fish stocks; consider means of improving fisheries co­
operation among states and formulate, as soon as possible, appropriate 
recommendations244.
Shortly before the Conference, strong but divided opinions existed regarding the 
objectives of the conference and negotiating blocs began to form. The like-minded 
states’ at this time predominantly consisted of developing coastal states with artisanal 
fisheries that were concerned to ensure protection of migratory fish species and desired 
regulation of the activities of DWFNs (such as China, the EU, Japan, Korea and Poland) 
in their waters. All participants at this meeting endorsed the necessity for a legally- 
binding instrument to achieve these goals.
2.6.4 The FAO Technical Consultations
Since 1990, technical consultations have also been held within FAO itself. The most 
relevant to straddling stocks was the FAO Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing 
held in Rome, in September 1992245. This Technical Consultation led to the adoption of 
the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas246. Another conference was
243 Agenda 21, Ch. 17.49.
244 UNGA Official Records, New York, A/RES/47/192, 93rd Plenary Meeting, 22 December 1992.
245 See Levy, Selected Documents, supra, note 113, pp. 273-300.
246 G. Moore, The Food and Agriculture Organization Compliance Agreement’, IJMCL, 10 (1993), pp. 
413-417.
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convened by Mexico in consultation with FAO in Cancun. This conference adopted the 
Cancun Declaration, which eventually led to the adoption of the 1995 Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries247. Although the latter is not legally-binding, both instruments 
contain specific provisions and arrangements based on relevant rules of international 
law for the conservation and management of fisheries on the high seas and the Code has 
since been complemented and implemented by 8 sets of FAO Technical Guidelines for 
Responsible Fisheries .
2.6.5 The UN Conference on SFS in context
The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Species was held at the United Nations headquarters in New York, in six sessions, 
which extended from April 1993 to August 1995. An initial technical consultation was 
held on 7-15 September under FAO auspices249. The FAO Technical Consultations 
provided important knowledge and data during the negotiations. The Conference was 
influenced by four groups of States. First, the extreme coastal States group of Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, in association with the activist coastal States: Canada, 
Argentina and Norway. This group of States embraced a combination of diverse 
interests extending predominantly from concerns related to straddling stocks and 
migratory species in and beyond the EEZ/EFZ. Secondly, the high seas fishing group 
consisting of Japan, Korea, Poland and China. Thirdly, the group of States with divided 
interests, such as United States of America, or more focused concerns, as in the case of 
the Russian Federation over the Bering Sea. Fourthly, the group of moderate reformist 
States represented mainly by Australia and New Zealand. In addition, a large number of
247 Bonucci, supra, note 242, p. 249.
248 FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries: No. 1, Fishing Operations (Vessel Monitoring 
System); No. 2, Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries and Species Introductions; No. 3, 
Integration of Fisheries into Coastal Area Management; No. 4, Fisheries Management; No. 5, 
Aquaculture Development; No. 6, Inland Fisheries; No. 7, Responsible Fish Utilization; and No. 8, 
Indicators for Sustainable Development of Marine Capture Fisheries. Information as available on 
10/05/00 http://www.fao.org/fi/agreem/codecond/codecon.asp
249 See Levy, Selected Documents, supra, note 113, pp. 300-371.
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developing country coastal States can be identified. These were unorganised and their 
interests were represented almost exclusively by India and Indonesia250.
Two main features can be drawn from the substantive phases of the United Nations 
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Species. First, the 
process of expanding negotiation and second, the role and the methods used by the 
Chairman of the Conference, Ambassador Satya Nandan from Fiji. In the process of 
negotiation as interactive problem solving device, four components can be described: 
identification and analysis of the problem; joint shaping of ideas for solution; 
influencing the other side; and the creation of a supportive political environment. In this 
framework, the ultimate goal of negotiation requires an agreement that addresses the 
fundamental needs and fears of both sets of parties on a basis of reciprocity251. Fisheries 
negotiations for multilateral agreements adapt to this diplomatic framework. A main 
feature of the Conference on Straddling Stocks is that most of its main sessions met in 
informal consultations involving the chair or hosted by leading diplomatic actors and 
were not subdivided on a collegiate basis into sub-working committees.
2.6.6 Progress at the Conference
The first (organizational) session of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was held at UN Headquarters in New York 
from 19-23 April 1993. The delegates adopted a list of issues, the agenda of the 
conference and the rules of procedure. The Conference agreed that all substantive issues 
would remain under the responsibility of the plenary and that no more than two 
simultaneous meetings, formal or informal, would be scheduled252. Ambassador Satya 
Nandan, Chairman of the Conference, was requested to prepare a paper containing a list
250 For the first four sessions of the Conference see David Doulman, ‘Perspectives on the Management of 
High Seas Fisheries: the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: a 
View from Rome’, Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 5 (1995), pp. 103-119.
251 Herbert C. Kelman, 'Negotiating as Interactive Problem Solving', International Negotiation, 1 (1996),
p. 116.
252 Doc. A/CONF. 164/3 on Organization of Work, dated 22 April 1993, reproduced in Levy et al. (eds.), 
Selected Documents, supra, note 113, pp. 17-18.
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of substantive subjects and issues to guide the Conference in order to speed the process 
given its urgency. Delegations were asked to submit their proposals to the Secretariat.
The second session was held in July 1993. Guided by the Chairman, the plenary 
addressed the major issues. The plenary held formal sessions on each of the issues 
outlined and then adjourned to allow informal consultations to continue. At each of 
these meetings the Chairman presented the group with a working paper that summarized 
the issues raised in the Plenary and in papers submitted by interested delegations253. In 
this substantive session, positions of the delegates to the Conference became clear 
regarding the three main issues. First, was a highly controversial issue, the management 
of fish stocks, which raised questions about the role of sovereignty. One group of states 
advanced the claim that fish stocks could and should be managed as one biological 
mass, in opposition to another group of States, which maintained support for the 
division of fish stocks along political and territorial boundaries. Some coastal States 
maintained that any allusion to the EEZ should be eliminated from the negotiating 
text254. This issue dominated the conference proceedings from the beginning to the end 
of negotiations. The like-minded leading group comprising Argentina, Canada, Chile, 
Iceland, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Peru and other Latin American countries, 
sought to secure enhanced coastal State jurisdiction. Opposing that group were the 
DWFNs comprising the EU, China, Japan, Korea and Poland, which resisted the 
"creeping jurisdiction" of coastal States. Obviously, certain divisions existed in each of 
the principal groups of States. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency was the only 
group acting with a unified voice .
The second major issue concerned flag state’s responsibilities for its fishing vessels on 
the high seas, as well as those concerning vessels, ports and regional fisheries 
organizations of coastal states. A consensus document was approved under FAO 
auspices, which led to the adoption, on 24 November 1993, of the FAO Agreement to 
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by
253 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, July 1993.
254 Keiver, supra, note 174, at 557.
255 Judith Swan, Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention. Straddling and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks and High Seas Fishing’, Paper Presented at the Thirty-First Annual Law of the Sea Institute 
Conference, University of Miami, 30-31 March 1998.
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0Fishing Vessels on the High Seas . At this time, the FAO also started to draft the Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.
The third issue discussed at the second substantive session of the Conference was the 
precautionary approach257. A group of States (EU, Japan and Korea) maintained that the 
precautionary approach, as outlined in the 1992 Rio Declaration applied only to 
pollution matters, not to fisheries management. Conversely, other delegations, which 
included Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Trinidad, Norway, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Iceland, Canada, the Solomon Islands and the United States argued that the 
precautionary approach contained in the Rio Declaration, applied in all fields of natural
258resources management .
During the third session in March 1994, the delegates continued discussions left 
unresolved at the end of the second session. Some coastal States proposed that unilateral 
measures could be adopted if agreement could not be reached regarding an acceptable 
regime to control fisheries on the high seas. Thus, the final outcome of the conference 
was uncertain given that all the issues were strongly contested. Many coastal States 
sought to ensure that recommendations would apply to straddling and highly migratory 
fish stocks found both within and beyond the EEZ259.
At the close of the session, the Chairman, at the Conference request, tabled a revised 
negotiating text dated 23 November 1993260. The negotiating text covered the nature of 
conservation and management measures to be established through co-operation; 
mechanisms for co-operation; regional fisheries management organizations or 
arrangements; duties of the flag state; compliance and enforcement of high seas 
fisheries conservation and management measures; port states; non-parties to sub 
regional or regional organizations or arrangements; dispute settlement; compatibility
256 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures 
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, supra, note 222.
257 The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management will be analysed in Chapter 3, Section 5.
258 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, July 1993.
259 Meltzer, supra, note 34, p. 327.
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and coherence between national and international conservation measures for the same 
stock; special requirements of developing countries; review of the implementation of 
conservation and management measures; and two annexes, one regarding minimum data 
requirements for the conservation and management of stocks and the other on 
arbitration261.
9A9The revised negotiating text (RNT) was discussed during the fourth session (August 
1994) and consultations were carried out in Informal-informals” sessions. General 
comments were incorporated in the negotiating text. During the second week of 
discussions, the Chairman issued a Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks ("The Draft Agreement"). Based on the comments received from 
delegations, the Draft Agreement consisted of 48 articles, thirteen parts and two 
annexes. It was considerably improved and included a number of proposals. First, in 
Part III, mechanisms for international co-operation concerning conservation and 
management of straddling stocks were provided. Secondly, in Part V, specific 
mechanisms of compliance and enforcement are outlined for conservation measures of 
stocks on the high seas. Thirdly, Part VIII endorsed the obligation to settle disputes 
peacefully and outlined related compulsory mechanisms263. The arrest by Canadian 
coast guards of the Spanish Fishing Vessel “Estai” on 9 March 1995 marked the fourth 
session of the Conference. This international incident emphasized the need for the 
adoption of a legally-binding agreement which included specific and improved 
mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes264.
In the fifth session (27 March to 12 April 1995), considerable disagreement on changes 
to the text of the revised Draft Agreement remained regarding two controversial issues: 
first, contentious issues concerning "areas of high seas forming an enclave surrounded
260 Document A/CONF. 164/13, Negotiating Text Prepared by the Chairman of the Conference”. This 
document was reissued by the Secretariat on 23 November 1993 as Document A/CONF. 164/13. 
Reproduced in Ldvy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113, pp. 73-81.
261 Ibid, p. 73.
262 Ibid.
263 Doc. A/CONF. 164/22, in Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113, p. 621.
264 See Section 4 of this Chapter.
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entirely by areas under the national jurisdiction of one state"265; secondly, "boarding and 
inspection by port states"266 as one of the mechanisms of port State enforcement267.
One inter-sessional meeting was held in Washington in June 1995, hosted by the 
American government. At this meeting, various coastal States and DWFNs discussed 
"the boarding and inspection issue" which was included under Article 21. Furthermore, 
one "pre-session" consultation meeting, attended by approximately twenty delegations, 
was held in New York at the UN Headquarters from 19 to 21 July 1995. The American 
delegation prepared a "non-paper", a document seeking a middle ground position, and 
the EU and Japan each presented an alternative text. Despite the two inter-sessional 
meetings, no agreement was reached concerning the final phrasing of the draft articles 
on boarding and inspection and the precautionary approach .
In the sixth (final) session held at the UN Headquarters in New York from 24 July to 4 
August 1995, the Chairman circulated a Revised Text of the Draft Agreement270 aimed 
at harmonizing the text in all UN official languages. Following the delivering of general 
statements in an informal plenary, the Chair held a series of informal consultations 
concerning the two controversial issues, at which they were resolved. The informal 
consultations were thus successfully concluded and Ambassador Nandan was able to 
report to the Plenary that the Conference had just adopted an historic, far-sighted, far- 
reaching, bold and revolutionary instrument. The delegates then formally adopted the 
Draft Agreement and afforded Ambassador Nandan a standing ovation.
In his Chairman’s statement on 4 August 1995, Ambassador Nandan outlined the link 
between the Agreement and the Convention on the Law of the Sea; the latter was 
reflected throughout the practical and realistic provisions of the former. According to
265 Doc. A/CONF. 164/22, Art. 14. Reproduced in Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113, 
pp. 621-652.
266 Ibid, Art. 21.
267 See Section 3, Chapter 6
268 See Chapter 6, Section 4. Chapter 6
269 See Section 3.3.7, Chapter 3
270 Doc. A/CONF. 164/CPR.7 “Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, Reproduced in Levy et al. 
(eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113.
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the Chairman, the Agreement is built on three essential pillars. The first pillar sets out
the principles on which conservation and management of the stocks must be based271
010and establishes that these are based on the precautionary approach and the best 
available scientific information273. The second pillar ensures that the conservation and 
management measures are adhered to and complied with, and that they are not 
undermined by those who fish for the stocks. The third pillar is the provision for 
peaceful settlement of disputes. The Chairman concluded that the Agreement provides a 
framework that promotes good order in the oceans and establishes detailed minimum 
international standards for the conservation and management of straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks274.
The Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks had to break new 
ground in several areas as an exercise in regime building in order to cover the gaps left 
by UNCLOS275. The extensive range of interests involved underlined the complex 
nature of the Conference and the difficulties of reaching agreement: coastal "reformist" 
States, DWFNs, developing coastal States, flag States (registering countries), flag States 
(State of Registration), newly industrialized import or transit States, intergovernmental 
fisheries organizations, FAO, a variety of NGO’s and the debate on coastal State 
sovereignty against the freedom to fish on the high seas. Furthermore, the Conference is 
a classic example of a modem chair-led multilateral negotiation based on the ’consensus 
fiction’.
The diplomatic consensus reached at the Conference directly led to the adoption of the 
1995 SSA276. However, the increasing pressures for collective regulation of fisheries, 
the development of the concept of the presential sea, Canada’s fisheries regulations, the 
Estai Case and the scientific consensus on the depletion of fish stocks, have also
271 Article 5 of the SSA. See Chapter 3, in particular Section 3.3.
272 See Section 3.3.7, Chapter 3
273 See Sections 2 and 4, Chapter 5
274 Doc. A/CONF. 164/35, in Ldvy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113, pp. 749-754
275 See Section 2, Chapter 3
276 Donald Grzybowski (ed.), ‘A Historic Perspective Leading up to and Including the United Nations 
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’, Pace Environmental Law 
Review, 13 (1995), pp. 49-74.
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indirectly shaped the process of adoption of the Agreement. This "convergence of 
factors" can positively influence both the construction of the new environmental regime 
for fisheries on the high seas and the implementation of the 1995 SSA itself.
Conclusions
The question of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks was an important matter left 
unresolved by the 1982 UNCLOS. Articles 63.2 and 114-120 fell short in making 
appropriate provisions for the problem of conserving stocks occurring within the EEZ of 
two or more coastal States or both within the EEZ and the area beyond and adjacent to 
it.
The problems associated with high seas fisheries began to attract attention on the 
international agenda from the early 1990’s because of stock depletion and conflicts 
involving coastal States and DWFNs in the Northeast Atlantic leading to the ‘Estai 
Case’ between Spain and Canada off the Grand banks, the Bering Sea, the Southwest 
Atlantic and the Pacific. These issues have been addressed in various international fora. 
Scientific and diplomatic consensus regarding the need for new developments for the 
conservation and management of world’s fisheries were evidenced in Agenda 21, 
Chapter 17, as well as in the FAO Technical Consultations of 1992.
Four groups of States exerted considerable diplomatic pressure in an attempt to 
influence the SFS negotiations at substantive stages. First, an extreme coastal State 
group was led by a core-group consisting of Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iceland New 
Zealand, Norway and Peru, which centred mainly on issues concerning compatibility of 
conservation and management measures and the role of fisheries organizations and 
arrangements. Secondly, a high seas fishing group focused on issues relating to the 
compatibility of conservation and management measures. Thirdly, one group of States 
which had divided interests. Fourthly, a group of moderate reformist States existed. The 
legal and political constraints pursued by various countries which strongly affected the 
course of the negotiations have already been outlined in this chapter. It is however 
important to realise that the negotiations were also significantly affected throughout by 
certain important specific events which occurred outside the formal negotiating forum:
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the emergence of the ‘Presential Sea’ doctrine articulated by Chile; the extended 
fisheries jurisdiction asserted by Canada; and finally, the I d ’s judgement and 
subsequent developments and implications of the ‘Estai Case’, including the 
accommodation of interests between Canada and the EU following this.
A study by Jonsson indicates that the adoption of an agreement requires a formula, a
977
shared perception or definition of the problem . According to this approach, in the 
negotiating process, the exchange of concessions is less important than the development 
of common perceptions278. Thus, the common perception or the 'core-anchoring 
concept’ facilitates the negotiating process. The core-anchoring concept upon which the 
new environmental regime for fisheries on the high seas is being established is the 
equation of duties and rights between coastal States and States fishing on the high seas
970
contained in the general principles of the 1995 SSA . The emphasis on the use of 
informal working groups280 adopted by the UN Conference on Straddling Stocks may be
901
used as a model for global negotiations even of a specialist kind . The emergence of 
this multilateral mode of diplomacy involves a shift to a novel form of diplomacy based 
on equality between groups of States, which Gottlieb called parity diplomacy282.
277 Christer Jonsson, 'Cognitive Factors in Explaining Regime Dynamics', in Rittberger et al. (eds.)., 
Regime Theory, supra, note 50, pp. 202-222, at 217.
278 Ibid.
279 1995 SSA, Art. 5. The issue of the legal equation of duties and rights between coastal States and States 
fishing on the high seas will be analysed in detail through Chapter 3.
280 According to Barston, in informal multilateral diplomacy, negotiations are conducted without 
extensive rules of procedure and States tend to participate more on an individual basis rather than on 
coalition or subregional group basis. See R. P. Barston, Modem Diplomacy, (London, Longman, Second 
Edition, 1997), p. 170.
281 Ibid, p. 196.
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Chapter 3 
The general principles of the new regime for international fisheries 
Introduction
Since the XVIth century, the freedom of the seas has been a pivotal principle in 
international law. However, over the last half century, technology has increased abilities 
to exploit ocean resources, stimulating countries to exclude other countries from the 
resources and to widen the area under their jurisdiction283. The dimension of that 
principle has been reshaped by the 1973-1982 United Nations Conference on Law of the 
Sea which can be seen as involving in particular two main features: the freedom of 
navigation and the freedom of fishing. This chapter explores the explanations that might 
account for the impact of the freedom of the seas as a binding principle of international 
law upon the international regime of fisheries on the high seas. The examination of the 
core provisions of the 1995 SSA suggests that, as a starting point at least, this principle 
is now becoming bounded by the terms of the Agreement.
The legal and economic implications of freedom of fishing, which are closely linked to 
the status of fisheries as a common property resource, are analysed in section one. The 
chapter then considers, in section two, the consequences of the extension of national 
jurisdiction over world fisheries in the 1982 UNCLOS, the international legal 
instrument providing the legal framework for fisheries on the high seas. The core legal 
provisions of the 1995 SSA, as a set of innovative rules to conserve and manage SFS 
and HMFS will be then discussed in section three of the chapter, under the following 
headings: conservation and management measures as the objective of the Agreement; 
sustainability and protection of biological diversity; the large marine ecosystem (LME) 
approach; protection of the marine environment; monitoring, control and surveillance; 
the interest of artisanal and subsistence fishermen; the precautionary approach and, 
finally, the general obligation to pursue co-operation with sub-regional or regional
282 Gideon Gottlieb, ‘Global Bargaining: the Legal and Diplomatic Framework’, in Richard Falk, F. 
Kratochwil and S. Mendlovitz, International Law: A Contemporary Perspective, (London, Westview 
Press, 1985), at 210.
283 See Patricia Birnie, ‘New Technologies’, supra, note 33.
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fisheries management organizations or arrangements. There is no fisheries equivalent of 
the “Polluter Pays Principle”. It has been concluded that the costs of depleted fisheries, 
degraded marine habitats, and impoverished ecosystems are passed on to society, thus 
representing large subsidies to an already heavily subsidized industry, in particular in 
developed countries284.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that, in developing a balanced 
legal relationship between the relevant interests of coastal and fishing States, the 1995 
SSA is consistent, though not fully consistent, with UNCLOS. The Agreement goes 
beyond the 1982 Convention on many issues, and provides, coupled with the support of 
other international instruments, the legal basis for a new regime of fisheries on the high 
seas.
3.1 High seas fisheries: a common property resource
In a broad sense, the global commons are areas in which resources are open to access to 
and use of all the international community, and are not under the jurisdiction of any 
state; examples are the oceans, atmosphere, deep-sea bed and Antarctica. Global 
commons are areas beyond the jurisdiction of sovereign States. Global commons, being 
owned in common rather than privately, are also referred to as 'common pool 
resources'285. Common-property regimes exhibit varying degrees of efficiency and 
sustainability, depending on the rules, which emerge from collective decision 
making286.
In 1968 Garrett Hardin put forward an influential model to explain why communities 
may nonetheless continue to over-exploit shared environmental resources even where 
they are aware that they are doing so and are aware that is against their long-term 
interests. He expressed this as 'The Tragedy of the Commons'287. The theoretical basis
284 Greenpeace USA Report, “Sinking Fast”, (Washington, Greenpeace, 1996).
285 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 12-13 and 29-33.
286 Tietenberg, supra, note 10, p. 49.
287 Garrett Hardin, Science, 162, (13 December 1968), pp. 1243-1248.
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of this concept of the tragedy of the commons shows how it is possible that ’rational’ 
individual actions can lead to Irrational’ collective practices resulting in catastrophic 
over-exploitation of common resources. Where, for example, there is unregulated and 
open access to an over-fished sea, each fisher continues to have an individual interest in 
maximizing his catch of fish. Each fisher gains the full extra benefit of catching 
additional fish, while the cost of over exploitation is shared by all of the communities 
that fish the sea. The tragedy is that this process continues until fish stock is almost 
wholly destroyed along with the fishing communities that depend on them288.
3.1.1 Game theory: the prisoners’ dilemma
Game Theory has developed a conceptual apparatus, based on games involving two-
9RQpersons to model a wide range of social situations . These games can enhance 
theoretical appreciation of the factors that inhibit collaboration in an anarchic context290. 
Hardin's model can be associated with the game known as the 'Prisoners’ Dilemma'291. 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma scenario has been described as follows: two suspects are taken 
into custody and separated. The district attorney is certain that they are guilty of a 
specific crime, but he does not have adequate evidence to convict them at a trial. He 
points out to each prisoner that each has two choices: to confess to the crime the police 
are sure they have done, or not to confess. If neither confesses, then the district attorney 
tells them that he will charge them on some minor made-up charge such as petty larceny 
and illegal possession of a weapon, and that they will both receive minor punishment; if 
they both confess, they will be prosecuted, but he will recommend that they do not 
receive the most severe sentence; but if one confesses and the other does not, then the
288 Ibid, p. 1244.
289 Steven Brams, Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration, (London, 
Routledge, 1990), p. 63. Other applications of the Game Theory are analysed in Section 2, Chapter 4 
(New Organizations and New Arrangements) and in Section 5, Chapter 5 (Participatory Rights) of this 
thesis.
290 Steven Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict, (New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1985), p. 164.
291 The Prisoners’ Dilemma has been attributed to Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher and formalized by 
Albert Tucker. See R. Campbell, 'Background for the Uninitiated', in R. Campbell and L. Soweden (eds.), 
Paradoxes of Rationality and Co-operation, (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1985), at 
125 and passim.
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former will receive lenient treatment for turning state’s evidence whereas the latter will 
get the charge292.
The logic associated with the Prisoners Dilemma, if applied in international relations, 
gives a wide range of irrational outcomes in the international arena that can explain in 
rational terms why States have persisted in over-fishing the seas, polluting the 
atmosphere, selling arms to undesirable regimes, and promoting policies that inhibit 
trade. All essentially represents cases in which States have chosen to pursue competitive 
rather than collaborative strategies, because they expect the other members of the 
present anarchic inter-State system to pursue competitive strategies293. The Prisoners 
Dilemma explains why anarchy inhibits collaboration but it also indicates that States 
can benefit from acknowledging the advantages of collaboration. However, States are 
inhibited from moving to collaborative strategies by their expectation that the other 
States will defect from it. The Prisoners’ Dilemma demonstrates the importance of 
identifying a mechanism that will convince all actors that there is no danger of defection 
by any one of them. The establishment of international regimes now provides evidence 
that mechanisms of this kind can and must exist294, if collapse of fisheries, in particular, 
is not to occur. Relevant for this thesis and for International Regime Theory, Elinor 
Ostrom has strongly advocated that social scientists engage in model building in order 
to address the above adverse analysis of these aspects of common property resources295.
The Prisoners’ Dilemma indicates that states acknowledge the advantages of 
collaboration and explains why anarchy inhibits cooperation. States are inhibited from 
moving to collaborative actions by their expectations that other states will defect. The 
Prisoners’ Dilemma indicates that market failures occur because in an anarchic system 
there is an expectation that states will compete rather than cooperate. Therefore, the 
theoretical reason for establishing a new international regime is the principle of
292 K. W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1968), at 
120.
293 Andrew Kydd and Duncan Snidal, Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of International Regimes’, 
in Rittberger, Regime Theory, supra, note 50, pp. 112-137, at 118-119.
294 Ibid, p. 116.
295 According to Ostrom, contemporary studies in the theory of public and social choice, the economics of 
transactions costs, the new institutional economics, law and economics, game theory, and many related
reciprocity by which there is no incentive to defect from the mutually collaborative 
strategies.
3.1.2 The market failure approach
The problems concerning access to the global commons and ownership of natural 
resources in the commons have been widely studied in economic theory296. In addition 
to game theory, the “market failure approach”297 provides an analytical tool that is 
widely used to explain the classical problem relating to collective action on the global 
commons 298. Thus, concepts like public goods, externalities, non-exclusion, non-rivalry 
and asymmetric information, related to market failure, provide valuable insights into the 
legal approach of the commons. A market is an exchange institution299 that serves 
society by organising economic activity using pricing to communicate the wants and 
limits of a diffuse and diverse society in order to facilitate co-ordinated economic
fields, are making important contributions that need to be carried forward in theoretically informed and 
empirical inquiries on how institutions work. See Ostrom, supra, note 285, p. 216.
296 W. Baumol and W. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy, (New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 1988); O. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, (New York, Free Press, 1985); G. 
Stevenson, Common Property Economics: A General Theory and Land Use Applications (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
297 Although in microeconomics theory unrestrained market provides the most effective mechanism for 
the production of economic goods, it is accepted that the market is not effective when it comes to the 
production of public goods like roads, hospitals, and common-property resources in the global commons. 
Even in a fundamentally market-based social system, there are reasons for the State to supplant the 
market in the distribution of valued resources taking into account that the market under-produces public 
goods and positive externalities. See Robert Goodin, ‘The Contribution of Political Science’, in Robert 
Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, (London, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1995), pp. 157-182, at 170.
298 Collective action can simply be defined as people acting together in pursuit of interests they share. See 
Anthony Giddens, Sociology, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997), p. 508. In problems with respect to 
collective action to provide public goods, benefits will accrue to people whether or not they contribute to 
the costs of their production, so everyone would rationally wait for others to contribute, which being 
equally rational, they would not. The upshot is that public goods will be systematically underprovided 
through voluntary efforts among rational actors. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. 
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1971); 
Lars Udehn, The Limits of Public Choice. A Sociological Critique of the Economic Theory of Politics, 
(London, Routledge, 1996); Russell Hardin, Collective Action, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1982).
299 According to Langton, commodities require the rise of the market and the rise of the exchange 
economy, which are the antecedents to the rise of capitalism and for which money is also necessary as a 
measure of the relative value of other commodities. In addition, maximum mutual economic benefit 
comes from maximum freedom to enter into exchange relationships. See John Langton, ‘The Origins of 
the Capitalist World Economy’, in Douglas, Huggett and Robinson (eds.), A Companion Encyclopaedia 
of Geography, supra, note 107, pp. 206-227, at 207.
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decisions in the most efficient manner300. Adam Smith’s invisible hand and optimal 
private decisions based on mutually advantageous exchange lead to optimal social 
outcomes301. But in the case of environmental assets, markets can fail if pricing does not 
accurately communicate society’s desires and constraints302.
Market failure occurs when private decisions based on prices, or lack of them, do not 
generate efficient allocation of resources. Such inefficiency implies that resources could 
be reallocated to make at least one person better off without making anyone else worse 
off; a wedge is driven between what individuals want privately and what society wants 
as a collective303. In a well-functioning economy, however, in which every activity has a 
price, property rights are defined and protected, competition is rigorous, and market 
information is complete, the free pursuit of self-interest by individuals leads by an 
’invisible hand’ to an efficient outcome. The very presence of market failure means that 
some form of intervention on a collective basis among the economic agents may be 
needed.
300 In the most literal and immediate sense, markets are places in which things are bought and sold. In the 
modem industrial system, the concept of market has expanded to include the whole geographical area in 
which sellers compete with each other for customers. In addition, along with globalisation and the growth 
of trade in goods, there has been a proliferation of financial markets, including securities exchanges and 
money markets. See Wolfgang Sachs, ‘The Economist’s Prejudice’, in Paul Ekins and Manfred Max-Neef 
(eds.), Real Life Economics. Understanding Wealth Creation, (London, Routledge, 1992), pp. 5-10, at 7.
301 See Chapter 1, Section 1. According to Milton Friedman, the founder of the Chicago School, 
ecological values can find their natural space in the market, like other consumer demand and the problems 
of the environment, like any other problem, can be resolved through price mechanisms, through 
transactions between producer and consumer, each with his own interests. This thought has been strongly 
contested by many other economists. Thus, Paul Samuelson: “market mechanisms alone cannot be 
counted on to solve the environmental problems which economists classify under the heading of 
‘externalities’”; Wassily Leontief: “relying on the market alone is nonsense”; Alfred Hirschman: 
“government intervention is necessary; the only people who think differently are the market-ffeaks, most 
of them neoclassical economists”; Immanuel Wallerstein: “the market does not touch environmental 
factors and has no interest in them; it doesn’t deal with any such problem and never has; in matters of 
environment the market would move in the opposite direction”; Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen: 
“mainstream economists have formed a sort of circle to protect the dogma that the market knows what it’s 
doing and prices will take care of every problem. This is just an economic fantasy, and the state of the 
environment is proof of this”. See Carla Ravaioli (ed.), supra, note 22, pp. 32-38.
302 See James R. Khan, The Economic Approach to Environmental and Natural Resources, (Harcourt, The 
Dryden Press, 1998), pp. 11-29.
303 Questions of the performance of the market and the corresponding role of the government lie at the 
heart of the most present day theories of distributive justice. Markets have well known potentials for 
promoting liberty and welfare, but they often fail to realize that potential, and correcting those market 
failures carries clear distributional consequences. The main conclusion to be drawn from the public 
choice theories is that we should propose only theories for which there exists the motivation, as well as 
the power and the information, that would be required to implement them. See Serge-Christophe Kolm, 
‘Distributive Justice’, in Goodin and Pettit (eds.), supra, note 297, pp. 438-461, at 455. See also John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 270-274.
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Market failure can result from an externality, can be associated with public goods, and 
may result from property rights that are either undefined or owned in common with 
unrestricted or open access. As a source of market failure, ’externality’ is an 
interdependency among two or more individuals or nations that is not taken into account 
by a market transaction. An externality represents an impact without a contract304. A 
(technological) externality exists "when an unintended side effect of one or more 
parties’ actions affects the utility or production possibilities of one or more other parties, 
and there is no contract between the parties or price system governing the impact"305. 
All externalities lead to distortions of consumer choices, either directly, because the 
externality affects consumers directly, or indirectly, because externalities in production
ms
cause prices to diverge from marginal social cost .
Public goods307 represent another important cause of market failure in global problems 
concerned with, for example, the removal of pollution, the elimination of disease, the 
accumulation of knowledge, the provision of security, and the forecasting of 
disasters308. It has been suggested by economists that universal public goods include 
assurances of peace and security from military and non-military threats, policies and 
institutions to facilitate various global activities, transport and communications
304 Natural resources are scarce and some uses are incompatible with others. This means that one person’s 
use affects the welfare of others. The consequence of one person’s use is that another use is denied. There 
is an unavoidable effect external to the user. In this sense, externalities are ubiquitous and reciprocal and 
the stuff of scarcity and incompatibility. See Allan Schmid, The Environment and Property Rights 
Issues’, in Bromley (ed.), The Handbook of Environmental Economics, supra, note 23, pp. 61-88.
305 Jonathan A. Lesser, Daniel E. Dodds, and Richard O. Zerbe Jr., Environmental Economics and Policy, 
(Reading, Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1997), p. 111.
306 Ibid, p. 132.
307 Public goods are those that exhibit both consumption indivisibilities and non-excludability and present 
a particularly complex category of environmental resources. Consumption is said to be indivisible when 
one person’s consumption of a good does not diminish the amount available for others. Several common 
environmental resources are public goods, such as the landscape, clean air and clean water. Public “bads” 
such as dirty air and dirty water are also possible. See Tietenberg, supra, note 10, at 51-52. The modem 
theory of public goods derives largely from a paper by Paul Samuelson, ‘The Pure Theory of Public 
Expenditure’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 36 (1954), at 387-389.
308 Tietenberg, supra, note 10, p. 51.
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channels, numerous facets of the environment including the ozone layer, the 
atmosphere, clean air, unpolluted oceans and transnational lakes, rivers and seas309.
As already noted, the class of public goods is large and can vary in terms of the degree 
of non-rivalry and the extent of non-excludability310. Non-rivalry goods311 are rare even 
within the commons and the concept indicates that one person’s use of a good does not 
deprive others of similar benefits. Therefore, once goods like fish, minerals, radio 
frequencies or satellite orbital positions become scarce, there will be ’rivalry’ between
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consumers . Non-excludability refers to a circumstance in which, once the resource is 
provided, even those who fail to pay for it cannot be excluded from enjoying the 
benefits it confers313.
Intergenerational externalities such as the release of high-level radiation, the loss of 
biodiversity, and global warming, constitute another important class of external effects 
in which uncompensated interdependency is found among the different generations. 
From an intergenerational perspective, these externalities are unidirectional, since an 
earlier generation’s actions can influence a future generation but not the other way 
around314.
A third source of market failure may stem from common-property resources315. These 
resources are either undefined or owned in common with unrestricted access or common
309 Ruben Mendez, ‘The Provision and Financing of Universal Public Goods’, in Meghnad Desai and Paul 
Redfem (eds.), Global Governance. Ethics and Economics of the World Order, (London, Pinter, 1995), p. 
43.
310 A good is non-excludable to the extent that it is difficult or costly to operate a system of charges, 
denying access to the good to people who do not pay the charge. Coastal protection against floods is a 
good example of a non-excludable, as well as non-rival good. See Shaun Hargreaves Heap, Martin Hollis 
et al (eds.)., The Theory of Choice. A Critical Guide, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1992), p. 347.
311 A good is non-rival in that consumption of one person’s enjoying more of the good does not reduce the 
ability of others to enjoy it. A classic example of a non-rival good is a television transmission. In contrast, 
an ordinary consumer good such as coffee or fish has the property of rivalness: if I consume a cup of 
coffee, you cannot consume that cup too. Ibid.
3,2 Volger, supra, note 39, p. 4.
313 Tietenberg, supra, note 20, p. 51-52.
314 Richard Howarth and Richard Norgaard, 'Intergenerational Choices under Global Environmental 
Change', in Bromley (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, supra, note 23, p. 111.
315 Common property resources are those that are owned in common rather than privately. According to 
Tietenberg, entitlements to use common-property resources may be formal, protected by specific rules, or
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access. Common ownership, when coupled with open access, leads to wasteful 
exploitation. The world’s fisheries provide an apt example to illustrate open access 
resources. Due to the application of advanced technologies like satellite-position 
tracking, radar, sonar and over harvesting, many fish species have had their populations 
reduced drastically .
Vogler has proposed a ‘simple typology of the common resources’ in which high seas' 
fisheries are either non excludable or non exclusible rival resources, free for the taking 
and they are regarded as ’res nullius ’, that is to say, the property of no-one317. Standard 
remedies for addressing market failures beyond State boundaries face insurmountable 
challenges. This Section has demonstrated that to treat fisheries to day, as unrestricted 
common property is socially indefensible. There is a consensus among economists that 
setting up private or public ownership on previously unowned resources like fisheries 
will create an opportunity for their rational use; economists seem to be divided on the
< 5 1 0
issue of which type of ownership is more desirable .
To date, the international legal system has not proved effective for the protection of 
fisheries on the high seas. Because the high seas are in effect "unowned", anyone can 
use, and, in the process, often abuse them, with relative freedom from restraint. As 
previously indicated, no market mechanisms exist by means of which access to common 
property fisheries' resources could be allocated among users. The transformation of 
common property fisheries resources to a limited entry system designed to optimize net 
benefits from the fishery is the condition sine qua non for rational management of 
fisheries on the high seas319.
they may be informal, protected by tradition or custom. This author has defined res nullius property 
resources or open access resources as those exploited on a first-come, first-served basis, because no 
individual or group has the legal power to restrict access which have given rise to what has become 
popularly as ‘the tragedy of the commons’. See Tietenberg, supra, note 10, pp. 49-50.
316 See Chapter 1, Section 1. See also Bimie, ‘New Technologies’, supra, note 33.
317 According to Vogler, common resources may be both collectively owned and managed by a 
community, in which user rights, shares, and rents can be specified. See Vogler, supra, note 39, at 4-5. 
Fisheries, can also, historically, be regarded as 'res communis ’ common property, open to all comers and 
reduced to private owner-ships only by possession.
318 Lesser et al (eds.), supra, note 305, pp. 132-140.
319 See Chapter 5, Section 5. Whether the 1995 SSA is establishing new forms of property through 
regional fisheries organizations is a question that will be discussed in Section 6 of Chapter 4, Towards 
Authoritative Global Institutions?’.
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In general, "the tragedy of the commons" is that all common property resources tend to 
be depleted, impoverished and degraded, unless their intensive use is limited by legal 
instruments and international or regional organizations. Most of the “tragedy of the 
commons” conceptualization has been used in environmental, market failure and 
resource issues. The recent collapse of fisheries in many parts of the world exemplifies 
"the tragedy of the commons” which can be pertinently understood as a ‘collective’ 
extension of the Prisoners' Dilemma. The Prisoners' Dilemma is a valuable tool in 
understanding the many tragedies of the commons and market failures that we face in 
the modem world, including fisheries on the high seas.
3.2 The 1982 UNCLOS: the legal framework
The 1982 UNCLOS, which entered into force on November 16, 1994, provides a set of 
global provisions for preserving and protecting marine living resources. UNCLOS 
unites efficiently the protection of the marine environment from pollution, whether land 
based, oceanic or atmospheric, with the conservation and economic development of the 
living and non-living resources it sustains320. Even before UNCLOS entered into force, 
many developing and developed countries had harmonized their national legislation 
with the international rules and standards provided in the Convention and substantially
991complied with its provisions
The 1982 UNCLOS is, on the whole, "the principal international legal instrument 
setting forth the general rights and obligations of states and other members of the 
international community for the conservation and sustainable use of marine living 
resources"322. UNCLOS establishes the jurisdictional limits, and the competence of 
States within these limits for conservation of marine living resources in the territorial 
sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, and the
320 Part V, Exclusive Economic Zone’; Part VII, High Seas’; Part XI, The Area’ (Article 145-147); Part 
XII, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment’.
321 Elizabeth Mann-Borgese, Ocean Governance and the United Nations, (Halifax, Centre for Foreign 
Policy Studies, 1995), p. 9.
322 Sands, Principles, supra, note 211, p. 422.
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high seas323. Regarding marine living resources, the Convention establishes in Articles’ 
61-68 and 116-120 the basic obligation of States to protect, conserve and manage these 
resources in areas within and beyond national jurisdiction. Ninety per cent of the 
world’s fish harvest occurs in areas under national jurisdiction. In the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), States have sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing its natural resources whether living or not-
' l ' J Aliving . States are also subject to resource-sharing arrangements and the requirement 
of "optimum utilization", taking into account the best scientific evidence available and 
taking measures designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at 
levels that can produce the "maximum sustainable yield" (MSY) as qualified by
I O C
environmental and economic factors , though this concept is not defined in the 
UNCLOS, unlike in the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing.
The 1982 UNCLOS reaffirms the rule that all States have the right for their nationals to 
engage in fishing on the high seas. However, this right is subject to specific treaty 
obligations, to the coastal state rights, duties and interests, and the obligation on all 
States to co-operate in conserving and managing high seas living resources . The 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the rules of customary law based 
on it, have almost wholly superseded the 1958 Geneva Conventions on Law of the Sea. 
On the other hand, the 1958 Geneva Convention of Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas reflected the concerns posed by developments in 
fishing technology and over-exploitation of fish stocks. However, it can be concluded 
that "the framework it established for concerted remedial action on an international co­
operative basis has not proved to be a significant landmark in the history of the law"327.
323 Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, p. 517.
324 UNCLOS, Art. 56.
325 According to UNCLOS, Arts. 61.3, the qualified factors are the economic needs of coastal fishing 
communities and the special requirements of developing States, fishing patterns, the interdependence of 
stocks and any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional 
or global.
326 UNCLOS, Arts. 62.
327 Brown, The International Law of the Sea, supra, note 169, p. 9.
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In addition, the United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP) Regional Seas 
| Programme has promoted and sponsored some thirty instruments including thirteen
I
framework conventions and supplementing protocols for the protection and 
development of the marine environment in thirteen regional seas. The framework 
conventions, together with their preliminary Action Plans, have created basic structures, 
institutional arrangements and specific provisions to prevent and control pollution and 
to protect the marine environment, in accordance with the general obligation contained 
in Article 192 of UNCLOS328.
UNCLOS establishes several rights and obligations directed at the protection and 
conservation of marine living resources in general and for fisheries in particular, as well 
as the protection of the marine environment. These rights and obligations are 
compatible with other international legal instruments including those adopted 
subsequently to UNCLOS. Thus, the obligation to co-operate in the conservation and
090
management of the living resources of the high seas is compatible and 
complementary with the obligation of co-operation on matters of mutual interest in 
respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction established by the Convention on
1 ' 3 ' j n
Biological Diversity . UNCED’s Agenda 21, a programme for action aimed at 
carrying out the Rio Declaration of Principles on Environment and Development with 
the goal of promoting sustainable development, while not legally binding, provides in 
Chapter 17, on protection of the oceans and all kind of seas, two legal dimensions 
relevant for marine living resources. First, UNCLOS is cited as "the international basis" 
for future action331. Secondly, it recognizes in the UNCLOS provisions on the marine 
living resources, the foundation upon which to pursue the protection and sustainable
0-59
development of those resources .
328 Groombridge at al (eds.), The Diversity of the Seas, supra, note 1.
329 UNCLOS, Arts. 116-120.
330 Tullio Treves, The Protection of the Oceans in Agenda 21 and International Environmental Law’, in 
Luigi Campiglio, Laura Pineschi, et al. (eds.) The Environment after Rio: International Law and 
Economics, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), p. 171.
331 Agenda 21, Par. 17.1
332 Agenda 21, Par. 17.44. According to Lee Kimball, regarding the oceans agenda, it can be expected that 
the ambiguities in the UNCLOS and tensions in fisheries management will prove creative, rather than 
destructive, where neither coastal State nor DWFNs will solely bear the burden. See Lee Kimball, 
‘UNCED and the Oceans Agenda. The Process Forward’, Marine Policy, November 1993, pp. 491-500, 
at 500.
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| UNCLOS remains the general framework for the protection of marine living resources. 
As endorsed in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, UNCLOS provides the general legal basis 
upon which to pursue the protection and sustainable development of the marine and 
coastal environment and its resources. Furthermore, the comprehensive approach and 
the consensus achieved in Agenda 21 have already impelled the conclusion of a number 
of international initiatives for the conservation of marine living resources, including the 
adoption of the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Species. However, regarding fisheries on the high seas, the 1982 UNCLOS did not 
develop detailed and specific provisions for the settlement of conflicting claims to 
specific fisheries beyond national jurisdictions. Neither did it establish decision-making 
procedures for adequate governance of the high seas, an area which for a long time has 
been considered to be subject to the decisions only of flag States, in the absence of any 
further agreement or agreements among them to the contrary333.
3.3 General principles and rules for conservation and management
The 1995 SSA sets forth international minimum standards on how to operate and 
manage a good fishery, combining existing good practice with new environmental 
concepts. In a long and detailed list, Article 5 provides basic principles for the 
conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks that must 
be applied by coastal States and States fishing on the high seas. As a source of action, 
the term ‘principle ’ in common usage means a general law or rule adopted or professed
'i'JA
as a guide to action . In other words, a principle must be taken into consideration 
whenever it is relevant, whereas rules, which are backed by the whole normative order
333 The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas requires States, whether coastal or not, to fix the 
conditions for the grant of their nationalities to ships, for the registration of ships in their territories, and 
for the right to flight their flag (Art. 5). In addition, the Convention provides that ships shall sail under the 
flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in 
the Convention itself, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas (Art. 6). The text of the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas has been reproduced in Edward Duncan Brown, The 
International Law of the Sea, (Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishers, 1994), Vol. II, pp. 158-165.
334 Collins English Dictionary, (London, Harper Collins Publishers, Third Edition, 1995).
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going beyond rules to include principles, policies and goals, must be observed . From 
a Regime approach, as a source of order, principles do not have to be explicit to have 
influence on the practices of states. Although there is a great deal of debate among 
scholars about the status of principles in international law, Arend has summarized three 
meanings of these, that are not necessarily mutually exclusive: first, principles may 
refer to those that are common to the domestic legal systems of States; secondly, 
principles may refer to those of legal significance within International Law because they 
are accepted by States as such, i.e. ‘pacta sunt servanda and thirdly, principles may 
refer to certain natural law principles, such as ‘equity’ and ‘humanity’ . Therefore, 
according to Article 5, the principles adopted by the 1995 SSA in Part II must be taken 
into account as general law or rules adopted as a guide to action for the management of 
international fisheries and must be applied by both coastal and fishing States as well as 
fisheries organizations in order to conserve and manage straddling and highly migratory 
fish stocks, thus giving effect to the duty of all these to cooperate in accordance with 
UNCLOS.
Principles and rules act as the milestones of International Regime Theory which 
underlines the need for co-operation rather than the number of participants involved: 
anti-discrimination, indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity are generalized principles of 
conduct in the process of building multilateralism337. Elinor Ostrom has defined 
institutional rules as prescriptive statements that forbid, require or permit some action or 
outcome. According to this author, all three deontological [ethical] operators -forbid, 
require or permit- must be contained in a statement for it to be considered a rule . The 
core of every international regime is a cluster of rights and rules whose exact content is 
a matter of intense interest to the actors, aimed at the solution of problems that require
335 According to Dworkin, whereas rules apply in an all-or-nothing fashion (either they are valid and 
dispose of the question, or they are invalid and contribute nothing), principles have a dimension of 
‘weight’, will be taken into account but may be overridden by other considerations and even if they are 
overridden, still survive as principles. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 1977).
336 Anthony Clark Arend, Toward an Understanding of International Legal Rules’, in Beck et al. (eds.), 
International Rules, supra, note 60, pp. 289-310. See also Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules and 
International Society, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).
337 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multirateralism: the Anatomy of an International Institution’, International 
Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 561-598, at 570-573.
338 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, supra, note 285, p. 139.
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collaborative solution339. From the draft Agreements successively adopted during the 
UN Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks340, it can be deduced 
that strong consensus existed regarding the urgency for the adoption of general 
principles for the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish 
species341. The general principles enumerated in Article 5 of the Agreement will also 
apply, mutatis mutandis to the conservation and management of straddling and highly 
migratory stocks in respect of areas under the national jurisdiction of coastal States. 
According to their object, these principles can be classified as those relating to 
sustainability and protection of biological diversity; they would include Large Marine 
Ecosystem; protection of the marine environment; monitoring, control and surveillance; 
interest of artisanal and subsistence fishers; and the precautionary approach.
3.3.1 Conservation and management measures
Conservation is not to be confused with preservation, which aims at maintaining a 
pristine environment or non-utilization of a resource342. Holt and Talbot have defined 
conservation as a component of management that, taking current and future values of 
the resources into consideration, regulates use to maintain the resource system at a 
desirable status . A more modem definition of conservation has been provided by 
Baretta-Bekker, as “a careful protection and planned management of a natural resource 
(ecosystem, fish stock, rare species) to prevent overexploitation, destruction or 
neglect”344.
339 Young, International Co-operation, supra, note 44, p. 15.
340 See Chapter 2, in particular Section 3.
341 See Document A/CONF. 164/22, reproduced in Ldvy, Selected Documents, supra, note 113, pp. 621- 
652; Document A/CONF. 164/22/Rev. 1, ibid, pp. 671-703; Document A/CONF. 164/37, ibid, pp. 763-800.
342 According to Nordquist, the concept of preservation means to conserve the natural resources and retain 
the quality of the marine environment over the long term. Myron Nordquist (ed.), United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary, (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Vol. IV, 9-12, 
quoted by Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, p. 517, footnote 86.
343 Holt and Talbot, ‘New Principles for the Conservation of Wild Living Resources’, Wildlife Monogr. 
1978, p. 33.
344 Hanneke Baretta-Bekker at al (eds.), Encyclopedia of Marine Sciences, (Hamburg, Springer-Verlag 
Berlin, 1998), p. 68.
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The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the High Seas provided the following definition of conservation: "the aggregate of the 
measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to 
secure a maximum supply to food and other marine products"345. According to this 
Convention, coastal States have a "special interest" in the maintenance of the 
productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial 
sea (Art. 6.1) and may adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate to any 
stock of fish or other marine resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its 
territorial sea, provided that negotiations to that effect with the other States concerned 
have not led to an agreement within six months.
3.3.1.1 The Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)
The 1982 UNCLOS does not provide any definition of "conservation of marine living 
resources" although in Article 61 it establishes certain objectives of conservation and 
management. Instead, the Convention adopted the concept of "maximum sustainable 
yield" (MSY) qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors such as the 
economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of 
developing States346. The concept of MSY was introduced into international law by the 
1955 UN International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the Sea, which preceded previously to the adoption of the Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea, which included the fishing and conservation of the 
living resources of the high seas. This Conference, for the first time, recognized that 
when the intensive exploitation of offshore waters considerably affects the abundance of 
fish in inshore waters, the conservation problem is best taken care of by including the 
entire area in a conservation system involving all the concerned States and that is 
subject to conservation regulations adequate to maintain the maximum sustainable 
yield347. The MSY, is the greatest harvest that can be taken from a self-regenerating
345 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. See 
supra, note 161. Also reproduced in AJIL, 52 (1958), p. 851.
346UNCLOS, Art. 61.3.
347 This Technical Conference introduced for the first time the concept of “special interest”. Report of the 
International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, Doc. 
A/CONF. 10/6 Corr.l, United Nations, New York, 1955, p. 9.
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stock of animals year after year while still maintaining the average size of the stock and 
is obtained when both fishing mortality and recruitment to the stock are maximized at 
the same time348.
Scientists have strongly questioned the application of MSY to a large number of 
practical situations for two main reasons: first, because it is not optimal in economic 
terms and second, because overshoots inevitably occur which are difficult to reverse349. 
Therefore, despite its being the only technical management measure referred to in 
UNCLOS, MSY is no longer considered a valid target reference point for high-seas 
fishery’s management350. Caddy and Griffiths suggest that MSY should be adopted as 
"limit reference points" rather than "target reference points" and the biomass that can 
produce MSY might serve as an initial rebuilding target351.
The general obligation imposed on all States to take conservation measures on the high 
seas is contained in Article 117 of UNCLOS. According to this obligation, States have 
the duty to take such measures in respect of their own nationals as may be necessary for 
the conservation of the living resources of the high seas. Article 119 provides the 
criteria on the basis of which such measures must be taken. Measures must be based on 
the best scientific evidence available to the States concerned to maintain or restore 
stocks at levels that can produce the MSY. The obligations imposed on all States under 
Article 119 are similar to the obligations imposed upon coastal States in respect to the 
conservation of marine living resources of their EEZ, provided by Article 61, 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4.
The modem conceptualization of conserving and managing fisheries must now, 
therefore, incorporate within this all the activities that bear on decisions concerning the 
wise use and disposition of the marine living resources in order to conform to the
348 Birnie and Boyle, supra, note 213, p. 438.
349 Realisation of the socio-economic potential of a fishery is not to be effected simply by setting a MSY; 
what is required is a legal system which gives fishers the incentive and the means to assume effective 
control of their activity. See G. L. Kesteven, ‘MSY Revisited. A Realistic Approach to Fisheries 
Management and Administration’, Marine Policy, 21 (1997), pp. 73-82 and Edward Miles, ‘Concepts, 
Approaches and Applications in Sea Use Planning and Management’, ODIL, 20 (1989), pp. 213-238.
350 J. Caddy and R. Griffiths, Living Marine Resources and their Sustainable Development. Some 
Environmental and Institutional Perspectives, (Rome, FAO-FTP No. 353, 1995), p. 63
351 Ibid, p. 195.
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scientific evidence. These activities must include the gathering, analysis and 
dissemination of information; public and private processes of making decisions about 
permissible levels of fish utilization; a myriad choices about the time, place, equipment, 
machinery, gear, and instruments that may be used in exploring and exploiting stocks; 
and all the phases of the business that relate to fishing, such as investment, 
subsidization, taxation, credit arrangements, and so forth352.
Caddy and Griffiths have identified the mechanisms required for managing the marine 
resources of the high-seas areas which include, inter alia: maintaining and exchanging 
up-to-date registries of licensed vessels; employing real time fishery reporting 
procedures and a system of surveillance using the latest modem technology; developing 
and maintaining a data base on stock sizes and removals and on changes in the ocean 
environment relevant to living resources; providing to the regional fishery commissions 
timely national information on fishing activities and on the state of resources 
overlapping relevant jurisdictions; and co-ordinating resource evaluations with the 
countries and regional fisheries commissions concerned; as well as mechanisms for co­
ordinating the various regional commissions353.
The 1995 SSA marks an advance in the setting of international standards for 
conservation and management of fisheries. In this regard, Part II of the Agreement, 
together with the two Annexes, provides specific rules for the conservation and 
management of straddling fish stocks that are considerably more precise than those 
contained in the 1982 UNCLOS. Thus, for the purposes of the Agreement, ’conservation 
and management measures’ means measures to conserve or manage one or more species 
of living marine resources that are adopted and applied consistent with the relevant rules 
of international law as reflected in the Convention as well as in the Agreement itself354.
The 1995 SSA is the first global Agreement to directly regulate high seas fisheries, 
providing for sustainable conservation and management measures for straddling and 
highly migratory fish stocks. However, several regional and bilateral fisheries
352 Burke, The New International Law, supra, note 110, p. 41.
353 Caddy et al., supra, note 350, p. 46.
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agreements had been adopted before 1982 that basically correspond to the provisions of 
Article 63.1 of UNCLOS. These included the Convention for the Preservation of the 
Halibut Fishery of the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea of 2 March 1953 and the 
Protocol thereto of 29 March 1979 between Canada and the United States; the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and 
Belts of 13 September 1973 and the Protocol of 11 November 1982355; the Agreement 
for Purposes of Regulating Jurisdiction in the Plate River and Ocean Areas Adjacent 
and Beyond this River of 19 November 1973, between Argentina and Uruguay .
The 1995 SSA is closely related to Agenda 21. The latter recognized that management 
of high seas fisheries was inadequate in many areas. Furthermore, Agenda 21 identified 
problems of unregulated fishing, overcapitalization, excessive fleet size, reflagging of 
vessels to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable data bases and lack of 
sufficient co-operation between States. Therefore, as called for in Agenda 21, action by 
States and co-operation among them was required in order to address inadequacies in 
fishing practices, as well as in biological knowledge, fisheries’ statistics and 
improvement of systems for handling data, multi-species management and other 
approaches that take into account the relationships among species, especially in 
addressing depleted species, but also to identify the potential of under utilized or 
unutilized populations357. The close relationship between Agenda 21 and the 1995 SSA 
is explicitly acknowledged in the preamble of the latter (paragraph 5), which states that 
the Agreement seeks to address the problems identified in Agenda 21, Chapter 17, 
Programme Area C. Conservation and management measures for SFS and HMFS; these 
indeed are the core of the Agreement.
354 1995 SSA, Annex II, Art. 1.1.b.
355 Ellen Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources: the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Convention Cooperation Between States, (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), 
Annex I.
356 Agreement for Purposes of Regulating Jurisdiction in the Plate River and Ocean Areas Adjacent and 
Beyond this River of 19 November 1973, between Argentina and Uruguay. Reproduced in ILM, 13
(1974) p. 251. See H. Gros Espiel, ‘Le traite relatif au ‘Rio de la Plata’ et sa facade maritime’, AFDI, 21
(1975), pp. 241-249.
357 Agenda 21, 17.45.
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3.3.1.2 Consistency with UNCLOS
On 28 July 1994, at the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Law of the Sea 
Convention358 was adopted. The provisions of Part XI of the UNCLOS constitute the 
regime governing the exploitation of the deep sea-bed. This Agreement and the SSA are 
contemporaneous and both instruments modify the 1982 UNCLOS. Therefore, a 
comparative evaluation of the relevant features of these two instruments can provide 
insights enabling accurate and comprehensive understanding of the scope of the 1995 
SSA.
The provisions of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI and Part XI 
itself must be interpreted and applied together, as a single instrument, and in the event 
of any inconsistency between the Agreement and Part XI of UNCLOS, the provisions of 
the Agreement will prevail359. Conversely, however, the 1995 SSA does not prevail 
over the 1982 Convention. While it is necessary to be party to UNCLOS to become 
party to the Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI, it is not necessary to be a 
party to the Convention in order to become party to the 1995 SSA. This latter 
Agreement must be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent 
with the Convention and nothing in it shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties 
of States under the Convention360.
The object of the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI was to facilitate 
universal participation in the Convention , adapting this part of the regime to the 
political and economic changes, necessary to bring it into accord with market-oriented 
approaches362, for the exploitation of the deep sea-bed and other requirements. 
Expressed in much more explicit terms than those of the UNCLOS, the objective of the 
1995 SSA is to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling and
358 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention of 10 
December 1982, reproduced in 33 (1994) ILM 1309-1327.
359 Ibid., Art. 2.
360 1995 SSA, Art. 4.
361 Preamble, paragraphs 6 - 7 ,  Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI supra, note 358.
362 Preamble, paragraph 5, Ibid.
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highly migratory fish stocks through effective implementation of the relevant provisions 
of the Convention363.
Both are implementing agreements. However, it has been argued that the Agreement for 
the Implementation of Part XI "substantially modifies"364, the regime contained in Part 
XI of UNCLOS and "goes beyond the mere implementation"365. However, whereas the 
1995 SSA develops an existing framework for the conservation and management of 
fisheries on the High seas, as outlined in Parts V and VII of the 1982 Convention, the 
Agreement for the Implementation of Part XI alters an existing regime . In fact, in 
developing an existing framework, the 1995 SSA, together with other recent 
international legal instruments, creates a new environmental regime for fisheries on the
' l  f i n
high seas . In both cases, the agreements are affecting and limiting the scope of the 
principle of freedom in the high seas which does not recognize the sovereignty or 
jurisdiction of any State over this area.
Furthermore, in spite of its title, the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of UNCLOS relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks does not require the prior acceptance of the Convention 
and it does not explicitly say that the relevant provisions of the Convention are binding 
for all the States Parties to the Agreement. The 1995 SSA provides in Article 4 that it 
shall be interpreted and applied in the context of, and in a manner consistent with the 
Convention. Conversely, Article 2 of the 1994 Agreement for the Implementation of 
Part XI requires that the Agreement must be interpreted and applied together with Part 
XI of UNCLOS, as a single instrument, and in the event of any inconsistency between
363 1995 SSA, Art. 2.
364 Jean Pierre Queneudec, Le 'nouveau' droit de la mer est arrivd’, RGDIP, 98 (1994), pp. 865-870, at 
866.
365 Dolliver M. Nelson, The New Deep Sea-Bed Regime', IJMCL, 10 (1995), pp. 189-203, at 190.
366 Antonio Rengifo, La Adopcidn de un Nuevo Regimen Intemacional para la Gestion y la Explotacion 
de los Fondos Marinos', Revista Politicas, Publicaciones Universidad del Valle, Colombia, 5 (1996), pp. 
29-46.
367 Vogler, supra, note 39, p. 52; Breitmeier et al., supra, note 40.
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them, the provisions of the Agreement shall prevail . This last provision has raised the 
concerns of some experts who suggest that there is now a situation of "two regimes"369 
and that "the Agreement’ generates contradictions and weaknesses that will be hard to 
live with"370. This provision implies the existence of two regimes and endorses the 
principle "iusposteriori derogat iuripriori” (a new law prevails over an old one).
The comparison between the Agreement for the Implementation of Part XI and the 1995 
SSA is relevant. It shows that for conservation and management measures, the 
UNCLOS remains a general framework providing the legal basis for the interpretation 
of the provisions contained in the 1995 SSA.
3.3.1.3 Contributions of the 1995 SSA
The 1995 SSA defines conservation and management measures as those measures to 
conserve or manage one or more species of living marine resources that are adopted and 
applied consistent with the relevant rules of international law as reflected in the 1982 
UNCLOS and the 1995 SSA371. The intention is to proffer a better understanding of the 
emerging international regime for fisheries on the high seas. The 1995 SSA does not 
define "stock" nor define "straddling stock" or "highly migratory fish stocks". Iversen 
has defined “stock” as a manageable unit of an exploited population -an actual 
biological unit- of fish or shellfish, sometimes a single interbreeding population or 
group of fishes372.
Straddling Stocks, which are referred to in Article 63 of the 1982 UNCLOS, could, 
accordingly to a Russian Draft proposed at the UN Conference on SSA, be defined as 
stocks formed by those species of marine life which reproduce and spend the greater 
part of their life cycle (spawning, drifting of eggs and larvae, growth of young fish,
368 Art. 2.1, Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI supra, note 358.
369 Queneudec, supra, note 364, p. 868.
370 Mann-Borgese, supra, note 321, p. 6.
371 1995, SSA, Art. l.b.
372 Iversen, supra, note 9, at 207.
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migration, etc.) within the 200-mile economic zone of two or more coastal States but 
which, in some cases (under the influence of climatic conditions or the need to extend 
their stock area because of an increase in numbers), may temporarily migrate beyond 
the 200-mile economic zone into EEZ or high seas adjacent areas, or by species whose 
natural habitat area includes both the 200-mile of the coastal State (the larger part of the 
stock area) and the adjacent area (the smaller part of the stock area)373. Examples of 
such stocks include cod stocks, found in the "nose and tail" of the Grand Banks in 
Newfoundland, Canada; squid and blue whiting resources of the south-west Atlantic; 
and stocks of pollock found in the Bering Sea and in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Highly migratory species are those which move considerable distances over vast 
expanses of ocean areas both within and beyond EEZs (EFZs). They are referred to in 
Article 64 of UNCLOS which provides for the rights and obligations of coastal and 
other States whose nationals fish for them. A list of species considered highly migratory 
at the time of elaboration of the 1982 UNCLOS was attached as Annex I: tuna, frigate 
mackerel, oceanic sharks and cetaceans are the most commercially significant species 
among those identified. The biological distinction between straddling and highly 
migratory species, however, is not always straightforward374.
In most national and international fisheries management situations, effective 
management will require a 'set of rules' comprising both ‘target reference points’ 
(TRPs) and ‘limit reference points’ (LRPs). A TRP indicates a state of a fishing and/or a 
resource that is considered to be desirable and at which management action, whether 
during development of the stock or stock rebuilding, should be aimed. A LRP indicates 
a state of a fishery and/or a resource that is considered to be undesirable and which 
management action should avoid375. The TRPs and LRPs can be incorporated into a set 
of management criteria. Caddy and Mahon have developed a sequence of four fishery
373 Definition submitted by the Russian Federation during the UN Conference on SFS, on 20 July 1993. 
See Doc. A/CONF.164/L.18, reproduced in Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 103, at 
215. According to this definition, "SFS form part of a single coastal ecosystem and their conservation 
should be carried out in accordance with unified principles both within the 200-mile economic zone and 
in adjacent areas".
374 FAO Fisheries Department, supra, note 35, at 70.
375 Serge Garcia, The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fisheries Management’, Ocean 
and Coastal Management, 22 (1994), 99-125.
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management questions and actions for the most effective development of such sets of 
rules. These questions give pre-eminence to sustainability, give habitat and ecosystem 
conservation highest priority, put resource conservation next and finally deal with issues 
of yield optimisation.
"1-Is current level of fishing effort affecting the environment? If the 
answer is YES, an attempt to quantify the level of impact must be 
started. 2-Is current level/type of fishing effort affecting the biodiversity 
of the ecosystem? If the answer is YES, Reference Points must be 
developed indicating the limit to acceptable level of impact. 3-Is current 
level/type/area/season of fishing effort affecting successful recruitment 
to the stock? If the answer is YES, the closure for spawning season or 
area and minimum spawning biomass must be triggered. 4-What effort 
level and size of first capture maximizes the yield per recruit. If YES, 
develop size limits/mesh size minima and Y/R limit reference point"376.
The 1995 SSA is also contemporaneous with other international instruments, both 
legally binding and "soft", aimed at the conservation and management of fisheries in 
general and on the high seas in particular. These instruments include the UN 
Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing377; the Convention on Biological Diversity378; the FAO 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas379; The FAO Code of Conduct for
o o a  T C I  ___
Responsible Fisheries ; and, the Jakarta Mandate . These global instruments reflect 
"a fundamental alteration of the discourse on fisheries conservation and management 
policies” . The principles, norms, organizations, decision-making and dispute 
settlement procedures and information, as well as compliance and enforcement
376 J. Caddy and R. Mahon, Reference Points for Fisheries Management, (Rome, FAO - FTP No. 347, 
1995), p. 46.
377 UN Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing: UNGA Resolution 45/197, 21 December 1990. UNGA 
Resolution 46/215, 20 December 1991, reproduced in 3 1 ILM (1992) 241.
378 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. Reproduced in Environmental Law and Policy, 22 (1992), 
p. 251.
379 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures 
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, supra, note 222.
380 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, supra, note 223.
381 The Jakarta Mandate basically embodies the Recommendation on Scientific, Technical and 
Technological Aspects of the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Coastal and Marine Biological 
Diversity (SBSTTA Recommendation) contained in Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/2/5, 4-8 September 1995.
382 Hey, 'Global Fisheries’, supra, note 224, p. 459.
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provisions contained in this ’new generation’ of fisheries’ agreements are interrelated 
and seem to be foreshadowing a new international environmental regime for fisheries on 
the high seas and should be applied in a comprehensive way . These new instruments 
include important principles and decision-making procedures, such as the precautionary 
principle, the requirement to exchange and share data, the adoption of an ecosystem 
approach, and the adoption of measures based on best scientific evidence. In the context 
of these developments, it can thus be argued that, in relation to fisheries management, 
the international community is entering a new era of ocean policy384. Therefore, insofar 
as the provisions of these instruments are consistent with relevant rules of international 
law and the 1982 UNCLOS, the provisions of all the contemporary international 
instruments referred above will be discussed in this and forthcoming chapters.
In adopting the system of "sets of rules" for conservation and management measures 
rather than the "univocal" MSY approach of UNCLOS, the SSA Agreement represents 
an important improvement in the international law of fisheries. This improvement is 
strengthened by the requirement of "compatibility of conservation and management 
measures" between EEZs and High Seas, established in Article 8385. The mechanism by 
which the above process of conservation and management measures can be achieved 
must include an institutional framework of subregional and regional co-operation 
between fisheries organizations. This institutional framework is provided by the 1995 
SSA which, in Article 5, outlines the set of rules that must govern the conservation of 
fisheries on the high seas.
3.3.2 Sustainability and protection of biological diversity
Some of the principles adopted by Article 5 of the 1995 SSA relate directly to the 
conservation of biological diversity and the long-term sustainability of straddling and 
highly migratory fish stocks. According to this set of principles, States must protect
383 Antonio Rengifo, Protection of Marine Biodiversity: A New Generation of Fisheries Agreements, 
RECIEL, 6 (1997), pp. 313-321.
384 C. Pell, ’A New Era in Ocean Policy’, IJMCL, 12 (1997), pp. 1-4.
385 This issue will be discussed in Chapter 5 "Decision-making Procedures".
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biodiversity in the marine environment ; adopt measures to ensure long-term 
sustainability of the stocks and promote the objective of their optimum utilization387; 
and, maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable 
yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors388.
Life originated in the oceans and they are a reservoir of life. The evidence that is now 
accumulating establishes that in respect to functional diversity, the marine ecosystems 
display much richer diversity or phyla than ’terrestrial’ or ’continental’ ecosystems389. 
Therefore, the problems of addressing the conservation of marine ecosystems are in 
essence different from those of terrestrial systems. In keeping with growing concerns 
regarding preservation of biological diversity, the principles of the SSA concerning this 
matter are consistent with Article 22.2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
which provides that Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention with respect to 
the marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of the States under 
the Law of the Sea”. This provision imposes upon States Parties the clear obligation to 
implement the CBD in accordance with, and subject to, the corpus of customary law of 
the sea, UNCLOS, and other international instruments on the Law of the Sea.
Notwithstanding this, as Freestone has pointed out, the specific problems concerning the 
conservation of marine ecosystems have been widely omitted from the CBD and the 
most important discussions regarding conservation of marine biodiversity have taken 
place in other fora, such as the UN Conference on SFS390. Clearly, the SSA introduces 
significant improvements with regard to the protection of biological diversity in marine 
ecosystems as a legal principle. There is now explicit recognition of the need to protect 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks as part of the rich biodiversity of oceans and 
seas.
386 1995 SSA, Art. 5.g.
387 1995 SSA, Art. 5.a
388 1995 SSA, Art. 5.b.
389 Norse, supra, note 1, p. 77.
390 David Freestone, The Conservation of Marine Ecosystems under International Law’, in Michael 
Bowman and Catherine Redgwell (eds.), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity, 
(London, Kluwer Law International, 1996), pp. 91-109, at 107.
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3.3.3 Large marine ecosystem (LME) approach
i
Two of the aforementioned principles incorporate the "large marine ecosystem" (LME)
I concept. Implicit in this concept is the understanding that States must adopt
O Q  1
conservation and management measures as well as assess the impacts of fishing, 
other human activities and environmental factors on species belonging to the same 
ecosystem or dependent on or associated with the target stock392. LMEs cut across 
maritime boundaries and have been defined as "extensive areas of ocean space of 
approximately 200.000 km2 or greater characterized by distinct bathymetry, 
hydrography, productivity and trophically dependent populations"393.
The approach that has been most commonly used to date is management on a species-by 
species basis that has proved less than adequate. Interrelationships between species, 
environment and fishery, need to be well understood for LME management to be 
applied. Since this is not the prevalent practice, LMEs will require an intensification of 
research by all parties to understand functional linkages and will need to be integrated 
with existing fisheries management structures, or require new ones394.
The introduction of the LME concept as a general principle for ordering conservation 
measures in the 1995 SSA is a major improvement in international law of fisheries. The 
LME approach underlies most of the legal interactions between the EEZ and the high 
seas, either in relation to given species and biomass distribution or in connection with 
the necessary comptability that management regimes must ensure between conservation 
measures adopted both for the EEZ and the high seas395. The LME approach has been 
one of the most prominent developments for the conservation and management of 
fisheries to date396.
391 1995 SSA, Art. 5.e.
392 1995 SSA, Art. 5.d.
393 Sherman and Alexander, Variability and Management of Large Marine Ecosystems, (Boulder, 
Colorado Westview Press, 1986), p. 86.
394 Caddy and Griffiths, supra, note 350, p. 42.
395 Orrego, The Changing International Law, supra, note 81, p. 78.
396 Lewis Alexander, ‘Large Marine Ecosystems: a New Focus for Marine Resources Management’, 
Marine Policy, 17 (1993), pp. 199-212. See also Elizabeth Kirk, ‘’Maritime Zones and the Ecosystem 
Approach: a Mismatch?’, RECIEL, 8 (1999), pp. 67-71.
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3.3.4 Protection of the marine environment
Fishing techniques and high levels of incidental catches are a matter of growing 
international concern. Consequently, two principles are designed to protect the marine 
environment in a broad sense. These principles affirm the obligation for Coastal and 
Fishing States to minimize pollution, waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, 
catch of non-target species and impacts on associated or dependent species, in particular 
endangered species, through measures including the development and use of selective,
Q^7environmentally safe and cost-effective fishing gear and techniques . Furthermore, 
these States must take measures to prevent or eliminate over-fishing and excess fishing 
capacity and to ensure that levels of fishing effort do not exceed those levels 
commensurate with the sustainable use of fishery resources398. The global assessment of 
fisheries’ bycatch and discards has been estimated as being between 18 and 40 million 
tonnes per year, with a mean estimate of 27 million tonnes399. This practice seriously 
threatens the long-term sustainability of fisheries. The improvement in the selectivity of 
fishing gear and fishing methods has been proposed as a major tactic to reduce the 
levels of discards.
A modem form of a traditional technique is drifhet fishing, which involves the use of 
nylon nets up to 30 miles wide suspended vertically to depths of about 30 feet. Larger 
and stronger driftnet fishing made of new synthetic fibres has allowed the gear to be 
employed for indiscriminate fisheries. This has precipitated a crisis in conservation as 
several of the most important pelagic stocks have been over-exploited400. Reflecting 
general concern over the use of large-scale pelagic drifnet fishing, the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted, at its 1989 Session, Resolution 44/225, calling for a 
moratorium on large-scale fishing. The implementation of this Resolution has been 
specifically recommended by Agenda 21.
397 1995 SSA, Art. 5.f.
398 1995 SSA, Art. 5.h.
399 FAO Fisheries Department, A Global Assessment of Fishery’s Bycatch and Discards, (Rome, FAO - 
FTP No. 339, 1994), p. 233.
400 Coull, World Fisheries, supra, note 3, p. 46.
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The present reporting system for fisheries, although adequate for recording catches, 
does not cover by catch/discards, fishing used and fishing effort. The Agreement on 
SFS establishes, for the first time, requirements for systematic collection, analysis, 
verification and sharing of data regarding catch, bycatch, discard and fishing effort401. 
However, the Agreement fails in providing specific provisions related to the use of 
drifnet fishing. The international community acknowledges that the accurate collection 
and reporting of fisheries’ bycatch and discards data are also an important part of 
monitoring, control and surveillance systems402.
3.3.5 Monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS)
Three principles relate directly to fishing activities, implicit in which is the requirement 
that coastal and fishing States promote and conduct scientific research and develop 
appropriate technologies403 as well as implement and enforce conservation and 
management measures through effective MCS404. Correlative to these principles, is also 
the obligation to collect and share complete and accurate data concerning fishing 
activities on vessel position, catch of target and non-target species and fishing effort, as 
well as information from national and international research programmes405. 
Additionally, Annex I of the 1995 SSA provides specific standard requirements for 
collection and sharing of data.
Although MCS are essential elements for efficient high seas fishing activities, they are 
not provided for in the 1982 UNCLOS. Unauthorized fishing and lack of effective
401 1995 SSA, Art. 5.f. Driftnets of 2-90 Kms in length function as “walls of death” for nearly everything 
they encounter. See Anthony Laughton, ‘Using the Ocean Wisely’, Marine Policy, 18 (1994), pp. 453- 
456. On December 1989 the UNGA expressed alarm at the over exploitation of living marine resources of 
the high seas by driftnets and the likelihood that driftnet fishing would have an adverse impact on the 
EEZ. See Michel Savini, ‘La rdglementation de la peche en haute mer par 1’Assemble Gendrale des 
Nations Unies’, AFDI, 36 (1990), pp. 777-817 and William Burke et al, ‘United Nations Resolutions on 
Driftnet Fishing: An Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management’, ODIL, 
25 (1994), pp. 127-186.
402 1995 SSA, Art. 14 and Annex I, Art. 3.1.
403 1995 SSA, Art. 5.k.
404 1995 SSA, Art. 5.1.
405 1995 SSA, Art. 5.j.
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MCS, however, have always undermined fisheries regulations and continue to threaten 
the sustainability of fisheries. The purpose of MCS systems is both to ensure the 
implementation of fisheries’ policies and management decisions and to ensure 
compliance with agreed measures for enforcement. The MCS measures are itemized in 
Part V of the 1995 SSA, which deals with the duties of flag States406 and will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6, Section 3.
3.3.6 Interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers
Article 5.i of the 1995 SSA requires that coastal and fishing States take into account the 
interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers. States are also required to take into account 
the vulnerability of those developing States which are dependent on the exploitation of 
living marine resources, to meet the nutritional requirements of their populations or 
parts thereof407 and to ensure access to fisheries by subsistence, small-scale and 
artisanal fishers and women fish workers, as well as indigenous peoples in developing 
States408.
Almost 50 per cent of total world landings are estimated to come from small-scale 
capture fisheries, most of which fish is used for direct human consumption409. ’Small- 
scale fisher’ is a useful term to describe fishers-artisans who fabricate much of their own 
gear, weave their own nets, fashion fish traps and use small-motorized watercraft. 
Small-scale fishing implies a small-scale capital commitment and use of small-scale 
power. Thus, in developing countries in particular, small-scale fishers are unable to 
influence fish markets and can only inefficiently protect fisheries against the 
environmental degradation produced by external developments410. Frequently, they have 
little representation on the formulation and implementation of fisheries management 
policies. Article 61.3 of UNCLOS makes explicit reference to the need to take into
406 See 1995 SSA, Art. 18.
407 1995 SSA, Art. 24.2.a
408 1995 SSA, Art. 24.2.b.
409 FAO Fisheries Department, The State of World Fisheries, supra, note 16, p. 17.
410 McGoodwin, Crisis in World Fisheries, supra, note 4, p. 10.
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account "the economic needs of coastal fishing communities". However, provisions 
related explicitly to artisanal and subsistence fishers are new in the international law of 
fisheries411.
Another important UNCED principle adopted by the 1995 SSA is the precautionary 
approach which is now a key element of international fisheries law412. Accordingly, an 
important development is inherent in the 1995 SSA which includes the ’precautionary 
approach’ as a principle in Article 5.c., to be applied in accordance with Article 6 Annex 
II, both Articles relating to the Application of the Precautionary Approach. As it is 
established, the 1995 SSA provides the necessary legal and administrative procedures 
and institutionalizes caution in the conservation and management of straddling stocks. 
The principles of the Agreement relating to conservation and management of straddling 
and highly migratory fish stocks mark an advance in conventional international 
standards for the international law of fisheries413. Taking into account its importance 
and scope, the precautionary approach is discussed in more detail in the following 
Section.
3.3.7 The precautionary approach
The policy stance of taking precautionary action before prevailing doubt and uncertainty 
about possible environmental damage can be resolved has been referred to as ’the 
precautionary principle’, the ’precautionary approach’, ’principle of precautionary action’, 
’precautionary management’, ’precautionary policy’ and ’precautionary action’. Elen Hey 
has pointed out that these different terms do not imply substantial differences in content
411 However, the interests of indigenous aboriginal peoples are taken into account in some whaling and 
sealing Conventions, notably of the Schedule of the International Convention on the Regulation of 
Whaling (Whaling Convention), Washington, 2 December 1946, in force 10 November 1948, as amended 
the 19 November 1956, (161 UNTS 72 and 338 UNTS 336).
412 The precautionary approach was developed in relation to polluting discharges into the oceans and its 
application to fisheries is difficult to identify. It is not mentioned in UNCLOS but is gradually creeping 
into the practice of fisheries commissions. The SSA provisions regarding the precautionary approach are 
thus a breakthrough on this matter.
413 David Anderson, The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995. An Initial Assessment’, ICLQ, 45 (1996) 
463-75.
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and that delineation of these terms has not been pursued systematically414. According to 
this author, "principle" implies a rule adopted as a guide for developing international 
environmental policy whereas "approach" means a way of considering or handling 
environmental problems415.
The precautionary approach has raised considerable controversy and there is no 
consensus regarding its legal status in international law. Some authors suggest that there 
is sufficiently broad support for it to be considered as a principle of customary law416. 
However, at the present stage, it is difficult to conclude the precautionary principle or 
precautionary approach has been established as part of customary international law417. 
This is because a universal definition of precautionary approach is non-existent at 
present and, thus, its implications and economic consequences need to be analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis418.
First, elaborated in the 1970s in the Federal Republic of Germany, the 1982 UNCLOS 
founded its provisions regarding conservation of marine living resources on the best 
available scientific evidence. Elizabeth Mann-Borghese comments that "at that time, 
there was less emphasis on the uncertainty principle and, therefore, on the necessity of a
414 Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution’, 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review , 4 (1992) 303-318.
415 Ibid., at 309. Daniel Bodansky has pointed out that although the precautionary principle provides a 
general approach to environmental issues, it is too vague to serve as a regulatory standard because it does 
not specify how much caution should be taken. In addition, according to Bodansky, the precautionary 
principle seems to suggest that the choice is between one risk and another. See Daniel Bodansky, ‘The 
Precautionary Principle’, Environment, Volume 33, Number 7, September 1991, pp. 4-5 and 43-44.
416 Ellen Hey maintains, however, that to be introduced successfully in international law, the 
precautionary approach requires that consideration of the relationship between the environment and 
development be reflected in the rules and procedures to be adopted; supra, note 414, p. 318. See also, 
David Freestone, The Road to Rio: International Environmental Law after the Earth Summit', Journal of 
Environmental Law, 6 (1994), pp. 193-211 and Sands, Principles, supra, note 211, p. 213; James 
Cameron and Juli Abouchar The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for 
the protection of the Global Environment', Boston College of International and Comparative Law Review, 
14 (1991), pp. 1-27. On the scope of the precautionary approach as a principle of customary international 
law relating to the environment, see also the Dissenting Opinions of Judges Weeramantry and Palmer in 
the Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's 
Judgement of 20 December 1974 in The Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France)’, ICJ, General List 
No. 97, 22 September 1995.
417 Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, p. 98; and Grant J. Hewison, The Precautionary Approach to 
Fisheries Management: An Environmental Perspective', IJMCL, 11 (1996), pp. 301-332, at 315.
418 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 'Ou en est le Droit International de lEnvironnement a la Fin du Siecle?', RGDIP, 
101 (1997), pp. 873-903.
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precautionary approach"419. However, the obligations and principles in the Convention 
have set the pace for international environmental law and supported a preventive 
approach, even if conceived at the time in a different language420. The "precautionary 
principle" and the "precautionary approach" relate equally to the concept of caution in 
management and more often than not the two terms remain undifferentiated by scholars. 
However, the term "approach", which is the more appropriate for fishery’s management, 
is generally preferred by governments as being the “softer” of the two in terms of 
obligation.
The 1992 UNCED stressed the need for a precautionary approach to the protection of 
the environment in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and Chapter 17 of Agenda 21. 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states that "in order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation". Thus, the substance of the principle recognizes the 
different local capabilities and accepts cost-effectiveness as a consideration in applying 
the approach.
There are numerous definitions of the precautionary approach or precautionary principle 
offered in the relevant literature. Cameron and Abouchar advance the following 
definition: "the precautionary principle ensures that a substance or activity posing a 
threat to the environment is prevented from adversely affecting the environment, even if 
there is no conclusive scientific proof linking that particular substance or activity to 
environmental damage"421. The authors make explicit the guiding character of the 
principle and its purpose, to encourage and possibly oblige decision makers to consider 
the likely harmful effects of their activities on the environment before they pursue those 
activities and take all appropriate measures to prevent harm422.
419 Mann-Borghese, supra, note 321, p. 53.
420 Lee Kimball, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: a Framework for Marine 
Conservation’, in IUCN -  The World Conservation Union, The Law of the Sea: Priorities and 
Responsibilities in Implementing the Convention, (Gland, IUCN and WWF, 1995), pp. 5-122, at 17.
421 Cameron and Abouchar The Precautionary Principle', supra, note 416, pp. 1-27, at 2.
422 Ibid.
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Regarding fisheries, the precautionary approach has been defined as "the taking of 
preventive conservation measures, where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
environmental damage, even in the absence of clear scientific evidence as to the
A'l'Xnecessity of such measures" . Garcia offers a definition of the precautionary approach 
as "a set of agreed cost-effective measures and actions, including future courses of 
action, which ensures prudent foresight, reduces or avoids risks to the resources, the 
environment and the people, to the extent possible, taking explicitly into account 
existing uncertainties and the potential consequences of being wrong".424 The author 
declares that, paradoxically, there is no definition of a precautionary approach that is 
generally related to the need to take action even in the absence of "full scientific 
certainty"425.
The Precautionary Approach had been suggested in several International Technical 
Consultations as well as in international agreements related to the protection of marine 
living resources426. Thus, in the 1992 Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing, the 
FAO stressed the uncertainty always implicit in the "best scientific evidence available" 
for management and drew attention to issues of precaution and burden of proof, the 
precautionary nature of the traditional MSY reference point, and the need for more and 
different reference points to be used as a basis for more precautionary management 
strategies427. The 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, although 
voluntary, includes a section on the precautionary approach on fisheries management. 
According to the Code,
"States and sub-regional and regional fishery’s management 
organizations should apply a precautionary approach widely to
423 FAO, Report of the Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing’, Doc. A/CONF.164/INF/2, Rome, 
7-15 September 1992. Reproduced in Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113, p. 288.
424 S. M. Garcia, The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries and its Implications for Fishery Research, 
Technology and Management: An Updated Review’, in Precautionary Approach to Fisheries. Part 2: 
Scientific Papers, (Rome, FAO Fisheries Department, FTP No. 350/2,1996), pp. 1-75, at 4.
425 Ibid.
426 Ibid. Possibly the most relevant provision on the matter has been the application of the precautionary 
approach to multispecies interaction in the Convention on the Conservation of Atlantic Marine Living 
Resources. See Convention on the Conservation of Atlantic Marine Living Resources, reproduced in 19 
ILM (1980) 837, Conservation Measures 68/XII, 67/XII, 66/XII.
427 Garcia, supra, note, 424, p. 7.
118
conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources in 
order to protect them and preserve the aquatic environment, taking 
account of the best scientific evidence available. The absence of 
adequate scientific information should not be used as a reason for 
postponing or failing to take measures to conserve target species, 
associated or dependent species and not-target species and their
• 4  28environment" .
The implementation of the Code regarding the precautionary approach is facilitated by a 
set of specific guidelines based on the best scientific evidence available, which include 
general principles for fisheries management, as well as explicit and detailed
management objectives; management framework and procedures; data gathering and 
management advice; management measures; implementation; and financial 
institutions429. These provisions should be applied in accordance with specific
guidelines for the implementation of the precautionary approach. The precautionary
approach promoted by FAO through the Code and other international instruments is 
being progressively reflected in the fishery sector in reality430.
As requested by the UN Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 
FAO submitted constructive recommendations related to the precautionary approach 
during the negotiations leading to the adoption of the 1995 SSA. Two papers were 
presented by FAO: one on the precautionary approach in fisheries management431 and 
the other on management reference points432. Taking into account the uncertainties in 
fisheries’ systems and the need to take action despite incomplete information, FAO has 
identified the elements involved in the application of the precautionary approach in 
fisheries management. These elements include:
"consideration of the needs of future generations and avoidance of 
changes that are not potentially reversible; prior identification of
428 Art. 6, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.
429 Art. 7.2, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.
430 Garcia, supra, note 424, p. 11.
431 ‘Reference Points for Fisheries Management: their Potential Application to Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Resources’, Doc. A/CONF.164/INF/9, in Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 
113, pp. 578-607.
432 ‘Suggested Guidelines for Application of Precautionary Reference Points in Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’, Doc. A/CONF. 164/22, Annex 
2, in Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113, pp. 649-655.
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undesirable outcomes and of measures that will avoid them or correct 
them promptly; that any necessary corrective measures are initiated 
without delay, and that they should achieve their purpose promptly, on a 
time scale not exceeding two or three decades; that where the likely 
impact of resource use is certain, priority should be given to conserving 
the productive capacity of the resource; that harvesting and processing 
capacity should be commensurate with estimated sustainable levels of 
the resource, and that increases in capacity should be further 
contained when resource productivity is highly uncertain; that all fishing 
activities have prior management authorization and be subject to periodic 
review; an established legal and institutional framework for fishery 
management, within which management plans that implement the above 
points are instituted for each fishery, and, appropriate placement of the 
burden of proof by adhering to the requirements above" 3.
During the Second Session on the UN Conference on SFS and HMFS in July 1993, the 
Delegations of Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iceland and New Zealand submitted a paper 
proposing selected precautionary measures on the high seas that differentiate between 
newly discovered stocks and existing fisheries434. For existing fisheries the text 
proposed inter alia that the Total Allowable Catches (TACs) must be established below 
the level of MSY or, if the population is below that required for traditional levels that 
can produce the MSY, the TAC must be established at a level that allows the stock to 
rebuild. Another proposal that dealt with TACs suggested that fishing be reduced to 
levels aimed at arresting the decline, and any subsidies for fishing operations must be 
ended. Regarding newly discovered stocks, the text proposed evenly that TACs must be 
established below the MSY level and that the coastal State should have special 
prerogatives to adopt interim management measures in the case of discovery of a new 
straddling or highly migratory fish stock and in the event of a coastal State establishing 
that an emergency existed. The intensive discussions regarding the latter proposal 
obscured other important aspects of the text. Moreover, no consensus was reached at the 
Conference for adopting precaution as a principle; there was support only for the 
proposition that the precautionary approach admits the possibility of adapting
433 FAO Fisheries Department, Precautionary Approach to Fisheries. Part 1: Guidelines on the 
precautionary approach to capture fisheries and species introductions, (Rome, FAO Fisheries Department, 
FTP No. 350/1,1995), p. 4.
434 Doc. A/CONF.164/L.11/REV. 1, in Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113, pp. 147- 
161.
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technology and measures to socio-economic conditions, consistent with the 
requirements for sustainability.
The precautionary approach, therefore, has not been defined in the 1995 SSA. Rather, 
the Agreement affirms that States must apply the precautionary approach widely to 
conservation, management and exploitation of SFS and HMS in order to protect the 
living marine resources and preserve the marine environment435. Furthermore, the 
Agreement not only asserts that the absence of adequate scientific information shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management 
measures, but also substantiates the obligation of States to be more cautious when 
information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate436. In case of high uncertainty about 
critical areas or species, in particular, and to avoid potentially irreversible changes, the 
precautionary approach has been extended to the management of straddling fish stocks.
In addition, the 1995 SSA sets out specific provisions for the implementation of the 
precautionary approach for management of SFS. According to these provisions, to 
improve decision making procedures, States are required to: obtain and share the best 
scientific information available437; apply the guidelines set out in Annex II438; take into 
account reference points and uncertainties relating to the size and productivity of the 
stocks439; and to assess the impact of fishing on non-target and associated or dependent 
species and their environment440.
The decision-making procedures for fisheries management and the goal of optimizing 
social benefits from fishery development and management can be achieved in different 
ways, according to national values and systems441. Therefore, the duty stressed in
435 1995 SSA, Art. 6.1.
436 1995 SSA, Art. 6.2.
437 1995 SSA, Art. 6.3.a.
438 1995 SSA, Art. 6.3.b.
439 1995 SSA, Art. 6.3.c.
440 1995 SSA, Art. 6.3.d.
441 W. C. Mackenzie, ‘An Introduction to the Economics of Fisheries Management’, (Rome, FAO 
Fisheries Department, FTP No. 226, 1992), p. 9.
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Article 6.6.a is a general obligation. Notwithstanding this, the innovatory aspect of the 
Agreement lies in the introduction of two mechanisms for improving decision making 
procedures: obtaining and sharing of best scientific information available on the one 
hand and, on the other, the implementation of improved techniques for dealing with risk 
and uncertainty.
Obtaining and sharing the best scientific information is a crucial element for fisheries 
management. Regarding the conservation of the living resources of the EEZ, the 1982 
UNCLOS provides that available scientific information, catch and fishing effort 
statistics, and other data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks must be contributed 
and exchanged on a regular basis through competent international organizations442. The 
present reporting system and the fishing effort statistics for fisheries on the high seas 
have not proved satisfactory. Thus, during the UN Conference on SFS, FAO advocated 
improvement of the data requirements for the high seas, which should encompass 
catches/discards and specific fishing gear used in terms of numbers of vessels and 
fishing effort443. This data can provide inputs for the improvement of the scientific 
information available444.
Hilbom and Peterman have defined risk as "expected loss" and not simply "the 
probability of some undesirable event occurring" identifying on these grounds seven 
sources of uncertainties and risks that can affect the success or failure of fisheries 
management which are:
"(a) estimates of fish abundance or other measures of the state of the 
system; (b) model structure; (c) estimated model parameters; (d) 
response of users to regulation; (e) future environmental conditions; (f) 
future social, political and economic conditions, and (g) future 
management objectives”. They add that “whether future losses would 
occur by taking scientific advice into account depends on how the 
uncertain information is used. There are now many computational and
442 UNCLOS, Art. 61.5.
443 FAO, Doc. 164/INF/2, in Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113, p. 317.
444 D. D. Huppert, Risk Assessment, Economics, and Precautionary Fishery Management’, in 
Precautionary Approach to Fisheries’. Part 2: Scientific Papers, (Rome, FAO Fisheries Department, FTP 
No. 350/2, 1996), pp. 103-128.
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statistical mechanisms which can incorporate the assessments of 
expected consequences of alternative actions"445.
Article 6.3.c of the 1995 SSA establishes that States shall apply the guidelines set out in 
Annex II and determine, on the basis of the best scientific information available, stock- 
specific reference points and the action to be taken if they are exceeded. The Annex II 
of the Agreement sets out guidelines for application of precautionary reference points in 
conservation and management of SFS and HMFS. These guidelines include a definition 
of precautionary reference point446; the two types of precautionary reference points that 
must be used447; the pattern that precautionary reference points should be stock- 
specific448; the pattern that management strategies shall seek to maintain or restore 
populations of harvested stocks at levels consistent with previously agreed 
precautionary reference points449; the pattern that fishery management strategy shall 
ensure that the risk of exceeding limit reference point is very slow450; the setting of 
provisional reference points when information for determining reference points for a 
fishery is poor or absent451; and finally, the pattern that fishing mortality rate which 
generates MSY should be regarded as a minimum standard for limit reference points452.
445 R. M. Hilbom and R. M. Paterman, The Development of Scientific Advice with Incomplete 
Information in the Context of the Precautionary Approach, in Precautionary Approach to Fisheries. Part 
2: Scientific Papers, (Rome, FAO Fisheries Department, FTP No. 350/2,1996), pp. 77-97.
446 “A precautionary reference point is an estimated value derived through an agreed scientific procedure, 
which corresponds to the state of the resource and of the fishery, and which can be used as a guide for 
fisheries management”. Annex II, Guideline 1, 1995 SSA.
447 For conservation, limit reference points which like boundaries are intended to constrain harvesting 
within safe biological limits within which the stocks can produce MSY and, on the other hand, for 
management, target reference points which are intended to meet management objectives. Annex II, 
Guideline 2, 1995 SSA.
448 Precautionary reference points should be stocks-specific to account for the reproductive capacity, the 
resilience of each stock and the characteristics of fisheries exploit ting the stock, as well as other sources 
of mortality and major sources of uncertainty. Annex II, Guideline 3, 1995 SSA.
449 Such reference points shall be used to trigger pre-agreed conservation and management action. Annex 
II, Guideline 4,1995 SSA.
450 Fishery management strategies shall ensure that target reference points are not exceeded on average. 
Annex II, Guideline 5,1995 SSA.
451 Provisional reference points may be established by analogy to similar and better know stocks. In 
addition, the fishery shall be subject to enhanced monitoring so as to enable revision of provisional 
reference points as improved information become available. Annex II, Guideline 6, 1995 SSA.
452 For stocks, which are not over-fished, fishery management strategies shall ensure that fishing mortality 
does not exceed that which corresponds to MSY and that the biomass does not fall bellow a pre-defined
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According to Article 48 of the Agreement, Annexes I and II form an integral part of it 
and references to the Agreement include references to the Annexes. There is now a clear 
obligation on States parties at least to be cautious and to utilize the procedures set out in 
Annex II453.
Caddy and Mahon have defined reference points as "a conventional value, derived from 
technical analysis, which represents a state of the fishery or population, and whose 
characteristics are believed to be useful for the management"454. In similar terms, the 
1995 SSA defines reference points as "an estimated value derived through an agreed 
scientific procedure, which corresponds to the state of the resource and of the fishery, 
and which can be used as a guide for fisheries management"455. Therefore, the 
"technical analysis" or "the scientific procedure” must be agreed in the context of sub­
regional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements, according 
to Article lO.a of the 1995 SSA.
In consonance with the Guidelines, two types of precautionary reference points should 
be used. First, Limit Reference Points, which set boundaries intended to constrain 
harvesting with safe biological limits allowing stocks to produce MSY. Second, Target 
Reference Points, intended to meet management objectives456. Other guidelines for 
application of the precautionary reference points include management strategies to 
maintain or restore populations of harvested stocks; to ensure that the risk of exceeding 
Limit Reference Points is very low; to set out Provisional Reference Points; and, to 
ensure that fishing mortality does not exceed the MSY. If the reference points are 
exceeded, States must, following the guidelines, take action to restore the stocks. The 
precautionary reference points should be stock-specific to account, inter alia, for the 
reproductive capacity of the stock, the resilience of each stock and the characteristics of 
fisheries exploiting the stock, as well as the other sources of mortality and major
threshold. For over-fished stocks, the biomass, which would produce MSY, can serve as a rebuilding 
target. Annex II, Guideline 7,1995 SSA.
453 David Freestone, ‘International Fisheries Law Since Rio: the Continued Rise of the Precautionary 
Principle’ in Boyle and Freestone (eds.), International Law, supra, note 81, p. 160.
454 Caddy and Mahon, ‘Reference Points for Fisheries Management’, supra, note 376, pp. 8 and 17.
455 1995 SSA, Annex II, Paragraph 1.
456 1995 SSA, Annex II, Paragraph 2.
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sources of uncertainty. States shall regularly revise the conservation and management 
measures in the light of new information, where the status of target stocks or non-target 
or associated or dependent species is of concern.
j
| For the application of the precautionary approach, States shall take into account 
uncertainties relating to the size and productivity of the stocks457; develop data 
collection and research programmes to assess the impact of fishing on non-target and 
associated or dependent species458; and adopt conservation and management measures 
on an emergency basis in the case of a natural phenomenon having a significant adverse 
impact on the status of SFSF and HMFS459. Furthermore, for new or exploratory 
fisheries, States shall adopt cautious conservation and management measures including 
catch and effort limits460.
The precautionary approach provisions included in the 1995 SSA are not as forceful as 
sought by a number of NGOs and do not go as far as to prohibit fishing when stocks are 
threatened461. The precautionary approach, as adopted by the Agreement, can be 
regarded as a qualified step forward for two main reasons: firstly, the adoption of the 
much criticized concept of MSY; and secondly, the conditionality of State compliance 
established in terms only of "should" not of "shall" and thus not binding, in particular in 
Annex II, as indicated above. In addition, as Nelson has pointed out, despite the fact that 
the 1995 SSA does not expressly rule out the application of moratoria on fishing 
activities462, the perception of the nature of the threat, should determine the severity of
457 1995 SSA, Art. 6.3.c.
458 1995 SSA, Art. 6.3.d.
459 1995 SSA, Art. 6.7.
460 1995 SSA, Art. 6.6.
461 The fear of fishing States was that a reversal of burden of proof would be adopted that could paralyse 
all fishing effort. See Peter Davies and Catherine Redgwell, The International Legal Regulation of 
Straddling Fish Stocks’, British Yearbook of International Law, (1996), p. 261. See also Greenpeace 
International Fisheries Campaign, Analysis of the United Nations Treaty for the Conservations and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, (Greenpeace International, 
Amsterdam, 1995), pp. 2-3.
462 At the UN Conference on SFS and HMFS, the Negotiating Text prepared by the Chairman envisaged 
where necessary, the application of moratoria on fishing activities. Document UN A/CONF.164/13 
(1993), in Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 103, pp. 73-
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the measures to be taken, which may include moratoria, to be applied with caution, 
given the subsequent socio-economic impact463.
These provisions affirm a global trend emerging in fisheries management464, confirmed 
in other international legal instruments dealing with fishery’s management, e.g. the FAO 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the FAO Compliance Agreement. The 
effectiveness of these provisions will depend on the subsequent modification of 
agreements, legislation and fishing practices at regional and national levels465, as well as 
regional and subregional fisheries organizations. According to Freestone, the 
precautionary approach adopted by the 1995 SSA, having become proactive in 
methodology, changes the underlying presumption from freedom of exploitation to 
conservation466.
3.3.8 The general obligation of co-operation
Co-operation is an intrinsic element in the operation of conservation and management 
measures. The general obligation to co-operate in the conservation and management of 
marine living resources on the high seas is contained in Article 118 of the 1982 
UNCLOS: States must co-operate with each other in the conservation and management 
of living resources in the areas of the high seas. The Convention does not specify the 
modalities of such co-operation, although the same Article provides that States must co­
operate to establish sub-regional or regional fisheries’ organizations to that end.
463 Dolliver Nelson, The Development of the Legal Regime of High Seas Fisheries’, in Alan Boyle and 
David Freestone (eds.), International Law, supra, note 81, pp. 113-134, at 129. According to Freestone, it 
should be argued that moratoria are preventive rather than precautionary. See David Freestone, 
‘International Fisheries Law Since Rio: the Continued Rise of the Precautionary Approach’, in Boyle and 
Freestone (eds.), ibid, p. 160, footnote 119.
464 Tahindro, 'Conservation and Management of Transboundary Fish Stocks’, supra, note 163, pp. 1-58, at 
13.
465 According to Edeson, to judge the real impact of the precautionary approach, it would be necessary to 
consider governmental policy papers, approaches adopted in fisheries management plans, application of 
concepts like precautionary reference points and decisions taken by fisheries organizations. William 
Edeson, Towards Long-term Use: Some Recent Developments in the Legal Regime of Fisheries’, in 
Boyle and Freestone (eds.), International Law, supra note 81, pp. 165-203, p. 203.
466 Freestone, ‘International Fisheries Law’, supra note 463, pp. 162-163.
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As Yturriaga notes, Article 118 adds the supplementary requirement of management to 
the already recognized principle of conservation467. However, this obligation to co­
operate is more general than the specific obligation to enter into negotiations required in 
Article 63 for straddling stocks, and still more so than the obligation to regulate by
A f y Q
i  agreement which is implied in Article 67 in the case of catadromous species . Article 
119.1 of the 1982 UNCLOS, as already noted, provides that States shall take measures 
to maintain or restore harvested species at levels that can produce MSY of the resource 
as qualified by environmental and economic factors. As Burke has observed, the most 
significant innovation in this Article permits departure from the MSY as the goal of 
modification measures because "there may be sound environmental or economic 
reasons for measures that seek the lower level of abundance that will produce the 
MSY"469. These factors include: the special requirements of developing States; 
interdependence of stocks; fishing patterns; the effects on dependent and associate 
species, and any generally recommended international minimum standards whether sub­
regional, regional or global470.
Regarding SFS, Article 63.2 of the 1982 UNCLOS obliges the parties to negotiate with 
a view towards reaching agreement on necessary conservation measures or ‘pactum de 
negotiando’, whereas for HMFS, Article 64 obliges the parties to reach an agreement on 
a particular result or ‘pactum de contrahendo ’. Some authors have drawn attention to 
the fact that this distinction is no longer of significance because in both cases good faith 
is required471; on the other hand, there is real content in a ‘pactum de negotiando’ as the 
ICJ has evidenced in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case:
"the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a 
view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a 
formal process of negotiations as a sort of prior conditions for the 
automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the 
absence of agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct 
themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the
467 J. A. de Yturriaga, The International Regime, supra, note 181, p. 159.
468 Moritaka Hayashi, The Management of Transboundary Fish Stocks under the Law of the Sea 
Convention’, IJMCL, 8 (1993), pp. 245-261, at 251.
469 Burke, supra, note 110, p. 112.
470 UNCLOS, Article 119.
471 Tahindro, supra, note 163, p. 19.
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case when either of them insists on its own position without 
contemplating any modifications of it. The parties are under an 
obligation to act in such a way that, in the particular case, and taking 
all the circumstances into account, equitable principles are applied"472.
International organizations are the bodies through which States, with the support of the 
appropriate organization, co-ordinate their activities regarding conservation and 
management of living resources on the high seas. Considering the biological and 
geographical specificities of fisheries in different regions of the world, subregional and 
regional organizations are the most efficient device for furtherance of international co­
operation. Jean Carroz argued that although there are a considerable number of fisheries’ 
agreements and organizations, there is little doubt that many of them will have to adjust 
themselves to prevailing circumstances in order to be able to achieve their goals within 
the new regulatory framework established by the 1982 UNCLOS473.
Part III of the 1995 SSA deals with "mechanisms for international co-operation 
concerning SFS and HMFS". Article 8, entitled "co-operation for conservation and 
management", establishes the basic provisions for such a co-operation. Article 8.1 
indicates that according to UNCLOS, Coastal States and States Fishing on the High 
Seas shall pursue co-operation in relation to SFS and HMFS either directly or through 
appropriate sub-regional or regional fisheries’ organizations or arrangements, taking into 
account the specific characteristics of the subregion or region, with the view to ensuring 
effective conservation and management of such stocks.
The obligation of international co-operation regarding the utilization of marine living 
resources on the high seas, established in Articles 56.2, 58.2, 58.3, 87.2 and 117 to 119 
of the 1982 UNCLOS, is embodied in Articles 8, 20, 21 and 25 of the 1995 SSA. 
Moreover, provisions on this obligation are included in Article 5 of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity; Article V.l of the FAO Compliance Agreement; and Article 6.12 
of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. The co-operation set out by the 
1995 SSA refers to four levels: first, the participation of States in sub-regional or
472 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47, Paragraph 85.
473 J. Carroz, Institutional Aspects of Fishery Management under the New Regime of the Oceans’, San 
Diego Law Review, 21 (1984), pp. 517-519.
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i regional fisheries’ organizations or arrangements474; second, co-operation for the control 
of vessel fishing on the high seas475; third, co-operation in enforcement, which includes 
boarding and inspecting vessels for the purpose of ensuring compliance with 
conservation and management measures476; and fourth, co-operation with developing 
States477.
Conclusions
High seas cannot be appropriated by any State and to date, the international legal system 
has not been effective for the protection of fisheries in this part of the oceans. 
Furthermore, there are no market mechanisms through which access to common 
property fisheries’ resources can be allocated among users. The 1982 UNCLOS 
provided the broad legal framework for the conservation and management of marine 
living resources on the high seas, but did not develop specific provisions for the 
settlement of conflicting claims to specific fisheries beyond national jurisdictions nor 
did it establish decision-making procedures to enable adequate governance of these 
resources.
As illustrated in this Chapter, the 1995 SSA adopted a system for the rational 
management of fisheries on the high seas, qualified by a set of principles and rules. This 
new system will clearly limit the principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas. In 
developing a "balance of interests" between coastal States and fishing States on the high 
seas, the 1995 SSA incorporates the basic concepts for conservation and management of 
marine living resources on the high seas established by the 1982 UNCLOS and other 
relevant international treaties and "soft law" instruments for fisheries management 
adopted since the conclusion of the Convention. However, on many issues, the 
Agreement goes beyond UNCLOS, providing, in conjunction with the support of other 
international legal instruments, in particular the Code of Conduct for Responsible
474 1995 SSA, Arts. 9 ,10 ,12 and 13. See Chapter IV.
475 1995 SSA, Art. 18.
476 1995 SSA, Art. 21.
477 1995 SSA, Arts. 24, 25 and 26. The three latter specific mechanisms for co-operation will be analysed 
in Chapter 6, "Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms".
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Fisheries and the FAO Compliance Agreement, the basis for a new international regime 
for fisheries on the high seas.
The 1995 SSA provides specific rules for the conservation and management of SFS and 
HMFS which are more precise by far than those contained in the 1982 UNCLOS. The 
adoption of concepts like Large Marine Ecosystem, sustainability and protection of 
marine biodiversity, protection of the marine environment, monitoring, control and 
surveillance and taking account of the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers, 
mark an advance in international standards for conservation and management of 
fisheries. The establishment of mechanisms for international co-operation as well as the 
adoption of the precautionary approach478 also constitute major improvements, although 
the latter does not go so far as to declare a moratorium on fishing on the high seas.
The legal status of the provisions adopted by the 1995 SSA, their meaning, and the 
consequences of their application to the complexity of fisheries on the high seas remain 
open. In the final analysis, the effectiveness of these provisions will depend on the 
modification of other fisheries related agreements, national legislation and fishing 
practices at regional and national levels, as well as on the future activities of fisheries 
management organizations. These will be will be analysed in Chapter 4.
478 The precautionary approach represents a major change in the traditional approach of fisheries 
management. Although the precautionary approach has been accepted in agreements such as the 1994 
Bering Sea Agreement (reproduced in 10 IJMCL (1995), 127) and in principle in the implementation of 
agreements and conventions such as CCAMLR (supra, note 357) and the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling (supra, note 411) through the International Whaling Commission, this is the first 
time that precaution has been specifically mentioned in an international fishery convention or applied to 
straddling and highly migratory stocks.
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Chapter 4 
Fisheries Management Organizations 
Introduction
Unregulated and open-access fishing is not only economically wasteful but has become 
unacceptable to the international community because it neither maintains fisheries at the 
qualified maximum sustainable yield level required by the 1982 UNCLOS nor leads to 
attainment of the goals established by the 1992 UNCED instruments479. Since the 
1960’s, many fisheries management organizations have been established with specific 
mandates for the conservation and management of stocks in high seas areas. Article 118 
of UNCLOS lays down as a general obligation that States must co-operate with each 
other in the conservation and management of living resources in the high seas. For three 
main reasons existing fisheries management organizations at global and regional level 
perform these tasks with different degrees of effectiveness. First, because their members 
often procrastinate in adjusting measures to the changes brought about by UNCLOS and 
UNCED; secondly, because of increasing conflicts, depletion and complexity of 
fisheries management consequent upon overexploitation of many stocks, and thirdly, 
because they are not always able to ensure that their recommendations and decisions are 
effectively implemented by their contracting parties.
International organizations are institutions with structures which provide a forum for
political communication as well as formal procedures for its conduct, able to constrain
the behaviour of their members, in general numbering three or more countries480.
International organizations, which are necessary for the operation and implementation
of regimes, cannot be established without a high degree of domain consensus defining 
4R,
their mission . Although the consensus process has not been defined in any general
479 Christopher Stone, ‘Can the Oceans be Harboured? A Four Step Plan for the 21st Century, RECIEL, 8 
(1999), pp. 37-47. See also Chapter 3, Section 1.
480 A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations. Principles and Issues, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice 
Hall, 6th edition, 1995), pp. 8-14.
481 Friedrich Kratochwill, 'Contract and Regimes. Do Issue Specificity and Variations of Formality 
Matter?', in Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory, supra, note 43, pp. 73-93, at 74.
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treaty or customary law482, Article 161.8.e of UNCLOS, in the context of voting 
procedures in the Council of the International Seabed Authority, defines ‘consensus’ as 
the absence of any formal objection. UNCLOS requires negotiations to continue when 
objections are raised to proposed articles until an article acceptable to all emerges483.
In International Regime Theory, it is recognized that regimes promote effective co­
operation among institutions through mechanisms of membership rules; centralization 
of tasks; issues covered; rules for controlling the institution and flexibility of 
arrangements.
This chapter examines the role and effectiveness of regional fisheries organizations and 
arrangements for fisheries management in high seas areas and in particular, for SFS and 
HMFS. It concludes that, in order to be effective, fishery management organizations 
must have adequate powers, involvement and commitment on the part of their members 
and adequate financial support and personnel. Therefore, this chapter analyses the main 
institutional arrangements envisaged in the 1995 SSA in relation to existing 
organizations and arrangements (section 1); new organizations and new arrangements 
(section 2); new members or participants (section 3) and non-members and non­
participants (section 4). The chapter then examines the issue of transparency in relation 
to the activities of fisheries management organizations which States must observe both 
in the decision-making process and in all the other activities of these bodies (section 5). 
The final section discusses whether fisheries management organizations are capable of 
creating new forms of authority that will better influence the behaviour of their member 
States (section 6).
The main conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the 1995 SSA, together with 
other related international legal instruments, will strengthen the existing fisheries 
management organizations and promote the creation of new fisheries bodies in areas 
that are not now covered by any existing bodies, in particular on the high seas. 
However, no mention is made in the 1995 SSA of fisheries management organizations
482 Patricia Birnie, supra, note 72, p. 55.
483 Ibid.; UNCLOS establishes a particular process for achieving this in the Council of the International 
Sea-bed Authority.
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for shared stocks occurring in the EEZ of two or more States. In addition, the existing 
instruments establishing such bodies do not provide permanent mechanisms for 
ensuring co-operation and co-ordination, that is to say, an effective link between all 
concerned fisheries’ organizations. If not resolved, this deficiency could have serious 
implications for the future implementation of an effective international regime.
4.1 Existing organizations and arrangements
International organizations have been defined as a formal, continuous structure 
established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) 
from two or more sovereign States with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the 
membership484. In International Regime Theory, international organizations are 
purposive entities, with bureaucratic structures and leadership, which permits them to 
respond to events, while international institutions encompass formal intergovernmental 
or transnational organizations, established by international regimes as well as 
conventions485. International organizations refer to multilevel linkages, norms and 
institutions and in this sense they are also another type of world political structure 
The United Nations is a very appropriate body to look to for indications of 
developments of international law, for international custom is to be deduced from the 
practice of States, which includes their international dealings as manifested inter alia by 
their diplomatic delegations and public pronouncements. The votes and views of States 
have come to have legal significance as evidence of customary law. According to 
Rosalyn Higgins, “the existence of the United Nations, and especially its accelerated 
trend towards universality of membership since 1955, now provides a very clear, very
Aon
concentrated focal point for State practice’
484 Clive Archer, International Organizations, (London, Routledge, 1995), p. 37
485 Robert Keohane, ‘The Analysis of International Regimes’, in Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory, supra, 
note 50, p. 28.
486 One way to think of the structure of world politics is in terms of the distribution of capabilities, overall 
or within issue areas among the major actors of world politics. See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 
Power and Interdependence, (Harvard, Harper Collins, Second Edition, 1989), p. 54.
487 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1994), pp. 22-23.
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Therefore, United Nations practice is a field that can be looked at in order to ascertain 
the directions of the development of international law. International organizations play a
J O O
significant role in the process of creating norms in the international system .
By the end of the 19th century, in the Bering Sea Fur Seals Arbitration489, as is well 
known the arbitral tribunal found in favour of the arguments put forward by Great 
Britain and upheld the freedom of the high seas; it hence made conservation more 
difficult, especially in relation to enforcement. However, the tribunal recognized that 
freedom was not absolute and strongly supported the need for restraint in exploitation, 
indicating the requisite measures490. Before the First World War, the only Convention to 
address the conservation of fisheries was the 1911 Convention on the Bering Sea Fur 
Seals491. The origins of this Convention were of great significance to the development 
of the international law of fisheries and its provisions were successful in restoring the 
stocks concerned. The earliest conventions on fisheries provided for only three basic 
legal requirements (jurisdiction, regulation and enforcement); they did not provide for 
scientific research or establish permanent institutions492.
The 1982 UNCLOS provides the general basis for conservation and management of the 
living resources of the high seas. Under Articles 116 to 120, which reflect Articles 61 
and 62 relating to the EEZ, States have the right to engage in fishing on the high sea 
subject to their treaty obligations (Article 116), their duty to adopt measures for the 
conservation of the living resources of the high seas (Article 117), and their obligation 
to co-operate with other States in conservation and management of living resources in 
the areas of the high seas (Article 118). Article 63.2 deals with stocks that straddle the 
outer limit of the EEZs and the high seas while Article 64 refers to highly migratory
488 Ibid., p. 28.
489 I. Moore, International Arbitration Awards, 1898, 755-761; Douglas Johnston, International Law of 
Fisheries: a Framework for Policy Oriented Inquiries, (New Haven: New Haven Press; Lancaster: 
Kluwer 1987).
490 Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, p. 495.
491 Convention between the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and Russia, for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, Washington, 7 July 1911, in force 
15 December 1911, Bemdt Riister, Bruno Simma and Michael Bock (eds.), International Protection of 
the Environment: Treaties and Related Documents, (Dobbs Ferry and NY, Oceana, 1983).
492 Birnie and Boyle, supra, note 213, p. 496.
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species, which are listed in Annex I of UNCLOS. In both cases it is the responsibility of 
the States whose nationals are engaged in the fishing of these resources on the high seas 
and the coastal State concerned to negotiate directly or through sub-regional or regional 
fisheries organizations to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of
i
| those resources. Finally, Article 119 refers to the need to take account of any generally 
recommended standards exchanged through competent international organizations, 
whether subregional, regional or global.
In 1996 there were 35 international fisheries’ organizations for the conservation and 
management of the marine living resources of the high seas throughout the world493. It 
is difficult, even after study of these, to specify the characteristics that make one fishery 
body more effective than another. However, a fisheries management organization is 
more likely to exert beneficial impact when its member States’ have congruent interests 
in fisheries, a consistent management focus conduct adequate scientific research on the 
fisheries, and the political will and technical means to implement recommendations and 
decisions, but the lack of disposition to stop the decline in stocks evidences that this is 
rare.
4.1.1 A Case Study: the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), established in 1978 by the 
Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries494 is 
one of the most relevant and instructive of existing fisheries’ bodies for the high seas’ 
areas. The NAFO membership currently comprises sixteen contracting parties495. NAFO 
itself consists of three bodies: a General Council; a Fisheries Commission, which is the
493 S. H. Marashi, ’Summary Information on the Role of International Fishery and Other Bodies with 
Regard to the Conservation and Management of Living Resources of the High Seas’, (Rome, FAO 
Fisheries Circular No. 908, 1996), pp. 98 and seq. See also Section 6 of this Chapter.
494 The Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries was signed on 24 October 1978 in Ottawa, Canada and came into force on 1 
January 1979 following the deposit with the Government of Canada of the instruments of ratification, 
acceptance and approval by seven signatories: Canada, Cuba, the European Economic Community (EEC), 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), Iceland Norway and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR). NAFO Handbook, Second Edition, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada, 1996, p. 10.
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body that manages the NAFO Regulatory Area (NRA)496, and Scientific Council. 
NAFO holds a regular annual meeting in September of each year, to establish the 
management measures for the NRA for the following year497. This meeting is preceded 
by a regular annual meeting of its Scientific Council in June of each year. This body 
provides scientific advice to the Fisheries Commission in accordance with the terms of 
reference previously specified by the Commission or, in certain circumstances, on its 
own initiative498. Additional meetings of any of the bodies can be and have been held at 
other times of the year as required499. The pivotal provisions for the adoption of 
management measures are contained in Article XI of the Convention establishing 
NAFO.
These provisions include optimum utilization, management measures for straddling 
stocks outside 200 miles (which must be consistent with management measures inside 
200 miles), respect for traditional fisheries, and special consideration for Canada in 
allocations of the TAC. The system for implementing management measures is as 
follows: the Fisheries Commission, based on the advice of the Scientific Council, 
adopts, by majority vote, Total Allowable Catches and other relevant measures for the 
NRA; it then adopts, by majority vote, quotas for each stock for each of the NAFO 
members. Following the NAFO meeting the Executive Secretary mails the relevant texts 
to the members, who then have 60 days within which to lodge written objections to any 
or all of the measures adopted. When an objection is lodged, the lodging member is not 
legally bound by the relevant measure or measures, and further objection periods are
495 Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, Estonia, the 
European Union, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Russian 
Federation and the United States of America.
496 The NAFO Convention Area covers the waters of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean north of 35°00’ north 
latitude and 42°00’ west longitude to 59°00’ north latitude, thence due west to the Convention Area. 
Article I, NAFO Convention, supra, note 425.
497 Article III of the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the on Future Multilateral Co­
operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, supra, note 425 and NAFO Handbook, Second Edition, 
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada, 1996, p. 20.
498 Article VIII of the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the on Future Multilateral Co­
operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, supra, note 425, NAFO Handbook, Ibid, p. 20
499 Ibid.
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opened up for other NAFO members, within which they can lodge objection to the same 
measure. This procedure is not original to NAFO500.
NAFO has been widely recognized as the most advanced and influential regional fishery 
management organization. However, two main criticisms can be made in relation to its 
role and effectiveness in the management and conservation of fish stocks in its area. In 
summary these are: first, that it is difficult to achieving an appropriate balance between 
the rights of the Coastal State and States fishing on the high seas; a difficulty which has 
indirectly contributed to the collapse of Canadian fisheries501; secondly, that effective 
management cannot be achieved when member States can free themselves from 
restrictions adopted by the majority by resort to a legitimate procedure of formal 
unilateral objection. In addition, the fact that nonetheless several States fishing on the 
high seas remained outside the regional arrangement has weakened the role of 
NAFO502.
4.1.2. The 1992 FAO Technical Consultation
A set of factors that can contribute to the variable performance of international fisheries’ 
bodies was summarised by the FAO Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing held 
in 1992. These factors include: i) a lack of funds and properly constituted and staffed 
secretariats; ii) disagreement over scientific advice concerning management and a 
refusal of contracting parties to accept such advice as binding; iii) conflict of interests 
among contracting parties and an inability to agree fully on the parameters necessary for 
management; iv) unregulated fishing by non-contracting parties that undermines efforts 
to promote rational resource use by fishery bodies; v) inability to make binding 
recommendations and decisions concerning management; vi) a lack of legal and real 
capacity to enforce management recommendations and decisions, and vii) the impact of
500 The 1946 Whaling Convention, supra, note 411, appears to have been the first to introduce it.
501 B. Applebaum, The Straddling Stocks Problem: The Northwest Atlantic Situation, International Law, 
and options for Coastal State Action’, in Alfred Soons (ed.), Implementation of the Law of the Sea 
Convention Through International Institutions, (Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute, Hawaii, 
1990), pp. 122-163, and D. G. Symes, ‘Fisheries Management in the North Atlantic: National and 
Regional Perspectives, Special Issue’, Ocean and Coastal Management, 35 (1997).
502 Lawrence Juda, The 1995 Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: A 
Critique’, ODIL, 28, (1997), pp. 147-166, at 149.
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management recommendations and decisions adopted by fisheries’ bodies which is 
weakened by the veto of recommendations and decisions by contracting parties, 
requirements to take unanimous decisions, the use of simple majority voting procedures 
or the use of consensus decision making 503. The Consultation agreed that there was a 
need for regional and sub-regional international fisheries’ bodies to provide the 
institutional mechanisms necessary to achieve effective high seas fisheries
504management .
During the second session of the UN Conference, held in July 1993, for the negotiation 
of the 1995 SSA, FAO stressed the need realistically to address the constraints facing 
fisheries’ bodies, to operate or initiate fundamental changes concerning their objectives, 
structure, purposes and powers and to equip them to deal more effectively with high 
seas’ issues. According to FAO, in formulating and implementing measures to meet the 
demands of the international community, fisheries’ bodies need to address concepts such 
as responsible fisheries and the precautionary approach and introduce new scenarios 
concerning the burden of proof. The condition sine qua non for such restructuring is that 
high priority must be accorded by contracting Parties and members of fisheries’ bodies 
to the need for enacting fundamental changes concerning the objectives, the structure, 
the purpose and the powers of fisheries organizations505.
The importance of co-operation for conservation and management of living resources 
on the high seas has been tackled in a number of international instruments recently 
adopted by the international community; in particular those adopted by the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development, especially Agenda 21 (Chapter 17); the 
Rome Consensus on World Fisheries adopted by the FAO Ministerial Conference on 
Fisheries held in Rome in March 1995506; the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fishing507; the 1993 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
503 Report of the Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing, Doc A/CONF. 164/INF/2. Reproduced in 
Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113, pp. 273-371.
504 Ibid. p. 349.
505 Ibid at 348. See also David J. Doulman, ‘Structure and Process’, supra, note 225, p. 15.
506 Paragraph 9; the Rome Consensus on World Fisheries was adopted unanimously by the FAO 
Ministerial Conference on Fisheries, Rome, 14-15 March 1995. This document, in its electronic form, is 
available on http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/fisherv/agreem/consensu/conef.htm. Consulted on 1st 
March 2000.
507 Code of Conduct, supra, note 223.
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Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas ; and, 
obviously, the 1995 SSA509. These international legal instruments globally 
acknowledged the importance of continuing international co-operation and co­
ordination in establishing sustainability of world fisheries exercised through fisheries 
management organizations.
4.1.3 The 1995 Straddling Stock Agreement
For straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish species, the 1995 SSA identifies, in 
Part III, the necessary mechanisms for international co-operation concerning those 
stocks. In general, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas must co-operate in 
relation to the stocks concerned either directly or through appropriate subregional or 
regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements510. The purpose of this co­
operation is to agree on conservation and management measures with respect to 
particular fish stocks where there is evidence that such stocks may be under threat of 
over-exploitation or where a new fishery is being developed for any such stocks. Where 
a regional or sub-regional fisheries body already exists and has the competence to 
establish conservation and management measures for SFS and HMFS, States fishing for 
the stock on the high seas and coastal States with a real interest in the stock must give 
effect to their duty to co-operate by participating in the work of that body. States with 
an interest in the stock that are not parties to an existing fishery organization or 
arrangement is encouraged to participate in the work of the organization. Only those 
States which are members of such an organization or participants in such an 
arrangement, or which agree to apply the conservation and management measures 
established by such an organization or arrangement, are to have access to the fishery 
resources to which those measures apply. This final provision, crucial for the 
implementation of the 1995 SSA, goes beyond existing treaties or customary law and 
certainly beyond UNCLOS.
508 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance, supra, note 222.
509 1995 SSA, supra, note 38.
510 1995 SSA, Art. 8.1.
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Regarding subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and
i
arrangements, the 1995 SSA provides that in establishing or on entering into such 
| organizations, States must agree inter alia on:
“0 the stocks to which conservation and management measures apply, 
taking into account the biological characteristics of the stocks directly 
concerned and the nature of all the fisheries involved;
ii) the area of application, taking into account the characteristics of the 
subregion or region, including socio-economic, geographical and 
environmental factors;
iii) the relationship between the work of the new organization or 
arrangement and the role, objectives and operation of any relevant 
existing fisheries management organizations or arrangements; and
iv) the mechanisms by which the organization or arrangement will obtain 
scientific advice and review the status of the stocks, including, where 
appropriate, the establishment of a scientific advisory body”511.
In addition, the provisions embodied in Article 10 of the SSA concerning functions of 
sub-regional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements are of 
particular relevance to the future role of the existing regional fisheries bodies and their 
success in conserving the stocks concerned. The two main functions that may be 
fulfilled by fisheries management organizations are those concerning provision of 
scientific advice and management. The degree to which each organization exercises 
these functions varies with each body and depends on its constitution. The scientific 
function includes the collection, exchange and assessment of scientific information and 
data. The management functions embrace the formulation of appropriate measures, 
standards and guidelines for States and the promotion of their implementation512.
According to Article 10 of the 1995 SSA, in fulfilling their obligation to co-operate 
through sub-regional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements, 
States must: i) agree on and comply with conservation and management measures to 
ensure the long-term sustainability of SFS and HMFS; ii) agree, as appropriate, on 
particular rights such as allocations of allowable catch or levels of fishing effort; iii) 
adopt and apply any generally recommended international minimum standards for the 
responsible conduct of fishing operations; iv) obtain and evaluate scientific advice,
511 1995 SSA, Article 9.
512 UN DOALOS Publication, The Law of the Sea, supra, note 116, p. 14.
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review the status of the stocks and assess the impact of fishing on non-target and 
associated or dependent species; v) agree on standards for collection, reporting, 
verification and exchange of data on fisheries for the stocks; vi) compile and 
disseminate accurate and complete statistical data to ensure that the best scientific 
evidence is available, while maintaining confidentiality where appropriate; vii) promote 
and conduct scientific assessments of the stocks and relevant research and disseminate 
I the results thereof; viii) establish appropriate co-operative mechanisms for effective 
monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement; ix) agree on means by which the 
fishing interests of new members of, or participants in, the organization or arrangement 
will be accommodated; x) agree on decision-making procedures which facilitate the 
adoption of conservation and management measures in a timely and effective manner; 
xi) promote the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with Part VIII; xii) ensure 
the full co-operation of their relevant national agencies and industries in implementing 
the recommendations and decisions of the sub-regional or regional fisheries 
management organization and arrangement; and xiii) give due publicity to the 
conservation and management measures established by the organization and its 
arrangements. The ambiguities in many of these obligations should be noted. All these 
provisions will require further interpretation either through the national legislation of 
States Parties or through negotiations within the relevant fisheries organizations of 
which they are members.
Many of the existing fisheries organizations have already adapted their mandates and 
functions in the light of the changes brought about by the 1982 UNCLOS513 and for the 
most part, they have undergone a radical restructuring according to the requirements of 
the new Law of the Sea514. One example of a step to radical restructuring is that the
513 Tullio Treves, ‘The Role of Universal International Organizations in Implementing the 1982 UN Law 
of the Sea Convention’ in Alfred Soons (ed.), Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention Through 
International Institutions, (Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute, Hawaii, 1990), pp. 208-239. See 
also Moritaka Hayashi, ‘Implementing the Law of the Sea Convention: FAO’S Contributions’, Paper 
Presented at the Thirty-First Annual Law of the Sea Institute Conference on “Building New Regimes and 
Institutions for the Sea”, University of Miami, 30-31 March 1998.
514 According to Satya Nandan, “in addition to the efforts of individual institutions to reinvigorate 
themselves, existing mechanisms for coordinating their activities must be strengthened and new 
mechanisms for securing more integrated and comprehensive coordination must be explored”. Satya 
Nandan, ‘Existing Institutional Framework and Mechanisms” in Peter Bautista Payoyo (ed.), Ocean 
Governance. Sustainable Development of the Seas, (Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 1994), at 
30..
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| Council of NASCO at its 15th Meeting, Edinburgh, 8-12 June 1998 adopted an 
Agreement on Adoption o f a Precautionary Approach515. The biggest change UNCLOS 
brought about during its negotiation, circa 1976 onwards was the widespread acceptance 
of EEZs and EFZs516. Therefore, the specific and detailed mechanisms provided by 
Articles 9 and 10 of the 1995 SSA will be helpful in the restructuring process of the 
existing fisheries organizations. These provisions can be considered as a major 
contribution to the international law of fisheries, enabling it to meet the new challenges, 
principles and rules of the emerging regime for fisheries on the high seas.
4.2 New organizations and new arrangements
Despite the abundance of fisheries organizations and the firmly established network for 
co-operation and co-ordination that exists in the world, the progress of international 
organizations today in breaking down the barriers that divide the peoples of the world 
often seems discouraging . Curiously, the study of international organizations from the 
sociological approach has not made much progress over the past few decades518. 
Notwithstanding this rather morose panorama, after the end of the Cold War and 
references to an uncertain ‘new’ world order519, international organizations and
515 Council of NASCO (15th Meeting, Edinburgh, 8-12 June 1998), Agreement on Adoption of a 
Precautionary Approach, Freestone, ‘International Fisheries Law’, in Boyle and Freestone, supra, note 
394, at 163, footnote 137.
516 See Brown, International Law of the Sea, supra, note 169, pp. 216-217 and Burke, The New 
International Law, supra, note 110, p. 37. According to Orrego Vicuna, “the recognition of national 
jurisdiction over the EEZ provided a clear source of authority as to the conservation and management of 
the world’s most important fishing grounds, not excluding third States’ interests in and access to those 
resources’. Francisco Orrego Vicuna, The Changing International Law, supra, note 81, p. 51
517 Bennett, International Organizations, supra, note 411, 433. According to this author, “New agencies 
are created in substantial number but are unable to realize much of their potential. Organizations are 
based on the principle that the sovereignty of the members will remain intact and undiminished. States 
retain all their prerogatives of ultimate decision making and cooperate through international organizations 
when their perceived national interests are enhanced rather than diminished or threatened by such 
cooperation”. Ibid., at 435.
518 See the essay by Pierre de Senarclens, ‘Regime Theory and the Study of International Organizations’, 
ISSJ, UNESCO, No. 138, (1993), pp. 453-462.
519 The notion of world order does not yet have a clear focus in the international relations literature. See 
A. J. R. Groom and D. Powell, ‘From World Politics to Global Governance. A Theme in Need of a 
Focus’ in A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to 
Theory, (London, Pinter Publishers, 1994), at 81-90. The most complete account of the world-system 
approach is to be found in the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, (San Diego, 
Academy Press, 1989). Also worth consulting, Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth
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international co-operation have become key actors in international law and international 
relations. International Organizations help to build gradually the human foundations for 
I a more orderly and just world in the area of assistance for economic and social 
development; contribute to the security and well-being of humanity providing channels 
and programmes for dealing with short and long-range crisis and disasters; concern 
themselves with denials of human rights and justice; and finally, contribute to the
S90integration and aggregation of interests across national boundaries . Yet, analyzed 
within the larger context of the international system, international organizations, both in 
their dependent and independent exercise of functions, are essentially ‘system- 
preserving’521.
The international organization as well as its member states, is the primary guardian and 
enforcer, on the international level, of the regulatory norms expressed in the treaty that 
creates the former. The major existing international organizations are the product of an 
uncommon burst of institutional innovation in the aftermath of World War II. It has 
become apparent that the world is in a period of intensive international law-making in 
the environmental field. To be effective, this effort must be accompanied by a renewed 
and further imaginative burst of institutional creation. International organizations are 
agents of "institutionalized compromise". Marie-Claire Smouts appeals for a return to 
the study of international organizations within a renewed sociology able to tackle the 
extended changes in the world of international relations and international politics 
(violence, debt, mass migrations, resurgent nationalism and global environmental 
degradation, to name but a few)522. International environmental norms, however sound 
in theory, will only be effectively applied within international organizations capable of 
implementing the regime they have established and adapting it to the exigencies of rapid 
change backed by the assurance of compliance adequate to induce continued 
commitment.
Century 1914-1991, (London, Abacus, 1997), in particular Ch. 19 Towards the Millennium’, pp. 558- 
585. According to Hobsbawm, “it is highly likely that the present phase of Post-Cold War breakdown will 
be temporary, even though it already looks like lasting rather longer than the phases of breakdown and 
disruption which followed the two world wars”. Ibid., at 584.
520 Bennett, International Organizations, supra, note 480, pp. 436-440.
521 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 171.
522 Marie-Claude Smouts, 'International Organizations and Inequality Among States', ISSJ, 144 (1995), 
pp. 229-241.
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Although, in an ever-changing world, regime theory cannot be considered as a panacea 
for global environmental change, it has made a fundamental contribution to the study of 
International Organizations (IOs), a study which otherwise has made little progress over 
the past few decades. The primary contribution of regime theory in this field has been to 
develop and apply the theory of games in order to investigate the different kinds of 
institutional arrangements that states could devise faced with different types of 
incentives524. Regime theorists try to provide answers to three essential questions 
relating to international institutions: first, why do they exist to deal with some issues but 
not others; secondly, how can the differences in the forms of institutions be explained; 
thirdly, why do some institutions establish a bureaucracy to monitor the actions of their 
member states and to impose sanctions while others are more or less self-enforcing?
James Caporaso has summarized the answers to these questions. He points out that 
institutions can be established in those situations where mutual benefits exist but cannot 
be realized through unrestricted non-institutionalized exchange and where some sort of 
problem exists that inhibits collective action so that private bargaining and exchange 
alone are unsuccessful. In some cases relating to co-operation, multilateral norms are 
likely to work, but in other circumstances, including the harvesting of common property 
resources, multilateral norms are, according to the author, less likely to bring desired 
results525.
523 Game Theory or the Theory of Games, which derives from a mathematical approach, is concerned 
with identification of the optimum choice of strategy in situations involving a conflict of interests in an 
anarchic setting. Both Liberal Institutionalism and Realism have drawn on some of the concepts 
developed by game theorists in order to enhance their own theoretical appreciation of the factors that 
inhibit collaboration and the means by which self-interested actors can nonetheless co-operate in the face 
of anarchy and important conflicting interests. See Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Game Theory and 
Cooperation’, World Politics, 40 (1988), pp. 317-334, at 319. Other applications of the Game Theory are 
discussed in Section 1.1, Chapter 3 (Game Theory: the Prisoners’ Dilemma) and in Section 5, Chapter 5 
(Participatory Rights) of this thesis.
524 Ogley distinguishes ‘game’ from ‘debate’. In a ‘game’, each party is trying to maximise its own payoff 
in terms of its interests and preferences, and does not expect the other party’s interests or preferences to 
change. In a ‘debate’, each party believes its policy to be based on some important truth, which it must 
make others see and act upon, because it is, or should be, a truth for them as well as for itself. In other 
words, in a game, the question is, what incentives can you devise for others so that it becomes rational for 
them, in terms of their original preferences, to act what you want them to act whereas in a ‘debate’ the 
question is how you can induce others to see the world as you see it. Roderick Ogley, ‘Between the Devil 
and the Law of the Sea’, in John Vogler and Mark Imber (eds.), The Environment and International 
Relations, (London, Routledge, 1996), pp. 159-171, atl61.
525 James Caporaso, 'International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: the Search for Foundations', 10, 
46(1993), 599-632.
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Pierre de Senarclens criticizes Regime Theory for downplaying the role of power and 
for overemphasizing the co-operative activities of international organizations on the 
basis that even in voluntary organizations, power is always in play. According to this 
author, there is a tendency within RT to produce idealistic pictures, to neglect the fact 
that there are winners and losers in favour of a rosy view that co-operation is to 
everyone’s benefit and to ignore the fact that the relative differentiated power of 
members of the international organization concerned can distort the politics of 
organizational behaviour . There is a measure of truth in such a view, but RT has 
presented the issue of power as one of distinguishing "power to" from "power over". 
"Power to" is the co-operative power or the power that can be exercised in the service of 
the common good. Much more political in character is "power over" which gives rise to 
conflict, coercion, sanctions, winners and losers. Krasner has provided a theoretical 
bridge which connects both concepts in pointing out that where conflicts of interest are 
salient and power is uneven, strong states have generally done as they pleased; whereas 
where conflicts have been less severe, and power more evenly distributed, regimes can 
be established527.
International organizations are not created de novo. On the contrary, they emerge from 
prior institutionalized contexts, the most fundamental of which cannot be explained as if 
they were contracts among rational individuals maximizing some utility function. In a 
broad sense, international organizations are created, first, to harmonize the actions of 
states in the attainment of common ends, as aptly expressed in the United Nations 
Charter; secondly, to develop and implement a very special kind of regulation 
appropriate to international interchange; and thirdly, to programme and co-ordinate the 
cross-national mobilization and utilization of resources for human welfare, that is, to 
manage international development528.
526 Pierre de Senarclens, Regime Theory and the Study of International Organizations’, ISSJ, 138 (1993), 
pp. 453-462.
527 Stephen Krasner, ’Global Communication and National Power’, World Politics, 43 (1991), pp. 336- 
366.
528 P. Jacob, A. Atherton and A. Wallestein, The Dynamics of International Organization, (Homewood, 
Illinois, The Dorsey Press, 1972), pp. 684-685.
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Public international organizations have proliferated since the Second World War. 
Amerasinghe points out two important legal problems relating to the acts of global 
organizations. The first relates to the applicability, scope and effect of the doctrine of 
ultra vires in regard to these acts. In the opinion of the author, where a constituent 
instrument deals with review and the effects of ultra vires acts, these provisions will 
govern. Ultra vires are decisions beyond the legal power or authority of an organization.
S9QThe second concerns the effects of acts performed by organs of organizations .
The kernel of the legal status of an international organization lies in its possession of 
international legal personality. In this regard, the acts of organs must be accepted as a 
whole and have supremacy over other treaties whether concluded by the member States 
or by the Organization itself530. The possession of international personality means that 
international organizations are subjects of international law and capable of having 
international rights and being subject to duties and of enforcing their rights by bringing 
international claims.
The need for more effective conservation and management organizations for fisheries 
has been stressed in several studies and international fora. The recent changes in the 
legal regime of the oceans have effected a great alteration in the conditions under which 
fisheries beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are managed. In this context, it 
should be underlined that there are a number of regional economic and other 
organizations: the OECD, the APEC, the EU, ASEAN, and the GCC, among others,
c o i
which play a role in fisheries .
529 C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 163.
530 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Patrick Daillier et Alain Pellet, Droit International, (Paris, Librerie Gdndrale de 
Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1994), pp. 558-569.
531 The OECD’s Committee for Fisheries, for example, decided in 1997 to study the implications on the 
fishing sector, fishers and processors alike, and public policy institutions of adopting responsible fisheries 
frameworks. The outcome is the document “Transition to Responsible Fisheries: Economic and Policy 
Implication”, which highlights the social implications of moving to responsible fisheries and explores the 
impact of government financial transfers in supporting a move to responsible fisheries; information as 
available on http://www.oecd.org/agr/fish/docrespfish.htm. on October 24, 2000. On the other hand, the 
European Union has established a European Commission Directorate-General for Fisheries and has 
adopted a Common Fisheries Policy aimed at setting up fisheries agreements and negotiating at the 
international level within regional and international fisheries organisations for common conservation 
measures in deep-sea fisheries; information, as available on 24/10/00 on the Web Site 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/fisheries/index en.htm
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Strengthening or restructuring the capacity of fisheries bodies to execute conservation 
and management functions in respect of high seas stocks is now the primary concern of 
regional and sub-regional fisheries organizations. A number of regional fisheries 
organizations have been established within the framework of FAO, either by separate 
agreements adopted under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution , or directly by 
Resolutions of the FAO Conference or Council under Article VI of the FAO 
Constitution . Other organizations have been established outside the framework of 
FAO. Therefore, the main question to be answered is whether fisheries organizations 
established within the framework of FAO can be more effectively managed than those 
established outside the framework of FAO.
The main advantages of establishing a regional fisheries management organization 
within the framework of FAO are that such organizations and consequently their 
members are assured of the technical and financial support of FAO in both management 
and development functions and can rely on the impartiality and competence of the 
scientific work carried out in fulfilment of these functions. The disadvantages of bodies 
established within the framework of FAO are that such organizations are often noted as 
being too closely related to FAO and are consequently perceived as neither belonging 
nor adequately representing the specific conservation and management interests of the 
region. This can be especially true with respect to regional organizations established 
under Article VI of the FAO Constitution which are, in effect, an integral part of the 
organization, wholly financed by and responsible to, FAO. Commissions established by 
agreements adopted under Article XIV of the Constitution have a greater degree of 
autonomy and flexibility, including the possibility of having their own independent 
budgets financed by their own members and decision-making powers of their own534.
Article 8.5 of the 1995 UN Agreement on SFS and HMFS states that where there is no 
sub-regional or regional fisheries organization for a specific stock, coastal States and 
States fishing on the high seas for such stock must co-operate to establish such an
532 IPFC, APFIC, GFCM. See Marashi, ‘Summary Information’, supra, note 225.
533 IOFC, WECAFC, CECAF, CARP AS. See also Marashi, ‘Summary Information’, supra, note 225.
534 FAO has taken the view that ‘old fashioned’, detailed fishery agreements are too technical and difficult 
to operate for developing countries which have poor infrastructures and budgets and lack trained fishery 
scientists and administrators and have never before set up a fisheries organizations. Thus the aim is to 
adopt a simple text that brings them in and can be upgraded later.
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organization or enter into other appropriate accord or arrangement to ensure 
conservation and management of such a stock and must participate in the work of the 
organization or arrangement. Article 9 provides a set of conditions for the endowment 
of regional and sub-regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements. 
According to that Article, States must agree on the stocks to which measures apply, the 
area of application, the relations between the new organization and the role, objectives 
and operations of other existing fisheries organizations and the mechanisms by which 
the organizations will obtain and use scientific advice and data. In addition, States 
participating in the formation of new fisheries bodies must inform other States having a 
real interest in the work and co-operation for the protection of the fishery in order to 
encourage them to join the new organization. These are important provisions in 
avoiding any adverse legal effects of the act of one international organization upon 
another, and enhance legal consistency among fisheries organizations. In practice, in 
relation to both substantive and procedural matters, the activities of fisheries 
organizations will take into account activities of other organizations on a legal basis535.
The provisions of the 1995 SSA relating to creation of new regional and sub-regional 
fisheries organizations will strengthen the capacity of those bodies to make effective 
management decisions and to enforce them. Also relevant, depending on specific 
circumstances, are the provisions of Article 9 which can be useful for purposes of 
reviewing the legal status, procedural matters and capacity building of existing fisheries 
organizations and coping with inefficiencies related to the conservation and 
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.
4.3 The problem of new members or participants
Among the other conservation and management functions, under the 1995 SSA, 
regional and subregional fishing organizations will have to deal with the issue of new 
members and participants in these organizations. Taking into account that all States 
have a qualified right to fish on the high seas536, procedures have to be adopted to deal 
with the problem of new entrants to particular high seas fisheries while ensuring
535 Philippe Sands, Principles, supra note 211, pp. 116-117.
536 Article 116 of UNCLOS
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stabilization of extraction rates. In this case, the shares of the TAC already allocated to 
existing participants in a fishery will need to be reduced or transferred through some 
other type of arrangement supervised by the fisheries organization concerned537.
Two general principles govern the membership of international fisheries organizations: 
first, matters concerning membership depend primarily on the provisions of the 
constituent instruments establishing the international organizations concerned and on
00
the practice of each organization ; and secondly, the general principle that all States 
have the right to participate in high seas fisheries still has to be observed539. During the 
UN Conference on SFS, the UN Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
prepared a document which was then submitted by the Secretariat as a ‘Background 
Paper’540. This document made a logical contribution to the debate stressing that a new 
entrant refusing to comply with an arrangement properly established in accordance with 
UNCLOS could not claim a right to fish the stock concerned or to fish in the area to 
which the conservation arrangement applies541.
Article 11 of the 1995 SSA establishes the basis for determining the nature and extent of 
participatory rights for new members or new participants in a sub-regional or regional 
fisheries management organization. Accordingly, States must take into account, inter 
alia: the state and the existing level of fishing effort in the stock concerned; the 
respective interests, patterns and practices of the existing and new members or 
participants; the respective contributions to the collection and provisions of accurate 
data and to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks that can be provided by 
existing and new participants to the fishery organization; the needs of coastal fishing 
communities dependent mainly on fish stocks and the needs of coastal States whose 
economies depend overwhelmingly on the exploitation of marine living resources; and
537 The issue concerning the reallocation of resources of new entrants, in particular in fisheries that are 
already fully exploited, will be discussed in Chapter 5, Decision-making procedures, Section 5, 
"Participatory rights").
538 Felice Morgenstem, Legal Problems of International Organizations, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), at 46; and, Amerasinghe, supra note 529, p. 105.
539 Article 87 of UNCLOS
540 Doc. A/CONF. 164/INF/5, 8 July 1993, in Levy, Selected Documents, supra, note 113, pp. 399-432.
541 Ibid, par. 83, p. 423.
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finally, the interest of developing states from the subregion or region concerned in 
whose areas of national jurisdiction the stocks also occur.
The specific objective of this Article is to balance the right or interest of all States to 
engage in fishing on the high seas, with the conservation and management measures that 
a group of States may already have established in the context of a sub-regional or 
regional fishery body, including imposition of some restraints to protect the stocks 
concerned. Two issues arise from this Article. The first concerns what portion of the 
TAC must be allocated to a new entrant to a specific fishery organization. The new 
entrants are under an obligation to respect the conservation measures already adopted. 
The existing member States fishing the stock are under an obligation to grant reasonable 
access to a new entrant, except where a complete ban on all fishing is to be imposed in 
the interest of conservation of a stock. In this case, pressure to resist reduction in quotas 
is likely to undermine the consensus established in the context of a specific 
organization542. The difficult question remains, of course, that regarding what is to be 
done when parties fail to agree543. Theoretically, all States are under an obligation to 
accept "reasonable”544 proposals. In practice, this will depend on the existence and use 
of effective dispute settlement mechanisms545.
The second issue concerns the criteria available to guide States and fisheries 
organizations in dealing with the conditions and merits of new entrants. The needs of 
coastal fishing communities, as well as the needs of coastal and developing States must 
be taken into account in the process of determining the nature and the extent of
542 Miles and Burke, Pressures’, supra, note 106, p. 355.
543 Another question concerning to what extent the provisions of the 1995 SSA regarding new entrants are 
reflected in die international customary law on that issue. Some authors maintain that to the extent that 
these measures become more common in practice, legislation and agreements, they may also be 
considered either as a part of the ancient rule or as qualifying as a new rule in customary international 
law. See Orrego, The Changing International Law, supra, note 81, p. 266. In the same direction, Habib 
Gherari, ‘L’accord du 4 Aout 1995 sur les stocks chevauchants et les stocks de poissons grands 
migrateurs’, RGDIP, 100 (1996), pp. 367-390. However, Davies and Redgwell argue, on the other hand, 
that DWFS, unhappy with the balance of rights and interests in the 1995 SSA, could search for 
alternatives to participation therein. Davies and Redgwell, supra, note 461, p. 265.
544 Study of the numerous decisions providing for a definition of the term of ‘reasonable’ reveals that 
international case-law on this retains a rather conventional appeal and the content of the concept is 
determined by reference to law and follows a positivist model, aiming at ascertaining the will of the 
parties. See Olivier Corten, ‘L’interpretation du “raisonnable” par les juridictions intemationales: au-dela 
du positivisme juridique?’, RGDIP, 102 (1998), 5-44
545 Chapter 6, Section 5.
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participatory rights. It is important to emphasize that the provisions of Article 11 can be 
seen as aiming to secure greater food supplies and food security546 for countries which 
depend mainly on the exploitation of marine living resources547; questions concerning 
availability of global food supplies persist548. This Article establishes a link between 
food production, environmental concerns, and the role of fishing communities549. As an 
offspring of Agenda 21, the 1995 SSA is a mainstream instrument for achieving the 
sustainable development as required by all UNCED instruments, in particular for 
achieving the sustainable development of marine living resources.
The developing countries most likely to want to participate in high seas fisheries are 
small islands, in particular in the Caribbean550 and the South Pacific551, where there is a
546 Food security depends, inter alia, on sustainable management of fish, forests and wildlife. The World 
Food Summit, convened at the invitation of FAO on 13-17 November 1996, adopted the Rome 
Declaration on World Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action. In order to combat 
environmental threats to food security, this Plan of Action adopted as its objective 3.2, inter alia, the 
promotion of early ratification of the 1995 SSA. The Rome Declaration and the Plan of Action are 
available on http://www.fao.org
547 In November 1999, the report entitled “Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability” 
submitted by leading climate scientists to the Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change evaluated impacts of climate change for particular sectors, stating that existing stresses 
on fish stocks could worsen as water temperature, salinity and entire ecosystems change. This report is 
available on http://www.ipcc.ch.
548 Discussions about the future of global agriculture take place in an unusual context: production is 
generally growing and is likely to continue to grow, but globally, the rate of growth is slowing. In the face 
of world’s food production declines, many experts are concerned about the capacity of the world 
agricultural system to continue to increase production over the coming decades to feed an ever-larger 
world population. See Lester Brown, Full House. Reassessing the Earth’s Population Carrying Capacity, 
(London, Earthscan, 1995); State of the World. Millennial Edition 1999, a Worldwatch Institute Report on 
Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, (New York, Norton and Company, 1999) in particular Ch. 7 by 
Lester Brown, ‘Feeding Nine Billion’; Anne Platt McGinn, Safeguarding the Health of Oceans, 
Worldwatch Paper No. 145, (Washington, Worldwatch Institute, 1999); Le defi alimentaire. Nourrir le 
Monde en 2010, Alternatives Economiques, No. 141, Paris, Octobre 1996; La securite alimentaire k long 
terme, Food for Development (Commission Europeenne, Direction Generale du Developpement) and 
Courrier de la Planete, Montpellier, France, Octobre 1996.
549 According to Davies and Redgwell, the sum total of these provisions is to ensure that no party acting 
in accordance with its obligations under the SSA may fish unilaterally and unrestrictedly on SFS and 
HMFS without being a member or participant in the relevant regional organization or agreeing to apply 
regional measures. Peter Davies and Catherine Redgwell, supra, note 461, p. 265. In the opinion of 
Freestone and Makuch, “membership criteria will continue to be restrictive rather than expansive because 
of existing member’s desire to exclude others seeking access to the relevant fisheries resources, as well as 
the difficulties that attend monitoring and enforcement of the conservation and management resources in 
relation to individual fishing vessels and distant water vessels of States”. D. Freestone and Zen Makuch, 
‘The New International Environmental Law of Fisheries: the 1995 UN Straddling Stocks Agreement’, 
Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 1 (1996), pp. 3-51, at 31.
550 FAO Caribbean Technical Cooperation Network on Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture, Circular 
Letter No. 33, January 1996.
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high dependency on fisheries and the oceans. According to FAO, to acquire high seas 
fishing capabilities, developing countries need to take into account the following 
considerations: how to overcome the constraints imposed by their lack of technology, 
because fisheries resources are dispersed and difficult to harvest; cost factors which are 
I high compared with the investment requirements for fishing industries within the EEZ;
how to develop appropriate marketing policies for target species and resist the intense 
I  international competition of existing fleets as well as prevailing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers552. The last is by far the most difficult problem given the relative poverty of the 
developing States concerned.
In sum, the provisions of Articles 11 of the 1995 SSA provide realistic grounds on 
which the regional and subregional fisheries organizations can strengthen fisheries 
policy formulation in determining the nature and extent of participatory rights for new 
members or new participants.
4.4 Non-members and non-participants
The effectiveness of high seas fisheries management can be considerably reduced if 
important fishing states are not bound by the decisions of a fishing organization and do 
not participate in the process of determining and adopting management decisions. The 
legal issue of non-members and non-participants was therefore an important legal issue 
that had to be addressed in the 1995 SSA.
The main legal issue to be addressed in this section is thus what the situation will be 
from legal view point, if third States, which are non-members and non-participants in a
551 The main objective of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency has been to affirm the right to 
exercise sovereign rights over HMFS, their most important resource, without interference or direction 
from DWFS, even if cooperation in form of access agreements would be realized. See Judith Swan, 
‘Highly Migratory Species. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency’, in Alfred Soons (ed.), 
Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention Through International Institutions, (Proceedings of the 
Law of the Sea Institute, Hawaii, 1990), pp. 147-163, at 156. The new environment in the South Pacific is 
characterized by a shift in the Pacific Island Countries’ development strategy that entails developing their 
own, locally based tuna industries. See Rachel Schurman, ‘The Future of Regional Fisheries Cooperation 
in a Changing Economic Environment: The South Pacific Island Countries in the 1990’, ODIL 28 (1997), 
pp. 369-383, at 371.
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relevant subregional or regional fisheries organization refuse to co-operate as required 
by UNCLOS (Articles 61 and 120) and as a result are banned from fishing in areas 
managed by the organization. In this regard, Article 8.4 of the Agreement now 
establishes that only States which are members of an organization or party to the 
arrangement concerned or which agree to apply the conservation and management 
measures established by such an organization or arrangement, will have access to the 
fishery resources to which those measures apply. This raises challenging questions 
concerning enforcement and is a major break from the previously existing situation 
under relevant international law.
As pointed out earlier, the general principle is that all States now have a qualified right 
to engage in fishing on the high seas. Addressing freedom of the high seas generally, a 
very long standing principle of public international law, Article 87 of UNCLOS stresses 
clearly that "the high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked"553. In 
addition, Article 119.3 reinforces this principle in stating that "States concerned shall 
ensure that conservation measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form 
or in fact against the fishermen of any State". In this regard, most of the conventions 
establishing sub-regional and regional fisheries organizations have provisions allowing 
third States interested in participating in the fisheries to join as "participants" in such 
organizations, rather than as full members, for the purpose of encouraging and 
providing for stability in the fisheries. However, this obligation is conditioned by an 
obligation to co-operate with other States in agreeing upon the measures necessary for 
the conservation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks554.
The 1995 SSA confirms the general principle that even non-members and non­
participant States which have not agreed to apply the conservation and management 
measures of a concerned sub-regional or regional fisheries organization are not 
discharged from the obligation to co-operate, in accordance both with the 1982 
UNCLOS and the SSA itself (Article 17.1). In addition, such States must not authorize 
vessels flying their flag to engage in fishing operations for the stocks concerned (Article
552 Doc. A/CONF. 164/INF/2, FAO 1992 Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing, in Levy et al 
(eds.), Selected Documents, supra note 113, pp. 329-337.
553 UNCLOS, Article 87.1.
554 UNCLOS, Art. 63.2, 64 and 118.
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17.2). The effectiveness of fisheries management would be considerably reduced if any 
high seas fishing States did not participate in the decision-making relating to 
management measures and was not bound by those decisions. Therefore, these 
provisions aim at preventing the effectiveness of any decision taken in the context of a 
specific organization from being put in the jeopardy by non-contracting parties.
Regarding non-members and non-participants, another set of rules adopted by the SSA 
(Article 17.3), is designed to promote rational exploitation, imposing certain duties on 
member States of regional and sub-regional fisheries management organizations to 
request any fishing entity which has fishing vessels in the relevant area to co-operate 
fully in the implementation of conservation and management measures established by 
the organizations (Article 17.3). The SSA sets out for such fishing entities what might 
be called a ‘principle of commensurate participation’; taking into account that Article 
17.3 provides that “such fishing entities shall enjoy benefits from participation in the 
fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply with conservation and 
management measures in respect of those stocks”. According to this provision, such 
entities must enjoy benefits proportional or equivalent to their commitment to comply 
with conservation and management measures in respect to the stocks concerned.
Furthermore, States which are members of or participants in a regional or subregional 
organizations must exchange information with respect to the activities of fishing vessels 
flying the flags of States which are neither members of nor participants in the 
organization but which are engaged in fishing operations on the relevant stocks (Article 
17.4). These States must take measures consistent with the Agreement and within 
international law to deter the activities of fishing vessels, which undermine the 
effectiveness of the measures adopted by the organizations concerned. In this regard, the 
1993 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, provides that States parties 
to this Agreement must co-operate in a manner consistent with international law to the 
end that fishing vessels entitled to fly the flag of non-Parties do not engage in activities 
that undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and management 
measures555. In addition, the Parties must encourage any State not party to this
555 FAO Compliance Agreement, Art. VIII. 2
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Agreement to accept it, exchange information amongst themselves and encourage non- 
parties to adopt laws and regulations consistent with the provisions of the Agreement 
(Article VIII). Other provisions restricting the access of non-contracting parties are the 
1994 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the 
Central Bering Sea556; the 1992 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna557; and the 1992 Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the 
North Pacific Ocean558.
The Commission of the CCAMLR has adopted, in its Schedule of Conservation 
Measures in Force for 1999-2000, a ‘Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non­
contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measure’. According to that 
scheme, a non-Contracting Party vessel sighted engaging in fishing activities in the 
CCAMLR Area is presumed to be undermining the effectiveness of CCAMLR 
conservation measures; information must be transmitted immediately to the 
Commission which will transmit this information to all Contracting Parties within one 
business day, and to the flag State of the sighted vessel as soon as possible. According 
to this Scheme, when a non Contracting Party vessel referred to above enters a port of 
any Contracting Party, it shall be inspected by authorised Contracting Party officials and 
shall not be allowed or tranship any fish until the inspection has taken place. 
Information on the results of all inspections of non Contracting Party vessels conducted 
in the ports of Contracting Parties, and of any subsequent action, must be transmitted 
immediately to the Secretariat of the Commission, which will transmit this information 
immediately to all Contracting Parties and to the relevant flag State(s)559. Similar 
schemes of conservation measures concerning non Contracting Parties have been
556 1994 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering 
Sea, Article XII.3. Reproduced in (1995) 3 4 ILM 67.
557 1992 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Article 15.4. Law of the Sea 
Bulletin, No. 26, 1994.
558 1992 Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean, Article IV.4. 
Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 22,1993.
559 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, CCAMLR, ‘Scheme to 
Promote Compliance by non Contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measures’, 
Conservation Measure 118/XVII, Schedule of Conservation Measures in Force 1999/2000. Document in 
electronic form as available on 2/11/00 on the Web Site of the CCAMLR: 
http://www.ccamlr.Org/Englisdh/e pubs/e measures/e cm99 00/e cm99 00page5.htm
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recently implemented by the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission560 and the International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas561.
On the other hand, FAO organized in October 2000, in Rome, a Technical Consultation 
on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, subsequent to an Expert 
Consultation on that issue organized by the Government of Australia in Co-operation 
with FAO in Sidney, in May 2000. This Technical Consultation addressed IUU fishing 
in a substantive manner, identifying a number of mutually consistent measures that must 
be implemented. In the first instance, the full and effective implementation of recently 
concluded international fishery instruments should be encouraged (viz. Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Compliance Agreement, UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
and the three FAO international plans of action (IPOA)). The implementation of these 
instruments will facilitate in different, but mutually reinforcing ways, greater national 
control and supervision over fishing vessels operations . As regards the difficulty 
experienced by regional fisheries bodies in applying responsible fisheries management 
measures to the vessels of non-Parties, particularly those on the fishing vessel registers 
of some "open register" States, the Technical Consultation has fostered various 
proposals, ranging from making efforts to encourage such non-Parties to join the 
regional fisheries bodies and/or comply with their management measures, to 
implementing bans of various sorts against them, such as denying port access, banning 
imports of fish, outlawing transhipments, etc .
Other international fora have addressed, and are continuing to address, issues relating to 
IUU fishing. The Seventh Session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development 
(CSD) in April 1999 considered the issue noting that FAO would give priority to
560 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, ‘Resolution 99/04 On the Status of Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Parties’. Document in electronic form as available on 2 November 2000, on the web site 
http://www.sevchelles.net/iotc/EIOTCRes.htm
561 International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, ‘Recommendation Concerning the 
Ban on Landings and Transhipments of Vessels from non Contracting Parties Identified as Having 
Committed a Serious Infringement’. Recommendation adopted by the Commission at its 11th Special 
Meeting (Santiago de Compostela, Spain, November 1998). Report for Biennial Period, 1998-1999, 
entered into force on June 21, 1999. Document in electronic form as available on 2 November 2000, on 
the web site http ://www. iccat.es
562 ‘Technical Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing’, FAO Document 
FLIUU/2000 Inf. 4, Rome, July 2000.
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develop an IPOA to deal effectively with any form of IUU fishing. The CSD 
underscored the importance of flag State and port State issues in combating IUU 
fishing. In doing so, the Commission invited IMO to develop, as a matter of urgency, 
measures in binding forms to ensure that ships of all flag State meet international rules 
and standards so as to give full and complete effect to the 1992 United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea (Article 91) as well as other relevant conventions564.
In summary, regarding the position of non-members of and non-participants in a 
specific regional and sub-regional fishing organizations, the 1995 SSA now qualifies the 
open access regime of high seas fisheries by restricting the access of non contracting 
parties to specific areas. This provision is in alignment with other recently adopted 
international instruments, such as the FAO Compliance Agreement and the above­
indicated schemes implemented by international fisheries organizations. The conditions 
for restricting access are clearly specified in the Agreement itself and must be consistent 
with international law. In voluntarily becoming members or participants of a fisheries 
organization, States parties to it are complying with an international obligation 
confirmed in the SSA, to co-operate. In the context of the balancing of the obligations 
and duties of the fishing and the coastal States established by the 1995 SSA this allows 
States parties to it to deter those fishing States which are non-members and non­
participants from fishing a specific stock565. The residual problem, once the SSA enters 
into force, will be the position and activities of those DWFS, which do not become 
parties to it. Even if non-parties to the SSA undermine the effectiveness of international 
management measures the fact is that, according to the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
Treaties [Art. 38], treaty law binds only States parties to a treaty unless they have 
otherwise indicated that they accept it or the obligation already exists in customary 
international law. The efforts to achieve sustainable use of high seas fisheries, therefore, 
may yet be jeopardized by unregulated fishing by States that are not parties to the SSA. 
The effectiveness of fisheries management will be reduced significantly if some high
563 Ibid.
564 See ‘Responsible Fisheries and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fisheries: Moving from Principles 
to Implementation’, UNICPOLOS Document in electronic form as available on 11 November 2000, on 
the Web Site http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Docs/UNICPO/ICPO fish.htm
565 The question remains as whether these provisions are consistent with the freedom of fishing on the 
high seas and the extent to which the Agreement’s further elaboration of the duty to co-operate is 
reflected in customary international law on this matter.
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seas fishing States do not participate in the management decisions and are not bound by 
those decisions566. It might be maintained that the non-fishing provisions of the SSA are 
declaratory, have the nature of an implementation of provisions of the 1982 
UNCLOS567 and consequentiy binding on all UNCLOS parties, whether or not the high
Cf ZQ
seas fishing States concerned are parties to the Agreement .
Regarding the problem of participation, the essential issue is the consequence of non­
participation, on which the SSA has highly innovated the law of high seas fisheries. 
Although the evolution of the law of the sea had been pointing in that direction, the 
conditions for restricting access specified in the Agreement is a major mechanism for 
the implementation of the new regime.
4.5 Transparency in activities of fisheries management organizations
Transparency is another important legal issue now needing to be addressed regarding 
the activities of regional and subregional fishing activities. Regimes, even without the 
benefit of binding substantive agreement, can build and enforce norms simply by 
making individual and national acts transparent. “The process of improving the shared 
international data set and integrating national and international policies is a mechanism 
by which national actors become more transparent, and norms can be shaped by the 
international organizations that fulfil that functions”569.
The general principle in international law, which is also reflected in the law of 
treaties570, is that all treaties must be executed in good faith by both States parties and
566 Tahindro, supra note 163, pp. 25. This point will be discussed in the following section.
567 In this regard it should be stressed that the title of the Agreement is “Agreement for the 
Implementation of Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Species”. See supra, note 38.
568 See Juda, supra, note 502, pp. 155.
569 David Victor, Abraham Chayes and Eugene Skolnikoff, ‘Pragmatic Approaches to Regime Building 
for Complex International Problems’, in Choucri (ed.), Global Accord, supra note 74, pp. 453-474, at 468.
570 Vienna Convention, Article 26. See Sh. Rosenne, A Guide to the Legislative History of the Vienna 
Convention, (Layden, Sijthoff, 1970); Robert Ago, ‘Le droit des traites a la lumiere de la Convention de 
Vienne’, RCADI, 134 (1971), pp. 303-330; I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1984); Julio Barberis, ‘Le concept de traite international et ses 
limites’, AFDI, (1984), pp. 239-270.
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international organizations. This principle has been reflected in many treaties and relied 
upon by international courts and tribunals in adjudicating numerous international 
decisions. Thus, in the Pacific Fur Seal Arbitration, the President of the Tribunal found 
that the exercise of a right for the sole purpose of causing injury to another is 
prohibited571. The award of the Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States vs. Canada), 
though now outdated following the principles recently endorsed by UNCED in Agenda 
21, can also be cited as an example of reliance upon the principle of good faith in order 
to ensure a proper balance between States’ rights and obligations and recognition of the 
interdependence of a person’s rights and obligations . The ICJ, in the Nuclear Tests 
Cases, has also recognized the principle of good faith as “one of the basic principles 
governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source”573. 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration as well as Principles 2 and 27 of the Rio 
Declaration affirm this in declaring that States and people shall co-operate in good faith 
and in a spirit of partnership in the fulfilment of the principles embodied in the latter 
declaration and in the further development on international law in the field of 
sustainable development and to ensure that their activities do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The 1995 
SSA affirms the principle of good faith in Articles 34 and 8.2.
4.5.1 The Principle of Good Faith and the Abuse of Rights
The 1982 UNCLOS refers to the concept of abuse of rights in Article 300. This Article 
requires States Parties to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under that 
Convention and to exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in the 
Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right. The doctrine of 
abuse of rights (‘sic utere iure tuo ut alienum non laedas’) implies a prohibition of 
activities constituting a repugnant exercise of a legitimate right and is generally
571 Pacific Fur Seal Arbitration. Reproduced in Philippe Sands, R. Tarasofsky and Mary Weiss (eds.), 
Documents in International Environmental Law, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994) Vol. 
IIA, 881.
572 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States vs. Canada). Reproduced in Sands et al. (eds.), ibid, n. 571, p. 
85.
573 Nuclear Tests Cases. ICJ Reports, 1974, at 267.
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recognized in most legal systems574. Its validity is asserted by many authors as a 
principle of international law575. However, regarding fisheries on the high seas, there 
appears to be significant contemporary disagreement about the scope and meaning of 
the doctrine . As Smith has pointed out, commentators on the doctrine of abuse of 
rights tend to fall into three categories: first, in its broadest formulation, abuse of rights 
is conceived as a general principle of the international law of torts; secondly, abuse of 
rights is conceived as a viable rule of decision, but Smith rejects this expansive 
perspective in favour of a narrow interpretation focusing on the purpose of the exercise 
of the right; and thirdly, a significant number of commentators deny entirely the 
function of abuse of rights as a rule of international decision577. Bimie and Boyle have 
pertinently stressed that “abuse of rights is not an independent principle, but simply an 
expression of the limits inherent in the formulation of certain rights and obligations 
which now form part of international law”578.
In the international law of fisheries on the high seas, the question of abuse of rights 
might arise in the following three stances. First, the concept might apply to the activities 
of a coastal State on the high seas areas adjacent to its EEZ. In this context, the doctrine 
of abuse of rights could in theory be relevant to the extent to which a coastal States can 
claim to exert any specific rights or jurisdictions over activities occurring in the high 
seas areas, on the basis of Articles 63.2 and 64. The problem here is that many States do 
not recognize any specific rights of the coastal State in this regard. Secondly, the 
concept might apply to the activities of States fishing on the high seas. Consequently, a 
number of situations are currently regulated only in the context of a generic duty to co-
574 J. I. Chamey, ‘Universal International Law’, AJIL, 87 (1993), pp. 529-551; Oscar Schachter, 
International Law in Theory and Practice, (Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1991); G. Battaglini, ‘II riconoscimento 
intemazionale del principi generali del diritto’, Melanges Ago, Vol I, (Paris, Pedone, 1989), pp. 97-140; 
Geraldo E. do Nascimento e Silva, Direito Ambiental International, (Rio de Janeiro, Thex, 1995), p. 14.
575 Alexandre Kiss, Droit International de TEnvironnement, (Paris, Pddone, 1989), p. 72; P. Sands, 
Principles, supra note 211, p. 123; A. Pellet, Recherches sur les principes generaux du droit en droit 
international, These University de Paris, LXIII, 1974; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990).
576 Burke, The New International Law, supra, note 110, p. 142.
577 Brian Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine Environment: the Rules of Decision, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 84-85
578 Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, p. 126.
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! operate579, which might invoke application of the doctrine. These situations include the
t
refusal to negotiate in good faith in order to reach appropriate conservation agreements; 
fishing in high seas areas adjacent to an EEZ while deliberately ignoring, to the 
detriment of the stock in question, the coastal State’s conservation measures; or if 
fishing on the high seas by vessels flying their flag was permitted by the flag State in 
reckless disregard of basic conservation measures. Thirdly, the concept of abuse of 
rights might arise in relation to the activities of a coastal State in its EEZ. Thus, the 
concept might apply to a coastal State which permitted fishing activities in its EEZ of 
such a kind (e.g. use of driftnets) or for such an amount of species that the conservation 
of a high seas stock (including SFS and HMFS) was endangered. The problems could 
arise in all these cases but may never be resolved by courts or tribunals since the 
UNCLOS provisions limiting the scope of compulsory dispute settlement (Article 297.3 
of UNCLOS) would inhibit the applicability of article 300 to such a situations580.
At the present stage of the development of the international law of the sea, it is 
sufficient to do no more that mention the three theoretical possibilities of invocation of 
the abuse of rights doctrine as referred to above. According to Burke, the realism of 
invoking the doctrine of abuse of rights, and its limitations, would need to be assessed 
in the context in which it is advanced581. One point that would need to be clarified 
concerns the right to invoke dispute settlement procedures. Can any State contest 
another State’s fishing activities on the high seas on the grounds that they do not 
comply with fishing management measures? Should any State be free to object to 
improper management of high seas fisheries? Or should the right to object be limited to 
members of the international fisheries organizations concerned? According to Miles and 
Burke, UNCLOS affords a plausible basis for coastal State action to prescribe needed 
measures and, more importantly, it provides for compulsory resort to third-party dispute 
settlement for settling differences over the scientific and non-discriminatory basis for 
the measures proscribed by the coastal State582. Lucchini and Voeckel maintain that 
rather than resolving the problem on the grounds of the preferential rights of coastal
579 UNCLOS, Articles 117-119.
580 FAO 1992 Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing, Levy et al. (eds.), Selected Documents, 
supra, note 113, pp. 61.
581 Burke, supra note 110, pp. 144.
582 Miles and Burke, ‘Pressures’, supra, note 106, p. 356.
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States, Article 286 of UNCLOS could be relied on since it facilitates the search for a 
solution leading to a ‘droit souhaitable’ of ‘lege ferenda’ 583. However, the question 
remains which of the choices of procedure should be adopted given the numerous 
limitations and options.
It is relevant to emphasize that, according to Article 34 of the 1995 SSA, States are 
required to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under the Agreement and to 
exercise their rights in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of rights. In this 
regard, it is important also to mention that, concerning the UNCLOS, the Agreement 
does not refer to these obligations in terms of "jurisdiction" or "freedoms"; only of 
"obligations" and "rights". Thus, Article 12 of the 1995 SSA affirms the “obligation” of 
States to provide for transparency in the decision-making process and other activities of 
sub-regional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements. It 
should also be noted that in Regime Theory, the need for transparency in relation to 
every activity of the organization is regarded as a very important matter in relation to 
the effectiveness of the regime. Studies of international environmental regimes indicate 
that such regimes, even in the absence of binding substantive agreements584, can build 
and progressively enforce norms simply by making individual and national actions 
transparent. The process of improving the shared international data and integrating 
national and international policies is a mechanism by which national actions become 
more transparent and norms can be shaped by the international organizations that fulfil 
these functions585.
583 Laurent Lucchini et Michel Voeckel, Droit de la Mer, (Pddone, Paris, 1996), Vol. 2-Tome 2, p. 665. 
Following on the same argument, Applebaum states: “current developments in a number of areas of the 
world suggest the possibility that the time has come for a reassessment of the international legal 
principles in play regarding fisheries conservation and environmental protection in order to determine if 
these principles can be developed so as to strengthen international institutions and make them more 
effective”. Applebaum, supra, note 501, p. 151.
584 Although exceptional, singular and non-existent in the field of international fisheries, this kind of 
regime has been identified theoretically in International Regimes Theory. The Prior and Informed 
Consent (PIC) system, managed jointly by FAO and UNEP under the International Regime to Manage 
Trade in Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides, based on non-binding instruments, has been considered as 
highly effective. See, e.g. David Victor, ‘“Learning by Doing” in the Non-binding International Regime 
to Manage Trade in Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides’, in David Victor, Karl Raustiala, and Eugene 
Skolnikoff (eds.), The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments. 
Theory and Practice, (IIASA, Laxenburg; MIT Cambridge), pp. 221-281. For a legal approach on this 
issue see Sands, Principles, supra note 211, pp. 465-468.
585 David G. Victor, Abram Chayes and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Programmatic Approaches’, supra, note 
569, p. 468.
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4.5.2 Participation of NGOs
The other mechanism for securing or enhancing transparency is the participation at the 
international level, of specialized non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In the area 
of the international environment, NGOs have played a major part in the formation of 
policy by identifying priority subjects for international action, producing innovative 
approaches to public policy, providing thoughtful analyses of environmental trends and 
other data, and creating pressure through stimulating public and political 
consciousness586. They have become increasingly effective in these fields, especially in 
obtaining consultative status with international and regional organizations, despite the 
opposition of some States. Their representation and the personal lobbying of delegates 
may influence the negotiation and thus the negotiating process587. In some cases, their 
documents may be formally circulated and their representatives allowed to speak in 
certain committees. Regarding creation and maintenance of regimes, Haufler
f O O
distinguishes two types of relationship between State and non-state actors . First, 
States can involve non-state actors at an early stage in developing the normative basis of 
a regime, or in implementing its programmes. Secondly, non-state actors can either act 
independently in establishing a regime or they may exert influence to determine State 
preferences through formation of domestic or transnational coalitions. In either case, the 
activities of non-state actors can have a large impact on the shaping of global
• _________ 589regimes .
The 1995 SSA accords representatives from IGOs and NGOs an important role in 
subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements. 
According to Article 12.2, these representatives must be afforded the opportunity to take 
part in meetings of regional and sub-regional fisheries organizations whether as 
observers or otherwise, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedures of the
586 James Cameron and Ruth Mackenzie, ‘State Sovereignty, Non-Governmental Organizations and 
Multilateral Institutions’, FIELD Document, on file with the author of this thesis.
587 Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, p. 76.
588 Virginia Haufler, 'Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International Regimes and Non- 
State Actors', in Rittberger, Regime Theory, supra, note 50, pp. 94-110, at 109.
589 Some NGOs lobbies are very powerful, i.e. the International Chamber of Shipping on the one hand and 
IUCN and Greenpeace on the other, at the International Maritime Organization; representatives of the 
whaling industry at the International Whaling Commission, but at this Commission so also are the 
conservationist NGOs; DWFNs at FAO; Greenpeace, IUCN and the WWF worldwide.
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organizations or the arrangements concerned. The issue of transparency and NGO 
participation was intensively debated during the UN Conference on SFS. Greenpeace, 
as well as other NGOs pleaded for the adoption of provisions which would establish 
public participation and public accountability as a fundamental principle related to 
fisheries decision-making at national, regional and global levels, in addition to specific 
provisions relating to the rules of procedure for regional organizations590. Regrettably, 
however, the final wording of the provisions of the SSA relating to transparency applies 
only to the functioning of regional and sub-regional organizations, not global ones.
According to Article 12 of the SSA, the procedures concerning transparency adopted by 
regional and sub-regional fisheries management organizations must not be “unduly 
restrictive” in relation to the participation of NGO's. The scope of the concept 'unduly 
restrictive' is, however, somewhat unclear. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to FAO’s 
progressive policy concerning its relations with international NGOs. The FAO 
Conference, which is the supreme governing body of the FAO591, decided in 1998 that 
in future, intergovernmental organizations that do not have an agreement with FAO and 
NGOs in liaison status with FAO may be invited to send observers to Conference and 
Council sessions if, in the judgement of the Director-General, there are concrete reasons 
for inviting them which would advance the work of the organization . It also required 
that international NGOs be "sufficiently representative"593.
FAO was one of the first organizations to lay down guidelines for relationship 
agreements with public international organizations (IGOs) setting out criteria to 
determine the nature of other organizations: an IGO should be set up by a formal 
convention concluded between States; its governing body should be composed of 
members designated by governments; its income should be derived mainly from
590 Greenpeace International Fisheries Campaign, Analysis of the United Nations Treaty for the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Greenpeace, 
Amsterdam, December 1995), p. 6.
591 “The Conference shall determine the policy and approve the budget of the Organization and shall 
exercise the other powers conferred upon it by this Constitution”, FAO Constitution, Article IV. 1. 
Document in electronic form as available on http://www. fao.org/UNFAO/bodies/confconf-e. htm. on 
19/08/98.
592 FAO Conference, Resolution No. 44/57. FAO Basic Texts Part Q, Observer Status in Respect of 
International Governmental and Nongovernmental Organizations. Document in electronic form as 
available on http://www.fao.Org/legal/basictxt/h226.f.htm, on 19/08/98.
593 Ibid.
governmental contributions; and it should have legal capacity to enter into agreements 
with other organizations594. Regarding international NGOs, many international 
organizations make provision for a variety of consultative relationships with such 
bodies, which include the right to attend meetings and to circulate documents595. The 
1995 SSA affirms the right for IGOs as well as for NGOs to have timely access to the 
records and reports of regional and sub-regional fisheries organizations and 
| arrangements, subject to the procedural rules on access to them (Art. 12.2).
i Article 13 of the 1995 SSA provides that States must co-operate to strengthen existing 
sub-regional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements in 
order to improve their effectiveness in establishing and implementing conservation and 
management measures for SFS and HMFS. Effectiveness addresses the question 
whether the agreement has achieved its stated objectives and whether the agreement 
successfully addresses the problem it was intended to resolve596. Coastal States and high 
seas fishing States must co-operate in spite of different interests, if the exploitation of 
j high seas fish stocks is to be rationally conducted and resources sustainably used. To be 
effective for high seas management purposes, fisheries organizations need to have a 
significant degree of independence in the execution of their functions, be assigned 
powers consistent with their management tasks and receive support from contracting 
parties. They have to address matters such as: objectives and purposes; membership; 
species coverage; management area; collection of catch data and related information; 
the provision of scientific advice; establishment of a management body; the problems of 
flag state responsibility; finance; management decisions; the position in relation to non­
contracting parties and the admission of new entrants; monitoring, control and 
surveillance of fishing activities; dispute settlement procedures; and imposition of 
penalties597.
594 Morgenstem, ‘Legal Problems’, supra, note 538, p. 76. See also FAO Conference, Tenth Session held 
in Rome, November 1959. Document in electronic form as available on 3/03/00, on 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5394c/x5394e01.htm.
595 Morgenstern, ‘Legal Problems’, supra, note 538, p. 86.
596 Edith Brown-Weiss, ‘National Compliance with International Environmental Agreements’ in ASIL, 
Proceedings 91st Annual Meeting, Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness, (Washington, ASIL, 
1997), pp. 56-59.
597 FAO 1992 Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing in Levy, Selected Documents, supra note 113, 
pp. 47-53.
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Within regional or sub-regional fisheries organizations, States parties are likely to be 
required to have the competence to implement and abide by management decisions and 
initiate measures to ensure that flag State vessels comply with such decisions. High seas 
management mechanisms will involve both developing and developed coastal States or 
DWFS. Some States may press for the adoption of criteria to determine eligibility for 
participation in such mechanisms, although this approach may not be widely accepted 
since it could be disadvantageous for developing countries. In the oceans area, 
international organizations have greatly increased the number of developing countries 
active on these issues, at the expense of the influence of major maritime powers598. This 
trend is relevant because it can contribute to the rebalancing of powers within 
international fisheries organizations.
In summary, transparency in relation to all their activities can considerably contribute to 
the strengthening of the effectiveness of regional and sub-regional fisheries 
management organizations and arrangements. The need for greater transparency, 
openness and participation is now virtually a mantra of modem governance. Public 
participation and influence in fisheries management, based on better and unbiased 
information can strengthen the management capabilities of fisheries organizations599. 
The 1995 SSA is a major step forward in that direction. International fisheries 
organizations, both regional and sub-regional, will need now a clear legal mandate to 
manage the resources concerned, the active participation of contracting parties and 
effective compliance by those states with the conservation and management measures 
adopted within the organization’s framework.
4.6 Towards authoritative global institutions?
Efforts to control international environmental problems are generally exerted 
incrementally rather than in a holistic manner, each set of issues being considered ad 
hoc separately, i.e. independently of consideration of possible common underlying 
causes such as population growth, patterns of consumer demand and the practices of
598 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, supra, note 486, pp. 124-126.
599 Tahindro, supra, note 163, p. 28. See also Greenpeace, ‘Analysis’, supra note 590, p. 6.
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modem industrial production600. This section will thus examine the extent to which 
international fisheries organizations are capable to deal efficiently with the complex 
problem of exploitation of fisheries on the high seas, without encroaching upon State 
sovereignty. It will also look at whether there is any move towards co-ordinating or 
integrating bodies established to protect and conserve (including restore) the marine 
environment, which provides the habitat of fisheries, with those established to regulate 
the fisheries, including setting quotas, choice of gear, etc., as advocated in Agenda 21.
4.6.1 Global interdependence on environmental issues
Environmental problems became a major focus of international concern and activity 
only in the late twentieth century. Many such problems are international or global in 
scale as are fisheries themselves and thus have stimulated international political activity 
in response. Institutions or regimes for collective management have and are being 
developed aimed at preventing further degradation of the global commons and, where 
necessary, restoring them to a status of sustainability. These institutions now form a 
complex of interlinked networks shaping the activities and expectations of all relevant 
actors across a wide range of activities. This development enhances a tendency towards 
globalization which has emerged in the second half of the 20th century and has led to 
expansion of international rules to cover many fields that formerly either fell within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of States, such as human rights, labour conditions, health care, 
etc., or were not subject of legal regulation as in the case of the protection of the 
environment and such other issue areas as the economic development of poor countries, 
control of drug trafficking, the fight against terrorism, etc.601
The political problem presented by ecological interdependence arises from the intricate 
web of relationships that exist between the international legal boundaries of the State 
system independently of the boundaries of the ecological causal networks. List and
600 Marc A. Levy, Robert O. Keohane and Peter M. Haas, Improving the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Institutions’, in Peter Haas et al. (eds.), Institutions for the Earth, supra, note 12, pp. 397- 
425, at 423.
601 Alexandre Kiss, Euture Directions in International Regimes. The Implications of Global Change for 
the International Legal System’, in Edith Brown Weiss (ed.), Environmental Change and International 
Law. New Challenges and Dimensions, (Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 1992), pp. 315-339.
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Rittberger claim that it is here that international regime theory assumes importance. 
"The demand for international regimes arises from tasks thrust upon states and non-state 
actors when they have to cope with interdependence and the problems and conflicts that
/ZT)'}
arise from it" . In Regime Theory, international institutions are assumed to include 
formal intergovernmental or transnational organizations, international regimes, and 
conventions. International organizations are purposeful entities, with bureaucratic 
structures and leadership, permitting them to respond to events. International regimes 
are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments that pertain to particular 
sets of issues in international relations and international law. They can include 
conventions, which are institutions, with implicit rules and understandings that shape 
the expectations of actors603.
Alexandre Kiss has expressed a similar view in his study on the implications of global 
environmental change for international institutions. Kiss argues that global change 
encourages present trends in the international community leading it to behave like a real 
system, i.e., an increasingly intricate web of dynamic relationships. He concludes that 
the protection of common interests of human kind needs a fundamental basis which can 
be found in the emergence of a true world ethic604. In a study of ethics and the 
economics of world order, Ruben Mendez argues that the present pattern of 
international public administration and financing is obsolete and that, due to the rapid 
and accelerating pace of change, international common interests need a new system of 
global governance for their protection and benefit605. He suggests, as have others, that 
this could consider a new method of financing the international public sector, which 
includes international taxation606, including taxes on foreign exchange transactions, on
602 M. List and V. Rittberger, Regime Theory and International Environmental Management’, in Hurrell 
and Kingsbury (eds.), note 72, pp. 85-108, at 86.
603 Robert O. Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American Research 
Programme’, in Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory, supra, note 50, pp. 23-48, at 28-29.
604 Kiss, supra, note 575, at 339.
605 Ruben Mendez, The Provision and Financing of Universal Public Goods’, supra, note 309, pp. 39-59, 
at 40-41.
606 International taxation for the protection of the environment is not a new issue in international relations 
or in international law. See Michael Boskin and Charles McLure (Eds.), World Tax Reform, (San 
Francisco, ICS Press, 1990); Thomas Sterner, ‘An International Tax on Pollution and Natural Resource 
Depletion’, Energy Policy, April 1990, 300-304; Sanford Gaines and Richard Westin, Taxation for 
Environmental Protection, (New York, Quorum Books, 1991) and, Taxation and the Environment, a 
publication of the OECD, Paris, 1993.
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military expenditures, arms transfers and polluters; monetary measures, including a new 
issue of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and a SDR-development link; the sale by the 
IMF of its remaining gold for development purposes; and finally, with specific 
relevance to this thesis, charges for the use of the global commons, including charges on 
ocean freight and overflight, fishing on the high seas and the Southern Ocean, and the 
mining of the deep ocean bed607.
The question regarding how, by whom and by what mechanisms these taxes could be 
set and collected, remains unclear. Despite positive signs, the efforts to establish new 
forms of governance, in particular for the oceans, have been summarized as follows by 
the Independent World Commission on the Oceans: first, the resistance from those who 
benefit disproportionately from current arrangements or from the absence of them; 
secondly, the ideological barrier, mainly in the economic sphere, that shape perceptions 
of the need for change; thirdly, the barriers in the form of the behaviour of individuals 
such as consumption patterns; fourthly, the increased number of nation states and 
therefore, the difficulties of balancing the needs and priorities of an increasingly 
heterogeneous community of nations; and fifthly, the complexity of scientific issues 
concerning ocean problems which make it difficult to forge a consensus608. These 
obstacles hamper the implementation of mechanisms required to regulate more 
effectively the uses of the oceans and to ensure that the benefits of the oceans are shared 
more equitably.
4.6.2 Global management of fisheries
The still rudimentary patterns of management regarding fisheries can be illustrated with 
reference to two main features. First, eighty percent of the total world marine catches 
are taken by only 20 states609. Secondly, according to a report by Greenpeace 
International, of the 3.5 million fishing boats in operation, the industrial fleet, consisting 
of approximately 35,000 fishing vessels, accounts for only about 1% of the total number
607 Mendez, supra, note 309, p. 40.
608 The Oceans our Future, The Report of the International World Commission on the Oceans, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 30-31
609 1995 FAO Report, supra, note 11. See also Chapter 1, Section 1.
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of boats in operation. Between 1991 and 1996, 1,654 new vessels were added to the 
world’s large-scale industrial fishing fleet, of which four states (Japan, Honduras, Russia 
and Peru) and the European Union accounted for 60%. Morever, this industrial fleet 
receives annually most of the 25 to 50 billion US dollars that is paid by governments in 
the form of taxpayer-funded subsidies to the fishing industry610. In essence, the high 
seas fisheries problem, as it relates to SFS and HMFS, stems from increasing fishing 
effort on stocks, principally from DWFN fleets and, on the other hand, from high seas 
fleet overcapacity and the subsidization of operations, which have generally exacerbated 
management difficulties and masked the real cost of fishing, leading to irrational 
exploitation611.
The elimination or reduction of these subsidies would not, in themselves, provide the 
solution to the problems of world’s fisheries. However, as Christopher Stone has 
pointed out, the elimination of subsidies would at least relieve national budgets of 
perverse expenditures, ease the task of fisheries managers, remove distortions of trade, 
help foster a larger, more valuable catch in the long term, and better protect the
f\\0environment . In the same direction, proposing changes that would allow the power of 
the markets to be put work to protect the environment, Robert Roodman has stressed 
that governments can grab the attention of business decision-makers by translating 
environmental costs into prices and also help consumers to better understand the true
f\ 1 ^environmental costs of their purchases and investments .
610 C. Newton and J. Fitzpatrick, Assessment of the World’s Fishing Fleet, 1991-1997. (Amsterdam, 
Greenpeace International Fisheries Campaign, 1998). All forms of economic failure, national and 
international, need to be addressed. According to Pearce, it has to be questioned whether global 
agreements carry with them the financial power to make other than cosmetic differences to the state of the 
global environment. See David Pearce, ‘New Directions for Financing Global Environmental Change’, 
Global Environmental Change, 5 (1995), pp. 27-40.
6,1 FAO Fisheries Department, ‘Some High Seas Fisheries Aspects Relating to Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’, FAO Fisheries Circular NO. 879, FIPP/C879, FAO, Rome, 1994, p. 13.
612 Christopher Stone, ‘Too Many Fishing Boats, Too Few Fish: Can Trade Laws Trim Subsidies and 
Restore the Balance in Global Fisheries?’, Ecology Law Quarterly, 24 (1997), pp. 505-537.
613 David Malin Roodman, The Natural Wealth of Nations: Harnessing the Market for the Environment, 
(Washington D.C., Worldwatch Institute, 1998), p. 28. According to this author, subsidies for the global 
fishing fleet-some $14 -  20.5 billion a year, or 14-28 percent of industry revenue, have helped produce 
enough boats, hooks, and nets to catch twice the available fish, contributing to overfishing and industry 
collapse. Ibid, p. 174.
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According to leading experts, the capacity of the world’s industrial fishing fleet should 
be cut by 50 percent and not sustained at all by subsidies614. Although international 
taxes cannot be considered to be a panacea, as has been argued since the time of 
Grotius, the high seas are considered free resources and the oceans have the status of res 
- communis; as a means of transport, providers of a carbon sink and a regulator of 
weather, they are an international public good. It would be in order therefore for the 
international community to charge user fees for the use of those parts of the global 
commons that are so used615. This seems, however, to be very distant prospect at the 
present time and in addition, this cannot apply to high seas fisheries, since fisheries 
resources are limited and their consumption is ‘rival’616.
The movement that has drawn attention to the possibilities of global environmental
f\ 11change has played an important role in providing an intellectual framework within 
which to consider systematic interactions between physical and biological systems, on 
the one hand, and human systems, on the other. It must be acknowledged that this 
movement is still in its infancy and that there is much that we do not understand about
/ r i  o
the systemic interactions . Of particular relevance to international law and 
international relations is the question of national sovereignty. Since the beginning of the
614 Newton et al, Assessment, supra, note 610, p. 28.
615 Mendez, supra, note 309, p. 53.
616 In environmental economics, when consumption is rivalrous, the total amount consumed is the sum of 
the amounts consumed by each individual. The market demand curve is, therefore, the horizontal 
summation of individual demand curves. With non-rivalrous use of a public good, people do not just 
consume a good simultaneously; they consume the same good, like people watching television or 
breathing the same air quality in a given area. For a detailed discussion on this point, see Lesser et al. 
(eds.), Environmental Economics, supra, note 305, pp. 137-143.
6,7 Meyer et al. define global change as having two main features: first, ‘global’ refers to the spatial scale 
or functioning of a system, because of the planet-fluidity and connectedness of the system affected; 
secondly, a worldwide scale, which represents a significant fraction of the total environmental 
phenomenon or global resource. Global changes have the potential to produce effects around the world, 
albeit far from uniform ones. The systemic impacts of human activities, notably greenhouse climate 
change and ozone depletion, were central to the emergence of the current scientific and popular interest in 
global change. William Meyer and B. L. Turner, ‘The Earth Transformed: Trends, Trajectories, and 
Patterns’, in R. J. Johnston, Peter Taylor and Michael Watts (eds.), Geographies of Global Change. 
Remapping the World in the Late Twentieth Century, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1995), pp. 302-317, 
at 304-305.
618 The discussion of the global climate-ecosystem linkage is fragmented, because a consensus has not yet 
emerged and even the key questions have not been properly sorted out. For a detailed analysis of this 
point see F. Kenneth Hare, ‘Climatic Variation and Global Change’, in Douglas et al. (eds.), Companion 
Encyclopedia of Geography, supra, note 107, pp. 482-507, in particular pp. 499-502. See also Oran 
Young, 'Negotiating an International Climate Regime: The Institutional Bargaining for Environmental 
Governance, in Choucri (ed.), Global Accord, supra, note 74, pp. 431-452, at 438.
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1970’s, many countries have increasingly demonstrated a willingness to control internal 
activities in response to international norms and demands, backed by scientific advice 
and information, in essence subordinating national political control to international 
environmental requirements619. As international organizations have been established 
with certain formal controls over the exercise of external sovereignty, the concern that 
national sovereignty may be curtailed by international co-operation does not appear in 
fact to have been a major inhibition to co-operation. Obviously there are many restricted 
limits to co-operation. But a full explanation of the secular change in environmental 
treaty making can only be developed by approaches that address the diplomatic 
processes, the diminution of uncertainty, and the application of consensual knowledge 
to an unfamiliar technical domain . As regards the oceans, UNCLOS III initiated a 
process later confirmed by the UNCED instruments of global recognition of the need 
for certain actions to be taken by the world community to combat the destruction of the 
world’s commons; this may be regarded as a positive encouraging sign for the future 
progress of environmental negotiations in that field621..
Agenda 21, which was endorsed by all UNCED participants, reflects a global consensus 
and political commitment at the highest level towards implementation of national 
strategies, plans, policies and processes which need to be supported and supplemented 
by international co-operation622. As regards international law, Agenda 21 may be 
regarded as reflecting a consensus on the principles, practices and rules which might 
contribute to the development of new rules of customary law623. Chapter 38 of Agenda 
21 proposed a framework for institutional arrangements to implement Agenda 21 and 
called for a the establishment of a new Commission to ensure the effective follow-up of 
the UNCED requirements and proposals, enhance international co-operation and 
rationalise intergovernmental decision-making on the integration of environmental and
619 See Peter Haas and Jan Sundgren, Evolving International Environmental Law: Changing Practices of 
National Sovereignty’, in Choucri (ed.), Global Accord supra, note 74, pp. 401-430, at 408-419.
620 Ibid, p. 416.
621 Christopher Joyner and Elizabeth Martell, ‘Looking Back to See Ahead: UNCLOS III and Lessons for 
Global Commons Law’, ODIL, (1996) 73, at 90.
622 Agenda 21, Para. 1.2.
623 Sands, Principles, supra, note 211, at 53.
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development issues624. The UN General Assembly, in December 1992, adopted 
Resolution 47/191 on the Institutional Arrangements to Follow up on UNCED625. This 
Resolution required the following actions: it requested ECOSOC to set up a high-level 
! Commission on Sustainable Development; requested all UN specialised agencies andj
; related organizations of the UN system to strengthen and adjust their activities, 
programmes and plans in line with Agenda 21; invited the World Bank and other 
international, regional and subregional financial and development institutions to provide 
financial support; requested UNEP, UNDP, UNCTAD, the UN Sudano-Sahelian Office 
and the UN’s regional economic commissions to submit reports of their plans to 
implement Agenda 21 to the Commission on Sustainable Development; and endorsed 
the view of the UN Secretary General concerning the establishment of a High Level 
Advisory Board626.
UNCED and associated developments have encouraged the establishment of innovative 
international legal and institutional mechanisms. The institutional arrangements 
recommended by UNCED sought to improve integration between agreed policies and 
the programmes developed within the UN system of organizations to support them627. 
The whole purpose of the UNCED strategy in relation to the oceans was to meet the 
need to identify and bring together within one integrated regime the disparate and 
discrete regimes for protection and prevention of pollution of the seas, conservation of 
their living resources, and related issues that so far had been developed only 
pragmatically, responding to particular needs as they had arisen, often in crisis 
situations when particular marine industries, such as fishing, were in a state of near 
collapse628. Agenda 21 tried to combine problems that traditionally had been envisaged 
and addressed separately, and approaches that may not necessarily appear to be
624 Agenda 21, Para. 38.11
625 UNGA Resolution 47/191 on the Institutional Arrangements to Follow up on UNCED, December 
1992. Reproduced in Philippe Sands, Richard Tarasofsky and Mary Weiss (eds.), Documents in 
International Environmental Law, Vol. IIA, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994), pp. 72-81.
626 Ibid, p. 79.
627 Lee A. Kimball, ‘UNCED and the Oceans Agenda’, Marine Policy, November 1993, pp. 491-500, at 
492.
628 Patricia Bimie, ‘The Law of the Sea and the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development’, Ocean Yearbook, 10, (1993), 21. See also E. Mann Borghese, ‘UNCLOS, UNCED, and
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consistent629. None of the Rio decisions is self-implementing and their impact depends 
on the extent to which the UNCED requirements are effectively implemented630.
There are currently a score of global institutions which are exclusively or partially 
engaged in activities concerning some aspects of ocean management, in a broad sense, 
and of fisheries management, in particular. Most of them come within the United 
Nations framework. The major agencies and other UN bodies involved are as 
follows631: (0 Agencies: the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the International 
Maritime Organization, the World Health Organization, the World Meteorological 
Organization, and the International Labour Organization; (ii) UN Programmes: the 
United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
Inter-agency Coordination: the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission and the 
United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea; (iii) UN Advisory 
Scientific Group: the Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution 
(GESAMP); (iv) Autonomous Organizations: the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
The International Whaling Commission (IWC), created by the 1946 International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling632, which is, however, outside the UN 
system, is another global institution established in order to provide for the proper 
conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the 
whaling industry633.
In the field of fisheries, six regional bodies have been established by FAO: the Indo- 
Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC); the General Fisheries Council for the
the Restructuring of the United Nations System’, in R. S. Macdonald (ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang 
Tieya, (London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp. 66-77.
629 Tullio Treves, ‘The Protection of the Oceans in Agenda 21 and International Environmental Law’, in 
Luigi Campiglio et al. (eds.), The Environment after Rio. International Law and Economics, (London, 
Graham and Trotman, 1994), 161-171, at 161.
630 Biliana Cicin-Sain and Robert Knecht, ‘Implications of the Earth Summit for Ocean and Coastal 
Governance’, ODIL, 24 (1993), pp. 323-346.
631 Official Web Site Locator for the United Nations System of Organizations. Official Classification of 
the United Nations System available on http://www.unsvstem.org/index on 23/01/00.
632 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra, note 411.
633 Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, pp. 37 and 76.
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Mediterranean (GFCM); the regional Fisheries Advisory Commission for the Southwest 
Atlantic (CARPAS); the Fishery Committee for the Eastern Southwest Atlantic 
(CECAF); the Indian Ocean Fishery Commission (IOFC); and the Western Central 
Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAF). These bodies share, by and large, the common 
objectives of promoting, co-ordinating and assisting national and regional programmes 
of research and development aimed at rational utilization of the resources concerned; 
formulating measures for the management and conservation of the resources, and 
encouraging exchange of information and studies as well as training. Apart from the 
FAO affiliated bodies, in addition to the IWC, the following are, at present, the principal 
regional and sub-regional fisheries organizations: (0 for the Atlantic Ocean: the North- 
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC); the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation 
Organization (NASCO); the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO); the 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the 
International Commission for the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF); (ii) for the 
Pacific Ocean: the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC); the Inter- 
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC); the Council of the Eastern Pacific Tuna 
Fishing Agreement (CEPTFA); the Eastern Pacific Tuna Fishing Organization (OAPO); 
the South Pacific Permanent Commission (PCSP) and the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FFA); (iii) for other regions: a Latin American Organization for the 
Development of Fisheries (OLDEPESCA) has been established within the Latin 
American Economic System; and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)634, a unique body for Antarctica fisheries.
In the twentieth century, a cleavage in the study of international organizations between 
advocates of universalism and supporters of regionalism has created a dichotomy 
between these two approaches. The universalists argue that world interdependence has 
created an increasing number of political, economic and social problems that require 
global solutions across regional borders and that regional resources are often inadequate 
to resolve the problems of states within the limited context of a region. On the other 
hand, regionalists argue that there is a natural tendency toward regionalism based on the 
homogeneity of interests, traditions, and values within small groups of neighbouring 
states, and that, therefore, political, economic and social integration is more easily
634 S. H. Marashi, The Role of International Fishery and other Bodies with Regard to the Conservation 
and Management of Living Resources of the High Seas, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 908, Rome, 1996.
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attained among a lesser number of states within a limited geographic area than on a 
global basis. Despite these dichotomies, in fact, an accommodation exists between both 
universalism and regionalism. Although the relationship of regional and international 
organizations may be either antagonistic or harmonious, as Bennett has pointed out, “the 
choice is not necessarily one of either regionalism or universalism but allows for both 
regionalism and universalism coexisting in sometimes competing and sometimes 
mutually supporting relations”635
International fisheries organizations focus around decision-making by international 
bodies such as the UN General Assembly, the Governing Bodies of FAO and the 
Committee of Fisheries (COFI) which have the task of adopting policy and legal 
instruments that provide the framework for fisheries governance. On the other hand, 
subregional and regional fisheries organizations focus on cooperative management of 
shared resources, including stocks occurring on the high seas. The framework for 
fisheries management at the subregional and regional level is specified in global and 
regional instruments. However, sound regional fisheries governance depends on 
effective input from members of these regional bodies which includes the political 
willingness of States to participate openly and cooperatively for the good governance of 
stocks subject to management, and the national capacity to meet commitments and 
obligations technically and financially.
The effectiveness of regional fisheries organizations has been undermined mainly by a 
series of issues constraining their efficient operation that were grouped into four 
categories at a FAO Meeting of FAO and Non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies or 
Arrangements, held in Rome, in February 1999. The first category of issues is related to 
the expectations of the international community. The adoption of the FAO Code of 
Conduct, the FAO Compliance Agreement and the SSA, have impacted on the 
perception of the international community regarding world fisheries resources and their 
sustainable management and utilization. These international legal instmments direct 
States and fisheries organizations to be responsible for adopting more detailed 
conservation and management measures which must take into account and promote an 
integrated ecosystem-wide conservation and management scheme and to apply the
635 Bennett, International Organizations, supra, note 480, p. 231.
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precautionary approach, giving a central role to fisheries organizations in the sharing of 
data and information collected by States. Secondly, issues related to the mandate and 
functions of regional fisheries organizations, which include scientific research, 
compilation and analysis of data, formulation of conservation and management 
measures, determination of total allowable catch, and allocation of quotas, a 
precautionary approach, decision-making procedures, implementation of decisions and 
settlement of disputes. Thirdly, issues related to the structure of the bodies such as 
i geographical areas of competence and species covered, membership, participation and 
subsidiary bodies. Fourthly, issues related to budgetary levels and financing, such as the 
lack of technical and financial resources . Despite the past difficulties of regional 
fisheries organizations in securing more effective management, they have the potential 
to be instruments for sound fisheries management provided that they nonetheless have 
realistic mandates, the required political backing, and the financial and human capacity 
to function as they are intended637.
In order to ensure efficiency and to promote effective co-operation for fisheries 
management, regional fisheries organizations need to address and fulfil key issues such 
as equitable participation of members; adequate funding; improved co-operation 
between organizations or arrangements, private sector interests and NGOs in order to 
broaden stakeholder participation; better co-ordination between organizations, 
irrespective of whether they are FAO and non-FAO organizations; promote maritime 
boundary delimitation, which is essential for fisheries management, resource allocation 
and resolution of disputes; and finally, to influence the participation of non-members 
which can be done through international scrutiny and publicity and even through moral 
and political pressure when the activities of non-members openly undermine the work 
and efforts of regional fisheries organizations.
636 ‘Major Issues Affecting the Performance of Regional Fishery Bodies’, Document FPRFB/99/2, FAO, 
Rome, December 1998. Document submitted at the Meeting of FAO and Non-FAO Regional Fishery 
Bodies or Arrangements, Rome, Italy, 11-12 February 1999.
637 David Symes, ‘Fisheries Management: in Search of Good Governance’, Fisheries Research, 32 
(1997), pp. 107-110
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4.6.3 The problems of global co-ordination
The vital remaining problems of global co-ordination between international 
organizations have not yet been properly addressed and this is particularly evident in 
the case of international fisheries organizations for the high seas. No single international 
authority for fisheries on the high seas exists, unlike the situation governing the 
international seabed , nor does a world international authority able to deal with global 
ocean issues as such yet exist either. Conceived as having a potentially wider 
application, the revolutionary concept articulated by Arvid Pardo in 1967640, asserting 
that the resources beyond national jurisdiction should be regarded as the ‘common 
heritage of mankind’ eventually was applied only to the seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction641, not to fisheries in the “commons”. Institutional mechanisms for 
coordination and joint programming at the international level have been notoriously 
weak, sometimes more symbolic than operational in nature, and can be considered as 
barriers to good ocean governance642. According to Pardo, to manage common heritage 
resources, the world community must create not merely an International Seabed 
Authority but also a balanced international system for ocean space as a whole643.
638 Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, pp. 80.
639 UNCLOS Part XI. See Chapter 3, Section 3.
640 Going far beyond his 1967 proposal, which political wisdom constrained him to restrict to the seabed, 
in a Draft Ocean Space Treaty submitted by Malta as a working paper to the Seabed Committee in 1971, 
Arvid Pardo proposed that ocean space beyond national jurisdiction was a common heritage of mankind. 
See E. Mann Borghese, ‘The Process of Creating an International Ocean Regime to Protect the Ocean’s 
Resources’, in Van Dyke et al. (eds.), Freedom for the Seas, supra, note 97, pp. 23-37, at 32. See also 
Alexandre Charles Kiss, “La notion de patrimoine commun de l’humanitd”, RCADI, 1982, Vol. 175-11, 
(The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), pp. 198.
641 The 1967 Outer Space Treaty states that the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, is to be carried out for the benefit and interests of all countries and shall be ‘the 
province of all mankind’. See 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies; UNGA Res. 1962 
XVIII (1963). Text in Ian Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents in International Law, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, fourth edition, 1995). See Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, pp. 415-418.
642 The Ocean, Our Future, supra, note 608, pp. 146-147.
643 Pardo’s proposed that there must be international agreement on the concept of the common heritage of 
mankind, as well as international agreement on the concept of regional development within the 
framework of a global organization. Arvid Pardo, ‘Perspectives on Ocean Governance’, in Van Dyke et 
al. (eds.), Freedom for the Seas, supra, note 97, pp. 38-40, at 40.
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The creation of new global fora where all ocean issues can be discussed periodically 
with the participation of all relevant organizations has been strongly advocated644. A 
Workshop jointly sponsored in 1995 by the Brazilian and British Governments stressed, 
however, that there was general consensus regarding the fact that no new international 
institutions should be established645. However, in the same Workshop, the need for 
some form of mechanism to crystallise political will and provide a high-level platform 
for greater coordination between regional and global initiatives was highlighted, given 
the plethora of existing institutions with relevant responsibilities646. Although ocean 
management will not be achieved by a single institution, institutionally, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations remains the forum that is competent to consider in an 
integrated manner developments related to the Law of the Sea and ocean affairs647.
The 1995 SSA does not, however, solve the problem of co-ordination between fisheries 
management organizations. To bridge the gap, the FAO Fisheries Department is now 
proposing that all fisheries bodies, including non-FAO bodies, should meet together in 
order to discuss common issues and adopt permanent mechanisms for ensuring better 
co-operation and co-ordination of their work and should establish an effective link to 
COFI, the FAO Committee on Fisheries, which is currently lacking648. Better co­
ordination among regional fisheries organizations and a closer linkage between them
644 See Satya Nandan, Existing Institutional Frame-work and Mechanisms’, in Peter Bautista Payoyo 
(ed.), Ocean Governance. Sustainable Development of the Seas, (Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 
1994), pp. 28-43, at 30; Mann Borgese, supra note 321, p. 244. For a more general approach, see 
Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, AJIL, 86 (1992), pp. 259-283; 
Julie Ayling, ’Serving Many Voices: Progressing Calls for an International Environmental Organization’, 
Journal of Environmental Law, 9 (1997), pp. 243-269; and R. S. Pathak and R. P. Dhokalia (eds.), 
International Law in Transition, Essays in Memory of Judee Naeendra Sineh, (Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1992), pp. 87-93.
645 The London Workshop On Environmental Science, Comprehensiveness and Consistency in Global 
Decisions on Ocean Issue, Sponsored by the Governments of Brazil and the United Kingdom, 
Commission on Sustainable Development Review of Progress on Strategies Under Chapter 17 of Agenda 
21 Oceans and all Seas. Final Report, Panel 2 on Successful Policy Formulation, Para. 2.2.
646 Ibid.
647 The Oceans Our Future, supra, note 608, p. 158. Christopher Stone has proposed an institutional 
Guardian for the oceans, which would be authorized to monitor the health of the ocean, monitor 
compliance with applicable law and treaties, and exercise a legislative advisory function. See Christopher 
Stone, ‘Can the Oceans be Harboured?’, supra, note 479.
648 Moritaka Hayashi, 'Implementing the Law of the Sea Convention: FAO's Contributions', and, Judith 
Swan, 'Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention. Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
and High Seas Fishing', Papers Presented at the Thirty-First Annual Law of the Sea Institute Conference, 
University of Miami, 30-31 March 1998.
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and COFI would greatly improve global governance in fisheries. The twenty-third 
session of the COFI was held in Rome, in February 1999, to discuss common issues 
relating to fisheries organizations and the possible institutional linkage between COFI 
and these organizations, particularly non-FAO bodies649. The twenty-third session of the 
COFI urged FAO to continue the systematic analysis of these Regional Fishery Bodies, 
especially concerning their institutional and financial arrangements, the strategies used 
to implement decisions and the recommendations and measures taken to address current 
international fishery issues650. The COFI also commended FAO for convening meetings 
of FAO and Non-FAO Regional Fishery Organizations or Arrangements to be held on a 
regular basis, preferably prior to regular sessions of COFI651.
Concerning the effectiveness of global environmental management, Choucri and North 
have identified five principles which aptly apply to fisheries on the high seas. First, 
responses to environmental challenges must be assumed by all actors, governmental and 
non-governmental, as legitimate, in both content and in the processes of adoption. 
Secondly, policy responses must be viewed as fair and appropriate both among existing 
countries and among present and future generations in the context of ensuring inter- 
generational equity652. Thirdly, approaches and instruments for global environmental 
management should be effective and aimed at pragmatic efficacy. Fourthly, responses 
must be voluntary, predicated on a shared recognition of environmental problems which 
is based on shared interpretations of the scientific evidence and the strategies for 
solution, rather than on geopolitics or considerations of power and domination. And
649 FAO Report of the Twenty-second Session of the Committee on Fisheries. Rome, 17-20 March 1998. 
FAO Fisheries Report No. 562, Rome, FAO, 1998.
650 FAO Report of the Twenty-third Session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, 15-19 February 1999. 
FAO Fisheries Report No. 595, Rome, FAO, 1999, p. 65.
651 Ibid.
652 Equity is an important principle that allows the international community to take into account 
considerations of justice and fairness in the establishment, operation or application of a rule of 
international law. Sands, Principles, supra note 211, p. 124. But equity is also a mode of introducing 
justice into resource allocation. For detailed analysis of this issue see Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in 
International Law and Institutions, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995); Amanda Wolf, Quotas in 
International Environmental Agreements, (London, Earthscan Publications, 1997) and Emmanuel Agius 
and Salvino Bussutil (eds.), Future Generations and International Law, (London, Earthscan Publications, 
1997).
180
fifthly, there should be participation of all actors, governments, peoples, governmental
/'f'5
and non-governmental organizations to ensure universality 
Conclusions
It is commonplace to assert the critical role of international organizations in 
international law and international relations. The emergence of formal international 
organizations has been recognized as necessary for the implementation of international 
regimes in the broader sense.
The specific and detailed mechanisms provided by the 1995 SSA will be helpful to the 
process of restructuring existing fisheries organizations and the creation of any 
necessary subsequent organizations. The Agreement also qualifies the open access 
regime of high seas fisheries by restricting the access of non-contracting parties to 
specific areas. The Schemes of Conservation Measures to Promote Compliance by non 
Contracting Party Vessel adopted by CCAMLR, IOTC and ICCAT regarding non­
members and non-participants (Section 4.4. of this Chapter), as well as the 
‘International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity’ adopted by 
FAO654, are good examples in that direction.
By accepting membership of a regional or subregional fishery organization, States are 
complying with their international legal obligation to co-operate, and therefore, are 
allowed to take action to deter other States, non-members and non participants from non 
compliance; i.e. from fishing in a specific area covered by the organization concerned if 
one exists. If not, one should be created. With regard to improving transparency in the
653 Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, d ob a l Accord: Imperatives for the Twenty-first Century’, in 
Choucri (ed.), Global Accord, supra, note 74, pp. A ll-507, at 506-507.
654 ‘The Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity’ is a voluntary Plan adopted by FAO in 
La Jolla (USA), in 1998. The immediate objective of the Plan is for States and regional fisheries 
organizations to achieve world-wide an efficient, equitable and transparent management of fishing 
capacity, on the grounds of four major strategies: the conduct of national, regional and global assessments 
of capacity and improvement of the capacity for monitoring fishing capacity; the preparation and 
implementation of national plans to effectively manage fishing capacity; the strengthening of regional 
fisheries organizations and related mechanisms for improved management fishing capacity at regional 
and global levels; and immediate actions for major transboundary, straddling, highly migratory and high 
seas fisheries requiring urgent measures. Document in electronic form available on 11/11/00 on 
http://www.fao.org/fi/ipa/capace.asp.
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activities of member States, the provisions of the Agreement can contribute 
considerably to the strengthening of international fisheries organizations. All such 
provisions can be considered as representing a major contribution to the international 
law of fisheries because they have the capacity to meet the new challenges, principles 
and rules emerging in the form of a new regime for fisheries on the high seas.
To what extent will these ’new’ fisheries organizations succeed in improving 
conservation of fisheries through effective management maintaining the long term 
sustainability at levels that safely permit their harvesting whilst still achieving the goal 
of sustainable development of the harvesting States? With regard to the institutional 
aspects, in reviewing the situation as a whole, the 1995 SSA both confirms and expands 
the provisions contained in UNCLOS, with a view to assisting States the better to 
implement conservation and management measures for fisheries on the high seas. A 
number of international fisheries organizations have already adapted themselves to their 
responsibilities of co-operation under the Convention. In this sense, the Agreement is a 
positive development, proceeding in the right direction. However, one of the main 
remaining difficulties, which gives rise to concern, is the lack of any form of co­
ordination of international organizations for fisheries in general, and those for fisheries 
on the high seas, in particular. Although there are many organizations, the existing 
organizations have not yet resolved the problem, nor has the 1995 SSA.
According to Articles 72.2, 118, 119.2 and 276 of the 1982 UNCLOS, FAO seems a 
suitable organization to take a lead role and to foster required extensive institutional 
developments for the protection of marine living resources655. However, taking into 
account that 40 percent of fish and fish products enter international trade, which 
suggests that trade can play an important role in the fisheries crisis656 the World Trade
655 UNCLOS, the central regime for ocean governance, created a subregime for the sustainable 
management of marine living resources. The focus for that subregime is FAO, including its network of 
regional fisheries commissions and conventions. The Oceans Our Future, supra note 608, p. 157.
656 At the Third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, the Draft Ministerial Text contained the 
following paragraph on the fisheries crisis, in the section on subjects for negotiation in a new round of 
trade talks, under the heading “WTO Rules”: “Subsidies and countervailing measures: the rules shall be 
reviewed, and where necessary amended, on the basis of proposals by participants, taking into account, 
inter alia, the important role that subsidies may play in the economic development of developing 
countries, and the effects of subsidisation on trade. In the context of these negotiations, the areas to be 
considered shall include, inter alia, certain subsidies that may contribute to over-capacity in fisheries and 
over-fishing or cause other adverse effects to the interests of Members. The work on fisheries subsidies 
shall be carried out in cooperation with the FAO and drawing also on relevant work under way within
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Organization can also play a role in the coordination of international and regional 
fisheries organizations657. In the final analysis, it is only on the basis of careful planning 
and mutual trust among States that the international community will be able to 
ameliorate the political concerns that currently inhibit international co-operation, and 
create the necessary conditions for a comprehensive, more integrated and transparent 
approach to the management of the global commons which will ensure the successful 
implementation of the SSA as well as UNCLOS.
other intergovernmental bodies, including regional fisheries management organisations”. Information in 
electronic form as available on 2/11/00 on the web site http://www.ictsd.org/html/fish.htm
657 See ‘Legal Developments Relevant to Fisheries Management and Why These are Being Brought to the 
WTO’, Document in electronic form by Caroline Dommen, available on 2 November 2000, on 
http://www.ictsd.org/dialogueweb/Dialogues/23-10-00-dommen.pdf. and ‘Fish for Thought: Fisheries, 
International Trade and Sustainable Development. Initial Issues for Consideration by a Multi-stakeholder 
Policy Dialogue, Research, and Information Exchange Process’, document in electronic form by Caroline 
Dommen for the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and the World 
Conservation Union, Washington, 1999, available on 2 November, 2000, on 
http://www.ictsd.org/html/fish.pdf
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Chapter 5 
Decision-making procedures 
introduction
In contrast with ‘terrestrial’ resources, the history of ocean management is partially the 
history of control over access to marine space and entitlements to the ownership of 
marine resources658. International regimes are capable of co-ordinating management 
activities more efficiently when they have a restricted membership composed 
exclusively of those who have real interests in and over the decision-making procedures 
concerning the relevant issues659. Thus, decision-making procedures, as prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choice, are an important element of 
regimes. They require an interaction in which interests are mutually adjusted on the 
basis of rules. They include procedures of international conferences or organizations as 
well as those procedures which translate the internationally contracted obligations into 
domestic law and which set the standard operating procedures for national 
bureaucracies implementing the regime660. If the decision-making procedures of a 
regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with 
principles, norms, rules and procedures, then the regime will weaken661.
The decision-making approach to international organizations is based on analysis of 
how different factors interact with the prevailing hegemony -the environment- and it 
seeks to understand the extent to which these interactions support the status quo or 
promote change in the structure of existing power relations . Institutions have strong 
decision-making procedures when changes are carried out according to a preceding plan
658 Alastair D. Couper, History of Ocean Management’, in Paolo Fabbri (ed.), Ocean Management in 
Ocean Change, (London, Elsevier, 1992), pp. 1-17, at 15.
659 Vogler, The Global Commons, supra, note 39, p. 156.
660 Friedrich Kratochwil, ’Contract and Regimes: Do Issue Specificity and Variations of Formality 
Matter?’, in Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory, note 50, pp. 73-93, at 87.
661 Krasner, ‘Structural Causes’, supra, note 46, p. 5.
662 Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, 'Decision Making', in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, 
Approaches to World Order (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 349-369.
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or, in other words, a procedure spelled out in the regime itself. In these cases, the 
appropriators design basic operational rules, create organizations to undertake the 
operational management of the Common Property Resources, and modify their rules 
over time in the light of past experience according to their own collective-choice 
rules663.
The large number of disparate international organizations dealing with fisheries, each 
with their own rules and procedures, leads to lack of focus and inefficient decision­
making664. The 1995 SSA is realigning interests by means of redesigning the structure 
of decision-making procedures. For example, the Agreement reorganizes decision­
making procedures in various ways analyzed in this chapter, regarding compatibility of 
conservation and management measures (Section 1), collection and sharing of data 
(Section 2), setting of minimum standards (Section 3), scientific assessments (Section 4) 
and participatory rights (Section 5). In this respect, compared to the 1982 UNCLOS, the 
1995 SSA is an obvious improvement. Furthermore, the Agreement readdresses certain 
problems, in particular those regarding participatory rights of new members and new 
participants, which otherwise would have the potential to undermine the decision­
making procedures. It seems, however, that the Agreement is providing fishing States, 
indirectly and through regional organizations, with a framework for asserting property 
rights to the resources, albeit these must be shared with the relevant coastal States.
5.1 Compatibility of conservation and management measures
In order to analyse the provisions of the 1995 SSA regarding the compatibility of 
conservation and management measures, it is necessary first to discuss the rights and 
obligations of coastal and high seas fishing States established by the 1982 UNCLOS. 
Modem conceptions of ocean management have made it clear that an integrated 
management policy is one in which the diverse policy components are unified according 
to conceptual notions of the whole range of interests involved665. Furthermore, it must
663 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, supra, note 285, p. 58.
664 Joy Hyvariden, Elizabeth Wall and Indrani Lutchman, The United Nations and Fisheries in 1998’, 
ODIL, 29 (1998), pp. 323-338.
665 James Wilson and Rebecca Lent, ‘Economic Perspective and the Evolution of Fisheries Management: 
Towards Subjectivist Methodology’, Marine Resources Economics, 9 (1994), pp. 353-373. Hance Smith
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meet the tests of comprehensiveness, aggregation and consistency. In this connection, 
comprehensiveness is measured in terms of space, time, actors, and issues. It is most 
important at the initial stage. Aggregation is the critical component of the input 
processing where the choice of policy options would depend on the aggregate 
evaluation of consequences in the short and long-term. Consistency has both vertical 
and horizontal dimensions. In the vertical dimension, it means that specific actions 
taken by different agencies conform to general guidelines. In the horizontal dimension, 
it means that only one policy is being pursued at any specific period in time666. Thus, 
the integration of policies must be one of the principal objectives of ocean management.
As regards the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the 1982 UNCLOS recognizes coastal 
States "sovereign rights" for the purpose, inter alia, of conserving and managing the 
living resources within the area extending to 200 nautical miles measured from the 
concerned coastal States territorial sea baselines. As the Convention makes clear, this 
means that the coastal State has the exclusive authority to prescribe conservation and 
management laws for such resources and to enforce them in the EEZ. Taking into 
account its broad discretion under Article 62 to determine and set the conditions of 
access for other States wanting to fish in the EEZ, the coastal State can effectively either 
exclude or allow foreign vessels to fish within its zone. Moreover, where the coastal 
State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch as determined by 
it, it must give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch667. However, in 
exerting its rights and performing its duties in the EEZ, the coastal State must have due 
regard to the rights and duties of other States and must act in a manner compatible with 
the provisions of the Convention. This jurisdictional "revolution" is of great global 
significance because it consolidates coastal State control over an additional 35% to 36% 
of the surface of the planet and precisely over those areas of the oceans most intensively 
utilized by human beings668.
has stressed the changing nature of the State, the trend towards growth of informal agreements due to 
interstate relationships and the close relationship between management and policy. Hance Smith, ‘The 
Role of the State in the Technical and General Management of the Oceans’, Ocean and Coastal 
Management, 27 (1995), pp. 5-14.
666 Edward Miles, 'Future Challenges in Ocean Management: Towards Integrated National Ocean Policy', 
in Paolo Fabbri (ed.), Ocean Management, supra, note 658, pp. 595-617, at 597.
667 UNCLOS, Article 62.
668 Miles, supra, note 666, p. 596.
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These Articles have a long history. At the resumed ninth session of the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1980, a group of 15 coastal States, including Chile, 
Ecuador, Australia, Argentina and Canada, proposed a change in Article 63.2 calling for 
the coastal State and fishing States to co-operate in adopting measures ‘necessary for 
the conservation of the stocks in the adjacent area’. At the eleventh session in 1982, a 
final effort was made to amend Article 63 along the lines proposed by Argentina at the 
ninth session calling for the inclusion of a provision for the settlement of disputes 
through “the appropriate tribunal” regarding the conservation measures to be taken, in 
order to ensure that even in the event of disagreement, conservation measures for 
straddling stocks would be prescribed669. Several other States continued to support and 
yet others to oppose that proposal. In opposing it, Japan stated that any arrangements for 
the conservation of such stocks should be based on voluntary agreements between the 
parties concerned; Korea objected that the proposal introduced ‘mandatory elements’ 
and involved ‘unnecessary complicated procedures’; the USSR argued that the 
amendment would curtail freedom to fish on the high seas; and finally, the German 
Democratic Republic opposed it contending that, by widening the rights of coastal 
States in the maritime areas adjacent to their coasts, the amendment was restricting the 
fishing rights of third States on the high seas670. In accordance with the procedure in 
force for the treatment of formal amendments at that stage of the Conference, and in 
response to an appeal by the President, the sponsors of the proposals announced that the
r7 i
amendments would not be pressed to a vote .
As regards the high seas, the 1982 UNCLOS affirms that the high seas are open to all 
States, whether coastal or land-locked (Articles 87 and 116). However, several 
conditions limit this right and need to be considered. First, a State fishing on the high 
seas has the duty to take conservation measures on the high seas, either for its own 
nationals alone or in co-operation with other States (Arts. 116.b and 63.2, 64, 65, 66 and 
67). In this regard, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case which the United Kingdom brought 
against Iceland, the International Court of Justice’s decision established the principle
669 Document A/CONF.62AVS/4 (1980), as cited in Myron Nordquist (ed.), A Commentary, supra, note 
342, Vol. II, p. 644.
670 Document A/CONF.62/L. 114 (1982), as cited in Myron Nordquist (ed.), ibid, pp. 645-646.
671 Myron Nordquist (ed.), Ibid, p. 647.
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that States fishing on the high seas have the duty to attend to the need to conserve the 
living resources affected672. Secondly, such States have an obligation to co-operate with 
other States in the taking of conservation measures (Article 117). Thirdly, they have an 
obligation to negotiate with the other States in the fishery in order to take the necessary 
conservation measures. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the International Court 
of Justice stated that such negotiation is a special application of a principle recognized 
in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter as one of the methods for settlement of 
disputes. Although this obligation to negotiate does not require conclusion of an 
agreement, it does require that negotiations be conducted in good faith in an attempt to
fn 'Xremove differences and reach substantive agreement . Fourthly, Article 117 requires 
both fishing and coastal States to take the measures necessary for co-operation. This 
implies an obligation to acquire and contribute scientific information on both the stocks 
targeted and those actually being fished on the high seas. Fifthly, Article 119.3 requires 
that the States concerned must ensure that conservation measures and their 
implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any State. 
Regarding shared stocks, that are, straddling stocks and highly migratory species, the 
Convention reiterates that both coastal and fishing States must seek agreement on 
conservation of the shared stock on the high seas. However, as Burke has pointed out, 
agreement on allocation is probably a prerequisite of agreed conservation measures 
since the two issues are difficult to disentangle674. From this it can be concluded that the 
relevant provisions of the UN Convention on straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks, are confusing and poorly drafted, as a result of the compromises necessary to
f n  ssecure consensus upon them .
672 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland), 1974, ICJ Rep., as cited in D. J. Harris, Cases and 
Materials on International Law, (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1991), pp. 954-969.
673 Burke, supra, note 110, p. 125.
674 Ibid., p. 132.
675 Coastal States should have primary management control over straddling stocks. Under other 
conditions, fishing States might render ineffective conservation measures taken by coastal States. 
Therefore, other fishing States would be bound by these measures, including measures concerning stocks 
on the high seas. “However, it is clear from Article 63.2 that such an obligation would exist only if the 
measures had been agreed upon as a result of negotiations conducted either directly or through 
appropriate regional or subregional organisation”. Brown, International Law of the Sea, supra, note 169, 
Vol. I, p. 228.
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Nonetheless, the 1982 UNCLOS has made a major contribution to the development of 
the principles governing the conservation and management of marine living resources. 
According to Orrego Vicuna, a number of principles, namely the need for preventive
|
| and precautionary approach, the assessment of environmental impact, rules on
I responsibility and liability and ecosystem management, which today are common in 
International Environmental Law, emerged from the Convention in the context of 
marine environmental protection676.
From a study of the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS concerning the protection of 
living resources, it can be observed that the classic concept of freedom of fishing is not 
only limited in it, but must be regulated by States as well. Thus, Articles 117 and 118 
require States to enter into negotiations at bilateral and regional levels with a view to 
taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned. 
Article 119 provides that, in determining the allowable catch and establishing other 
conservation measures for the living resources on the high seas, coastal States must use 
the best scientific evidence available taking into account other factors677. Articles 61 to 
69 require conservation measures to be developed either by the coastal State, or through 
agreements adopted by the States concerned for the stocks in question. Of particular 
interest is Articles 116-118 on the freedom of fishing on the high seas and the 
limitations imposed concerning the coastal States' offshore fishery jurisdiction. The 
claim to an EEZ of 188 nautical miles within the 200 nautical miles limit established by 
the UNCLOS confers on the coastal States exclusive access to fisheries within the zone 
with the possibility of access by other states only if the coastal State has determined that 
there is a surplus to its capacity to harvest the whole allowable catch. Although the 
UNCLOS supports the classic doctrine of freedom of fishing on the high seas, in 
practice access to fisheries on the high seas is limited to those States with sufficiently 
sophisticated fishing technology to reach them and stay on the fishing grounds for long 
periods; that is, those with distant water fleets and freezer trawlers. It should be noted 
that not all such vessels that are owned by or registered in developed States.
676 Francisco Orrego, ‘The Changing International Law’, supra, note 81, p. 25.
677 Article 119 provides that, in determining the allowable catch and establishing other conservation 
measures for the living resources on the high seas, Coastal States shall use the best scientific evidence 
available, as qualified by various matters. No standards are provided for determining this best’ scientific 
evidence.
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Although the 1982 UNCLOS now represents a negotiated balance of rights between 
coastal States and other States, the new concept of the EEZ encountered resistance in 
the course of the UNCLOS III negotiations. By preserving some of the classical 
freedoms with regard to the EEZ (Article 58.2), the Convention mitigated fears that the 
EEZ would jeopardize the advantages enjoyed by some members of the international 
community under the classical doctrine of freedom of the high seas678. However, the 
Convention conveys the impression that most fish stocks are confined to the EEZ of 
each single coastal State since the overwhelming majority of the world’s fish stocks are 
found within 200 miles of land679. Notwithstanding this, the 1982 UNCLOS does not 
provide a basis upon which enforcement action might be taken on the high seas by one 
State against another for failure to comply with the coastal State’s conservation 
measures, nor does it condone unilateral action to enforce multilaterally agreed
i ' o n
standards in the absence of specific agreement . Yet, there is no specific requirement 
that the measures taken within the EEZ and beyond it be co-ordinated though this is 
obviously desirable in terms of achieving the generalised goals that living resources be 
conserved.
During the Third UNCLOS, eight coastal States, conscious of the weakness of the 
phrase “seek to agree” in Article 63, proposed a text stating that in the event that 
agreement on compatible measures is not reached within a reasonable period, the 
International Tribunal on Law of the Sea must determine the measures to be applied in 
the adjacent area for the conservation of straddling stocks681. However, this was 
opposed by some high seas fishing States on the grounds that the balance between
678 Brown, International Law of the Sea, supra, note 169, Vol. I, p. 235. See also Josd Antonio de 
Yturriaga, Ambitos de Soberania de la Convencion de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar, 
(Madrid, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1993), p. 381.
679 Churchill and Lowe, supra, note 8, p. 234. See also Brown, International Law of the Sea, supra, note 
169, Vol. I, p. 228.
680 Miles and Burke, "Pressures’, supra, note 106, p. 351; and Davies and Redgwell, supra, note 461, p. 
234.
681 Amendment proposed by Australia, Canada, Cape Verde, Iceland, Philippines, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal and Sierra Leone. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.114, 13 April 1982, reproduced in Documents of 
the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea, Vol. XVI, 1988.
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coastal and fishing States already established within the Conference had to be preserved 
and this opposition provoked the failure of that amendment682.
The 1995 SSA introduces significant innovations into this controversial field. This 
constituted one of the major issues both for DWFNs and coastal States throughout the 
Conference on SFS and HMFS. The DWFNs viewed the Conference simply as 
providing a forum within which some coastal States could attempt to extend their 
national influence to areas beyond those permitted under the provisions of Part V of the 
Convention. On the other hand, coastal States co-ordinated their positions in the debate 
and in the negotiations in order to develop a common strategy regarding this issue683. 
The outcome is the formulation expressed in Article 7 of the 1995 SSA, which aims to 
ensure compatibility between conservation and management measures within and 
beyond areas of national jurisdiction and is one of the pillars of the Agreement. The 
question which still has to be answered, however, is whether the 1995 SSA confers a 
superior right on the coastal State for purposes of establishing conservation measures 
which are applicable to the stock as a whole, including the portion of it found on the 
high seas at any time, and whether it enables it to demand and enforce compliance with 
these by high seas fishing States. In other words, which set of rules now prevails in 
cases of conflict?
Article 7 of the 1995 SSA provides that, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of 
coastal States for the purpose of exploring, conserving and managing the living marine 
resources found within areas under their national jurisdiction and the right of all States 
for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, in accordance with UNCLOS, 
Coastal States and States fishing on the high seas are required to seek to agree on the 
measures necessary for the conservation of straddling fish stocks in the adjacent high 
seas area and to co-operate with a view toward ensuring conservation and promoting the 
objective of optimum utilization of highly migratory fish stocks throughout the region, 
both within and beyond the areas under national jurisdiction. These measures must be 
compatible in order to ensure conservation and management of the straddling fish stocks 
and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this effect, according to the 1995
682 Lucchini et Voeckel, Droit de la Mer, supra, note 583, p. 651.
683 David Doulman, ‘Structure and Process’, supra, note 225, pp. 27-29.
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SSA, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas need to consider the following 
factors: i) the coastal States’ conservation and management measures for the two stocks 
in their EEZs in accordance with Article 61 of the 1982 UNCLOS; ii) the high seas 
measures already established by agreement between coastal States and high seas fishing 
States for the stocks; iii) the agreed measures established by a sub-regional or regional 
fishery organization for the same stock; iv) the biological unity and other biological 
characteristics of the stock concerned, the fisheries and the geographical particularities 
of the region concerned, including the abundance of the stocks in areas under national 
jurisdiction; v) the respective dependence of coastal states and high seas fishing states 
on the stocks concerned; and vi) the impact of measures on the living marine resources 
as a whole.
With regard to compatibility of conservation and management measures, Article 7 of 
the 1995 SSA also provides that in cases where States do not agree on compatible 
measures within a reasonable period of time, any one of them can resort to the 
procedures for settlement of disputes provided in the Agreement. Pending agreement on 
compatible conservation and management measures, States must seek to agree on 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature. Where they do not agree on provisional 
arrangements, they must secure the adoption of provisional arrangements through the 
settlement procedure mechanisms of the Agreement. Such provisional measures must: i) 
take into account the principles of conservation and management of the two stocks 
concerned as established in the Agreement; ii) have due regard to the respective rights 
of all States concerned; iii) not jeopardize the reaching of final agreement on compatible 
conservation and management measures; and iv) be established without prejudice to the 
final outcome under the dispute settlement procedure. In addition, coastal states must 
regularly inform other states of the measures they have adopted for straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in areas under national jurisdiction. On the other 
hand, high seas fishing States also must regularly inform other States of the measures 
they have adopted for regulating the activities of fishing vessels flying their flags and 
harvesting such stocks in the high seas.
In the opinion of Casado, the 1995 SSA reveals a biased propensity for favouring the 
interests of coastal States, because while in determining compatible conservation and 
management measures, States must take into account similar measures adopted both by
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the coastal State within areas of national jurisdiction and by concerned States on the 
high seas, only in the first case does the Agreement stress the need to ensure that 
measures established for the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of the
fLQAmeasures adopted by the coastal State in areas under its jurisdiction . Yturriaga, 
another Spanish author, also subscribes to this view, underlining the fact that the 1995 
SSA does not include a parallel provision concerning the negative impact that the 
measures adopted by the coastal State within its jurisdiction will have on the high
_  685seas .
Lucchini and Voeckel, French authors, argue that whereas Article 63.2 of the 1982 
UNCLOS uses the expression that States must "seek to agree" upon the measures, 
Article 7.3 of the 1995 SSA clearly categorises co-operation as a legal obligation686. 
According to Davies and Redgwell, this legal obligation for both coastal and fishing 
States is dependent upon the stocks concerned and must not result in harmful impact 
upon on the living marine resources as a whole687. It is important that, in order to be 
effective, fisheries management should be concerned with the whole stock unit in its 
entire area of distribution, and management measures should be harmonized among all
/TOO
the states involved . This represents a welcome move to a biologically specific 
approach to stock management rather than one based simply on the arbitrary 
jurisdictional limits of the Law of the Sea Convention689. The holistic approach towards 
compatibility of conservation and management measures in Article 7 is consistent with 
the large marine ecosystem concept adopted as a principle in Article 5.d and 5.e of the 
Agreement and is the keystone of modem fisheries regulations, as pointed out in Section 
3, Chapter 3690.
684 Rafael Casado, El Derecho de la Pesca en Alta Mar y sus Ultimos Desarrollos, (Cursos de Derecho 
Intemacional de la Universidad del Pais Vasco, Vitoria-Gasteiz, 1995), p. 125.
685 Yturriaga, The International Regime, supra, note 181, p. 207.
686 Lucchini et Voeckel, Droit de la Mer, supra, note 583, p. 682.
687 Davies and Redgwell, supra, note 461, p. 263.
688 Tahindro, supra, note 163, p. 15.
689 David Freestone and Zen Makuch, The New International Environmental Law of Fisheries’, supra, 
note 549, p. 29.
690 See Frida Armas Pfirter, El Derecho Intemacional de Pesquerias, (Buenos Aires, Consejo Argentino 
para las Relaciones Internacionales, 1996), p. 379.
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Regarding the compatibility of conservation and management measures, the 1982 
UNCLOS provides an inadequate framework for this and little effective guidance. The 
1995 SSA is thus a significant step forward in the shifting course that leads from the 
traditional approach, under which management is focused on a single factor, to a 
broader focus, which attempts to define the overall interests of States in the oceans, its 
resources, environment and patterns of use and to meld the concept of development into 
the overall definition of co-operation for the protection of the global commons691.
In aiming to establish an improved negotiated legal equitable balance between rights 
and duties of both coastal and fishing States, the 1995 SSA gives a certain priority to 
management measures taken by coastal States. This is attributable to two reasons: first, 
although it is not always the case for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, the 
overwhelming majority of fisheries in the world occur in the EEZs; secondly, the failure 
of international fisheries organizations to deal effectively with fisheries on the high 
seas. As McRae has pointed out, the approach of recognizing the priority of the Coastal 
State in the management of straddling stocks was probably the only realistic way to 
solve the problem, and thus had to be embodied in a multilateral agreement692. But, 
particularly relevant, according to the wording of Article 7 of the 1995 SSA, is the fact 
that the new reinforced balancing of interest in the Agreement is achieved mainly 
between coastal States measures and regional fisheries organizations, rather than 
between coastal States and high seas fishing States. Finally, an important improvement 
in the 1995 SSA is that the compatibility of measures must depend on acceptance of and 
the giving of effect to the large marine ecosystem concept.
691 Max Collett, ‘Achieving Effective International Fishery Management: a Critical Analysis of the UN 
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks’, Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies, 4 (1995), pp. 1-33.
692 Donald McRae, 'State Practice in Relation to Fisheries', Washington, Proceedings of the American 
Society of International Law, 1990, p. 287.
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5.2 Collection and sharing of data
Transparent collection and sharing of information are the sine qua non conditions for 
decision-making procedures in workable international environmental regimes693. Thus, 
the general obligation to exchange information is found in basically every international 
environmental agreement. Information exchange has been characterised as a general 
obligation of one State to provide general information on one or more matters on an ad 
hoc basis to another State, especially in relation to scientific and technical 
information694. Regarding fisheries in particular, collection and sharing of data is a key 
determinant of effectiveness. The creation of an ocean management information system 
is not a database management or information technology or even marine policy activity, 
but represents an enormous exercise in information management. Therefore, it is 
relevant to discuss the problem of collecting and sharing of data in the new international 
regime for fisheries on the high seas.
Cole-King and Lalwani have identified three major groups of functional components of 
information systems for ocean management. First, are the primary data gathering 
programmes and databases: these tend to be organized along sectoral lines and are 
mainly the responsibility of national government departments and agencies. They can be 
local, national, regional or global; they can describe the environment or human activities 
or both; and they can be short or long term. Secondly, are the secondary data 
compilations which can either deal with single activity sectors or scientific disciplines, 
or be concerned with a range of economic, social and environmental subjects and be 
conducted by FAO and other UN agencies or regional fisheries commissions. Thirdly, 
are the data and information dissemination systems which include the technology of 
data transfer, the data catalogues and referral systems and the exchange of data695. The 
distinction between these components of information systems is helpful to a more 
comprehensive analysis of fisheries management on the high seas, taking into account
693 Vogler, The Global Commons, supra, note 39, p. 40. See also Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, 
’Adjustment and Compliance Processes in International Regulatory Regimes’, in Jessica Tuchman 
Mathews (ed.), Preserving the Global Environment. The Challenge of Shared Leadership, (New York, 
WW Norton and Company, 1991), p. 291.
694 Sands, Principles, supra, note 211, p. 597
695 Adam Cole-King and Chandra Lalwani, Information and Data Processing for Ocean Management’, in 
Fabbri (ed.), Ocean Management, supra, note 658, pp. 134-149, at 138.
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the lack of integration of information systems for the management of straddling fish 
stocks.
Availability and exchange of information regarding activities having adverse effects on 
the environment and on the state of the environment in general, are well-established 
objectives of international environmental law. The general obligation to exchange 
information is found in virtually every international environmental agreement696. The 
UNEP Principles on Shared Natural Resources, for example, provide that States sharing 
a natural resource should, to the extent practicable, exchange information and engage in 
consultations on a regular basis on its environmental aspects, as laid down in Principle
fx\n
5, specifying mechanisms for exchange of information, Principles 6 and 7 . The 1982
UNCLOS obliges exchange of scientific information and other data relevant to
rqo
conservation of fish stocks (Arts. 61.5, 62.4 and 119.2), to marine scientific research 
(Art. 143) and to marine pollution (Arts. 200 and 244).
The Convention on Biological Diversity, insofar as it is relevant to fisheries on the high 
seas, provides that the Contracting Parties shall facilitate the exchange of information 
from all publicly available sources, relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, taking into account the special needs of developing countries699. 
Regarding fisheries, the need for exchange of information, consultation, and advance 
notification of plans to exploit shared resources is well effected through fisheries 
agreements, as is the need, based on the customary principle of good faith and good 
neighbourliness, to co-operate to find a solution700. The rules relating to the exchange of 
information provide an example of the synergies between, inter alia, the CBD, 
UNCLOS and the new fisheries agreements. In addition to the general obligations
696 Sands, Principles, supra, note 211, p. 596.
697 Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation 
and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States. Reproduced in (1978) 
17ILM 1091.
698 Patricia Bimie, ‘Law of the Sea and Ocean Resources: Implications for Marine Scientific Research’, 
IJMCL, 10 (1995), pp. 229-251, and J. Ashley Roach, ‘Marine Scientific Research and the New Law of 
the Sea’, ODIL, 27 (1996), pp. 59-72.
699 CBD, Art. 17.
700 Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, p. 509. See also, OECD Publication, Towards Sustainable 
Fisheries. Economic Aspects of the Management of Living Marine Resources, (OECD, Paris, 1997), p. 27.
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established by UNCLOS and the CBD, detailed provisions for gathering and exchange 
of information through either the FAO or sub-regional and regional fisheries 
management organizations can be found in the FAO Compliance Agreement (Article 
VI) as well as the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Articles 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 
I 12.3).
When evaluating the current state of information for assessment of high seas marine 
living resources in 1993, FAO stated that for most oceanic species there is insufficient 
and inadequate information and data on the identity of the majority of unit stocks and on 
the boundaries of their areas. Nor are there adequate data on the catch removed from 
each unit stock, the by-catches and discards, or the level of fishing effort applied. In 
some cases, as with some tunas, whales, squids and offshore demersals such as Alaska 
pollock, there is fragmentary information which allows the exploitation rate to be 
roughly estimated but rarely, if at all, can reliable estimates of population biomass or 
total numbers be deduced with reasonable levels of accuracy. Quantitative information 
is almost non-existent for sharks, small cetaceans, most squids and pomfret701.
FAO have acknowledged that rather than producing absolute estimates of abundance, 
assessment work on information is usually aimed more at determining trends in 
abundance. These depend to a large extent on the validity of trends in overall catch rate 
that are based, for the most part, on data voluntarily provided by fishing fleets. Facing 
the uncertainties about the distribution and migration of some species and on the 
optimal method of control and surveillance, FAO has proposed an assessment 
framework for management of data based on boxes’, framing area/season Windows’ of 
critical importance. These critical areas could be used in a precautionary fashion, by 
closing them to fishing during known periods of biological importance to the life 
histories of the species concerned702.
The 1995 SSA adopts, as a general principle, that States must collect and share, in a 
timely manner, complete and accurate data on fishing activities, relating inter alia, to 
vessel position, catch of target and non-target species and fishing effort, as set out in
701 FAO Technical Consultation, in Levy et al. (ed.), Selected Documents, supra, note 113, p. 325.
702 Ibid., p. 326.
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Annex I of the Agreement, as well as information from national and international 
research programmes (Article 5.j). This obligation of collecting and sharing complete 
and accurate data is related to the obligation, also established as a general obligation 
(Article 5.k), to promote and conduct scientific research and develop appropriate 
technologies in support of fishery conservation and management. Article 14 of the SSA 
provides that states shall collect and exchange detailed, accurate technical and statistical 
fisheries data on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in a timely 
manner as part of their obligations under the Agreement. States are also required to take 
appropriate measures to verify the accuracy of such data. In addition, States must co­
operate directly or through competent international organizations, to strengthen their 
scientific research capacity in the field of fisheries and promote scientific research on 
the conservation and management of SFS and HMFS. In this connection, States, or the 
international organizations conducting research on the stocks concerned beyond areas 
under national jurisdiction, must actively promote for the benefit of any interested 
States, the publication and dissemination of the results of that research, information 
relating to its objectives and methods and, to the extent practicable, must facilitate the 
participation of scientists from those States in such research. The exchange of data 
includes the exchange of "meta-data” or data about data, that is, detailed description of a 
dataset and the ways in which it can be accessed.
The need to collect and exchange biological data is the most prominent element in 
inducing States to co-operate703 in the process of decision-making. At present, in most 
cases, the true status of marine living resources in the high seas can only be inferred, 
given the fragmentary nature of the information collection system concerning these 
resources. The provisions of the 1995 SSA develop the general principle of collection 
and sharing of data in the process of decision-making.
As scientists are, by and large, in favour of free exchange of data, the 1995 SSA did not 
address the issues of data ownership, copyright and confidentiality of data information. 
The application to marine plants and animals of recent discoveries in genetic 
engineering offers enormous potential for harvesting more food, pharmaceuticals, and 
industrial compounds from the sea. The wealth of ocean genetic information will
703 Tahindro, supra, note 163, p. 29.
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provide new knowledge of the earth’s oceans and of ourselves704. As regards areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, the 1982 UNCLOS maintains freedom of 
| fishing (Article 87.1.e) and freedom of scientific research (Article 87.1 .f)* The legal 
; status of the high seas and of the Area’s genetic resources are neither determined nor 
changed by the CBD705. The CBD incorporates provisions that explicitly call for 
cooperation and complementarity between conservation of biodiversity and regimes to 
protect intellectual property rights. However, CBD does not determine the legal status 
of naturally occurring genetic material and property. It does make it clear that genetic 
resources are a form of commodity which may be withheld from a market and that 
access to them is not free706. Thus, the CBD indicates an implicit rejection of a common 
heritage approach to genetic resources and the conservation of biodiversity in favour of 
a model balancing the needs and goals of industrial and developing States707. The issue 
of genetic resources in the Area, which must include as well genetic resources in the 
high seas, was firmly placed in the international arena during the International Year of 
the Ocean. Several fora have been suggested as suitable for looking at the issues with 
the necessary political commitment and in good faith. They include the CBD 
Conference of the Parties or its Subsidiary Body, the UN General Assembly, the 
International Seabed Authority and the International Oceanographic Institute of 
UNESCO, inter alia7m.
The 1995 SSA develops co-operative structures to enable exchanges between different 
jurisdictions and creates new mechanisms for filling the severe vacuums in information 
processes prevailing at present. This obligation is a vital component of the Agreement.
704 Rita Colwell and Jack Greer, ‘Biotechnology and the Sea’, ODIL, 17 (1986), pp. 147-165.
705 Lyle Glowka, ‘The Deepest of Ironies: Genetic Resources, Marine Scientific Research and the 
International Deep Seabed Area’, IUCN Environmental Law Centre, 1995, p. 13. Paper Distributed for 
Comment and Discussion at the First Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and 
Technological Advice of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Paris, 4 September 1995.
706 James Cameron and Zen Makuch, The UN Biodiversity Convention and the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 
(Gland, WWF International Discussion Paper, 1995), pp. 3 and 19.
707 Rebecca Margulies, ‘Protecting Biodiversity: Recognizing International Intellectual Property Rights in 
Plant Genetic Resources’, Michigan Journal of International Law’, 14 (1993), pp. 322-356. See also 
Karen Goldman, ‘Compensation for Use of Biological Resources under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity: Compatibility of Conservation Measures and Competitiveness of the Biotechnology Industry’, 
Law and Policy in International Business, 23 (1994), pp. 695-726.
708 Lyle Glowka, ‘Genetic Resources, Marine Scientific Research and the International Seabed Area’. 
RECIEL, 8 (1998), pp. 56-66, at 64.
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| The various provisions contained in the 1995 SSA regarding collection and provision of 
! information and cooperation in scientific research (Article 14), as well as standard 
requirements for collection and sharing of data (Annex I), are important instruments for 
regional and subregional fisheries organizations, NGOs, fishers and fishworkers. The 
Agreement provides mechanisms for assistance to developing States in the collection, 
reporting, verification, exchange and analysis of data, stock assessments and capacity 
building for observer programmes. However, the new data collection requirements will 
be demanding and laborious. Consequently, existing and new regional and sub-regional 
fisheries organizations will have to expand their scientific staff to gather, assimilate and 
process the information which will demand the use of satellite surveillance systems, 
observer programmes and other measures necessary to ensure comprehensiveness.
5.3 Minimum Standards
There is no ideal type of or model for international standard setting. The methods of 
setting standards are distinct from the question of the establishing the optimal 
institutional arrangements for environmental management and have long been a part of 
multilateral agreements and are commonly separated from basic treaty provisions709. 
Over a few decades, in spite of several positive measures, a gap has appeared between 
the demands for new integrated ocean management and United Nations global policies 
and national governments’ sectoral approaches and practices in relation to sea uses710. 
New directions in ocean management and the 1995 SSA in particular, suggest that 
different components of fisheries management are at last beginning to be developed and 
put into place. Indeed, a set of common, compatible and easily convertible standards 
urgently need to be applied in management of fisheries on the high seas. It is, as we 
have seen, widely recognized that accurate and verifiable data is required in order to 
analyze evolution and trends of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. Well- 
defined and detailed information strengthens the decision-making process.
709 Paolo Contini and Peter H. Sand, Methods to Expedite Environment Protection: International 
Ecostandards’, AJIL, 66 (1972) 37-59. According to Oxman, the duty to respect international standards is 
expressed in connection with a duty or right to adopt national laws and regulations governing a particular 
matter; thus, according to him, "the purpose of the duty is to establish uniform practice". Bernard Oxman, 
The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted International Standards’, N.Y. University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, 24 (1991), pp. 109-159, at 157.
710 Alastair Couper, ’History of Ocean Management’, supra, note 658, p. 16.
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Internationally accepted methods for collection and analysis of data are increasingly 
vital to the effectiveness of environmental conventions and establishing them may be 
| regarded as the most critical task to be addressed by whatever advisory mechanisms are 
established in the relevant convention711.
Article 5.c of the 1995 SSA provides, as a general principle, that coastal States and 
States fishing on the high seas, in adopting measures to ensure long-term sustainability 
of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, must take into account fishing patterns, 
the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum 
standards, whether subregional, regional or global. In this connection, Article 14.2 
provides that States must co-operate either directly or through fisheries management 
organizations to agree on the specification of data and the format in which they are to be 
provided to such organizations, taking into account the nature of the stocks and the 
fisheries for those stocks. States must also develop and share analytical techniques and 
stock assessment methodologies to improve measures for the conservation and 
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.
Annex I of the SSA, which forms an integral part of this instrument, set the standard 
requirements for collection and sharing of data. Article 1 establishes the general 
principles: the timely collection, compilation and analysis of data, and technical 
assistance, including training and financial support. To ensure timely collection, 
compilation and analysis of data, information from fisheries for stocks in areas under 
national jurisdiction is required and must be collected and compiled in such a way as to 
enable statistically meaningful analysis for the purpose of fishery resource conservation 
and management. This data should include: i) catch and fishing effort statistics; ii) other 
fishery-related information, such as vessel related and other data for standardizing 
fishing effort; iii) information on non-targeted and associated and dependent species. On 
the other hand, assistance must be provided to developing States in order to build 
capacity in the field of conservation and management of living marine resources. The 
assistance must focus on enhancing capacity to implement data collection and
711 Lee Kimball, Treaty Implementation: Scientific and Technical Advice Enters a New Stage, 
(Washington, American Society of International Law, 1997), p. 74. See also Lee Kimball, ‘International 
Law and Institutions: the Oceans and Beyond’, ODIL, 20 (1989), pp. 147-165, at 159.
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verification, observer programmes, data analysis and research projects supporting stock 
assessment. The fullest possible involvement of developing States’ scientists and 
managers must be promoted. Finally, as a general principle, all data shall be verified to 
ensure accuracy. Confidentiality of non-aggregated data shall be maintained. The 
dissemination of such data must be subject to the terms on which such data have been 
provided.
Adherence to standards is a fundamental requirement if comprehensive information 
systems at international, regional and national levels are to increase the utility of data 
and broaden the scope for discussion and analysis of environmental issues. According to 
Cole-King and Lalwani, even information which may be isolated geographically, by 
subject, by administrative function or by hardware type, should be incorporated into an
719integrated information system . There is a proliferation of fisheries management 
information schemes, largely nationally based that must be integrated together. The 
1995 SSA is embracing a set of minimum, common, compatible and easily convertible 
standards for information within a net of international co-operation, which is now taking 
shape in the new international environmental regime for fisheries on the high seas.
5.4 Scientific Assessments
Development of international environmental law is influenced by achievement of 
scientific consensus about the cause and consequences of a problem. Moreover, the 
economic interests of States, as well as compelling evidence that action is required to 
prevent environmental damage, are being taken into account in the development of 
international environmental law713. Furthermore, epistemic communities, as a network 
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and 
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area, 
can consolidate influence on their various governments, national preferences in a way 
that policies will come to reflect their beliefs and, therefore, the regime eventually
712 Cole-King and Lalwani, supra, note 695, p. 137.
713 Sands, Principles, supra, note 211, p. 11.
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negotiated will then reflect the causal and principled beliefs of the relevant epistemic
714community .
Cole-King and Lalwani have identified five groups of primary objectives for sea-use 
management, that are relevant for scientific assessment: safety, allocation of resources; 
environmental control; social and economic objectives; information gathering and 
understanding715. All these subject areas must be supported by scientific assessment and 
thus the role of scientific assessment is enhanced in the decision-making process. The 
need for better interaction between science and policy was discussed during the London 
Workshop on Environmental Science, Comprehensiveness and Consistency in Global 
Decisions on Ocean Issues. The Workshop concluded that, in order to promote sound 
management, decisions on ocean-resource utilization, research into economic, social
71 /r
and related fields should be enhanced . It is now widely recognized that all 
conservation problems have scientific, social and economic aspects. Although the 
relative mix will vary from problem to problem, it is essential to recognize all three 
components in problem solving. Furthermore, the process of decision-making must be 
capable of fairly taking into account different values and interests, defining and 
responding to specific problems on appropriate temporal and spatial scales, and 
adapting quickly to new information and analysis .
The important role played by scientific audit of environmental issues is also evident and 
has assumed greater importance since the 1992 UNCED. Science is one of the non-legal 
factors influencing the development and implementation of international environmental 
law718; this reality is confirmed by developments relating to climate change719 and
714 As epistemic communities obtain and consolidate influence in different governments, national 
preferences and policies will reflect epistemic beliefs. In this process, international organization’s 
secretariats, such as secretariats for fisheries in FAO, UNEP, IMO, NAFO, OECD, EU AND ICES, can 
play a crucial role as sources of information. See Peter Haas, ‘Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics 
of International Environmental Co-operation’, in Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory, supra, note 50, pp. 188- 
189.
715 Cole-King and Lalwani, supra, note 695, p. 135.
716 The London Workshop on Environmental Science, Final Report, supra, note 645
717 Mangel, Talbot, Meffe et al., Principles for the Conservation of Wild Living Resources, Journal of 
Ecological Applications, 6 (1996), pp. 338-353. In the opinion of these authors, “the full range of skills 
from the natural and social science must be brought to bear on conservation problems”, p. 338.
718 Sands, Principles, supra, note 211, p. 11.
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fisheries on the high seas. To the extent that an epistemic community exists in relation 
to high seas fisheries and to the extent that it has been able to gain influential position in 
policy-making fields in the major states involved, it is expected that the 1995 SSA will 
improve the decision-making process. In other words, the success of the Agreement 
should be measurable in terms of the capacity of epistemic communities to secure for 
themselves spaces in the relevant policy-making circles, either through traditional 
bureaucratic systems or through non-formal but recurrent access to decision-makers.
5.4.1 MSR under UNCLOS
The 1982 UNCLOS provides in its Part XIII a comprehensive framework for 
international marine scientific research (MSR). The objective is provided for in Articles 
239, aimed at promoting marine scientific research, and 242, aimed at promoting 
international co-operation in marine scientific research. Although the consent of a 
coastal State is needed for marine research within its EEZ, under the Convention’s Part 
XIII, a coastal State may only withhold its consent on well-founded technical, legal or 
political grounds applicable to the international community as a whole (Article 246.5). 
The coastal State, according to Article 246.3, in “normal circumstances”, grants its 
consent for MSR projects by other States or competent international organizations if it 
is for peaceful purposes and increases the knowledge of the marine environment for the 
benefit of mankind. Fisheries research, given the number of requirements for it in the 
UNCLOS, UNCED, 1995 SSA and numerous existing fisheries conventions at all 
levels, surely meets these requirements.
Article 240 establishes four general principles for the conduct of MSR: i) MSR must be 
conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes; ii) MSR must be conducted with 
appropriate scientific methods and means compatible with UNCLOS; iii) MSR must be 
conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the
719 Within the context of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, there is increasing appreciation by 
developing countries of the potential significance of the Clean Development Mechanisms established by 
its Article 12. Not only do these mechanisms have the potential to develop new income and technology 
streams in developing countries, but regulation of these mechanisms also represents an important 
challenge for development of international environmental law relating to global climate change.
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Convention, including those for the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment an finally, iv) MSR must not unjustifiable interfere with other legitimate 
uses of the sea compatible with the Convention, but, on the other hand, must be duly 
respected in the course of such other uses. These ‘principles’ are very general indeed. 
The concept of ‘peaceful purposes’, ‘unjustifiably interference’, ‘appropriate scientific 
methods’ and ‘due respect’ are difficult to define and highly subjective in nature and
770thus open to a variety of interpretations in practice .
According to the 1982 UNCLOS, States and competent international organizations have 
to promote international co-operation in MSR for peaceful purposes (Article 242); they 
have to co-operate, through the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements, to 
create favourable conditions for MSR and to integrate the efforts of scientists (Article 
243); and, finally, they have to co-operate in the publication and dissemination of 
information and knowledge derived from MSR (Article 244). Regarding MSR rules
771governing the Exclusive Fishing Zone which are basically the same as those 
governing MSR in the EEZ, Part XIII of the 1982 UNCLOS establishes as general rule 
that in ‘normal circumstances’ consent has to be granted by the coastal State for MSR 
carried out for peaceful purposes and in order to increase scientific knowledge of the 
marine environment for the benefit of all mankind (Article 246.3). Applications 
concerning MSR Projects must be made through appropriate official channels, unless 
otherwise agreed (Article 250). Regarding the high seas, freedom of scientific research 
is included among the six freedoms listed in Article 87.1 though under this Article, this 
freedom has to be exercized with ‘due regard’ for the interests of other States in their 
exercise of the freedom of the high seas and subject to Parts XIII and VI, the latter 
concerning the Continental Shelf, the living resources of which are regarded as 
sedentary species subject to the regime established for the shelf, not that of the of the 
high seas, i.e., they are not open to freedom of fishing.
720 Brown, International Law of the Sea, supra, note 269, Vol. 1, p. 423.
721 The concept of Exclusive Fishing Zone is recognized neither in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, nor in the 1982 UNCLOS. Its existence has been acknowledged by the International 
Court of Justice in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom vs. Iceland), Merits, Judgement, 
I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.3 at23, para. 52.
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As regards the standard set for the conservation for living resources, which Article 61.2 
of UNCLOS requires should take into account ‘the best scientific evidence available’, 
Burke has pointed out that the coastal State may adopt measures even though the 
evidence gathered by the State is not complete or is recognized to be of low quality722. 
In addition, the concept ‘available scientific information’ provided by Article 61.5, must 
be understood to refer not only to data generated directly by the Coastal State, but also 
to data from other sources, including foreign fleets, international organizations, and 
other States involved in the fisheries concerned723.
Agenda 21 proposed that in implementing the provisions of the UNCLOS, States, with 
the support of relevant intergovernmental organizations, must promote the study, 
scientific assessment and use of appropriate traditional management systems724. 
Although not legally binding, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
provides that responsible management of fisheries requires the availability of a sound 
scientific basis to assist fisheries managers and other interested parties in making
79Sdecisions .
5.4.2 Scientific research under conventions for the protection of the 
atmosphere
The Conventions adopted post-Stockholm added a new dimension to scientific analysis. 
They promote collective assessment of resource conditions and trends as the basis for 
agreement on conservation measures. A scientific basis for decision-making procedures 
is particularly well established in the conventions protecting the atmosphere. The 1979
722 Burke, supra, note 110, p. 56.
723 Ibid., p. 57.
724 Agenda 21, Para. 17.93.
725 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Article 4 of the Code requires the FAO Committee 
on Fisheries (COR) to monitor the application and implementation of the Code. Thus, the Committee 
has adopted technical guidelines in support of the implementation of the Code specifically on matters 
concerning fishing operations and vessel monitoring system; a precautionary approach to capture 
fisheries; integration of fisheries into coastal area management; fisheries management; aquaculture 
development; inland fisheries; responsible fish utilization; and indicators for sustainable development of 
marine capture fisheries. In addition, FAO’s Fisheries Department has elaborated a draft strategy for the 
promotion and implementation of the Code. Information as available on 8 November 2000, on 
http ://www. fao. org/fi/agreem/codecond/codecon.asp
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Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution calls for research "with a view 
to establishing a scientific basis for dose/effect relationships designed to protect the 
environment" . In a like manner, the Vienna Convention on Protection of the Ozone 
Layer and its Montreal Protocol establish that control measures are to be based on 
relevant scientific and technical considerations727. They are to be assessed on the basis 
of available scientific, environmental, technical, and economic information, which is 
useful distinction. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), 
adopted post UNCED, expressly incorporates "best available scientific information and 
assessment on climate change and its impacts" as the basis for action, as well as 
"relevant technical, social and economic information"728.
The FCCC requires Parties to promote systematic observation as well as scientific, 
technological, technical, socio-economic and other research related to the climate 
system and to reducing uncertainties regarding causes, effects, magnitude, and timing of 
climate change and the economic and social consequences of various responses 
strategies. It calls for support of international programmes and networks for co­
operating in these activities and in exchanging relevant information (Articles 4.1.g. and 
l.h.5). Comparable methods for national inventories are to be agreed upon by the 
Conference of the Parties, and for evaluating the effectiveness of measures to limit 
emissions and enhance removal of greenhouse gases (Article 7.2.d). Data archives 
related to the climate system are to be developed, as well as co-operative means for 
exchanging scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic, and legal information; 
information on education and training programs; and public awareness materials 
(Articles 4.1.g and l.h and 6). The term ‘technology’ explicitly encompasses adaptation 
and mitigation activities in agriculture, forestry, waste management, energy, transport 
and industry, sinks and reservoirs such as forests and oceans, and adaptation techniques 
in coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, including rehabilitation of 
areas affected by drought, desertification and floods (Article 4.1.c, l.d. and l.e)
726 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. Reproduced in (1979) 18 ILM 
1442.
727 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Reproduced in (1987) 26 ILM 1529. 
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Reproduced in (1987) 26 ILM 
1550.
728 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Reproduced in (1992) 31 ILM 849.
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The IPCC729 can be seen as representative of the epistemic community at its most 
organized. It was the biggest politically organized process yet undertaken to 
independently assess the state of scientific knowledge on climate change at the 
international level and an attempt to arrive at consensus. The IPCC produced two 
reports, one in 1990730 and one in 1992731 providing evidence of scientific consensus 
that something had to be done about global warming. These reports greatly influenced 
the negotiations leading up to the 1992 Climate Change Convention across a range of 
cross-sectoral issues732. The IPCC concentrates its activities on the tasks allotted to it by 
the relevant WMO Executive Council and UNEP Governing Council resolutions and 
decisions as well as on actions in support of the UNFCCC process. The IPCC has three 
Working Groups: Working Group I on the Science of Climate Change; Working Group 
II, on the Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability; and Working Group III, on the 
Mitigation of Climate Change. According to ‘the Principles Governing IPCC Work’, the 
role of the Panel is to assess, on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis, 
the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the 
scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and 
options for adaptation and mitigation733.
729 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Report of the First Session of the WMO/UNEP, 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, 9-11 November 1988, World Climate Programme 
Publications Series, TD -  No. 267, Geneva, World Meteorological Organization.
730 JT Houghton, GJ Jenkins and JJ Ephraums (eds.), 1990 Scientific Assessment of Climate Change -  
Report of Working Group, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).
731 JT Houghton, BA Callander and SK Varney (eds.) Climate Change 1992 - The Supplementary Report 
to The IPCC Scientific Assessment, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).
732 Sands, Principles, supra, note 211, p. 86. See also Prude Taylor, An Ecological Approach to 
International Law: Responding to Challenges of Climate Change, (London, Routledge, 1998); R. R. 
Churchill and D. Freestone, International Law and Global Climate Change: International Legal Issues 
and Implications, (London, Graham and Trotman, 1992).
733 In taking decisions, and improving, adopting and accepting reports, the Panel and its Working Groups 
shall use all best endeavours to reach consensus. Different views on matters of a scientific, technical and 
socio-economic nature shall, as appropriate in the context, be represented in the scientific technical or 
socio-economic document concerned. Conclusions drawn by IPCC Working Groups or Task Forces are 
not official until the Panel in a plenary meeting has accepted them. See ‘Principles Governing IPCC 
Work’, approved at the Fourteenth Session (Vienna, 1-3 October 1998), Document in electronic form as 
available on 8/11/00, on http://www.ipcc.ch
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5.4.3 Scientific research under the 1992 CBD
The objectives of the 1992 CBD, as set out in Article 1, are the conservation of 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The process of 
negotiation leading up to the adoption of the Convention was initiated through a series
H ' l Aof expert meetings convened by the UNEP Governing Council , the report of which 
led to the commencement of intergovernmental negotiations m 1991 .
The Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) is 
established by the 1992 CBD to provide the COP and other appropriate subsidiary 
bodies with timely advice in these fields. The SBSTTA is a multidisciplinary body 
composed of government representatives the purpose of which is to provide scientific 
and technological assessments of the status of biological diversity; prepare scientific 
and technical assessments of the effects of measures taken; identify innovative, 
efficient, state-of-the art technologies and know-how relating to the purposes of the 
Convention, and advise on ways and means of promoting the development and transfer 
of such technologies; provide advise on scientific programmes and international co­
operation in relevant research and development; and to respond to scientific, technical, 
technological, and methodological questions posed by the COP and its subsidiaries 
bodies (Article 25). Regarding scientific analysis, an indicative list of categories for 
identifying important components of biodiversity is set forth in Annex I. The parties are 
to co-operate in using scientific advances in biodiversity research to develop methods 
for its conservation and sustainable use (Article 13.c). As regards information 
requirements, each Party is to identify and monitor important components of biological 
diversity and the processes and categories of activities which have or are likely to have 
significant adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and 
to monitor their effects. The data is to be maintained and organized by any mechanism 
(Article 7) and conservation measures include measures on protected areas, on the use 
and release of living modified organisms resulting from biotechnology, on the 
introduction of alien species, on threatened species, on threatened species and 
populations, and for ex situ conservation and the reintroduction of threatened species
734 UNEP GC Decs. 14/26 (1987).
735 UNEP GC Decs. 15/34 (1989).
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into their natural habitats (Articles 8 and 9). Each Party is to facilitate access to and 
transfer of relevant, environmentally sound technologies (Article 16).
The COP continues to debate the focus and structure of the clearing-house mechanism 
called for in Articles 17 and 18 of the 1992 CBD. The proposed scope of this clearing­
house is broad: it covers access to scientific and technical data and research results for 
the contracting Parties; sources of scientific and technical expertise and training 
programmes; information on relevant technologies and specialized knowledge, 
including indigenous and traditional knowledge; methodologies and techniques for 
assessing and valuing biological resources; traditional knowledge and socio-economic 
research; legislative models; sources of financial support; and all programmes and 
projects related to CBS objectives. Each Party must maintain and organize data derived 
from its identification and monitoring of components of biological diversity and the 
processes and activities that impact upon them (Article 7.d).
5.4.4 Scientific assessment under the 1995 SSA
The 1995 SSA reflects the wide beliefs and conclusions of the epistemic community 
regarding fisheries on the high seas. Indeed, Article lO.g of the Agreement provides that 
sub-regional or regional fisheries management organizations shall promote and conduct 
scientific assessments of the stocks and relevant research and disseminate the results 
thereof. Consonant with that provision, Article 3 of Annex I sets out in detail the types 
of data necessary to facilitate the scientific assessment of the stocks. These types 
include, i) time series of catch and effort statistics by fishery and fleet; ii) total catch in 
number or nominal weight, or both, by species, both target and non-target, as 
appropriate to each fishery; iii) discard statistics, including estimates where necessary, 
reported as number or nominal weight or live-weight equivalent of the landings by 
species, as appropriate to each fishery; iv) effort statistics appropriate to each fishing 
method; and v) fishing location, date and time fished and other statistics on fishing 
operations, as appropriate. In addition, according to this provision, States must also 
collect, where appropriate, and provide to the relevant sub-regional or regional fisheries 
management organization, information to support stock assessment, including: i) 
composition of the catch according to length, weight and sex; ii) other biological
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information supporting stock assessment, such as information on age, growth, 
recruitment, distribution and stock identity; and iii) other relevant research including 
surveys of abundance, biomass surveys, hydro-acoustic surveys, research and 
environmental factors affecting stock abundance, and oceanographic and ecological 
studies.
Under Annex I of the 1995 SSA, the detailed guidance on procedures to be used in 
scientific assessments is complemented by three obligations: verification, reporting and 
data exchange. First, regarding verification, States or fisheries management 
organizations will be allowed to establish mechanisms to corroborate data. These 
mechanisms include verification of fishing vessels position through use of vessel 
monitoring systems; scientific observer programmes to monitor catch, effort, catch 
composition (target and not target species) and other details of fishing operations; vessel 
trip, landing and transhipment reports and port sampling. Secondly, with reference to 
reporting, States must ensure that vessels flying their flag send to their national fisheries 
administrations and, where agreed, to the relevant sub-regional or regional fisheries 
management organization, log book data on catch and effort, including data on fishing 
operations on the high seas, at sufficiently frequent intervals to meet national 
requirements and regional and international obligations. Such data must be transmitted,
H ' l f L
where necessary, by radio, telex, facsimile or satellite transmission or by other means . 
Thirdly, with respect to data exchange, flag States must share data collected with other 
flag States and coastal States through fisheries management organizations. Such 
organizations must compile data and make them available in a timely manner and in an 
agreed format to all interested States under the terms and conditions established by the 
organization, while maintaining confidentiality of non-aggregated data, and should, to 
the extent feasible, develop database systems which provide efficient access to data. The 
SSA lays down that, at the global level, collection and dissemination of data will be 
activated through FAO. Where a sub-regional or regional fisheries management 
organization does not exist, FAO may also fulfil the same role at the sub-regional or 
regional level by arrangement with the States concerned. The mechanisms by which 
subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements will
736 Annex I, Art. 5, SSA.
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obtain scientific advice and review the status of the stocks include, where appropriate, 
the establishment of a scientific advisory body (Article 9.d).
There is no established system of scientific assessment for the management of fish 
stocks. The theory of ocean management is not well developed and, in the strict sense, 
as a discipline, scarcely exists737. However, it is widely recognized that scientific 
knowledge and an interdisciplinary approach are the best basis for scientific 
assessments in management processes. Viagrie has identified two major groups of 
scientific questions for fisheries management. First, the equilibrium between catches 
and the capacities of renewal of the species. Second, the economic and social structures 
of fisheries communities in both developed and developing countries, and in particular, 
the impact of new fishing technologies upon these communities738. In this regard, 
although the SSA establishes as a basic principle that all States Parties must take into 
account the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers (Article 5.i), no detailed 
provisions are provided regarding scientific assessments involving economic and social 
activities of fishing communities. Evaluation of the possible ecological and sociological 
effects of resource use needs, however, to precede both proposed use and proposed 
restriction or expansion of ongoing use of a resource. In this regard, two crucial 
economic issues will in the future affect the decision-making procedures established by 
the 1995 SSA. First, the increasing number of new entrants; according to Fitzpatrick 
and Newton, between 1991 and 1996, 1,654 new vessels were added to the world’s 
large-scale industrial fleet739. Secondly, the existence of government subsidies which 
currently encourage overfishing by enabling vessels to continue fishing even when it is 
known that catches and, therefore, stocks, are declining740. Between $14.0- 20.5 billion 
a year, or 14-28 percent of industry revenue have helped produce enough boats, hooks 
and nets to catch twice the available fish, contributing to overfishing and fishery 
collapse741.
737 Hence D. Smith, Theory of Ocean Management’, in Fabbri (ed.), supra, note 658, pp. 19-33.
738 Daniel Vigarie, Ocean Sciences and Management’, in Fabbri (ed.), supra, note 658, pp. 108-124, at 
120- 121.
739 John Fitzpatrick and Chris Newton, ’Assessment of the World’s Fishing Fleet 1991-1997’, 
(Amsterdam, Greenpeace International, Amsterdam, May 5,1998).
740 Peter Weber, Abandoned Seas, (Washington, Worldwatch Institute, Paper No. 116, 1998).
741 David Malin Roodman, The Natural Wealth of Nations, (Washington Worldwatch Institute, 1998).
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It is widely acknowledged that, in the light of all these circumstances, management 
bodies must recognize that ecological uncertainty is an overriding factor. Further, any 
approach to management that does not take the socio-economic factors into account
H A 'lprobably will not succeed . Therefore, the "social gap" in the SSA will have to be 
bridged by regional and sub-regional organizations, by limiting entries, incorporating 
social issues and analysis into management decisions, as well as means of involving 
fishers and finally, establishing closed areas or seasons and property rights743.
5.5 Participatory Rights
One of the sources of market failure stems from property rights either being undefined 
or the property concerned being owned in common unrestricted or open access744. Open 
access to a commonly owned resource is a crucial component of waste and 
inefficiency745. Common property institutions have been developed that have succeeded 
in effectively managing resources provided that the owners can limit exploitation to 
those within the group and that these groups abide by the rules. Fisheries on the high 
seas, owned in common with open access, are a good example of the first category, 
however, and thus, the 1995 SSA seeks to address this problem, as illustrated in its 
Article 11. This Article establishes that States must take into account various 
requirements in determining the nature and extent of participatory rights for new 
members or new participants in a subregional or regional fisheries management
746organizations .
742 R. Talbot, ‘Living Resources Conservation: An International Overview’, Ecological Applications, 
May 1996, p. 356.
743 See McGoodwin, supra, note 4, pp. 145 and 206.
744 See Section 1, Chapter 3.
745 See Chapter 2, Section 1.
746 According to Article 11 of the SSA, these requirements include the status of the stock and the existing 
level of fishing level; the interests, patterns and practices of existing and new members or participants; the 
contributions of existing and new members or participants regarding collection of data and scientific 
research; the needs and interests of coastal fishing communities as well as of the coastal States dependant 
of the stocks and concerned with national jurisdiction where the stocks occur.
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Thus, international fisheries organizations are now expected to solve the highly complex 
issue of participatory rights. Complex, first, because there is a larger number of players 
and secondly, in respect of the possibility that new members will enter the regional 
fisheries organization. Traditionally, most fisheries were common property resources 
characterized by free entry or open-access. This meant that the resource was open to 
anybody and that no one had the right to exclude others from fishing. Being common 
property resources, exclusive property rights could not be assigned to international 
fisheries resources and only by capture could property rights be established in relation 
to the fish concerned. Thus, almost all attempts to regulate international fisheries have 
regularly been extensively frustrated747.
The inadequate management of many international high seas fisheries follows partly 
from the fact that the relevant articles of the UNCLOS are themselves inadequate in 
many respects. For example, Article 61 states that the coastal States must determine the 
allowable catch in their exclusive zones; they should also ensure, by proper 
conservation and management measures, that the maintenance of the stocks in their EEZ 
is not endangered by over-exploitation; as appropriate, the coastal State and competent 
regional or subregional international organizations must co-operate to this end. 
Available scientific information and economic statistics must be contributed and 
exchanged on a regular basis through competent international organizations, with 
participation therein by all States concerned. Determination of the allowable catch is 
quite a complex process. It is not a purely scientific matter. Biological considerations; 
social equity and cultural heritage; administrative feasibility and political acceptability
HAQ
are the main factors affecting the choice of management measures . Obviously the 
problem becomes even more complex in the case of straddling and highly migratory 
stocks. In such cases, the UNCLOS requires States to agree upon the measures 
necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks 
(Article 63).
747 Ostrom, supra, note 285, p. 169.
748 Retting, supra, note 23, pp. 438-440.
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The economic theory of fisheries distinguishes several forms of property rights each 
leading to different management policies. Property rights can be defined as a set of 
| rules, regulations and laws that define rights to appropriation, use and transfer of goods 
and services749. The main attraction of instituting a system based on property rights is 
that fishermen who can consider certain fish stocks to be their own property may be 
more likely voluntarily to restrain their fishing effort and therefore develop and act upon
nc  r v
greater concern for conservation and management . In the process of efficient 
allocation of property rights, Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) play an important 
role. Tietenberg has identified three characteristics on which the success of an ITQ 
system depends. First, the quotas entitle the holder to catch a specified weight of a 
specified type of fish. Secondly, the total amount of fish authorized by the quotas held 
by all fishermen should be equal to the efficient catch for the fishery. Thirdly, the 
quotas should be freely transferable among fishermen751. It has been suggested that this 
right-based system, developed in close consultation with all the interested parties, is 
likely to be more successful than the one designed by aloof governments or model- 
building academics752.
In a study by Kaitala, Bjomdal, Lindroos and Munro, property rights were differentiated 
as open access common property fisheries, sole-owner fisheries, and shared fish 
stocks753. The methodological importance of game theory, when applied in international 
resource negotiations, is in identifying the steps to be taken in the negotiations. First, it 
is necessary to understand what happens if agreement cannot be reached; secondly, the 
benefits from co-operation to all parties need to be identified, and thirdly, and perhaps
749 Bonnie G. Colby, ’Regulation, Imperfect Markets, and Transaction Costs: the Elusive Quest for 
Efficiency in Water Allocation’, in Broomley (ed.), supra, note 18, pp. 475-502, at 485.
750 McGoodwin, supra, note 4, at 177.
751 Tietenberg, supra, note 16, pp. 287-289. See also Amanda Wolf, Quotas, supra, note, 652, in particular 
Chapters 4, 5 and 9.
752 Retting, supra, note 23, pp. 441.
753 Veijo Kaitala and Gordon Munro, The Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery 
Resources Under the New Law of the Sea’, Natural Resources Modelling, 10 (1997), pp. 87-108. This is 
another issue in which application of Game Theory can be instructive. For further analysis of Game 
Theory, see Section 1.1, Chapter 3 (Game Theory: the Prisoners’ Dilemma) and Section 2, Chapter 4 
(New Organizations and New Arrangements) of this thesis.
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most important for SFS, the parties need to agree on a fair share of the benefits from co-
754operation .
The 1995 SSA provides a flexible structure for participatory rights of States members or 
participants in a regional or sub-regional fisheries organization. According to Article 8 
of the Agreement, the basic principle is that only those States that are members or 
participants of the organization or those that agree to apply the conservation and 
management measures in a regional or subregional fisheries organization will have 
access to the fishery resource to which those measures apply. In addition, these States 
must have "a real interest" in the fisheries concerned in order to qualify for membership. 
The elements of this "real interest" are related to the importance of living marine 
resources to the economy of the country concerned, its contributions to the conservation 
and management measures, as well as to scientific research projects on the stock, and its 
historical record of harvesting the stock concerned755. More detailed considerations for 
the decision-making process involved in determining the nature and extent of 
participatory rights for new entrants are listed in Article 11 of the SSA756. It is clear that 
new entrants or participants in a regional or subregional fisheries organization do not 
have the same right as existing members and participants. Kaitala and Munro have 
identified this new type of property right as a problem that needs to be understood and 
solved for the reason that economic theory, and consequently, international law 
regarding this issue, remain rudimentary757.
Governments have tried many types of regulations to prevent overfishing, most of 
which have failed to address the causes of overfishing. In this era of globalization, new 
technologies are transforming the concepts of “property” and “ownership”. Rifkin 
designates as ‘hypercapitalism’ the phenomenon by which property is equated with
754 Veijo Kaitala, Game Theory Models in Fisheries Management, (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1986), pp. 
252-276 and, Mesterton-Gibbons, Game-theory Resource Modelling’, Natural Resource Modelling, 7 
(1993), pp. 93-147.
755 Kaitala and Munro, The Management of High Seas Fisheries’, Marine Resource Economics, 8 (1993), 
pp. 313-329.
756 See Section 3, Chapter 4 of this thesis.
757 Kaitala and Munro, supra, note 753, pp. 104.
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“access”, as in relation to the Internet758. ‘Global Public Goods’ thus offers a new 
rationale and framework for international developments regarding access and property 
rights’ allocation aimed at the improvement of international fisheries management. In 
International Regime Theory, regimes can influence behaviour that matters for 
conserving natural resources and protecting the environment. They can succeed only by 
influencing the behaviour of their member’s actors operating under their members’ 
jurisdiction. Participatory rights in international or shared fisheries are a mechanism that 
can cause variations which improve effectiveness both across regimes and within
n cq
individual regimes over time .
In existing international instruments there are at least two commonly used meanings for 
the concept of ‘equitable sharing of benefits’, but not, specifically, for ‘participatory 
rights’. As for ‘equitable sharing of benefits’, the first meaning refers to equitable 
sharing among countries regarding use of natural resources. The second meaning calls 
for receipt of a fair economic return to all of those State and non-state Parties from 
which the resource was obtained. The need for equitable sharing is highlighted in the 
Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States.
As an outgrowth of the ideal for a New International Economic Order, equitable sharing 
in the inter-state context has arisen pursuant to developing country demands that they 
are entitled to share in benefits that industrialized countries derive from the exploitation 
of the “global commons”, which includes areas where deep sea-bed minerals can be 
found beyond the EEZ of coastal States. Equitable sharing of benefits derived from the 
use of these resources has been linked to classifying these resources as the "common 
heritage of mankind.” Most developing countries do not have the technical or financial 
resources themselves to exploit natural resources in these global common spaces. For at 
least the past two decades, developing countries have argued on moral and legal 
grounds in the United Nations that these resources should not be claimed and carved up 
for the exclusive use of a small club of industrialized countries, to the detriment of the
758 Jeremy Rifkin, The Age of Access; the New Culture of Hypercapitalism Where All of Life is a Paid-for 
Experience, (London, Penguin Books, 2000).
759 See Oran R. Young (ed.), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal 
Connections and Behavioural Mechanisms, (Cambridge, Mass., London, MIT Press, 1999). See also Inge 
Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stem (eds.), Global Public Goods: International Co-operation in the 
21st Century, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).
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development objectives of the rest of the world. Rather, their argument is that these 
resources and any benefits derived from them should be considered as global patrimony 
and shared equitably with all nations.
Thus, the original articles of the UNCLOS 1982 dealing with the deep seabed regime 
are products of the ideal of a New International Economic Order referred to above. 
These articles remain the most far-reaching attempt by developing countries to create 
binding treaty obligations that mandate the restructuring of international economic 
relations. The specific provisions are set out in Article 5 of Annex III of the UNCLOS 
1982. These Article 5 provisions would create an international treaty obligation on the 
part of industrialized countries to developing countries to make technology transfer to 
them on preferential terms. However, the original text of UNCLOS 1982 does not 
articulate the specific means for ensuring "equitable sharing" among States. It only 
provides that the "Enterprise” must provide for the equitable sharing of benefits derived 
from the deep seabed Area.
The common heritage of mankind concept has not been applied to high seas fisheries. 
Despite efforts by certain developing countries, it also has not been applied in 
conventions covering living and non-renewable resources in Antarctica. The Protocol 
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty of 1991 refers to protection of the 
Antarctic environment and dependent ecosystems as “in the interest of mankind as a 
whole”, but this suggests a duty rather than a right as indicated by the term "heritage".
Conclusions
In conclusion, compared to the 1982 UNCLOS, the 1995 SSA must nonetheless be 
regarded as a definite improvement on the previous situation concerning decision­
making procedures. However, the Agreement raises new problems regarding the nature 
of the changing property or participatory rights in international fisheries. International 
fisheries organizations will face complex management problems in the future, mainly 
because of the larger number of members and participants in fisheries organizations, 
and the possibility of new members entering such organizations. Fisheries which are 
pursued by more that one Party necessarily involve not only competition, but require 
active co-operation if they are not to collapse. At present, it seems clear that in order to
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implement the Agreement, members and new entrants will have first to agree on the 
decision-making process regarding participatory rights.
The 1995 SSA has established a basis of consent for collective action in the decision­
making procedures for the management of international fisheries. These procedures 
have to be agreed among States within the framework of regional and subregional 
fisheries organizations which will have to act as clearing-houses for the process of 
collecting and exchanging data and information. To the extent that an epistemic 
community of scientists in the field of fisheries can become stronger within the 
emerging regime for international fisheries, the Agreement is expected to improve the 
decision-making process. It establishes the means for providing the scientific basis, the 
minimum standards and a renewed balance for compatibility between conservation and 
management measures for the management of SFS. Consequently, compared to the 1982 
UNCLOS, the merits of the 1995 SSA are clearly evident.
From the progress reviewed in this chapter, it can be concluded that the 1995 SSA is by 
implication reinforcing the institutional setting for the recognition of property rights. In 
a rights-based fishery, international fisheries organizations grant each participant the 
right to gain access to a geographic area at or for a certain time. It is widely recognized 
by economists that setting up private or public ownership of previously unowned 
resources will create an opportunity for their rational use760. Regulators, in this case 
regional and subregional fisheries organizations, will have to deal with economic and 
social issues. New entrants and subsidies will significantly affect in the future the 
decision-making process for the management of international fisheries.
760 According to Peter Pearse, the trend is clearly toward establishing more well defined fishing rights 
held by those who fish. See Peter Pearse, ‘From Open Access to Private Property: Recent Innovations in 
Fishing Rights as Instruments of Fisheries Policy’, ODIL, 23 (1995), pp. 71-83. To the same end, 
Amason recognizes this economic rationalization of the ocean fisheries as inevitable but signals the 
problems and difficulties associated with the ITQ system: this system is not suitable for all fisheries; it 
requires socio-economic adjustments; and the actual distribution of the costs and benefits may turn out to 
be undesirable. See Ragnar Amason, ‘Ocean Fisheries Management: Recent International Developments’, 
Marine Policy, September 1993, pp. 334-339.
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Chapter 6
Compliance and enforcement mechanisms 
Introduction
By the early 1990s, there were at least 120 multilateral environmental agreements and 
hundreds of bilateral ones. Some of them could be regarded as ineffective and others as 
symbolic or weak and they have probably had little or no independent effect on the 
behaviour of relevant actors or on the problem that they address761. Fishing agreements 
are not always fully respected, catch conditions and restrictions are not always complied 
with and little trace can be found in practice of the ‘spirit’ of the accords, preambles and
H f / J
preliminary declarations to the agreements . Nevertheless, numerous environmental 
regimes, for example, the Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, have 
already been effective, in that they have changed the behaviour of States parties in line 
with their aims and have at least helped to tackle the problems for which they were 
established763. These regimes are dynamic and tend to develop and change over time, 
according to changing needs and opportunities in the international context.
Regimes with strong compliance mechanisms can alter considerably the behaviour of 
participant states. Much of international environmental regime theory is focused around 
the development and implementation of international legal instruments. The 
implementation phase includes all of the activities involved in developing and executing 
the decisions and policies adopted in response to the problem. Whether or not 
international agreements are implemented may largely depend on the nature of the 
commitments themselves. Once they have been established, institutions and agreements 
can be revised to adapt to changing circumstances or only if the treaty provides for 
amendment, revision or is open to interpretation. This is a critical characteristic of 
effective agreements.
761 Geoffrey Palmer, ‘New Ways to Make International Environmental Law’, AJIL, 86 (1992), pp. 259- 
283, at 262.
762 Sabr El Djamil Abada, ‘ACP-EU Fishing Agreements: Accord or Disaccord?. “Keep to the Spirit” 
Appeal by Joint Fisheries Committee’, The Courier ACP-EU, No. 156, March-April 1996, pp. 9-12.
763 E. Barrat-Brown, ‘Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol’, Yale 
Journal of International Law, 16 (1991), pp. 519-554. See also Sands, Principles, supra, note 211, pp. 
286-287.
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| Edith Brown-Weiss has identified the different issues for research and analysis relating 
! to implementation, compliance and effectiveness. According to her, implementation 
refers to the measures taken to carry out the agreement; compliance addresses whether 
the targeted Parties have changed their behaviour; and effectiveness addresses both 
whether the agreement has achieved its stated objectives and whether it successfully 
addresses the problem it was intended to solve764.
Chayes and Chayes have identified the two most important hypotheses for compliance 
within international regimes. The "managerial" approach, which holds that States have a 
propensity to comply, considers that non-compliance usually results from problems of 
lack of capacity, treaty ambiguity or uncontrollable social or economic changes or all 
these. On the other hand, the "enforcement"765 school, generally favoured by lawyers in 
the past, is based on traditional realist models and maintains that in fact States calculate 
the costs and benefits in choosing whether or not to comply766. In other words, the use 
of resource transfers ("carrots") is part of a "managerialist" approach, whereas stronger 
responses and sanctions ("sticks") are preferred by the "enforcement" school767.
Focusing specifically on the 1995 SSA, this chapter examines the system of compliance 
and enforcement emerging from the new regime for fisheries on the high seas. This 
system is a wise combination of two approaches. First, the ‘managerialist approach’, 
which includes specific mechanisms for international co-operation (Section 1); special 
mechanisms for co-operation with developing countries (Section 6); and specific 
obligations for flag states fishing on the high seas (Section 2). Secondly, the 
‘enforcement approach’, which includes procedures for boarding and inspecting 
(Section 4); duties and jurisdiction of port states (Section 3); and dispute settlement
764 Edith Brown Weiss, National Compliance with International Environmental Agreements’, in 
Proceedings of the 91st Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law, Washington, April 
1997, p. 57.
765 Enforcement: to ensure observance of or obedience to a law, decision, etc; to impose obedience, 
loyalty, etc., by or as by use of force, Collins English Dictionary, (London, Harper Collins Publishers, 
Third Edition, 1995).
766 Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty. Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 51.
767 Kal Raustiala and David Victor, ‘Conclusions’ (Chapter 16), in David G. Victor et al. (eds.), The 
Implementation and Effectiveness, supra, note 584, pp. 683-684.
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mechanisms (Section 5). Two main conclusions can be drawn from the survey of these 
two approaches conducted in this chapter. First, the theoretical framework adopted in 
the 1995 SSA and relevant related agreements, provides an adequate starting point for 
explaining the compliance and enforcement mechanisms for the regime of fisheries on 
the high seas. Secondly, this compliance and enforcement system is now setting the 
framework for a new approach to freedom of navigation in relation to fisheries on the 
high seas. The restrictions on freedom introduced mainly by the SSA, are the conditions 
sine qua non for the effectiveness of the new regime.
6.1 International and regional co-operation for enforcement
The obligation to co-operate in protecting the environment can be drawn from state 
practice, judicial decisions768, treaties, the work of the International Law Commission 
and developments in ‘soft’ law.
In the ‘soft’ law context, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted 
by the UN General Assembly in 1974, provides, in Article 3, that:
"in the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries, 
each State must co-operate on the basis of a system of information and 
prior consultations in order to achieve optimum use of such resources
7fiQwithout causing damage to the legitimate interest of others"
The same obligation is developed in Article 1 of the UNEP Principles of Shared Natural 
Resources, which reads as follows:
"It is necessary for States to co-operate in the field of the environment 
concerning the conservation and harmonious utilization of natural 
resources shared by two or more States.... Such co-operation is to take 
place on an equal footing and taking into account the sovereignty, rights 
and interests of the States concerned"770
768 Icelandic Fisheries Cases, in Harris, supra, note 672, pp. 378. For further discussion on co-operation, 
see Chapter 3, Section 3.
769 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA Resolution 3281 (XXIX).
770 Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation 
and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States. UNEP, Governing 
Council, Sixth Session, 9-25 March 1978. Reprinted in 17 ILM, (1978) 1091.
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Although not legally binding, the above enunciations of the obligation of co-operation 
are embodied in various other international legal instruments. Thus, regarding the 
utilization and management of marine living resources, Articles 117 and 118 of 
UNCLOS provide that States fishing on the high seas must take measures to conserve 
fish stocks and to co-operate with other States for that purpose. Articles 63.2 for 
straddling fish stocks, and 64, for highly migratory fish species, also urge States to co­
operate either through international organizations or directly between themselves. 
Regarding the marine environment, Article 5 of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
provides that each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, co­
operate with other Contracting Parties, directly or through competent international 
organizations, for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, in respect 
of areas beyond national jurisdiction and on other matters of mutual interest. Moreover, 
provisions on the obligation of international co-operation are embodied in Article V. 1 of 
the FAO Compliance Agreement. Further, Article 6.12 of the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries establishes the obligation to co-operate as a fundamental rationale 
for the conservation and sustainable use of fisheries.
As we have already seen, the duty to co-operate is a long and well-established duty in 
International Law771. This obligation to co-operate on different matters is a substantial 
requirement of the 1995 SSA772. Further, specific mechanisms for international co­
operation are provided by the 1995 SSA regarding enclosed and semi-enclosed sea 
areas, Art. 15773, and areas of high seas surrounded entirely by an area under the 
national jurisdiction of a single state, Art. 16774. The obligation to co-operate 
internationally regarding the enforcement of the Agreement, is embodied in Articles 20
771 Bimie and Boyle, supra, note 213, pp. 513. According to Sands, the obligation to co-operate, affirmed 
in virtually all international environmental instruments, may be in general terms, relating to 
implementation of a treaty’s objectives or relating to specific commitments under a treaty. Sands, 
Principles, supra, note 211, pp. 197.
772 See Chapter 5, Section 1.
773 Art. 15 of the 1995 SSA establishes that in implementing provisions in an enclosed or semi enclosed 
sea, States shall take into account the natural characteristics of that sea and shall also act in a manner 
consistent with Part IX of UNCLOS and other relevant provisions of the Agreement.
774 Art. 16 of 1995 SSA establishes mechanisms for international co-operation for areas of high seas 
surrounded entirely by an area under the national jurisdiction of a single State. In this regard, pending the 
establishment of provisional arrangements or measures, States concerned shall take measures in respect of 
vessels flying their flag in order that they do not engage in fisheries, which could undermine the stocks 
concerned.
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and 21. These Articles provide a device for co-operative enforcement of sub-regional 
and regional conservation measures for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, at 
the global, regional and sub regional level. Article 20, establishes a specific mechanisms 
for co-operation between flag States, coastal and fishing States in order to ensure 
compliance with conservation and management measures established by sub-regional or 
regional fisheries organizations. These mechanisms include provision of assistance to 
conduct investigations of an alleged violation; identification of vessels reported to have 
engaged in activities undermining the effectiveness of sub-regional, regional or global 
conservation and management measures; the possibility for a flag State to authorize a 
coastal State to board vessels flying its flag in cases of unauthorized fishing in areas 
under the jurisdiction of the latter; and collective action by all States Parties to a sub­
regional or regional fisheries organization to compel a flag State to take measures 
against a vessel flying its flag which has engaged in activities undermining the 
effectiveness of conservation measures established by the fisheries organization or 
arrangement. This mechanism is derived from examples of current States practices 
under certain existing fisheries commissions, notably the Bering Sea Pollock Fishery 
Commission and the NAFO.
Article 21 establishes an exception to the flag State’s exclusive jurisdiction over its 
registered vessels in conceding to a State Party to the SSA, which is a member of the 
sub-regional or regional fisheries organization concerned, the right to board and inspect 
fishing vessels flying the flag of another State Party for the purpose of ensuring 
compliance with conservation and management measures established by that 
organization, whether or not the State Party whose vessels are boarded or inspected is 
also a member or participant in the organization. Thus, on the grounds that both States 
are parties to the 1995 Agreement, a member of a fisheries organization can take certain 
enforcement measures within a regulatory area against any vessels, including those of 
States that are not members of or are non-participants in the organization. If, within two 
years of the adoption of the Agreement, any fisheries organization has not established 
procedures for boarding and inspecting, enforcement actions must, pending the 
establishment of such procedures, be conducted in accordance with the basic procedures 
set out in Articles 22 and 21.
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6.2 Duties of flag states
Freedom of navigation on the high seas is one of the oldest rights, going back to thef
[ Greeks and the Rhodian Sea Law. In International Law, this right was first embodied in 
the Treaty of Tordecillas of 1494 between Spain and Portugal . Grotius supported 
freedom of navigation in 1609 when he published his treatise "Mare Liberum"776. His 
arguments were countered by John Selden in 1635 in his treatise on "Mare Clausum", 
but in the long term, the Grotian argument prevailed 777. It is not difficult to recognise 
the policy interests of the maritime powers which lay behind the trends in the law of the 
sea in earlier times. Freedom is good when it allows one power to challenge other 
power’s monopoly; freedom is bad when it prevents one power from excluding other 
powers from a specific fishing area.
The League of Nations attempted to settle the question of the limits of the territorial sea. 
However, in 1930, at the Hague Conference on the Law of the Sea convened by the 
League, no agreement was reached concerning the extension of the territorial sea 
beyond the then widely accepted 3 nautical miles limit, nor on any special jurisdiction 
for coastal States beyond their territorial sea, in a so-called “contiguous zone”778. The 
Conventions adopted by the UN Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958, 
were the first to endorse freedom of the high seas and to accept certain limited coastal 
State enforcement jurisdiction in a contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea, but lacked 
provisions for appropriate means of implementing the ‘special interest’ of coastal States 
established in the Convention on Conservation of Fishing779. This failure to deal with 
resource conservation and allocation was mainly responsible for the subsequent large
775 Lucchini et Voeckel, Droit de la Mer, Tome 2, Vol. 2, supra, note, 583, pp. 99.
776 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, edited with an introductory note by James Brown Scott, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1916).
777 David Larson, Security Issues and the Law of the Sea, (New York, University Press of America, 1994), 
p. 8. See Brown, supra, note 169, p. 8; Orrego, supra, note 81, pp. 3-21; Burke, supra, note 110, p. 14; 
Churchill and Lowe, supra, note 8, p. 166.
778 The problem could not be satisfactorily handled on the basis of the old concept of territorial waters. 
“The difficulties of the Codification Conference were to be expected when it attempted to fix limits 
without regard for the purpose for which those limits were designed”. A. P. Dagget, ‘The Regulation of 
Maritime Fisheries by Treaty’ 28 AJIL (1934), pp. 693-717. See also De Yturriaga, Ambitos de 
Soberania, supra, note 678, pp. 26-27 and G. Gidel, “La mer territoriale et la zone contigue”, RCADI, 48 
(1993), p. 193.
779 Orrego, supra, note 81, p. 20.
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extensions of national jurisdiction780. Following the process of decolonisation in the 
1960s and 1970s, the number of independent coastal States has increased and a 
multiplicity of maritime zones has emerged, leading to the UNCLOS endorsement of 
the concept of the EEZ, as well as the contiguous zone.
6.2.1 1982 UNCLOS
Under thel982 UNCLOS, all states continue to enjoy freedom of navigation in those 
areas of the world oceans beyond national jurisdiction though the limits of the territorial 
sea have been extended to 12 nautical miles and the concept of the EEZ or EEF has 
extended the coastal’s State sovereign rights over fisheries and jurisdiction over 
protection of the marine environment, inter alia, to 200 n.m. from the baselines781. 
Notwithstanding this, the high seas beyond, must be preserved for peaceful purposes 
and such freedom of navigation cannot disregard other states' equal rights or 
conventional duties such as protection and preservation of the marine environment and 
safety at sea. Therefore, along with the other freedoms of the high seas, the freedom of 
navigation is by no means absolute and its exercise is limited by a wide range of rules of 
municipal and international law782. These limitations are indicated in Article 87 of the 
Convention783. These freedoms are to be exercised with 'due regard' to the interests of 
other states; this is the basic criterion by which the legitimacy of the exercise of this 
right is to be tested, but it is not easy to determine. Furthermore, the freedom of 
navigation is limited by permitting the exercise of 'extraordinary' jurisdiction by other
H Q A  7RSStates in relation to hot pursuit ; piracy and suppression of unlawful acts such as
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terrorism and hijacking ; transport of slaves ; illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or
780 Burke, supra, note 110, p. 95.
781 UNCLOS, Art. 87
782 Lucchini et Voeckel, Droit de la Mer, supra note 583, pp. 132-133.
783 According to Art. 87 of UNCLOS, the freedom of fishing is subject to the conditions laid down in 
Section 2, regarding the Conservation and Management of the Living Resources of the High Seas.
784 UNCLOS, Article 111.
785 UNCLOS, Articles 100-107.
786 In the aftermath of the Achille Lauro affair, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, followed by a Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf was adopted in Rome on 10 
March 1988. 27 (ILM) 668-690. It entered into force on 1 March 1992. “Multilateral Treaties Deposited
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psychotropic substances ; unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas ; ’the right 
of visit and search’790; and other rights over foreign ships.
| Article 94 of UNCLOS requires establishment of a legal link between every ship and 
I the flag state791. Furthermore, this article establishes the specific and detailed duties of
the flag State in order for it to effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
7Q9
administrative, technical, and social matters over ships flying its flag . The effective 
enforcement of these provisions by the maritime administrations of flag states is an 
important function of the genuine link between flag state and ship . Despite these 
provisions, in the 1960s, ship owners increasingly started to “flag out”, that is to say, 
register their vessels in foreign countries in order to avoid taxes, high registration fees 
and stringent employment legislation in their own countries. As a result of this practice, 
both safety of shipping and the marine environment have been jeopardized.
6.2.2 FAO Compliance Agreement and FAO Code of Conduct
Thus, one of the most important issues in undermining fisheries management has been 
the reflagging of fishing vessel under the flags of states, which are not parties to 
international high seas fisheries conservation agreements, for the purpose of avoiding
with the Secretary General", United Nations, New York ST/LEG/SER/E, as available on 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Treatv on 7 January 2000. The main purpose of the Convention is to ensure that 
appropriate action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships. On this, see G. Plant, 
‘The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation’, 39 
ICLQ (1990), pp. 27-56.
787 UNCLOS, Article 99.
788 UNCLOS, Article 108.
789 UNCLOS, Article 109.
790 UNCLOS, Article 110.
791 The 1958 Geneva Convention provides simply that “there must be a genuine link between the State 
and the ship”. The 1986 UN Convention for Registration of Ships, negotiated under the auspices of 
UNCTAD, provides a definition of the elements of a ‘genuine link’ which include participation by 
nationals of the flag States in the ownership, manning and management of ships. According to the 
Convention, not in force, the management criterion must be satisfied in all cases. Brown, International 
Law of the Sea, supra, note 169, p. 89. Article 8.2.2. of the FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries provides that “flag States should ensure that no fishing vessels entitled to fly their flag fish on 
the high seas or in waters under the jurisdiction of other States unless such vessels have been issued with 
a Certificate of Registry and have been authorized to fish by the competent authorities”.
792 Art. 94 of UNCLOS established specific Duties of the Flag State'.
793 Brown, supra, note 169, p. 294.
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the conservation measures under those agreements794. This issue was considered, among 
other issues, at an International Conference on Responsible Fishing, held in Cancun, 
Mexico, at which the FAO proposed, inter alia, conclusion of an Agreement on the 
Flagging of Vessels Fishing on the High Seas795.
Subsequently, the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation 
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas was approved by the 
27th Session of the FAO Conference on November 1993. The FAO Conference can 
adopt international conventions or agreements of general application in the field of food 
and agriculture and submit them for acceptance to FAO Members, Associate Members 
and eligible non-member States. Originally, according to Moore, "the Agreement was 
designed to correct the practice of vessel operators changing their vessels’ flag to those 
of non-parties to avoid having to comply with conservation and management measures 
laid down by those agreements or arrangements”796. However, because no consensus 
could be reached on proposed provisions dealing with the national registration of fishing 
vessels, the focus of the Agreement shifted to that of requiring that vessel fishing on the 
high seas should be authorized to do so. Despite international efforts, in particular by 
FAO797, this Agreement is still not in force and thus, its implementation remain doubtful 
in the short term and in any case will be difficult taking into account that some of the 
most innovative provisions are optional and do not include dispute settlement 
mechanisms which would have helped to resolve the differences of interpretation798.
794 Patricia Birnie, Reflagging of Fishing Vessels on the High Seas’, RECIEL, 2 (1993), pp. 270-276.
795 The Cancun Declaration was submitted to the FAO Council at its hundred and second session (Rome, 
November 1992). It called on FAO to draft, in accordance with other relevant international organizations, 
an International Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing, in the light of the Declaration as a whole.
796 G. Moore, The FAO Compliance Agreement, IJMCL, 10 (1993), pp. 413-417.
797 FAO Legal Office, ‘Guidelines for the Implementation in National Legislation of the Agreement to 
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on 
the High Seas’, Rome, August 1994 and ‘OECS/FAO Regional Workshop on the Implementation of the 
1993 FAO Compliance Agreement and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement’, Castries, St. Lucia, 28 July to 1 
August 1997, both documents on file with the author.
798 Patricia Birnie, ‘New Approaches to Ensuring Compliance at Sea: the FAO Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High 
Seas’, RECIEL, 8 (1999), pp. 48-55; W. Edeson, ‘Towards Long-term Sustainable Use: Some Recent 
Developments in the Legal Regime of Fisheries’, in Boyle and Freestone (eds.), supra, note 81, pp. 165- 
204. The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement requires 25 acceptances for entry into force and by the 31 
January 2001 has been ratified by 20 States: Canada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Georgia, Myanmar, Sweden, 
Madagascar, Norway, United States of America, Argentina, European Community, Namibia, Benin,
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However, the FAO Compliance Agreement is the best effort to date to address the
I problem of reflagging in relation to fisheries and together with the FAO Code of 
Conduct and the 1995 SSA now forms an international framework linked to UNCLOS, 
with the potential to develop State practice in the field of international fisheries.
The FAO Compliance Agreement applies to all fishing vessels that are used or intended 
for fishing on the high seas. It has two basic features. First, it establishes the concept of 
flag state responsibility in respect of vessels fishing on the high seas. Second, it aims to 
ensure the free flow of information on high seas fishing operations. Under the 
Agreement, states are required to take such measures as are necessary to ensure that 
fishing vessels entitled to fly their flag do not engage in any activity that undermines the 
effectiveness of international conservation and management measures (Article III). 
International conservation and management measures are defined in the Agreement as 
measures to conserve or manage one or more species of living marine resources that are 
adopted and applied in accordance with the relevant rules of international law as 
reflected in UNCLOS (Article I.b).
Regarding exchange of information, the FAO Compliance Agreement requires each 
Contracting Party to provide the FAO with basic information on each fishing vessel 
entered in the record of fishing vessels entitled to fly its flag and authorized for use on 
the high seas (Article IV). The Agreement also provides for international co-operation 
and co-operative arrangements, such as port state control (Article V.2) and 
arrangements of mutual assistance on a global, regional, sub-regional or bilateral level 
(Article V.3). The Agreement is the first international instrument to require 
collaboration and transmission of reliable information and provide for the establishment 
of a data bank on fishing operations for all vessels authorized to fish on the high seas799. 
Two years later, the FAO Agreement was complemented by the 1995 SSA Agreement 
and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which now together form the 
international framework for the fishing activities permitted under the UNCLOS regime.
Tanzania, Mexico, Uruguay, Seychelles, Cyprus, Japan, Barbados and Morocco. Information as available 
on 2 March 2001, on the Web Site http://www.fao.or g/fi/agreem/complian/tab 1.asp
799 The FAO Compliance Agreement, Arts. IV and VI.
229
In setting out the duties of States to adopt, with respect to their nationals, measures for 
the conservation of the living resources of the high seas, Article 117 of UNCLOS 
mandates that "all States have the duty to take, or to co-operate with other States in 
taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the 
conservation of the living resources of the high seas". In addition, Articles 94 and 217 
of UNCLOS require that flag States effectively exercise their jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying their flag (Article 94), as 
well as take measures to enforce on their flag vessels, rules and standards regarding the
orvrv
protection and conservation of the marine environment . Following the provisions of 
UNCLOS, Article 18 of the Agreement establishes that States whose vessels fish on the 
high seas must take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that vessels flying 
their flags comply with regional and sub-regional conservation and management 
measures and do not engage in any activity which undermines the effectiveness of such 
measures. Thus, according to the Agreement, a State must only authorize the use of 
vessels flying its flag for fishing on the high seas where it is able to exercise effectively 
its responsibilities in respect of such vessels that are laid upon it both under the 
UNCLOS and the Agreement.
6.2.3 The 1995 SSA
Article 18 of the 1995 SSA requires that the measures to be taken by States in respect of 
vessels flying their flag include: 1) control of such vessels by means of licences, 
authorizations or permits; 2) establishment of high seas fishing regulations, including 
the terms and conditions of the licence and prohibition of fishing on the high seas by 
vessels not duly licensed; 3) establishment of a national record of fishing vessels 
authorized to fish on the high seas and provision of access on request by other States to 
information therein; 4) requirements for the marking of fishing vessels and fishing gear 
for identification purposes in accordance with the FAO Standards and Specifications for
orvi
the Marking and Identification of Fishing Vessels ; 5) requirements for reporting of
800 Art. 217 of UNCLOS provides detailed provisions for Enforcement by Rag States’.
801 At the request of the Committee of Fisheries of FAO, a Group of Experts have developed Technical 
Guidelines for Responsible Fishing’ which include standard specifications for the Marking and 
Identification of Fishing Vessels. The Guidelines may be applied by States on a voluntary basis to all 
fishing operations on all oceans, seas and inland waters, to all fishing vessels, to fishers, owners, 
managers, masters of harbours for fishing vessels, and competent authorities. The Guidelines include
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fisheries data; 6) establishment of requirements for verification of fishing effort, in 
particular the catch of target and non-target species; 7) adoption of monitoring, control 
and surveillance schemes and programmes at the national, sub-regional, regional and
i
I global levels, including requirements for vessels to permit access by duly authorized
: inspectors of other States; 8) establishment of regulations regarding transhipment on the 
high seas to ensure that the effectiveness of conservation and management measures is 
not undermined; and 9) establishment of regulation of fishing activities aimed at 
minimizing catches of non-target species. In order to ensure effectiveness, all these 
measures must be compatible with subregionally, regionally or globally agreed systems.
The 1995 SSA802 requires all States Parties whose vessels fly their flags to ensure 
compliance with sub-regional and regional conservation and management measures. To 
this end, States Parties must: 1) take enforcement measures where violations occur; 2) 
investigate immediately and fully any alleged violation and report the outcome to the 
State alleging the violation and to the relevant fishery organization; 3) require any 
vessel flying their flag to give all relevant information to the investigating authority; 4) 
refer the case to their authorities with a view toward instituting proceedings if sufficient 
evidence is available; and 5) ensure that a vessel involved in a serious violation of 
conservation and management measures does not engage in fishing operations on the 
high seas until it has complied with any sanctions imposed. Furthermore, all 
investigations must be carried out expeditiously and sanctions applied must be adequate 
in severity to be effective in securing compliance, discourage future violations and 
deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. Such measures 
must include refusal, withdrawal or suspension of authorization of the individual 
concerned to serve as masters or officers on such fishing vessels.
The provisions of the 1995 SSA are rigorous regarding the issue of flag State control, in 
particular concerning the control of its vessels fishing on the high seas. Whereas the 
1995 SSA requires the flag State to enact regulations prohibiting fishing by non­
licensed vessels on the high seas, the FAO Compliance Agreement, in Article III.3,
appropriate management policies; monitoring of gear and catch; promotion of more selective gear; 
regulations for transhipment; and, establishment and operation of observers programmes. See J. Prado, 
’Guidelines for Responsible Fishing’, FAO Regional Workshop on Responsible Fishing, Bangkok, 
Thailand, 24-27 June 1997.
802 1995 SSA, Art. 19.
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i 8 0 ^I provides this in terms of a direct obligation . Both, the FAO Agreement and the 1995 
SSA provide for the utilization of Standard Specifications for the Marking and 
Identification of Fishing Vessels804. Regarding the basic procedures for boarding and 
inspection established by Article 22 of the Agreement, the flag State must ensure that 
masters of vessels fishing for high seas stocks accept and facilitate, co-operate with and 
assist in the inspection of the vessels; do not obstruct, intimidate or interfere with the 
inspectors; allow the inspectors to communicate with the authorities of the flag State 
and the inspecting State during the boarding and inspection; provide reasonable 
facilities, including, where appropriate, food and accommodation, to the inspectors; and 
facilitate safe disembarkation by the inspectors (Arte. 22.3).
6.3 Duties and jurisdiction of port states
Although the 1982 UNCLOS does not address the role of port States in relation to 
enforcement of fisheries laws and regulations, it does accord port States certain powers 
concerning the conservation and preservation of the marine environment to enforce 
applicable rules and standards established for the prevention of marine pollution 
through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference 
(Article 218.1). Article 218 of UNCLOS defines the role of port States in respect of any 
discharge from vessels outside the internal waters, territorial seas or EEZ in violation of 
international rules and standards and allows port States, in the variety of circumstances 
defined in it, to undertake investigations and institute proceedings when such vessels are 
voluntarily within its ports or at its offshore terminals. However, no similar provisions 
regarding fishing vessels that have violated international conservation and management 
measures, are to be found in the Convention. The position in relation to them is thus left 
to general international law. This, it has been argued, recognizes that “states exercise 
sovereignty over ports and other installations in their territory, and that customary 
international law does not establish a right of entry into maritime ports"805. As we have
803 According to Art. Ill of the FAO Compliance Agreement, “no Party shall allow any fishing vessel 
entitled to fly its flag to be used for fishing on the high seas unless it has been authorized to be so used by 
the appropriate authority or authorities of that Party”.
804 1995 SSA, Art. 18.3.d
805 Tahindro, supra, note 163, p. 41. Despite the absence of any clear right of entry into port in customary 
law, most States do enjoy such rights under treaty.
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seen, the FAO Agreement does make some provision for a port State, but in much less 
strong terms than the UNCLOS does for marine pollution.
Despite these limitations, an informed regime of port State control could be emerging to 
deter use of sub-standard vessels, which is of relevance, as a model, to fisheries’ 
control. The most catastrophic disasters affecting the marine environment and straddling 
stocks have resulted from breaches of the rules on safety of navigation, as has been 
demonstrated by accidents such as the ‘Torrey Canyon’ (1967), the ‘Amoco Cadiz’ 
(1978), the ‘Exxon Valdez’ (1989), the ‘Aegean Sea’ (1992) and the ‘Braer’ (1993). In 
response to this, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed a 
network of international legal instruments establishing, inter alia, provisions, rules and 
preventive measures for sealanes, shore guidance, speed restrictions, navigational 
equipment, officer and crew training, use of automatic pilots, construction and design of 
tankers; and identification and charting of hazards. These instruments include: the 1974 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and Protocols806; the 1966 
International Convention on Load Lines and Protocol807; the 1972 Convention on the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea808; the 1977 Torremolinos 
International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels (SFV) and the 1993 
Torremolinos Protocol809; the 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers810; the 1976 Merchant Shipping
806 The 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and Protocols (1974; 1978) was 
concluded at London on 1 November 1974 and came into force on 25 May 1980. Registration Number 
18961 by Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (Doc. IMO-150 E), which became in 
1959 the International Maritime Organization.
807 The 1966 International Convention on Load Lines and Protocol was done at London on 5 April 1966 
and entered into force on 21 July 1968. registration Number 9159 by IMO. Doc. IMO-705 E.
808 The 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. entered into 
force on 15 July 1977. Doc. IMO 904 E.
809 The 1977 Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels (SFV) and the 1993 
Torremolinos Protocol. This Agreement regarding the arrangements for the International Conference for 
the Safety of Fishing Vessels was adopted in Torremolinos (Malaga, Spain) and entered into force on 16 
December 1976. Registration Number 15197, IMO.
810 The 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers, this Convention was drafted with the close co-operation of IMO and the International Labour 
Organization. IMO Doc. IMO-938 E.
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(Minimum Standards) Convention811; and the 1989 International Convention on 
Salvage812. In addition, an International Safety Management Code (ISM) adopted in the 
! framework of IMO entered into force on 1 July 1998. The ISM Code establishes safety 
management objectives which include safe practices in ship operation and safe working 
environment; safeguards against all identified risks; and improvement of safe 
management skills of personnel, including emergencies . Finally, a new International 
Convention has been concluded on Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Fishing Vessel Personnel814.
Because of the failure of many flag States to effectively enforce these standard setting 
instruments and the resultant incidence of collisions and strandings, a special standard 
enforcement scheme utilizing the port State’s jurisdiction was introduced, initially based 
on the 1982 Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (PMOU)815 
which in turn was preceded by a more limited Hague MOU among North Sea States, 
was originally adopted by the Maritime Authorities of 14 North Sea States816. The 
PMOU is designed to encourage compliance with the requirements of the shipping 
safety conventions as a whole and came into operation in July 1982. It applied only to 
EC member states, although other states could adhere to it with the consent of the EC 
participants. The parties shared the conviction that effective action through an improved 
and harmonized system of port State control was needed to deter the operation of
811 The 1976 Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention. Reproduced in (1976) 15 ILM 1288. 
Entered into force on 28 November 1981.
812 The 1989 International Convention on Salvage. Doc. IMO 450 E.
813 The International Safety Management Code (ISM) is intended to improve the safety of international 
shipping and to reduce pollution from ships and entered into force under the tacit acceptance procedure of 
IMO on 1 July 1998.
814 A new Convention on Training and Certification for Fishing Vessel Personnel has been drafted under 
the auspices of FAO. A new revised UN International Convention on the Arrest of Ships was adopted in 
1999. This Convention establishes detailed provisions on the exercise of right of arrest. The text of this 
Convention and the preceding IMO Conventions are available 11/11/00 on the Web Site 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Treatv/collection - (IMO).
815 The 1982 Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MOU) has been 
reproduced in (1982) 21 ILM 1.
816 Maritime Authorities of 14 North Sea States: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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substandard ships in the region, thus increasing maritime safety and reducing the threat 
to the environment817.
The PMOU was concluded not between the States concerned but between their 
Administrations. It is thus not a treaty and, therefore, it does not infringe per se the flag 
State’s jurisdictional rights. It is based on a commitment by each Administration that it 
will inspect a set number of vessels entering its ports to ascertain whether or not they 
comply with the standards set in various IMO and ILO instruments regarding the safety 
of navigation which are in force and to which the States concerned are Party. The 
relevant instruments, as listed under the original PMOU, are the 1966 International 
Convention on Load Lines; the 1974/78 SOLAS Convention; the 1973/78 MARPOL 
Convention; the 1978 STCW Convention; the 1972 COLREG; and the 1976 ILO
oio
Convention No. 147 . The PMOU also establishes inspection procedures requiring the
Authorities to pay attention to ships, which may present a special hazard, for instance 
oil tankers and gas and chemical carriers and ships that have had several recent 
deficiencies819. The PMOU Parties can only detain vessels if they present a major threat 
to safety of navigation and the marine environment and then only for as long as is 
necessary to effect repairs.
The PMOU accepts that the chief responsibility for the effective application of 
standards lies with the flag state and that the rights and obligations of the participating 
states are supreme under any international agreement. However, although it does not 
establish an international regime creating legal rights and obligations for its parties, the 
PMOU can be perceived as a formal co-operative regime relating to enforcement 
issues820. Following the considerable success of the PMOU over a period of 17 years,
817 Brown, International Law of the Sea, supra, note 169, p. 383.
818 George C. Kasoulides, ‘Paris Memorandum of Understanding: a Regional Regime of Enforcement’, 
IJECL, 5 (1990), pp. 180-192, at 182. See also George C. Kasoulides, Port State Control and 
Jurisdiction. Evolution of the Port State Regime, (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), and David 
Anderson, ‘Port States and Environmental Protection’, in Boyle and Freestone (eds.), supra, note 81, pp. 
325-344, in particular p. 344, where Anderson mentions that Port State Control has begun to be extended 
to fishery vessels.
8,9 The PMOU also establishes inspection procedures. These inspection procedures, developed in Annex I 
of the PMU, take into account Conventions adopted by IMO.
820 Kasoulides, ‘Paris Memorandum of Understanding’, supra, note 818, p. 191-192.
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similar schemes based on other Memoranda of Understanding have been adopted for the 
Asian-Pacific Region821; the Indian Ocean Region822; the Caribbean Region823; and
c>0a
more recently, the Mediterranean Region and other regions are considering doing so .
It is relevant that in relation to protection and preservation of the marine environment, 
Article 228 of the UNCLOS allows coastal States, subject to specific limitations, to 
initiate proceedings against foreign vessels entering their ports, in order to impose 
penalties in respect of any violation of applicable laws and regulations or international 
rules and standards relating to the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from 
vessels committed by a foreign vessel beyond the territorial sea of the State instituting 
proceedings. The port State’s powers vary according to where the violations take place: 
in the territorial sea, the EEZ or on the high seas. Articles 218 and 228 recognize the 
special interest of the coastal State in prosecuting vessels for infringements of 
applicable coastal State law and regulations or international rules and standards, in the 
EEZ which cause major damage to the coastal State. The provisions of the 1995 SSA 
are consistent with the 1982 UNCLOS provisions for enforcement of its Part XII but do 
not go so far as the former; this can be explained by the common interest of States in 
maintaining the complex balance of rights and duties between coastal and fishing 
States825.
Freestone and Makuch have pointed out that although Article 23.1 of the 1995 SSA 
indicates that a port state must not discriminate against the vessels of any state when 
applying the Agreement, port states, nonetheless, could violate the GATT. Boarding and 
inspecting measures can affect the quality of catches and "can cause distortions in
821 In 1995, under the Asia-Pacific Memorandum of Understanding, more than 30% of ships visiting ports 
in that region were inspected for compliance with international regulations concerning safety and 
pollution prevention. IMO News 2/96.
822 On 5 June 1998, 15 Maritimes Authorities signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
Control in the Indian Ocean Region. IMO FX 10/1198.
823 The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control involving twenty Caribbean States and 
Territories of the Caribbean Region was signed in February 1996. IMO News 2/96.
824 The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control for the Mediterranean Region was signed 
on 15 July 997. IMO FX8/1997. In addition, nineteen West and Central African countries have agreed to 
establish a MOU for their Region.
825 Davies and Redgwell, supra, note 461, pp. 268-269.
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relation to competitiveness and other factors when compared to fisheries products 
harvested by coastal states and destined for domestic markets". Freestone and Makuch 
find that with respect to the GATT, the port state provisions of the SSA could be 
implemented pursuant to a multilateral fisheries conservation agreement rather than a 
unilaterally imposed national government regulation and that, on the other hand, the 
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment is considering avenues for ensuring 
compatibility between trade related environmental provisions contained in UNCLOS, 
and the SSA’s and the WTO’s requirements826. The premise regarding measures taken 
by a port state is that, as indicated by article 23.1 of the SSA, when taking such 
measures a port state must not discriminate in form or in fact against the vessels of any 
state.
Fully consistent with UNCLOS and other developments, such as the Memoranda of 
Understanding, Article 23 of the 1995 SSA equips port States with enforcement powers 
(subject to the requirement that they must not discriminate in form or in fact against the 
vessels of any state), for the purpose of promoting the effectiveness of regional, sub­
regional and global conservation and management measures. These enforcement powers 
include inspection of documents, fishing gear and catch on board fishing vessels when 
such vessels are voluntarily in the ports or offshore terminals of the State concerned. In 
addition, states may adopt regulations empowering their relevant national authorities to 
prohibit landings and trans-shipments of any catch that has been taken in a manner that 
undermines the effectiveness of conservation and management measures.
Regarding Port State Control, the FAO Compliance Agreement establishes a specific 
obligation for each Port State Party to notify the flag State when there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that its fishing vessel has been used for an activity that 
undermines the effectiveness of international conservation and management 
measures827. A similar provision can be found in the FAO Code of Conduct regarding
o9o
Port State duties . The 1995 SSA establishes a more general duty in providing that a 
Port State has the right and the duty to take measures, in accordance with international
826 Freestone and Makuch, supra, note 549, pp. 38-41.
827 FAO Compliance Agreement, Art. V.
828 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Art. 8.3.
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law, to promote the effectiveness of subregional, regional, and global conservation and 
| management measures829. The wording of all these provisions does not display any 
significant differences, reflecting the fact that the three instruments were drafted and 
completed in the same period, and therefore, each successive diplomatic conferences
oon
influenced the others during the negotiations .
The enforcement powers of port States which, in the 1982 UNCLOS, were only 
recognized for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (Articles 218 
and 226) have been, to some extent, extended to the field of fisheries on the high seas. 
This specific aspect of the new regime is binding only on those states, which accept it 
by becoming parties to the 1995 SSA; it cannot yet be considered as part of customary 
law831. Nevertheless, it represents a considerable advancement in the international law 
concerning fisheries. As the first international instrument to establish a global legal 
basis for boarding and inspecting fishing vessels of another State on the high seas, the 
SSA enables a State party participating in a regional or sub-regional fisheries 
organization or arrangement to board and inspect vessels of any other party, in any high 
seas areas covered by a sub-regional or regional fisheries organization, whether or not 
the latter State is participating in the organization or arrangement concerned, for the 
purpose of ensuring compliance with the measures which that organization has 
established. By becoming parties to the SSA, States accept that their vessels can be 
inspected by another party on the high seas even if they are not party to the regional 
organization. However, a residual problem remains which concerns the position of the 
SSA’s Parties vis-a-vis third States, which are non-parties to the relevant international 
or regional convention. The issues are complex. The negotiated solution is a fragile 
balance and it remains to be seen whether and if so when, the prime overfishing States 
will become parties.
829 1995 SSA, Art. 23.1
830 According to Edeson, “the more crucial question is whether the powers of Port States have been 
converted into enforceable legal requirements at the national level in order that they can be made 
effective. See William Edeson, Towards Long-term Sustainable Use’, supra, note 465, pp. 165-203.
831 Tahindro, supra, note 163, p. 41.
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6.4 Procedures for boarding and inspecting
Grotius claimed, as we have seen, that the resources of the oceans have been created by 
nature for common use and that, therefore, the seas should be free for navigation and
i 899fishing . However, it is relevant that regarding conservation of the sea and its 
| resources, Grotius did concede that fish might some day be regarded as exhaustible and 
seems to imply that in the event of severe depletion of stocks, appropriate prohibition 
may be introduced and enforced833. Now, due to the development of widespread use of 
drift nets and other sophisticated high seas fishing technology leading to 
overexploitation of the oceans’ finite living resources, the concept of freedom of the 
high seas can no longer be supported. A new regime, based on new principles, more 
consonant with 21st century perceptions and problems, is needed to govern the high seas 
and to allocate its resources equitably834. Through gradual institution of procedures for 
boarding and inspecting fishing vessels on the high seas, the new regime for fisheries on 
the high seas aims to establish a more rigorous set of rules to prevent and resolve the 
conflicts arising from the centuries during which disordered exploitation of fisheries on 
the high seas was permissible. Arrangements for non-flag State action and in particular 
for boarding and inspecting vessels now exist in a number of regional fisheries
OOf
arrangements such as NAFO , the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources836 and the Bering Sea "Donut Hole" Pollack Agreement837.
The 1995 SSA provides that where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel 
has violated conservation and management measures, the inspecting state shall secure 
evidence thereof and notify the flag state at the time of the boarding and inspection. 
Article 21 provides that inspecting States shall, either directly or through the relevant 
sub-regional or regional organization, inform all States whose vessels fish on the high
832 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, supra, note 776, pp. 27-28.
833 M. C. W. Pinto, ‘The New Law of the Sea and the Grotian Heritage’, in, International Law and the 
Grotian Heritage, Proceedings of a Commemorative Colloquium held at The Hague on 8 April 1983, 
(The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Institut, 1985), p. 71.
834 Jon Van Dyke, 'International Governance and Stewardship of the High Seas and its Resources', in Van 
Dyke et al. (eds.), supra, note 97, p. 14.
835 See Chapter 2, Section 1.
836 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, supra, note 426.
837 Bering Sea "Donut Hole" Pollack Agreement, 1994. Reproduced in 10IJMCL (1995), 127.
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I seas in the subregion or region of the form of identification issued to their duly 
authorized inspectors. The vessels used for boarding and inspection must be clearly 
marked and identifiable as being on government service. The flag State must respond to 
the notification within three working days of its receipt and either take enforcement 
action, in which case it must promptly inform the inspecting State of the results of the 
investigation and of any enforcement action taken, or authorize the inspecting State to 
investigate. When the flag State has failed to respond or to take action in a case of 
’serious violation’, the inspectors may remain on board for further investigation and, 
where appropriate, may request the master to bring the fishing vessel to the nearest port 
the name of which must be communicated immediately to the flag State. States Parties, 
other than the flag State, also are entitled to take punitive measures proportionate to the 
seriousness of the violation against any vessel engaged in activities contrary to 
conservation and management measures taken by sub-regional or regional 
organizations.
A ’serious violation’ is defined by the 1995 SSA as including fishing without a valid 
licence; failing to maintain accurate records of catch and catch-related data; fishing in a 
closed area, during a closed season, or after attainment of the quota established by the 
relevant organization; fishing for a stock which is prohibited or subject to a moratorium; 
using prohibited fishing gear; falsifying or concealing the markings, identity or 
registration of a fishing vessel; concealing, tampering with or disposing of evidence 
relating to an investigation; and finally, also considered to represent a ’serious violation’, 
are multiple violations which together constitute a serious disregard of conservation and 
management measures, as well as such other violations as may be specified in 
procedures established by the relevant fisheries organizations (Art. 22. II)838.
To avoid possible abuses, the SSA also establishes a scheme consisting of minimum 
rules for authorized inspectors of inspecting states and basic procedures for boarding 
and inspecting fishing vessels. Thus, the inspecting State must require its inspectors to
838 There are precedents for inspection schemes. The development of inspection schemes was difficult in 
the 1970s. Joint inspection schemes were eventually set up under both the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission and the old North West Atlantic Fisheries Commission. They did good work but originally 
did not have power to inspect the vessels in order to see if fish catch looked too large or included 
protected species. A good early study on this matter has been conducted by Winston Conrad Extavour, 
The Exclusive Economic Zone: a Study of the Evolution and Progressive Development of the 
International Law of the Sea, (Geneva, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1979).
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! observe international rules and generally accepted practices and procedures relating to
i
the safety of the vessel and the crew, minimize interference with fishing operations and, 
to the extent practicable, avoid action, which would adversely affect the quality of the 
catch on board. Inspecting States must ensure that boarding and inspection is not 
conducted in a manner that could constitute harassment of any fishing vessel (Article 
21.10). Furthermore, the authorized inspectors of an inspecting State must be formally 
accorded the authority to inspect the vessel, its licence, gear, equipment, records, 
facilities, and relevant documents necessary to verify the vessel’s compliance with the 
relevant conservation and management measures (Article 22.2).
In addition, under Article 22.1 of the SSA, the inspecting State must ensure that its 
inspectors present credentials to the master of the fishing vessel839 and produce a copy 
of the text of the relevant conservation and management measures relating to the high 
seas which are in question; initiate notice to the flag State at the time of the boarding 
and inspection. They must not interfere with the master's ability to communicate with 
the authority of the flag State during the period of the inspection; provide the master and 
the authorities of the flag State with a copy of the report on the boarding and inspection, 
including any objections presented by the master; promptly leave the vessel following 
completion of the inspection if no evidence of a serious violation is found840. He must 
avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary, to ensure the safety of 
the inspectors or where the inspectors are obstructed in the execution of their duties 
(Article 22.1)84'.
839 The FAO Compliance Agreement provides in Article I a definition of ‘fishing vessel’ as “any vessel 
used or intended for use for the purposes of the commercial exploitation of living marine resources, 
including mother ships and any other vessel directly engaged in such fishing operations”. No definition of 
'fishing vessel' is provided by the 1995 SSA, which instead, stresses the responsibilities of the flag State 
over vessels flying its flag. As no definition of the concept of 'fishing vessel' is provided, this concept 
could include all vessels engaged in the business of processing fish and providing services or supplies to 
fishing vessels.
840 Art. 292 of UNCLOS provides that where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying 
the flag of another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied with the 
provisions of the Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its crew, the question of release may 
be submitted to any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within 10 days 
from the time of detention, to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining State under article 287 or to the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, unless the parties otherwise agree.
841 For a discussion regarding the proportionality of the use of force in law of the sea, see Natalino 
Ronzitti, The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force Against Terrorist Activities' in Natalino Ronzitti (ed.), 
Maritime Terrorism and International Law, (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), pp. 4-25.
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According to the SSA, in the event that the master of a vessel refuses to accept boarding 
and inspection which is to be carried out in accordance with the basic procedures for 
boarding and inspection established by the Agreement itself, the flag State must direct 
the master of the vessel to submit immediately to boarding and inspection and, if the 
master does not comply with such direction, must suspend the vessel’s authorization to 
fish and order the vessel to return immediately to port842. In that case, the flag State 
must inform the inspecting State of the action it has taken (Article 22.4)843. As in the 
exercise of the right of hot pursuit844, there is the risk that the exercise of boarding and 
inspecting may be frustrated by the refusal of the pursued vessel to stop or by its 
escaping while being escorted to port. Therefore, the inspecting State must ensure that 
its duly authorized inspectors avoid the use of force except when it is necessary or use it 
only to the degree that it is necessary to ensure the safety of the inspectors or where the 
inspectors are obstructed in the execution of their duties. The degree of force used must 
not exceed that reasonably required in the circumstances. Only when the personal safety 
of the inspectors is endangered and their inspecting activities are obstructed by violence, 
may the inspectors take appropriate measures to stop such violence. Force must only be 
used by inspectors against the crewmembers committing violent acts and not against the 
vessel as a whole or other crewmembers or fishermen845.
842 The ‘Estai Case’ presents a good example of exactly what the SSA drafters had in mind in including 
this provision. See Section 4, Chapter 2.
843 The 1995 SSA provides, in Article 24.4, an exception in that event. This exception relates to 
circumstances where, in accordance with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and 
practices relating to safety at sea, it is necessary to delay the boarding and inspection.
844 Article 111 of UNCLOS provides that the hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the 
competent authorities of the Coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws 
and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is 
within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the 
pursuing State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit 
has not been interrupted.
845 The Red Crusader Incident in 1962 illustrates well the concept of ’necessary and reasonable force’. The 
Red Crusader was a Scottish trawler, which, after arrest by a Danish fishery patrol vessel in Faroese 
territorial waters, attempted to escape with members of the boarding party on board. The Danish vessel 
fired warning shots ordering the Red Crusader to stop and then fired upon it directly with solid shot and 
damaged, but did not sink the vessel. A Commission of Enquiry expressed the opinion that the escape of 
the Red Crusader in flagrant violation of the order received and obeyed, "cannot justify such violent 
action" and that other means should have been attempted to stop it and revert to the normal procedure. 
See E. Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law Reports, (London, Butterworths, 1967), Red Crusader Case, 
Vol. 35, pp. 485, at 499. See also Harris, supra, note 672, p. 418.
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In the ‘Schedule of Conservation Measures in Force 1999/2000’, the Commission of 
CCAMLR has adopted a detailed ‘Scheme of Inspection’ aimed at verifying compliance 
by fishing vessels with conservation measures adopted under the Convention, according 
to which, inspectors are entitled to board a fishing or fisheries research vessel in the area 
of the Convention, in order to determine whether the vessel is, or has been, engaged in
Q/t£
scientific research, or harvesting marine living resources . In addition, the 
Commission has established a ‘Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection’, in 
order to assess and provide advice on inspection and observation priorities and, if 
necessary, coordinate and observe activities of inspection to ensure representative 
coverage in the inspection area, as well as review inspection reports847. Although more 
detailed, this ‘Scheme of Inspection’ essentially follows the provisions of the 1995 SSA 
regarding procedures for boarding and inspecting.
To achieve better management of fisheries on the high seas, the 1995 SSA had to go 
beyond the concept that the flag State is the only authority authorised to take 
enforcement measures. Thus, relying henceforth on better co-operation among States 
now that the problem has been so widely publicised globally and fiercely debated 
during the intensive negotiations of the new regime for fisheries, following the ‘Estai 
Case’, the Agreement puts forward a balance between the international community 
interests and the interests of flag States.
6.5 Dispute settlement mechanisms
Techniques and institutions for settlement of disputes are key issues both in 
international relations and international law. The 1982 UNCLOS in particular, institutes 
the most comprehensive range of mechanisms ever established in an agreement of the 
Law of the Sea, as part of a flexible and many-level system of dispute settlement. The 
SSA is expected to make further important contribution to the development of the rule 
of law in international ocean affairs.
846 ‘Text of the CCAMLR System of Inspection’. Document in electronic form as available on 
http://www.ccamlr.Org/English/e basic docs/e basic docs online/e part9..htm on 11/11/00.
847 Ibid. Major problems still remain in the CCAMLR such as the management of Patagonian toothfish 
stocks. See ‘CCAMLR’s Management of the Antarctic’, Document in electronic form as available on
http://www.ccamlr.Org/English/e pubs/e app to manag/CCs man ant/e CCs pagel.htm on 11/11/00.
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Part XV of the 1982 UNCLOS establishes the basic framework for settling disputes 
arising from the interpretation or application thereof. It includes both non-compulsory 
procedures and compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions, as well as 
limitations on resort to the latter. Non-compulsory procedures include use of peaceful 
means and conclusion of regional or special arrangements or instruments on disputed 
problems . Compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions, include various fora 
such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; the International Court of 
Justice; arbitral tribunals constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention 
on "arbitration"; and, special arbitral tribunals constituted in accordance with Annex VII 
on "special arbitration"849. Limitations to compulsory procedures entailing binding 
decisions are provided by Section 3, Part XV of UNCLOS. In this regard, Art. 297.3 (a) 
mandates that for fisheries disputes coastal States are not under any obligation to submit 
for settlement under the compulsory procedures, disputes involving the exercise of their 
sovereign rights with respect to the management of the living resources in the EEZ, 
including their discretionary powers to determine the TAC, harvesting capacity, etc. 
These disputes are assigned first to the non-compulsory procedures of Section 1, and 
where no settlement is reached by these, to compulsory conciliation provided under 
Section 2 dealing with conciliation procedures. States are not obliged to submit to 
Article 287 procedures in relation to disputes concerning their sovereign rights over the 
EEZ fisheries, including those arising from failures to determine total allowable catches 
and harvesting capacities; they can opt to refer them to the "compulsory conciliation 
procedure" established in Article 297.3. However, the recommendations of the 
Conciliation Commission established by that article are not binding and in no case may 
that Commission substitute its discretion for that of the coastal state850.
Section 1, Part XV, of the 1982 UNCLOS establishes the obligation of States Parties to 
settle their disputes through peaceful means and allows them to use any of the peaceful
848 Provided by Section 1, Part XV of UNCLOS, Articles 279-285. These includes ones on fisheries, 
marine pollution and scientific research. FAO is the depositary of the names of the special arbitrators on 
fisheries disputes; UNEP on marine environment; and IMO on navigation. To date this provision for 
special tribunals has not been activated.
849 Provided by Section 2, Part XV of UNCLOS, Articles 286-296.
850 Art. 297.3.(c), UNCLOS.
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means set out in Articles 2.3 and 33 of the UN Charter. This obligation is reproduced in 
Article 27 of the SSA, which provides that States have the obligation to settle their 
| disputes by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
' resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
According to Article 28, as a matter of duty, States must co-operate in order to prevent 
disputes. To that end, States must establish efficient and expeditious decision-making 
procedures within sub-regional and regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements and must strengthen existing decision-making procedures as necessary. 
These obligations harmonize with the obligation of States to strengthen fisheries 
organizations and arrangements (Article 13) and the obligation to implement and 
enforce conservation and management measures through effective monitoring, control 
and surveillance, as provided in Article 5.1.
Article 29 of the SSA provides for reference by States of any disputes of a technical 
nature to an ad hoc expert panel established by them. The panel must confer with the 
States concerned and must endeavour to resolve the dispute expeditiously without 
recourse to binding procedures for the settlement of disputes. No criteria are provided 
for determining which disputes are to be regarded as having a "technical nature" or 
concerning the composition of the panel. It seems, however, that the aim of this article 
is to provide States with an informal and expeditious mechanism to settle directly their 
dispute. As Brown has pointed out, this expert panel is different from the list of experts 
on fisheries required to be established by FAO under Annex VIII of UNCLOS, 
notwithstanding that States can refer to this list when establishing such a panel851.
Article 30 of the 1995 SSA reinvigorates the obligation of States to settle their disputes 
by peaceful means of their choice. Article 30.1 states that the provisions relating to the 
settlement of disputes set out in Part XV of UNCLOS apply, mutatis mutandis, to any 
dispute between States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the SSA, 
whether or not they are also Parties to the Convention. A distinction is introduced here 
between two situations. First, in the case of States Parties to both the UNCLOS and the 
SSA, according to Article 30.3, the rule is that any procedure accepted by those States 
pursuant to Article 287 of the UNCLOS will apply unless the States have accepted
851 E. D. Brown, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea: the UN Convention Regime’, Marine Policy 
21 (1997), pp. 17-43, at 41.
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another procedure pursuant to Article 287 for the settlement of disputes under the 
I Agreement. Secondly, for States Parties to the 1995 SSA, which are not Parties to the 
| UNCLOS, Article 30.4 of the former provides that these States, by means of a written 
declaration made on signing, ratifying or acceding to the Agreement, are free to choose 
one or more of the means set out in Article 287.1 of the UNCLOS for the settlement of 
disputes under the Agreement. According to Article 30.2, the provisions relating to the 
settlement of disputes set out in Part XV of the Convention, apply mutatis mutandis to 
any dispute between States Parties to the SSA concerning the interpretation or 
application of a sub-regional, regional or global fisheries agreement relating to SFS or 
HMFS to which they are parties, including any dispute concerning conservation and 
management of such stocks, whether or not they are also Parties to the Convention. In 
this second case, Article 287 of the UNCLOS will apply to the declaration made by 
States that are Parties only to the 1995 SSA, as well as to any dispute to which such 
States are Parties which is not covered by a declaration in force. In order to maintain 
equality between States that are Parties and States that are not Parties to the 
UNCLOS852, the 1995 SSA establishes that States not Parties will be entitled to 
nominate conciliators, arbitrators and experts to be included in the lists referred to in 
Annexes V, VII and VIII of the UNCLOS for the settlement of disputes under the 
Agreement853. This is a groundbreaking provision, as we have seen from the account of 
previous procedures for dispute settlement applicable to fisheries disputes.
Article 30.5 of the 1995 SSA establishes the law to be applied by any court or tribunal 
to which a dispute has been submitted under the SSA. In order to ensure the 
conservation of the SFS and HMFS concerned, the court or tribunal must apply the 
relevant provisions of the UNCLOS, the SSA and any relevant sub-regional, regional or 
global fisheries agreement, as well as generally accepted standards for the conservation 
and management of living resources and other rules of international law not 
incompatible with the Convention854.
852 Brown, ibid, p. 44.
853 Article 30.4, 1995 SSA.
854 Chapter 5, Section 3.
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Finally, regarding settlement of disputes, Article 30 of the SSA establishes a set of 
provisional measures. First, pending the settlement of a dispute, the Parties to it must 
make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature. Secondly, 
without prejudice to Article 290 of the UNCLOS, the court or tribunal may prescribe 
any provisional measures that are appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the 
rights of the parties and prevent damage to the stocks concerned, as well as for disputes 
regarding compatibility of conservation and management measures under Articles 7.5 
and 16.2. According to Article 290.3 of the UNCLOS, such provisional measures may 
be prescribed, modified or revoked only at the request of a party to the dispute, and after 
the parties have been given an opportunity to be heard. Thirdly, the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea would be entitled, under certain circumstances, to 
prescribe provisional measures pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which 
a dispute is being submitted (Art. 290.5 of the UNCLOS). Notwithstanding these 
provisions, a State not Party to the UNCLOS is entitled, under Article 31.3 of the 
Agreement, to declare that the Tribunal’s provisional measures be not applied without 
its assent.
The provisions establishing the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea can be found in Article 
287.1.a and Annex VI of the UNCLOS. Having regard to the tensions and conflicts 
concerning fisheries which emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, the Judges of the 
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, at their second meeting in Hamburg, in 
February 1997, established a standing special Chamber on Fisheries Matters. This 
Chamber will deal with any disputes, which parties agree to submit to the Tribunal 
concerning the conservation and management of marine living resources. Two other 
chambers were also established at this meeting: the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber and the 
Chamber on the Marine Environment855.
On 4 December 1997 the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea delivered its first 
Judgement in the M/V 'Saiga' Case. The 'Saiga' was an oil tanker flying the flag of Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines which, at the time of the incident with respect to which the 
Application was based, was operating as a bunkering vessel supplying fuel oil to fishing
855 ITLOS/Press Release 5, Issued by the Registry, 3 March 1997. Document in electronic form as 
available on 11/11/00 on http://www.un.org/Depts/los
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vessels and other vessels off the coast of Guinea in West Africa. On 27 October 1997, 
the ’Saiga’, having crossed the maritime boundary between Guinea and Guinea Bissau, 
entered the EEZ of Guinea and supplied gasoil to three fishing vessels. The ’Saiga’ was 
arrested by Guinean Customs Patrol boats at a point south of the maritime boundary of 
the EEZ of Guinea. In the course of this action, at least two crew members were injured 
and the vessel was brought into Conakry, Guinea, where it and its crew were detained 
on charges of commission of smuggling and other offences under the Customs Code of 
Guinea and it was asserted that Guinea had exercised the right of hot pursuit856.
The Tribunal’s task was not to decide whether the arrest was lawful but whether the 
detention of the vessel and crew following the arrest was in violation of the provisions 
of the UNCLOS concerning prompt release of a vessel and its crew. The application 
was based on Article 292 of the UNCLOS which provides that where the authorities of 
a State Party have detained a vessel flying the flag of another State Party to the 
Convention, and if it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied with the 
requirements of the Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the 
posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security, the question of release from 
detention may be submitted, inter alia, to the ITLOS if, as was the case in relation to the 
'Saiga', the Parties have not agreed within 10 days from the time of detention to submit 
the case to another court or tribunal.
Finding that it had jurisdiction under Article 292 of the UNCLOS to entertain the 
Application, the Tribunal decided that the argument of Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, based on Article 73 of the Convention concerning enforcement of laws and 
regulations of the coastal state was well founded and that, therefore, it was unnecessary 
for the Tribunal to adopt a position on the non restrictive interpretation of Article 292 of 
the Convention857. The Tribunal decided that the application was admissible, that the 
allegations made by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were well founded for the 
purpose of the proceedings and that, consequently, Guinea must release promptly the 
'Saiga' and the members of the crew detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty858.
856 ITLOS, The M/V "SAIGA", Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, Judgement, 4 December 
1997, paragraphs 25-33. Document in electronic form as available on 11/11/00 on 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los
857 Article 292 of the Convention, “Prompt Release of Vessels and Crews”
858 Judgement, supra, note 856, par. 45, 73 and 79.
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These findings were analysed and discarded by some Judges in a dissenting opinion:
"A textual analysis of Article 292 of the Convention clearly establishes 
that it applies only where the Convention contains specific provisions 
concerning the prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the posting 
of a reasonable bond or other financial security. If Article 292 was also 
intended to cover other cases of ship arrests, it would have been phrased 
differently"859.
According to Brown, this conclusion "appears to be unassailable" and is fully consistent 
with one of the most fundamental rules of international law, which maintains that 
"restrictions upon the independence of states cannot be presumed"860.
On 27 August 1999, Australia and New Zealand, filed with the Registrar of the Tribunal 
a requests for the prescription of provisional measures (interim injunction) in a case 
against Japan. The dispute between Australia and New Zealand on one side, and Japan 
on the other, concerned the conservation of the population of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 
which is significantly overfished and is below commonly accepted thresholds for 
biologically safe parental biomass. Australia and New Zealand claimed that Japan’s 
actions amounted to a failure to conserve and to cooperate in the conservation of the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna stock and claimed that Japan, by initiating a unilateral 
experimental fishing programme for Southern Bluefin Tuna in 1998 and 1999, 
threatened serious or irreversible damage to the Southern Bluefin Tuna population. The 
request for an interim injunction against Japan to immediately cease the unilateral 
experimental fishing of the Southern Bluefin Tuna, commenced at the beginning of June
859 Dissenting Opinion of Judges Park, Nelson, Chandrasekhara Rao, Vukas and Ndiaye, Appended to the 
Judgement, supra, note 856, para. 23.
860 E. D. Brown, The M/V Saiga Case on Prompt Release of Detained Vessels: the First Judgement of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’, Marine Policy, 22 (1998), pp. 307-326, at 324. On the 
Merits, the Tribunal decided that, under the Convention, in arresting the Saiga, and in detaining the Saiga 
and members of its crew, in prosecuting and convicting its Master and in seizing the Saiga and 
confiscating its cargo, Guinea violated the rights of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The Tribunal noted 
that, under the Convention, in the exclusive economic zone the coastal State has jurisdiction to apply 
customs laws and regulations in respect of artificial islands, installations and structures (article 60, 
paragraph 2). In the view of the Tribunal, the Convention does not empower a coastal State to apply its 
customs laws in respect of any other parts of the exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal, therefore, found 
that by applying its customs laws to a customs radius which includes parts of the exclusive economic 
zone, Guinea acted in a manner contrary to the Convention. See THE M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) CASE 
(SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES v. GUINEA) JUDGMENT, as available on 
http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2001/document_en_68.doc
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1999. In the absence of agreement between the parties for the settlement of the merits 
(substance) of the dispute between them, the Governments of Australia and New 
Zealand decided to submit their dispute with Japan to an arbitration procedure under 
Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Pending the 
constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Governments of Australia and New Zealand 
requested the Tribunal to prescribe provisional measures, pursuant to paragraph 5 of 
Article 290 of the Convention861.
On August 9, 1999, at the invitation of the President of ITLOS, Japan filed a single 
statement in response to Australia and New Zealand’s requests. Japan’s statement raised 
objections to the jurisdiction of ITLOS on the basis that the Arbitral Tribunal would not, 
once constituted, have jurisdiction prima facie to decide the dispute. The Tribunal, after 
it had found that it had jurisdiction over the disputes, issued its Order on 27 August 
1999, in the Request for Provisional Measures, prescribing provisional measures in 
order the parties to prevent the aggravation or extension of the dispute; to prevent 
prejudice to the decision on the merits, to keep catches to levels last agreed; to refrain 
from conducting an experimental fishing programme; to resume negotiations; and to 
seek agreement with others engaged in fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna . In its 
Order, ITLOS found that, prima facie, the Arbitral Tribunal would have jurisdiction and 
following appointments in due course, the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted and 
composed by Judge Stephen M. Schwebel (President), H. E. Judge Florentino Feliciano, 
The Rt. Hon. Justice Sir Kenneth Keith KBE, H.E. Judge Per Tresselt and Professor 
Chusei Yamada863. The Arbitral Tribunal decided that it was without jurisdiction to rule 
on the merits of the dispute on the basis that the dispute settlement mechanism of the
861 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Dispute Concerning Southern Bluefin Tuna, Australia 
and New Zealand versus Japan, Provisional Measures Requested, ITLOS, Press/24, 30 July, 1999 (Issued 
by the Registrar). Information as available on 2 March 2001 on the Web Site of the Tribunal 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLQS 24.htm.
862 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Dispute Concerning Southern Bluefin Tuna, Australia 
and New Zealand versus Japan, Provisional Measures Requested, Order, 27 August, 1999, List of Cases, 
No. 3 and 4. Information as available on http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/Order-tuna34.htm on 2 
March 2001.
863 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, August 4, 2000, Award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Document in electronic form as available on 2 
March 2001 on http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/bluefintuna/award080400.pdf, p.2
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1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (Art. 16), adopted 
I between the three countries involved in that Case, excluded any further recourse to the 
procedure within the contemplation of Article 281.1 of UNCLOS and decided, in 
accordance with Article 290(5) of UNCLOS that provisional measures in force by order 
of the ITLOS prescribed on August 27, 1999, had to be revoked from the day of 
signature of the Award865. Of relevant interest is that the Arbitral Tribunal recognized 
that the substantive provisions of the 1995 SSA are more detailed and far-reaching than 
the pertinent provisions of UNCLOS, and that both instruments, if effectively 
implemented, can ameliorate the substantive problems that had divided the parties866.
In a Separate Opinion, Justice Sir Kenneth Keith voted in favour of holding that the 
Arbitral Tribunal had jurisdiction and against the contrary decision of that Tribunal. Sir 
Kenneth Keith concluded that both treaties in issue in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 
the 1993 Convention on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna and the 1982 
UNCLOS, set up substantive obligations and obligations relating to peaceful settlement; 
that the parallel and overlapping existence of the obligations arising under each treaty 
was fundamental in that Case; and that therefore, the one had not excluded or in any
Q /ZH
relevant way prejudiced the other . The Award in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case is 
the first decision according to which an arbitral tribunal has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over the merits of an inter-state dispute and marks the first instance of the
864 Ibid, p. 100. The Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, was concluded in 
Canberra the 10 May 1993, signed for Australia, Japan and New Zealand the 10 May 1993; in force the 
20 May 19944. Information as available on 2 March 2001 on the Web Site ‘Australian Treaty List- 
Multilateral’, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/multi/19940520.html
865 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, supra, note 863, p. 111.
866 Ibid, pp. 109-110.
867 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, August 4, 2000, rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Separate Opinion of Justice Sir Kenneth Keith. 
Document in electronic form as available on 2 March 2001 on the Web Site 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/bluefintuna/opinion.pdf. p.l. The Federal Minister for Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry of Australia, Mr. Warren Truss, stated that Australia did not resile from its position 
on Japan’s experimental fishing; called on Japan to accept the call by the Tribunal to refrain from 
unilateral acts that may exacerbate the dispute; and stressed that Australia’s commitment in the area 
related to the long-term conservation and optimum utilisation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna stock would 
continue to explore all possible avenues to resolve the dispute amicably and expeditiously, including by 
negotiations. Joint Statement by the Federal Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Warren 
Truss, and the Federal Attorney-General, Mr. Daryl Williams, AFFA00/153WTJ, 5 August 2000. 
Document in electronic form as available on 2 March 2001 on the Web Site ‘Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry -  Australia’, http://www.affa.gov.au/ministers/truss/releases/00/00153wtj.html.
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application of Section 2 on Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions and 
Annex VII on Arbitration of Part XV on Settlement of Disputes of the 1982 
UNCLOS868.
In addition to the Saiga Case, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has also 
delivered judgements concerning the prompt release of fishing vessels in two more 
cases. First, in the Camouco Case, brought before the Tribunal on behalf of Panama 
against France on 17 January 2000, the dispute concerned the fishing vessel Camouco, 
which flied the Panamanian flag arrested in September 1999 by a French frigate 
allegedly for unlawful fishing in the exclusive economic zone of Crozet (French
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Southern and Antarctic Territories) . Panama requested the Tribunal to order the 
prompt release of the Camouco and its Master and to find that France has violated the 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning the 
prompt release of vessels and their crews. Panama maintained that the release should be 
effected without the payment of a bond or in the alternative, to determine the amount, 
nature and form of the bond or financial security to be posted for the release of the 
vessel. The Government of France requested the Tribunal to declare and adjudge that 
the application requesting the Tribunal to order the prompt release of the Camouco and 
of its captain was not admissible; and as a subsidiary submission, if it decided that the 
Camouco was to be released upon the deposit of a bond, that the bond be not less than 
the sum of 20,000,000 francs and that this sum be posted in the form of a certified 
cheque870. The Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction under article 292 of the 
Convention to entertain the Application made on behalf of Panama on 17 January 2000; 
that the Application for release was admissible; and ordered France to promptly release 
the Camouco and its Master upon the posting of a bond of eight million French Francs
868 Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘The Australia and New Zealand v. Japan Southern Bluefin Tuna. Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility Award of the First LOSC Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal’. Document in electronic form 
as available on http://www.rgl.ruu.nl/english/isep/paper.asp on 5 March, 2001, pp. 1-3.
869 ITLOS/Press Release No. 33, 17 January, 2000, as available on 5 March 2001 on the Web Site 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS_33.htm
870 ITLOS/Press Release No. 34, 3 February, 2000, as available on 5 March 2001 on the Web Site 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS_34.htm
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(8,000.000 FF) to be posted with France in the form of a bank guarantee or, if agreed to 
by the parties, in any other form871.
The Second case concerned the Monte Confurco, a fishing vessel registered in the 
Republic of the Seychelles, licensed to fish in the international waters. The vessel was 
spotted and apprehended for alleged illegal fishing by a French frigate, as well as for 
failure to announce its presence in the EEZ of the Kerguelen Islands. The Republic of 
the Seychelles denied the charges and requested the Tribunal to order the prompt release 
of the Monte Confurco and its Master and to find that France had violated the provisions 
of the 1982 UNCLOS concerning the prompt release of vessels and their crews. In 
addition, the Republic of the Seychelles requested the Tribunal to determine a 
reasonable bond or financial security to be posted for the release of the vessel872. France 
contended the Application and requested the Tribunal to declare that such an 
Application was inadmissible and to declare that the bond set by the competent French
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authorities was reasonable . The Tribunal unanimously found that the Tribunal had 
jurisdiction under article 292 of the Convention to entertain the Application made on 
behalf of Seychelles on 27 November 2000; that the claims of Seychelles that France 
failed to comply with article 73, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Convention were 
inadmissible; and that the Application with respect to the allegation of non-compliance 
with article 73, paragraph 2, of the Convention was admissible874. The Tribunal found 
that the allegation made by the Applicant was well founded and ordered to France the 
prompt release of the Monte Confurco and its Master upon the posting of a bound or 
other security to be determined by the Tribunal, by 19 votes to l 875.
871 ITLOS, Case No. 5, The “Camouco” Case (Panama v. France), Application for Prompt Release, 
Judgement, 7 February 2000. Document in electronic form as available on 5 March 2001 on the Web Site 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/Jud-Camouco.htm
872 ITLOS, Notice to the Press (Issued by the Registrar), ITLOS/Press/Notice 15, 6 December 2000. 
Application for Release of Fishing Vessel Monte Confurco and its Master. Republic of the Seychelles v. 
France. As available on http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS N15.htm on 5 March 2001
873 ITLOS/Press Release No. 42, 18 December, 2000, as available on 5 March 2001 on the Web Site 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS_42e.pdf
874 ITLOS, Case No. 6, The “Monte Confurco” Case (Seychelles v. France), Application for Prompt
Release, Judgement, 18 December, 2000. Document in electronic form as available on 5 March, 2001, on 
the Web Site http://www.oceanlaw.net/cases/montej.htm
875 Ibid.
253
For the past decade, Chile has adopted controversial legislation on international 
fisheries concerning stocks beyond its EEZ and, consequently, has been involved in
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legal controversies with the EU over swordfish fisheries in the South Pacific . Chile 
claims that the EU fails to cooperate with the coastal State to ensure the conservation of 
straddling and highly migratory stocks, in violation of the 1982 UNCLOS; the EU 
claims that Chilean denial of port access violates substantive provisions of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994).
On the request of Chile and the EU, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
by an Order dated 20 December 2000, formed a Special Chamber877 to deal with their 
dispute concerning the conservation and sustainable exploitation of swordfish stocks in 
the South-eastern Pacific Ocean and to decide whether the EC had complied with its 
obligations under the 1982 UNCLOS to ensure conservation of swordfish in the fishing 
activities undertaken by vessels fishing the flag of any of its Member States in the high 
seas adjacent to Chile’s EEZ; whether the Chilean Decrees which purports to apply 
Chile’s conservation measures relating to swordfish on the high seas were in breach of 
UNCLOS; and whether the “Galapagos Agreement” was negotiated in keeping the 
provisions of UNCLOS878.
The “Galapagos Agreement” was signed on 14 August 2000 in Santiago, Chile, by 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru879. The stated objective of the Agreement is the 
conservation of living marine resources in the high seas zones of the Southeast Pacific,
876 The inalysis of the Chilean fisheries legislation in general and the presential sea in particular, is 
provided in Chapter 2, Section 2 of this Thesis.
877 Article 15 of the Statute of the Tribunal provides for the formation of Special Chambers, if so 
requested by the parties to a dispute Statute of ITLOS (Article 15, Annex VI of UNCLOS). The 
composition of the Special Chamber is determined by the Tribunal with the approval of the parties and 
the judgement given by it is considered as rendered by the full Tribunal (Articles 28-31, Rules of the 
Tribunal Document in electronic form as available on March 5, 20001, on
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/rTLOS/Rules-Tribunal.htm).
878 ITLOS, Case No. 7, concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in 
the South-eastern Pacific Ocean, (Chile v. European Community), Constitution of Chamber, Order, 20 
December 2000. Document in electronic form as available on 5 March, 2001, on the Web Site 
http://wv/w. un .org/depts/los/ITLOS/Order3 2000En g.pdf
879 Information concerning the status of the Galapagos Agreement, available on 5 March 2001 on the Web 
Site http//www.oceanlaw.net/texts/summaries/galapagos.htm.
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with special reference to straddling and highly migratory fish populations . The 
Agreement applies exclusively to the high seas of the Southeast Pacific, encompassed 
by the outer limits of the coastal States’ national jurisdiction zones and a line traced 
along the complete length of the 120 west meridian of longitude, from the 5 north 
parallel of latitude to the 60 south parallel of latitude. It does not apply to the zones 
under national jurisdiction corresponding to oceanic islands belonging to any of the 
coastal States, but is shall also include the areas of high seas surrounding and adjacent
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to these oceanic islands, within the limits described . The Agreement applies to 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. Particular species are to be identified as 
being of "high-priority" at the first Meeting of the Parties. An organization is to be set 
up under the Agreement, consisting of a Commission, charged with adopting the 
necessary decisions for the fulfilment of the Agreement’s provisions; a Scientific- 
Technical Committee, to serve as a consulting body for the Commission on these 
matters; a Secretariat; and any other subsidiary body that the States Parties or the 
Commission decides to establish in support of the Agreement’s implementation882. 
Despite applying to the high seas, however, the Agreement is not currently open to 
signature by non-coastal States883.
The EU brought the Swordfish Case to the WTO in April 2000 and as negotiations 
between the parties did not reach a settlement of the dispute, a Panel was finally 
established by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body in December 2000. The EU claimed 
that the Chilean prohibition on unloading of swordfish in its ports under its fisheries 
laws was inconsistent with 1994 GATT Article V (providing for freedom of transit for 
goods through the territory of each contracting party on their way to or from other 
contracting parties) and Article XI (prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports or 
exports, subject to some exceptions for imports of agricultural or fisheries products). 
Chile had requested the ITLOS Chamber to declare whether the EU had fulfilled its 
obligations under UNCLOS Articles 64 (calling for cooperation in ensuring
880 Art. 2. Integral text of the Galapagos Agreement available in electronic form on 5 March 2001 on the 
Web Site http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/galapagos.htm.
881 Ibid, Art. 3.
882 Ibid, Art. 11, Institutional Mechanisms.
883 Status of the Galapagos Agreement, supra, note 879.
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conservation of highly migratory species); Articles 116-119 (relating to conservation of 
the living resources of the high seas); Article 297 (concerning dispute settlement); and 
Article 300 (calling for good faith and no abuse of right). Chile further asserted that the 
EU had failed to enact and enforce substantive conservation measures on its vessels 
fishing in the area; that the EU had failed to report its captures to the relevant 
international organization (in this case FAO); and that the EU had failed to cooperate 
with the coastal state in ensuring the conservation of highly migratory species .
During the last week of January 2001, the EU and Chile finally reached an agreement 
that effectively suspends proceedings at the WTO and at the ITLOS. This provisional 
agreement, which will become operational in March 2001, rests on three basis: first, the 
re-establishment of a bilateral technical commission in order to design conservation 
measures for the stocks and will subsequently meet periodically to review the 
information provided by the scientific fisheries expeditions supported by a satellite 
vessel monitoring system; secondly, port access for fish caught under a new scientific 
fisheries program that will allow each Party to unload in the Chilean ports up to a 
thousand tons of swordfish each year, as well as the creation of a multilateral 
conservation forum for the Southeast Pacific that will lay the grounds for the 
establishment of a multilateral conservation organization open to the participation of 
interested States; and thirdly, the political context of this provisional arrangement is set 
by the ongoing negotiations between the EU and Chile for the conclusion of a free trade 
agreement885. In the end, the EU obtained port access for the four ships that had been 
traditionally fishing in the area. However, the two jurisdictional fora involved in the 
Swordfish Case, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body, both dealing respectively with the Law of the Sea and 
International Economic Law, make apparent that the potential risk of contradictory 
decisions is always present.
884 The information presented in this paragraph has been provided by Marcos Orellana Cruz, The 
Swordfish in Peril: the EU Challenges Chilean Port Access Restrictions at the WTO’, Bridges, 
Publication by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, July-August 2000, pp. 
11-12
885 Marcos Orellana, The EU and Chile Suspend the Swordfish Case Proceedings at the WTO and the 
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea’, ASIL Insight, February 2001. Document in electronic form 
as available on March 5, 2001, on http://www.asil.org/insigh60.htm.
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The decisions adopted by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea are of 
considerable relevance to the international law for fisheries and provides States that are 
Parties both to the Convention and to the SSA with the opportunity to appraise the 
scope of the mechanisms for enforcement and compliance by the Tribunal. The question 
remains however whether such a manifold system of dispute settlement can effectively 
establish a consistent jurisprudence on these issues886. Despite concern regarding this 
issue which can only be resolved as the ITLOS is given more opportunity to develop it, 
it must be concluded that the institution of this new procedures by the 1995 SSA, as 
well as the 1982 UNCLOS, marks a considerable step towards generalized compulsory 
settlement of disputes by arbitral or judicial means as well as provision of opportunities
oo7
for peaceful conciliation in the field of the Law of the Sea .
The 1994 GATT (Article XX.g) allows contracting parties to adopt and enforce 
measures relating to the conservation of natural resources if this is done in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption, provided that there is no 
arbitrary discrimination, no abuse, and no disguised restriction on trade. This provision 
has been the object of controversy in several cases, including the recent WTO Appellate 
Body decisions on the 1998 Shrimp/Turtle Case. The preamble to the WTO Agreement 
recognizes the need to preserve the environment, and the case law interprets GATT 
1994 with increasing deference to environmental concerns.
The Shrimp/Turtle Case involved restrictions on imports of shrimp from the 
complainant countries because the shrimp were caught by methods that incidentally 
caught sea turtles, an endangered species. The dispute centred on a 1989 US law 
(Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act) that requires the US government to certify 
that all shrimp imported to the country are caught with methods (such as use of “turtle 
excluder devices,” or TEDs, that reduce the number of turtles caught in shrimp nets by
886 The provisions of the 1995 SSA and the measures taken by regional and subregional fisheries 
organizations in order to implement the Agreement “indicate that port State measures of control, notably 
inspections and bans on landings, are likely to increase”. David Anderson, ‘Port States and Environmental 
Protection’, in Boyle and Freestone, supra, note 81, pp. 325-344, at 344.
887 Tullio Treves, The Settlement of Disputes According to the Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995’, in 
Boyle and Freestone, supra, note, 81, pp. 253-269. See also Tullio Treves, ‘The Law of the Sea Tribunal: 
Its Status and Scope of Jurisdiction after November 16, 1994, in Symposium on The Entry into Force of 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Redistribution of Competences Between States and International
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some 90%) that protect sea turtles from incidental drowning in shrimp trawling nets. 
The US-imposed trade embargo was expanded in May 1996 to include all shrimp- 
exporting countries, and affected some 40 nations. India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand 
and the Philippines lodged complaints at the WTO in early 1997, claiming that Section 
609 violated a number of WTO rules888. On April 6, 1998, a Dispute Settlement Panel 
ruled against the shrimp embargo, arguing that it represented the kind of unilateral 
measure that ‘insofar as [it] could jeopardise the multilateral trading system, could not 
be covered by Article XX of the GATT’. On appeal, the WTO Appellate Body stated 
that WTO members may take measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible
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natural resources”, including sea turtles . However, these measures may not be applied 
in a way that is arbitrary or unjustifiable or constitutes a disguised restriction on 
international trade.
In this case, the US measure failed to meet these requirements because, in applying it, 
the United States treated some WTO members less favourably than others; did not 
accept sea turtle protection programmes of other members that were equivalent to the 
US programme; and banned imports of shrimp, even if harvested in a way that complied 
with US regulations, if the country of origin of the imports had not been certified under 
the US regulation890.
Environmental issues remain controversial in the WTO, basically for two reasons. First, 
because some developing countries fear that environmental measures may be used, 
deliberately or not, to create barriers to their exports. They also argue that they need 
economic growth to raise their own environmental standards. Secondly, because the 
work in the WTO, in its Committee on Trade and Environment, does suggest some risk 
that conflict could arise between provisions in multilateral environmental agreements
Organizations in Relation to the Management of the International Commons?, Heidelberg, January 28, 
1995. Heidelberg Journal of International Law (ZaoRV), 55/2 (1995).
888 The facts of the Case, including its history, WTO legal context and alternative multilateral solutions to 
the dispute, have been summarized in ‘Shrimp Trade and Sea Turtle Conservation’, Bridges, No. 1, April 
1997, ICTSD, Geneva.
889 WTO Panel Report: ‘United States. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products’. 
World Trade Organization, April 6, 1998, WT/DS58/R, Geneva, WTO. Document in electronic form as 
available on 5 March, 2001 on http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm
890 Gregory Shaffer, ‘WTO Shrimp-Turtle Case’, International Trade Reporter, 15 (1998), pp. 294-301.
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permitting trade measures and, on the other hand, WTO rules. It can be concluded that, 
as regards measures to ensure the conservation of fish stocks within and beyond 
national jurisdictions, unilateral measures taken by one State or group of States will 
remain highly controversial and that it is only in the framework of global and regional 
legal co-operation that the effectiveness of compliance and enforcement mechanisms 
can be achieved.
6.6 Special mechanisms for co-operation
In modem environmental treaties, States Parties are required to assist other States 
Parties which, for various reasons, are not able to take the necessary measures to 
implement the legal obligations imposed upon them by the treaty. This requirement is 
derived from Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration which recognizes that in view of their 
different contributions to global environmental degradation, developed and developing 
States have common but differentiated responsibilities. Examples of treaties providing 
for this kind of compliance assistance are found in the CBD891 and the FCCC 892. 
Assistance to developing countries to enable them to fulfil their legal obligations is also 
provided for in the FAO Compliance Agreement893 and the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries894. Assistance can also be rendered by NGOs and IGOs895.
The UNCLOS provides that in determining the allowable catch and establishing other 
conservation measures for living resources in the high seas, States shall take into
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account, inter alia, the special requirements of developing states . This obligation is
891 Arts. 20.2 and 21.1 CBD.
892 Arts. 4.3 and 11.1 FCCC.
893 Article VII, FAO Compliance Agreement.
894 Article 5 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Full recognition must be given to the special 
circumstances and requirements of developing countries, including in particular least-developed among 
them and small island developing countries.
895 Environment and Development are closely interlinked throughout the ACP-EC Lome Conventions, 
which provides that the support to be provided in the context of these Conventions must be based on a 
sustainable balance between economic objectives, rational management of the environment and the 
enhancement of human and natural resources. See Special Report No 4/99 concerning financial aid to 
overseas countries and territories under the sixth and seventh EDF accompanied by the replies of the 
Commission. Official Journal C- 276, 29/09/1999, pp. 0001-0024.
896 Articles 62, 69 and 70 of the UNCLOS
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included in the 1995 SSA, in which it is stated as a general principle (Article 5.b), and 
unlike the UNCLOS, it is also developed in Article 24.1 which reads:
"States shall give full recognition to the special requirements of 
developing States in relation to conservation and management of 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and development 
of fisheries for such stocks. To this end, States shall, either directly or 
through the United Nations Development Programme, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other specialized 
Agencies, the Global Environment Facility, the Commission on 
Sustainable Development and other appropriate international and 
regional organizations and bodies, provide assistance to developing 
States".
In giving effect to the duty to co-operate, States must take into account the following 
special requirements: the vulnerability and dependency of developing States on fisheries 
for food; the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, 
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women workers, as well as indigenous 
people in developing States, particularly small island States, and the need to ensure that 
such measures do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate 
burden of the action required for conservation onto developing States (Article 24.2).
The 1995 SSA establishes specific mechanisms through which States must co-operate, 
in particular with the least-developed among them and small islands developing 
countries, either directly or through sub-regional, regional or global organizations 
(Article 24). These mechanisms include: enhancement of the ability of developing 
States to conserve and manage SFS and HMFS and to develop their own fisheries for 
such stocks; assistance to enable them to participate in high seas fisheries897; promoting 
participation of such States in sub-regional and regional fisheries organizations; and, 
provision of financial assistance, human resource development, technical assistance, 
transfer of technology, including joint venture arrangements and advisory and 
consultative services. The assistance to developing States must be directed specifically 
towards the improvement of conservation and management measures through 
collection, reporting, verification, exchange and analysis of data and information; 
scientific assessment and research; and finally, mechanisms for monitoring, control,
897 Articles 5 and 11 of the 1995 SSA.
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surveillance, compliance, enforcement and provision of access to technology and
I
| equipment.
Conclusions
It must be recognized that the main value of the 1982 UNCLOS to the international 
community of States lies in its comprehensive character and hence also the 
comprehensive character of the integrated regime for the seas which it establishes. It has
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become apparent that some parts of this Convention are being fully implemented but 
that others are not, or are implemented only in part. In particular, it has become apparent 
that regarding compliance and enforcement mechanisms for fisheries on the high seas, 
the Convention establishes only a general framework for co-operation which thus needs 
further development, especially through revision of existing fisheries conventions 
relating to the high seas and conclusion of new ones.
With regard to fisheries on the high seas, the 1995 SSA in particular, and to some extent 
related instruments, such as the FAO Compliance Agreement and the FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, has significantly expanded the system for 
compliance and enforcement established by the UNCLOS. The enforcement provisions 
of this new Agreement require States to ensure that vessels flying their flag fishing on 
the high seas conform to conservation and management measures adopted by regional 
and sub-regional fisheries organizations, consistent with the provisions of the 
Agreement. States parties to a regional fisheries organization are allowed to board and 
inspect vessels fishing on the high seas flying the flag of another State in areas covered 
by the relevant regional organization, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with 
conservation and management measures for SFS and HMFS established by that 
organization or arrangement. In cases where evidence of violation of measures adopted 
by the regional fisheries organization is found, States may detain the vessel. Taking into
898 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention of 10 
December 1982, supra, note 200. This Agreement results from UN efforts since 1990 to reconcile 
international difficulties over seabed mining and provides an improved framework for a management 
regime aimed at more commercial recovery consistent with the new approaches of the world economy. 
Thus, this Agreement has ensured the conditions for a worldwide ratification of the UNCLOS. See Tullio 
Treves, ‘L’entree en vigueur de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le Droit de la Mer et les conditions 
de son universalisme’, AFDI, 39 (1993), pp. 850-873 and Christopher Joyner, ‘The United States and the 
New Law of the Sea’ ODIL (1996), pp. 41-58.
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account that the general lack of flag State enforcement has been a major factor in over 
exploitation of fisheries world wide, the SSA, if and when it enters into force and is 
widely ratified and implemented, has the potential for solving the problem of 
compliance and enforcement for the better conservation and management of fish stocks 
on the high seas.
In providing for such measures, the 1995 SSA equips States to solve the problem of 
compliance and enforcement on the high seas. This can be considered an advance of the 
utmost importance in the international law for fisheries.
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Chapter 7 
The dynamics of the new regime for international fisheries: 
conclusions concerning the relevance of legitimate expectations
The principle of legitimate expectations implies that States can legally rely on each 
other to behave consistently in relation to previous assurances or patterns of behaviour 
if those assurances or that behaviour is of such a type, and takes places within such a 
context, that they are considered legally relevant by most if not all States899. Byers 
argues that the principle of legitimate expectation is largely external to short-term 
interest calculations and applications of power precisely because it is a principle of 
international law900. In this context, as regards emerging legitimate expectations relating 
to international fisheries, the findings of this thesis can best be summarized by dividing 
them into two groups. The first consists of a number of specific observations that arise 
from the application of international regime theory to international law with particular 
reference to high seas fisheries. The second includes two questions to which these 
findings give rise, raised at the end of this chapter; viz (i) why is a new international 
regime emerging for international fisheries; and (ii) how will this regime operate as an 
‘institution’ able to influence the behaviour of states and their subjects in order to 
address the complex problem of fisheries conservation and management on the high 
seas, and the further development of the Law of the Sea and the protection of the 
environment in general, and the international law pertaining to fisheries in particular.
7.1 The conclusions
The structure of this thesis follows both the International Regime Theory and the 
provisions of the SSA.
899 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, supra, note 59, p. 107.
900 Ibid, p. 109.
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In Chapter 1 the theoretical framework adopted for this investigation is discussed, 
which applies the international regime theory evolved by specialists in international 
relations to the analysis of a problem arising in international law; namely the regulation 
of fishing on the high seas. The hypothesis addressed in this work is that a new regime 
for fisheries on the high seas, able to influenciate the behaviour of States, is emerging in 
the international arena. Four interconnected elements are relied on to establish this 
hypothesis: (z) a scientific and diplomatic consensus about the nature of the specific 
issues requiring to be addressed regarding fisheries; (zz) a core of informal and 
formalized principles, norms and rules contained mainly in the 1995 SSA, but also in 
other related international legal instruments; (zzz) organizational and decision-making 
procedures that constitute the operational aspects of the international regime; and (iv) a 
set of compliance and enforcement mechanisms enabling international society to ensure 
effective management of the problems of fisheries within global commons. These four 
elements characterise the continuous process of development and improvement of 
International Environmental Law in the field of fisheries.
The achievement of the necessary scientific and diplomatic consensus on the nature of 
specific fisheries issues is established in the analysis of the 1995 UN Conference on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks which is presented in Chapter 
2. This Chapter addressed the proposition that both scientific and diplomatic consensus 
are preconditions for an international environmental regime of fisheries on the high 
seas. The existence of an international regime will remain ambiguous as long as 
differences exist among the scientists and states concerned about the scientific aspects 
of the issues. The global scientific consensus regarding the actions required to ensure 
sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of the high seas has 
emerged from the actions initiated pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 17 of 
UNCED’s Agenda 21, the authoritative participation of its member States in the debates 
of FAO, the issues arising in the ‘Estai Case’ and the controversial actions of Canada 
and Chile, the former in arresting the Estai and the latter in adopting legislation creating 
a ‘presential sea’. The last three developments in particular, exerted influential 
constraints during the Conference negotiations by highlighting the problems now 
arising from the existence of excess fishing capacity on the high seas which might lead 
to widespread unilateral action and thus exert pressure for the adoption of measures. 
The balancing of the duties and rights of coastal States and States fishing on the high
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seas was the core goal aimed at the attempt to achieve a diplomatic consensus on a new 
international regime for fisheries on the high seas.
Chapter 3 examined the issues arising from the fact that the key legal questions 
concerning straddling and highly migratory fish stocks had been left unresolved by both 
the 1958 and the 1982 UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea and the resultant 
Conventions, respectively the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and the 1982 
UNCLOS. Articles 63.2 and 114-120 of the latter did not establish appropriate measures 
for conservation of stocks occurring within the EEZ of two or more states or both within 
an EEZ and the area beyond and adjacent to it. Subsequently, by establishing a core of 
general principles and rules, the 1995 SSA achieved the “equation” or "balance of 
interests" between coastal and fishing States on which a new, more conservatory regime 
could be based. These general principles and rules include specific provisions for the 
conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks that are far 
more precise than those laid down in the 1982 UNCLOS. The adoption of concepts and 
approaches such as the Large Marine Ecosystem; acceptance of the need for the 
sustainability and protection of marine biodiversity; protection of the marine 
environment inhabited by the fish; procedures for monitoring, control and surveillance; 
a precautionary approach; and recognition and protection of the interests of artisanal and 
subsistence fishermen, mark an advance in international standards for the conservation 
and management of fisheries. In achieving this, the 1995 SSA Agreement is consistent 
with, but goes further than the UNCLOS on many issues, providing, with the support of 
other related international legal instruments, the legal basis for a new regime for 
fisheries on the high seas.
The study of the third element of the new regime, the organization and decision making 
procedures that deliver the operational aspects of the international regime is conducted 
in Chapter 4, on fisheries management organizations, and Chapter 5, on decision­
making procedures. In Chapter 4 it was submitted that the 1995 SSA, as well as other 
related international legal instruments for fisheries on the high seas, is providing 
specific and detailed mechanisms for the process of restructuring existing and future 
fisheries organizations, as appropriate. Not all existing fisheries organizations require 
‘restructuring’ although they may need to acquire better enforcement powers, perhaps 
by adoption of additional protocols establishing joint enforcement schemes. The 1995
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SSA also qualifies the open access regime of high seas fisheries by restricting the access 
of non-contracting parties to specific areas. It was also concluded in Chapter 4 that 
despite these improvements, the new regime does not provide permanent mechanisms 
for ensuring that there is not get an effective linkage between all relevant fisheries 
organizations that would enable co-operation on and co-ordination of fisheries policies. 
This deficiency, if not resolved, could have serious implications for the future 
implementation of the new international regime for fisheries. Taking the view that the 
problem of linkage and co-ordination of fisheries organizations has not been resolved by 
the 1995 SSA, the analysis conducted in this Chapter led to the conclusion that FAO 
and the WTO are the most suitable organizations for ensuring this co-ordination and 
fostering the extensive institutional developments necessary for the implementation of 
the new regime. In this context, the WTO Shrimp-Turtle Ruling shows how both trade 
and conservation arguments are crucial to a settlement of fisheries disputes901.
Chapter 5 considered the proposition that the 1995 SSA is in fact realigning the interests 
of coastal and fishing States in the global commons fisheries by redesigning the 
structure of the decision-making procedures relating to them. On the basis of this 
analysis of the system for decision-making, it was concluded that the Agreement is 
establishing a scientific basis, the minimum standards and a new equation of interests 
and measures which will ensure the compatibility of conservation and management 
measures for the management of both SFS and HMFS. In this respect, it was submitted 
that the Agreement is by implication reinforcing an institutional setting within which it 
is possible that, in the future, a system recognizing the property rights of fishermen in 
SFS will be established902. Thus, the new regime is bringing about a change of 
perspective: all rights are in reality ‘shared powers’ i.e. shared between the holder of the
901 See Matthew Stilwell and Charles Arden-Clarke, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: A Crisis for 
Sustainable Development, (CIEL, Oxfam and Community Nutrition Institute, 1998), pp. 2-5
902 The economic problems, attributed to market failure and externalities (see Chapter 3, Section 1.2 of 
this thesis, ‘the market failure approach’), such as fisheries problems, derive from weak or absent 
property rights (see Chapter 5, Section 5 of this thesis). The more extensive and higher quality the 
property rights are, the more efficient and productive the economy will be. As Amason has demonstrated, 
property rights are limited for two basic factors: first, technical limitations, consisting in the need to resort 
to the use of indirect and imperfect property rights mechanisms such as harvesting rights in fisheries; and 
secondly, social limitations involving inevitably opposition to the changes, reallocations of power and 
radical shifts in the social institutions. See Ragnar Amason, ‘Property Rights as a Means of Economic 
Organization’. A Paper for the Course on Rights-based Fisheries Management, International Conference 
on the Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management, Fremantle, Australia, 11-19 November 1999, pp. 
19-21.
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| power and the community of States, in which regard for the interests of other States and 
of all States is of the essence903. This change of perspective is being driven by the fact 
that the international regulatory mechanisms are being reconstructed as part of a process 
of negotiated compromises between nation-states. Leyshon has pointed out that the 
tendency towards geoeconomic competition within the global economy precludes the 
construction of international regulatory mechanisms capable of controlling the tendency 
towards over accumulation on a world scale or preventing further environmental 
degradation904.
The fourth factor upon which the new regime relies for its success is a new approach to 
compliance and enforcement mechanisms studied in Chapter 6. What is innovative 
about the 1995 SSA is surely that it makes the conduct of fisheries on the high seas 
conditional upon participation in the relevant fisheries Conventions (Organizations), 
which means conditioned by the rules, regulations and enforcement powers and 
mechanisms recognized in that Convention. The main proposition advanced in that 
chapter is that, by adopting innovative provisions, the 1995 SSA allocates enforcement 
powers to fisheries organizations and to States, mainly coastal States, and in this way 
regulates the freedom of fishing on the high seas. These provisions, which include 
mainly new obligations for flag States and new duties for and jurisdiction of port States 
as well as stringent procedures for boarding and inspecting, are necessary for solving 
the previous weaknesses and problems of securing effective compliance and 
enforcement on the high seas. The strength of its compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms creates high expectations for the efficacy of the future of the regime, if and 
when the 1995 SSA enters into force, taking into account that regimes with strong 
compliance mechanisms can considerably alter the behaviour of actor’s participants.
903 Philip Allott, ‘Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea’, AJIL, 11 (1983), pp. 1-29. A book of interest in 
this broad context is P. Allott, Eunomia, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990).
904 Andrew Leyshon, ‘The Transformation of Regulatory Order: Regulating the Global Economy and 
Environment’, Geoforum, 23 (1992), p. 249. In the same direction, reviewing the role of market forms in 
environmental degradation, Judith Rees has demonstrated that the achievement of sustainable 
development will continue to depend on the complex process which create social values and drive 
political and economic decision making. Judith Rees, ‘Markets: the Panacea for Environmental 
Regulation?’, Geoforum, 23 (1992), p. 383. See also Judith Rees, Natural Resources, supra, note 24, pp. 
129-132.
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In addition to articulating the findings of the investigation into the enforcement aspects 
of the new regime, one of the purposes of this concluding chapter is to provide the basis 
for discussion of the directions that future policy and research concerning the 
development of international law for the global commons might take in particular 
concerning the nature and causes of substantive problems and the types of regulatory 
regimes to be established in order to dealt with them, which must effectively enable a 
solution. In this respect, it is submitted that the findings arising from the present 
research have implications for the analysis and practice of international law in general. 
Thus, the contribution of this research can be summarized under two headings: (/) 
providing a critique of the methodology for increasing the opportunities for 
interdisciplinary research in international law and international relations; and (ii) 
identifying the evolution of international legal regulation of the global commons in the 
future. These aspects are outlined below.
7.2 Interdisciplinary research in International Law and International 
Relations
The conclusions under this heading derive from the application of the methodological 
framework constructed for the analysis of the problematique addressed in this thesis. By 
bringing together, on one hand, the legal analysis of the 1995 SSA on international 
fisheries and, on the other, the theoretical dilemmas raised by evolving international 
regimes theory as developing in international relations, it is submitted that this thesis 
contributes to a better understanding of the problems and potentialities of developing 
international environmental law for the protection and management of the global 
commons and, in particular, of the recent attempts by the international society to 
establish an international regime for fisheries on the high seas, following failure of the 
previous attempts to do so. In fact, the implications of the "interlinked approach" are not 
new905. Various recent articles essays have claimed for the prospects and advantages of
905 Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, ’System Analysis of International Law: A Methodological Inquiry’, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 17 (1986), pp. 45-74; Kenneth Abbott, Modern International 
Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers’, Yale Journal of International Law, 14 (1989); 
Phillip Trimble, ‘International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies’, Stanford Law Review, 42 
(1990), pp. 811-845; John Gamble and Natalie Shields, ‘International Legal Scholarship: a Perspective on 
Teaching and Publishing’, Journal of Legal Education 39 (1989), pp. 39-46; David Kennedy, ‘A New 
Stream of International Law Scholarship’, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1 (1988); Nigel Purvis, 
‘Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law’ HJIL 32 (1991). Koskenniemi has stressed that the 
move away from general principles and formal rules into contextually determined equity may reflect a
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interdisciplinarity between international law and international relations with particular 
references to International Regime Theory906.
However, it is submitted that one of the main contributions of this thesis relates to the 
use and application in international law of the concept of the international regime, a 
widely studied theory in international relations which provides a specific link enabling 
the connection of two areas of social sciences which are often related in their subject 
matter but separated in academic discussion. In an enlightening article published in July 
1998, Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood endorsed this approach, outlining the importance 
of law as an other "explanatory factor in the analysis of state behaviour in the 
international system"907. They have suggested ways of applying international regime 
theory in international law and international relations scholarship to generate theoretical 
explanations of particular substantive problems and to provide better understandings of 
the meaning and functions of institutions, procedures and international agreements such 
as the 1995 SSA908. In conclusion, these authors state that in the aftermath of the Cold 
War, the use of international regime theory is valuable to the extent that it sharpens our 
understanding of the function and structure of particular institutional arrangements 
within a deepening and mutually profitable dialogue between International Law and 
International Relations909. It is submitted that the findings of this thesis support the 
proposition that, if such an approach is followed, international institutions might better 
perform their functions for purposes of precluding the depletion of those fisheries that
turn in the development of international legal thought and practice in which social conflict is increasingly 
met with flexible, contextually determines standards and compromises. See Martti Koskenniemi, The 
Politics of International Law’, EJIL, 4 (1990), pp. 4-32.
906 Recent works analysing the relationship between IR Theory and International Law include Anne- 
Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’, AJIL 87 
(1993); Martti Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security’, Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 17 (1996) 455-464; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger (eds.), 
Theories of International Regimes, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997); Charles Kegley 
(ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, (St. 
Martins Press, 1995); Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches, 
(Columbia, Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Beck et al. (eds.), International Rules, supra, note 
60; and, most recently, Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, supra, note 59.
907 Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., 'International Law and International Relations Theory’ supra, note 41, p. 
367.
908 Ibid, pp. 375-376.
909 Ibid, p. 393.
269
are found in the global commons. A successful application of international regime 
theory in international law might encourage scholars to develop the theoretical basis of 
regime building and to apply this methodology to other international issues relating to 
| natural resources and collective goods.
The essential quality of an inter-disciplinary approach is to understand the other 
discipline from the inside, using the methods and conclusions generated by others.
I International Relations approach has much to offer international law. As Hurrell has 
pointed out, the greatest contribution of international relations has been to develop a 
theoretically sophisticated account of norms and institutions and to be willing to face up 
to the difficult questions that lawyers have often avoided, in particular, under what 
conditions law is likely to be effective? and how can be explained variances in patterns 
of compliance? 910. On the other hand, as Anne-Marie Slaughter has stressed, 
international law can have a strong influence on domestic politics through the 
mechanism of mobilizing domestic political actors and providing focal points for stable 
domestic equilibrium in a context where states are conceptualized in ways that render 
the domestic-international links as transparent as possible while maintaining the 
medium of State agency911. As regards a new international regime for fisheries on the 
high seas, this thesis, based on a method linking the international regime theory and the 
legal provisions of the SSA, has provided understanding on the factors that will 
strengthen reciprocity within the system for the purpose of ensuring that states will 
operate within the parameters of a regime. This approach has demonstrated the 
importance of identifying mechanisms by which all the actors will be convinced that 
there is no danger of defection and that it becomes worthwhile pursuing a collaborative 
strategy in order to produce the optimum result.
910 Andrew Hurrell, “Conclusion: International Law and the Changing Constitution of International 
Society”, in Michael Byers, The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations 
and International Law, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2.001), p. 328.
911 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations, Acaddmie de Droit 
International, Recueil del Cours, Vol. 285, 2000, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), p. 233.
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7.3 The evolution of international regulations of the global commons
The second conclusion it is submitted also has far-reaching implications. The theoretical 
conclusion arising from this research is that, as regards fisheries on the high seas, the 
role of the State as a principal actor is now being shared with regional and sub-regional 
| fisheries organizations. It is now widely recognized that, largely owing to globalization, 
the Westphalian system, premised on the concept of the sovereign independence of the 
State, is no longer operative and cannot be revived in the context of the trend to present 
globalization in the world affairs. During the coming decades, the operational 
sovereignty of formally sovereign governments "is likely to continue to be eroded by 
their own decisions, shaped by interdependence, to seek effectiveness at the expense of 
legal freedom of action"912. Anthony Arend argues that as the international system 
structure, including international legal rules, is socially constructed it plays a role in
01 Taltering the identity of the actors . Therefore, in today’s setting, the only way most 
States can express and realize a ’new sovereignty’ is through participation in the various 
regimes that regulate and order the international system. States have a propensity to 
comply with such regimes once established and the emerging conditions of the ’new 
sovereignty’ have the potential to increase interactions, interdependence and reliance on 
international law and international regimes914. In this respect, in international 
environmental law, regional organizations, as well as NGOs, have been allowed new 
forms of access to and participation in the law-making process that makes them 
increasingly visible and important players in the process of international co-operation, 
and that participation often yields political, technical and informational benefits for 
States915. This is the direction to which Agenda 21 pointed the way, e.g. in Chapters 17, 
27, 28 and 31.
Under the new regime, regional and sub-regional fisheries organizations have a much 
enhanced an increased role in the implementation of the provision of the 1995 SSA. Part 
III of the Agreement establishes the structure, functions and mechanisms of fisheries
912 Robert O. Keohane, ’Sovereignty, Interdependence, and International Institutions’, in Linda Miller and 
Michael Joseph Smith (eds.), Ideas and Ideals, Essays on Politics in Honour of Stanley Hoffmann, 
(Boulder, Westview Press, 1993), p. 103.
913 Anthony C. Arend, Do legal rules matter?’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 38 (1998), p. 140.
914 Chayes and Chayes, New Sovereignty, supra, note 766, p. 27.
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organizations. The increased authority of such organizations derives from requirements 
that: all states fishing in a region either join or at least abide by the measures adopted by 
the relevant organization; only states which comply with those requirements will have 
| access to the fisheries protected by a regional agreement; states which do not comply 
are obliged to prevent their vessels from fishing on the stock concerned; other States’ 
members of the regional fishery or arrangement are permitted to take action consistent 
with international law to deter fishing by vessels from a state which is a non-member or 
participant. This investigation has substantiated the conclusion that the transfer of 
powers to regional and sub-regional fisheries organizations is absolutely necessary for 
the effective implementation of the new international regime. However, a crucial 
question remains: will the 1995 SSA and the FAO Compliance Agreement enter into 
force and, if so, for which States? The 1995 SSA could, if this occurs, mark the second 
time that the international community has gathered the political will to improve on the 
Convention, the first being the Agreement for the Implementation of Part XI. According 
to Burke,
“Unless coastal States are satisfied that foreign fishing effort on 
straddling stocks can be brought under control either by international 
mechanisms or through directly agreed coastal States measures, the 
potential exists for another round of extended jurisdiction to get under 
way. If the 200 mile EEZ is breached as a result, an accelerating cascade 
of departures from the treaty could be set in motion, eroding if not 
destroying the stability of expectations that is the EEZ’s foremost 
contribution to world order”916.
The theoretical framework adopted for this investigation about international regimes 
comprehends five categories of analysis: (0 scientific and diplomatic consensus; (ii) 
general principles and rules; (iii) fisheries management organizations; (iv) decision­
making procedures; and (v) compliance mechanisms. This methodological approach has 
facilitated the identification of the strengths and weakness of the new regime, which is 
basically formed by the 1995 SSA and other related international legally binding 
instruments for fisheries on the high seas as well as numerous non-binding ones. These 
instruments are: the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; the 1993
915 Karl Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution" in International Environmental Law’, HELR, 21 
(1997), pp. 537-586, at 584.
9,6 W. T. Burke, ‘Importance of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its Future 
Development’, ODIL21 (1996),pp. 1-17.
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FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas; the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Jakarta Mandate; UNCED’s Declaration of Principles on 
Environment and Development and Agenda 21, particularly its Chapter 17; the FAO 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; the UN Resolutions on Drifnet Fishing; and 
the Cancun Declaration.
The conclusions of this thesis further demonstrate that the strength of the new regime 
lies in its provision, at the international level, of a comprehensive set of rules and 
principles for the rational management of fisheries on the high seas. The 1982 UNCLOS 
provided the legal framework for the conservation and management of marine living 
resources beyond areas of national jurisdiction, but did not develop detailed measures 
for the settlement of conflicting claims to fisheries and conservation measures on the 
high seas. Neither did it establish decision-making procedures requiring the 
establishment of fisheries organizations and compliance mechanisms to ensure adequate 
governance of those resources. Now, however, on the basis of a renewed "balance of 
interests" between coastal States and States fishing on the High Seas, a new “legal 
equation” has emerged. The new 1995 SSA has the potential to set important precedents 
in international law for the conservation and management of international fisheries. The 
balancing of rights and duties in an increasingly interdependent world is indeed a 
necessary direction in which international environmental law must head:
"On the one hand, States have the right to pursue freely their own 
economic and environmental policies, including conservation and 
utilization of their natural wealth and the free disposal of their natural 
resources; on the other hand, obligations and responsibilities have
Q 1 7emerged, which confine States' freedom of action" .
This thesis has demonstrated that the 1995 SSA not only implements the 1982 
UNCLOS but also goes beyond it, providing the legal basis for the new regime. This 
new system is clearly limiting the principle of freedom of fishing i.e. in conditioning the 
right to fish on the high seas, as well as establishing more rigorous rules for navigation
917 Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. Balancing Rights and Duties, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 252. See also Camilleri and Falk, The End of Sovereignty, supra, 
note 232, p. 145.
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on the high seas with the clear purpose of conserving and managing straddling and 
highly migratory fish stocks. In so doing, the 1995 SSA is not in conflict with the
I principle of freedom of the high seas, as recognized by international law. Philip Allott
i
has demonstrated that “the story of the development of international society since 1945 
is the story of a progression from legal freedoms to legal powers”918, in which a 
freedom implies the absence of legal control while a power implies the absence of 
unfettered discretion. Each holder of a power under the law must act as an agent of all 
society. In that writer’s opinion, in modem international society, the authority flows 
from those who participate in the system919. Allott concludes that states are not only 
representatives of their nationals, but are also appointed as representatives of the 
international community as a whole920 to organize the world governance921.
Further correlative findings from this investigation concerning the weaknesses of the 
new regime emerge from and justify the use of the multi-level analysis adopted in this 
thesis. These weaknesses can be identified as follows: first, the Agreement does not 
make specific provision for linkage and co-ordination between regional and sub­
regional fisheries organizations although this is vital to the implementation of the Large 
Marine Ecosystem approach. Secondly, although new entrants have always presented a 
problem in international fisheries organizations, such organizations will have to face 
complex problems in the future, mainly regarding the possibility of new members 
entering such organizations as well as the larger number of members and participants in 
such organizations demanding access to the fishery. Thirdly, external economic factors 
identified in this investigation can negatively affect the new regime particularly on the 
one hand, the increasing number of new vessels now added every year to the world's 
large-scale industrial fishing fleet; and, on the other, payment of government subsidies 
that currently encourage overfishing.
918 Philip Allott, ‘Power Sharing’, supra, note 903, pp. 1-28.
919 Ibid., p. 27.
920 Ibid.
921 Global Governance means doing internationally what governments do at home. Global Governance 
transcends national frontiers and has been defined by Finkelstein as “governing without sovereign 
authority”. See Lawrence Finkelstein, ‘What is Global Governance?’, Global Governance, 1 (1995), pp. 
367-375. Desai has defined Global Governance as a framework of rules by which all the participants 
agree to abide. See Desai and Redfem (eds.), Global Governance, supra, note 309, p. 19.
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These are complex matters solutions to which demand improved international co­
operation and adequate political conditions for a comprehensive approach to the 
management of the global commons. This thesis identifies possible opportunities to 
overcome the factors that weaken the new regime of fisheries on the high seas. First, for 
purposes of improving the co-ordination of fisheries organizations and their co­
ordination with commissions, it seems that FAO and WTO are the most suitable 
organizations to ensure such a co-ordination and to foster extensive institutional 
developments for protection of the marine living resources in the high seas, taking into 
account the number of regional fisheries organizations already created and functioning 
under the auspices of FAO and, on the other hand the linkage between trade and the 
exploitation of international fish stocks. Secondly, concerning new entrants, the 
conclusion from this investigation is that the Agreement is de facto contributing to the 
establishment of an institutional framework within which a form of property rights 
could be recognized. In a rights-based fishery, regulators grant each participant the right 
to gain access to a geographic area at certain times. It is widely recognized in economic 
theory that setting up private or public ownership of previously unowned resources will 
create a better opportunity for their sustainable use. Therefore, in this regard, the 1995 
SSA is a positive step in the right direction.
Only with a comprehensive and accurate understanding of fishing industries as well as 
of its constituent components can fishery policies be properly formulated922. Therefore, 
the issue concerning subsidies and the increasing number of fishing and industrial 
fishing vessels deserves deeper analysis. It is clear that States, as the main actors in the 
international system, can determine their behaviour unilaterally and they are able to 
pursue what are basically their own interests. Thus, at the present stage, many States are 
promoting development of shipping technology in order to improve the fishing capacity 
of their industrial fleets. In addition, according to World Bank and FAO estimates, 
many states, developed states in particular, provide annually between 25-50 billion US 
dollars in the form of government subsidies to the fishing industry. These two activities
922 Policy makers and fishery managers require accurate overviews of the performance of their harvesting 
sectors; productivity or fishing power, trends in effective, as opposed to nominal effort; and productivity 
“creep” due to unmeasurable factors. See Dale Squires, ‘Sources of Growth in Marine Fishing Industries’, 
Marine Policy, 18 (1994), pp. 4-11. In addition, Burke recognizes that the management difficulties 
concerning straddling stocks are not responsible for the widespread failure of fishery management around 
the globe. W. T. Burke, ‘Importance of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and its Future 
Development’, ODIL, 27 (1996), pp. 1-7, at 3.
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are increasingly contributing to the plundering of fish stocks and could undermine the 
new regime. It has been concluded that industrial fishing fleets capacity must be cut by 
50 per cent if overfishing is to be eliminated and stocks allowed to recover, and that 
subsidies must be progressively dismantled. The WTO Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement provide justification for eliminating subsidies which encourage 
over fishing923. However, doing this will require serious commitments and strict 
implementation at the regional and national levels to become effective924.
This thesis has demonstrated that the setting of biological objectives alone is not 
sufficient for the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks. Economic and 
political objectives also need to be considered for fisheries at the international level. At 
its present stage, the international system may appear ’anarchical’. As the late Hedley 
Bull pointed out in 1977,
"To avert a universal ’tragedy of the commons’, all men in the long run 
may have to learn to accept limitations of their freedom to determine the 
size of their families, to consume energy and other resources and to 
pollute their environment, and a states system that cannot provide these 
limitations may be dysfunctional"925.
This concept of 'anarchical' international system is closely associated to the economist’s 
model of the perfect market. Outcomes are supposed to emerge automatically as 
aggregate results of unilateral decisions on the basis of 'spontaneous' co-ordination. But, 
the fact of the matter is that, so far, the international system has not been effective for 
the conservation and management of international fisheries. Because the high seas are in 
effect 'unowned', any State926 can use, and often abuse them, with relative dispensation. 
There are no market mechanisms through which access to a common property fisheries'
923 Although not aimed at eliminating subsidies, the Council of the European Union has recently adopted 
a Resolution laying down detailed rules and arrangements limiting the provision of Community structural 
assistance in the fisheries sector. Council Resolution (EC) No. 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999. Official 
Journal of the European Community, L337/10, 30.12.1999.
924 The issue of subsidy reform in the fisheries sector has been introduced as part of the agenda for serious 
consideration in the context of the next round of multilateral trade negotiations. See ‘Fisheries Subsidies 
and Overfishing: Toward a Structured Discussion’, Paper prepared and presented by Gareth Porter for the 
UNEP Fisheries Workshop, Geneva, 12 February 2001, Economics and Trade Unit, UNEP.
925 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, (London, MacMillan, 
Second Edition 1995), p. 283.
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I resource could be allocated among users. As demonstrated in this thesis, the main
i
purpose of the new regime is that it will effect the transformation of fisheries from the 
status of a common property resource to a system based on limited entry. This "market 
failure" can be overcome only by hierarchical co-ordination.
But in spite of, or because of, this ’anarchical’ system and market failures, new 
institutions are emerging. Pursuing their own interests, States are now able to co­
ordinate their behaviour within international organizations established by them in 
common and are also able to establish international regimes charged to act according to 
commonly agreed standards927. In this context, the role of international law to date has 
been paradoxical and somewhat ambiguous, as it has contributed, in the view of some 
authors, to retarding the development of international society as a common society:
"failing to recognize itself as a society, international society has not 
known that it has a constitution. Not knowing its own constitution, it has 
ignored the generic principles of a constitution"928.
It is in this context that study of international regime theory applied to the global 
commons can bring insights into international law. Regime theory brings together 
international law and political factors to help in the understanding of why and how 
States may co-operate even in the absence of international global authorities and 
hegemonic powers that could forcefully influence them to do so929. In international 
regime theory, co-ordination is not based on spontaneous co-ordination of the market, 
but on a community-oriented approach based on the voluntary implementation of 
obligations by the actors involved930. In this perspective, negotiation, balancing of
926 A fisherman will need to fly a flag to operate on the seas.
927 More than 110 countries have adopted a new Plan of Action Against Illegal, Unregulated and 
Unreported (IUU) Fishing promoted by the FAO. Although a voluntary Agreement, the Plan aims at 
preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing making more difficult for fishing vessels to threaten the 
sustainability of the fisheries resources, stressing flag State Responsibility. FAO Press Release 01/11, 
Rome, 2 March, 2001. See also Greenpeace News Headlines, Newslink, Friday, 2 March, 2001, 
Greenpeace International, http://www.greenpeace.org
928 Philip Allott, Eunomia, supra, note 903, p. 418.
929 Gerd Junne, Beyond Regime Theory’, Acta Politica, Amsterdam, January 1992/1.
930 Lee Kimball has identified three categories of functions performed by international institutions which 
must be integrated in order to serve the needs of protecting the global environment: scientific data and 
technical skills; compliance and enforcement; and effective co-ordination. See Lee Kimball, 
‘International Law and Institutions: the Oceans and Beyond’, ODIL, 20 (1989), pp. 147-165.
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individual interests and the development of common perception of a global problem and 
its appropriate solution are essential aspects of regime formation931. The role played by 
the United Nations in the last twenty years has been substantial in developing new rules 
i and norms of international law for co-operation and settlement of disputes932. More 
specifically, the United Nations has provided global forums for negotiation and 
adoption of international agreements, codes and declarations that tackle complex 
problems of fisheries in international law. Thus, the United Nations promotes the setting 
; of new regimes, but States are expected to act under international law in bonnae fides 
for the benefit of collective co-operation, a principle that also underpins the 
effectiveness of treaty law.
Whether the new international regime for fisheries on the high seas actually emerges or 
not, is more a matter of better international co-operation and, therefore, of the capacity 
of States to overcome their conflicts in the future933, taking into account that, in strict 
application of the pacta tertiis rule934, the 1995 Agreement does not create any legal 
obligation for third States, but only for the States parties935. The key issue, with respect 
to the viability of the Agreement continues to be the resolution of the ‘new members
931 Thomas Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes. Institutions for International Environmental 
Governance, (Berlin, Peter Lang, 1994), pp. 482-483.
932 Christopher Joyner, The United Nations as International Law-giver, in The United Nations and 
International Law, (Cambridge, ASIL and Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 457.
933 According to Art. 40, the 1994 SSA will enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the 
thirtieth instrument of ratification or accession. The SSA has been ratified by 29 States: Australia, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Maldives, Mauritius, The Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, 
Norway, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon 
Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga, United States of America and Uruguay. Information updated on 27 August 
2001, as available on 2 October 2001, on http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Fish-status.htm. While there are 
some important fishing States absent from the list of ratifications such as the EU and Japan, it seems that 
it is just a matter of time before the thirtieth ratification is reached.
934 Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (agreements do not give rights, neither do they impose obligations 
on third States) is a basic rule of customary international law dating back to Roman law. See R. Bledsoe 
and B. Boczek, The International Law Dictionary, (Santa Barbara, ABC-Clio, Inc., 1987), pp. 259-260.
935 Erik Franckx, ‘Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 december 1982 Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’, FAO Legal Papers, Online, 
No. 8, June 2000. Document in electronic form as available on http://www.fao.org/Legal/Prs- 
OL/franckx.pdf on 5 March 2000.
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I problem’ and the ‘interloper problem’936. The 1982 UNCLOS can effectively influence 
j the process of applying the provisions of the 1995 SSA through the participation of 
States in the process of elaborating norms, rules and standards for international 
fisheries. The participation of both coastal and fishing States in UNCLOS will be 
crucial for the implementation on the SSA . The potential for collective action will 
increase as States begin truly to understand the need for co-operative action and as this 
understanding outweighs the bias toward the assertion of national sovereignty938. The 
need for integrated, fully functioning authoritative and legitimate regimes for managing 
the global environment has become increasingly pressing939. Johnson has stated that it is 
not possible to propel the concept of “global resources” too far without coming into 
conflict with the basic principles of international law as we know them today, in 
particular, the principle of the sovereignty of States940; however, global environmental 
problems require nations to surrender some sovereignty in order to facilitate and benefit 
of collective action941.
The new regime for fisheries has been progressively developed in the direction of 
reliance on the principle of long-term reciprocity through acceptance of participatory 
rights. Away from competitive fishing, this regime has been designed to restructure
936 According to Bjomdal and Munro, the resolution of these issues will demand the skills and ingenuity 
of economists and specialists in international law working in close collaboration, a proposal that suggest, 
indirectly, the need for dealing with high seas fisheries in the context of the International Regime Theory. 
See Trond Bjorndal and Gordon Munro, The Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources and the 
Implementation of the U. N. Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995: Problems and Prospects’. Article in 
electronic form as available on http://osu.orst.edu/dept/IIFET/2000/papers/bjomdal.pdf on 5 March 2001.
937 See A.L. Kolodkin, V.V. Andrianov and V. A. Kiselev, ‘Legal Implications of Participation and or 
Non-participation in the 1982 Convention’, Marine Policy, July 1988.
938 Susan Bragdon, ‘National Sovereignty and Global Environment Responsibility: Can the Tension be 
Reconciled for the Conservation of Biological Diversity?’, Harvard International Law Review, 33 (1992), 
pp. 381-392.
939 Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, 'Global Accord: Imperatives for the Twenty-First Century', in 
Choucri (ed.), Global Accord, supra, note 74, p. 495.
940 Therefore, according to him, “in years to come, we shall certainly see more intergovernmental co­
operation designed to achieve common actions in areas of common concern”; Stanley Johnson, ‘Evolving 
Perceptions: Legal Aspects of the Protection of the Environment in Areas not Subject to National 
Jurisdiction (Global Commons)’, in N. Al-Nauimi and R. Meese (eds.), International Legal Issues Arising 
under the United Nations Decade of International Law (Kluwer, The Netherlands, 1995), pp. 295-315.
941 Geoffrey Palmer, ‘New Ways to Make International Environment Law’, supra, note 761, pp. 259-271.
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incentives towards rational exploitation and conservation942. The depletion of fish 
stocks is causing wider changes and repercussions in the ocean environment and can 
i  affect food security patterns943. Declining production and international concern about 
the sustainability of capture fisheries have the potential to hasten the fisheries’ collapse 
and create major disorder in the world’s international system. Declining fisheries in the 
high seas could incite a real threat to oceanic security and the potential for critical 
generation of problems is always present944. If international society, as it should under 
the UN Charter, is to prevent extensive outbreaks of conflict, its members have no 
option but to implement the new regime. Concerning this, in adopting ’managerial’ 
approaches to compliance, the 1995 SSA offers two avenues for implementation. First, 
the legal obligations of States regarding conservation and management of straddling and 
highly migratory fish stocks can be ’internalized’ in domestic legislation through a 
process of ’internal acceptance’ based mainly on collective interests, rather than on 
’imposition^45. Secondly, avoiding any attempt to create tools for coercion, the new 
regime has introduced the possibility of resort to the sanction of international 
embarrassment and the social opprobrium that accompanies the disclosure of a 
responsible state’s dereliction of its internationally accepted obligations946. Reciprocity 
is also frequently cited as a reason why international law does work947. These are, 
undoubtedly, major achievements of the new regime for international fisheries.
942 According to Ellen Hey, behind the developments in the law for international fisheries lies a 
reconceptualization that involves a shift in the perception of both the interests to be protected and the 
nature of the actor to be regulated; this reconceptualization in turn has affected the relationship between 
the duty to cooperate and the right of access to high seas fisheries resources. See Ellen Hey, 
‘Reconceptualization of the Issues Involved in International Fisheries Conservation and Management’, in 
Ellen Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law, (Dordrecht, Kluwer Law International, 
1999), pp. 577-578. In opinion of Hedley, “in recent years, the international law of fisheries has 
undergone something of a revolution”. See Chris Hedley, ‘International Relations and the Common 
Fisheries Policy: the Legal Framework’, Document on electronic form as available on 5 March, 2001, on 
the Web Site http://www.oceanlaw.net/hedley/pubs/bergen2000.htm
943 Brown and Kane, Full House, supra, note 548, pp. 75-88.
944 James M. Broadus and Raphael V. Vartanov, The Oceans and Environmental Security. Shared U.S. 
and Russian Perspectives, (Washington, Island Press, 1994), p. 248.
945 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, Yale Law Journal, 106 (1997), pp. 
2549-2568. According to Chayes and Chayes, "the fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance 
with treaties at an acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty 
organization, and the wider public", supra, note 766, pp. 25.
946 Colburn, Turbot Wars', supra, note 41, p. 363.
947 See Georges Abi-Saab, ‘De la sanction en Droit International. Essai de clarification’, in Makarczyk 
(ed.), Theory of International Law, supra, note 83, pp. 61-78, and in particular pp. 69-70.
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I This thesis represents an attempt to study a specific international environmental
i  problem holistically rather than in a pragmatic way. This interdisciplinary investigation
into international law and international relations focused on high seas fisheries has been 
traversed by the idea that international regime theory provides an integrated and 
adequate framework for the study of interstate co-operation over fisheries regarded as a 
global commons. The central problem here is how to integrate the approach concerning 
interstate relations regarding fisheries on the high seas with an understanding of a 
State’s position within a global market. In this context, this thesis has attempted to 
contribute to the knowledge about both the theoretical and pragmatic legal issues arising 
in relation to the emerging regime of fisheries on the high seas. To the extent that the 
resolution of the problem of depletion of fisheries on the high seas requires political 
measures to be taken in order to restrain production and to introduce mechanisms of 
more equitable justice and distribution948, it will also require broad transformation in 
States’ legal interactions on this issue. Indeed, any interdisciplinary enterprise in such 
fields cannot finish with limited integration of international law and international 
relations. As Byers argues, “other disciplines, such as history, economics, sociology, 
linguistics and theology, may also be relevant to an integrated study of international 
society”949. In the same direction, Lynne Jurgielewicz has pointed out that,
“while international law is not politics or economics or sociology, it is 
surely shaped by these areas, and understanding not only that but the 
manner in which those disciplines go about their scholarly pursuits is 
essential. The use of regime theory within international law requires that 
this interdisciplinary linkage be observed and incorporated as part of 
international legal studies”9 °.
Principles and rules are the core of international law and establishment of international 
regimes. Byers has pointed out that the impact of a legal rule derives not merely from its 
having been ‘iterated’ but from “the fact that it is the result of a rule creating processes
948 According to FAO, 20 States take 80% of world marine catches. FAO, The State of World Fisheries 
and Aquaculture, supra, note 16, p. 6.
949 Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, supra, note 59, p. 215.
950 Lynne Jurgielewicz, Global Environmental Change and International Law, supra, note 56, p. 250. See 
also, Lynne Jurgielewicz, ‘Global Environmental Change and International Law: Prospects for Progress 
in the Legal Order’, PhD Thesis, University of London, 1994, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
Library, Thesis 756, p. 341.
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within a legal system”951. Customary rule-creating processes as well as treaties give 
rules a legal specificity that enables them to shape future behaviour through a sense of
QS9obligation, thus constraining and modifying state power . By focusing on the 1995 
SSA, this thesis has used International Regime Theory to explain the role and function 
of law in conserving SFS and HMFS on the high seas and, on the other hand, to explain 
why States have an incentive to create and implement a new international regime for 
international fisheries. The 1995 SSA and related international instruments; new 
developments with respect to non-members and non-participants adopted by some 
international fisheries organizations; and the Plans of Action adopted by FAO regarding 
illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (Section 4, Chapter 4), prove that the new 
regime for high seas fisheries is a reality in the international arena. This new regime 
responds to the need for concerted action to develop regional and sub-regional 
cooperation and harmonization with respect to scientific and diplomatic consensus, 
principles and rules, international organizations, decision-making procedures, 
monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement concerning international fisheries.
Environmental issues, including fisheries on the high seas, emerged in the late twentieth 
century as a major focus of international concern and activity. Much international 
political activity related to environmental issues has focused on the development and 
implementation of regimes, involving a wide range of actors, legal instruments and 
decision-making processes. International regime theory provides important insights into 
the character of such activities, in particular raising questions about the role of states in 
environmental politics; the relationship between power and science; and the distinctions 
between international and domestic spheres of activity. However, it is important to 
recognize that regimes are essentially reformist and have been regarded as falling short 
for the task of changing the socio-economic processes generating environmental 
degradation.
The theoretical framework adopted for this thesis, based on the International Regime 
Theory and the provisions of the SSA, may help States and actors to make their required
951 Michael Byers, ‘Taking the Law out of International Law’, HIU, 38 (1997), pp. 201-226.
952 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an 
Interdisciplinary Perspective’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 17 (1995), p. 109.
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behaviour intelligible within a rational-choice mode of analysis that emphasizes, at the 
same time, the role of international legal obligations and duties as well as the role of 
incentives and constraints for compliance and enforcement.
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AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
OF 10 DECEMBER 1982 RELATING TO THE CONSERVATION AND 
MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY 
MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS
The States Parties to this Agreement.
Recalling the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982,
Determined to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks,
Resolved to improve cooperation between States to that end,
Calling for more effective enforcement by flag States, port States and coastal States of 
the conservation and management measures adopted for such stocks,
Seeking to address in particular the problems identified in chapter 17, programme area 
C, of Agenda 21 adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, namely, that the management of high seas fisheries is inadequate in 
many areas and that some resources are overutilized; noting that there are problems of 
unregulated fishing, over-capitalization, excessive fleet size, vessel reflagging to 
escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and lack of sufficient 
cooperation between States,
Committing themselves to responsible fisheries,
Conscious of the need to avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment, preserve 
biodiversity, maintain the integrity of marine ecosystems and minimize the risk of long­
term or irreversible effects of fishing operations,
Recognizing the need for specific assistance, including financial, scientific and 
technological assistance, in order that developing States can participate effectively in 
the conservation, management and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks,
Convinced that an agreement for the implementation of the relevant provisions of the 
Convention would best serve these purposes and contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security,
Affirming that matters not regulated by the Convention or by this Agreement continue to 
be governed by the rules and principles of general international law,
Have agreed as follows:
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PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1 
U se of term s and s c o p e
1. For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a) "Convention" means the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982;
(b) "conservation and management measures" means measures to conserve 
and manage one or more species of living marine resources that are adopted and 
applied consistent with the relevant rules of international law as reflected in the 
Convention and this Agreement;
(c) "fish" includes molluscs and crustaceans except those belonging to 
sedentary species as defined in article 77 of the Convention; and
(d) "arrangement" means a cooperative mechanism established in accordance 
with the Convention and this Agreement by two or more States for the purpose, inter 
alia, of establishing conservation and management measures in a subregion or region 
for one or more straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks.
2. (a) "States Parties" means States which have consented to be bound by this
Agreement and for which the Agreement is in force.
(b) This Agreement applies mutatis mutandis:
(i) to any entity referred to in article 305, paragraph 1 (c), (d) and (e), of 
the Convention and
(ii) subject to article 47, to any entity referred to as an "international 
organization" in Annex IX, article 1, of the Convention
which becomes a Party to this Agreement, and to that extent "States Parties" refers to 
those entities.
3. This Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities whose vessels 
fish on the high seas.
Article 2 
O bjective
The objective of this Agreement is to ensure the long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks through 
effective implementation of the relevant provisions of the Convention.
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Article 3
A pplication
1. Unless otherwise provided, this Agreement applies to the conservation and 
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks beyond areas 
under national jurisdiction, except that articles 6 and 7 apply also to the conservation 
and management of such stocks within areas under national jurisdiction, subject to the 
different legal regimes that apply within areas under national jurisdiction and in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction as provided for in the Convention.
2. In the exercise of its sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks within 
areas under national jurisdiction, the coastal State shall apply mutatis mutandis the 
general principles enumerated in article 5.
3. States shall give due consideration to the respective capacities of developing 
States to apply articles 5, 6 and 7 within areas under national jurisdiction and their 
need for assistance as provided for in this Agreement. To this end, Part VII applies 
mutatis mutandis in respect of areas under national jurisdiction.
Article 4
R elationship  b etw een  th is  A greem ent and the C onvention
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of 
States under the Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the 
context of and in a manner consistent with the Convention.
PART II
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND 
HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS
Article 5 
G eneral principles
In order to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in giving effect to their 
duty to cooperate in accordance with the Convention:
(a) adopt measures to ensure long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks 
and highly migratory fish stocks and promote the objective of their optimum utilization;
(b) ensure that such measures are based on the best scientific evidence 
available and are designed to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing 
maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic 
factors, including the special requirements of developing States, and taking into 
account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally
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recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or 
global;
(c) apply the precautionary approach in accordance with article 6;
(d) assess the impacts of fishing, other human activities and environmental 
factors on target stocks and species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated 
with or dependent upon the target stocks;
(e) adopt, where necessary, conservation and management measures for 
species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the 
target stocks, with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such species above 
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened;
(f) minimize pollution, waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, catch 
of non-target species, both fish and non-fish species, (hereinafter referred to as non­
target species) and impacts on associated or dependent species, in particular 
endangered species, through measures including, to the extent practicable, the 
development and use of selective, environmentally safe and cost-effective fishing gear 
and techniques;
(g) protect biodiversity in the marine environment;
(h) take measures to prevent or eliminate overfishing and excess fishing 
capacity and to ensure that levels of fishing effort do not exceed those commensurate 
with the sustainable use of fishery resources;
(i) take into account the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers;
(j) collect and share, in a timely manner, complete and accurate data 
concerning fishing activities on, inter alia, vessel position, catch of target and non­
target species and fishing effort, as set out in Annex I, as well as information from 
national and international research programmes;
(k) promote and conduct scientific research and develop appropriate 
technologies in support of fishery conservation and management; and
(I) implement and enforce conservation and management measures through 
effective monitoring, control and surveillance.
Article 6
A pplication of the precautionary approach
1. States shall apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation,
management and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
in order to protect the living marine resources and preserve the marine environment.
2. States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or
inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures.
3. In implementing the precautionary approach, States shall:
332
(a) improve decision-making for fishery resource conservation and management 
by obtaining and sharing the best scientific information available and implementing 
improved techniques for dealing with risk and uncertainty;
(b) apply the guidelines set out in Annex II and determine, on the basis of the 
best scientific information available, stock-specific reference points and the action to be 
taken if they are exceeded;
(c) take into account, inter alia, uncertainties relating to the size and productivity 
of the stocks, reference points, stock condition in relation to such reference points, 
levels and distribution of fishing mortality and the impact of fishing activities on non­
target and associated or dependent species, as well as existing and predicted oceanic, 
environmental and socio-economic conditions; and
(d) develop data collection and research programmes to assess the impact of 
fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species and their environment, and 
adopt plans which are necessary to ensure the conservation of such species and to 
protect habitats of special concern.
4. States shall take measures to ensure that, when reference points are
approached, they will not be exceeded. In the event that they are exceeded, States 
shall, without delay, take the action determined under paragraph 3 (b) to restore the 
stocks.
5. Where the status of target stocks or non-target or associated or dependent 
species is of concern, States shall subject such stocks and species to enhanced 
monitoring in order to review their status and the efficacy of conservation and 
management measures. They shall revise those measures regularly in the light of new 
information.
6. For new or exploratory fisheries, States shall adopt as soon as possible
cautious conservation and management measures, including, inter alia, catch limits 
and effort limits. Such measures shall remain in force until there are sufficient data to 
allow assessment of the impact of the fisheries on the long-term sustainability of the 
stocks, whereupon conservation and management measures based on that 
assessment shall be implemented. The latter measures shall, if appropriate, allow for 
the gradual development of the fisheries.
7. If a natural phenomenon has a significant adverse impact on the status of
straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks, States shall adopt conservation 
and management measures on an emergency basis to ensure that fishing activity does 
not exacerbate such adverse impact. States shall also adopt such measures on an 
emergency basis where fishing activity presents a serious threat to the sustainability of 
such stocks. Measures taken on an emergency basis shall be temporary and shall be 
based on the best scientific evidence available.
Article 7
Com patibility o f con serva tion  and m anagem ent m ea su res
1. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living marine resources within 
areas under national jurisdiction as provided for in the Convention, and the right of all
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States for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas in accordance with the 
Convention:
(a) with respect to straddling fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and the 
States whose nationals fish for such stocks in the adjacent high seas area shall seek, 
either directly or through the appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided for in 
Part III, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in 
the adjacent high seas area;
(b) with respect to highly migratory fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and 
other States whose nationals fish for such stocks in the region shall cooperate, either 
directly or through the appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, 
with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization 
of such stocks throughout the region, both within and beyond the areas under national 
jurisdiction.
2. Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and 
those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to 
ensure conservation and management of the straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, coastal States and States fishing on 
the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving compatible 
measures in respect of such stocks. In determining compatible conservation and 
management measures, States shall:
(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and 
applied in accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same stocks 
by coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures 
established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine the 
effectiveness of such measures;
(b) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied for 
the high seas in accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by 
relevant coastal States and States fishing on the high seas;
(c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied in 
accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or 
regional fisheries management organization or arrangement;
(d) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of 
the stocks and the relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and 
the geographical particularities of the region concerned, including the extent to which 
the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national jurisdiction;
(e) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the 
States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned; and
(f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living 
marine resources as a whole.
3. In giving effect to their duty to cooperate, States shall make every effort to 
agree on compatible conservation and management measures within a reasonable 
period of time.
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4. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, any of the 
States concerned may invoke the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided 
for in Part VIII.
5. Pending agreement on compatible conservation and management measures, 
the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every 
effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature. In the event that they 
are unable to agree on such arrangements, any of the States concerned may, for the 
purpose of obtaining provisional measures, submit the dispute to a court or tribunal in 
accordance with the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided for in Part VIII.
6. Provisional arrangements or measures entered into or prescribed pursuant to 
paragraph 5 shall take into account the provisions of this Part, shall have due regard to 
the rights and obligations of all States concerned, shall not jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of final agreement on compatible conservation and management measures 
and shall be without prejudice to the final outcome of any dispute settlement procedure.
7. Coastal States shall regularly inform States fishing on the high seas in the 
subregion or region, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional 
fisheries management organizations or arrangements, or through other appropriate 
means, of the measures they have adopted for straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks within areas under their national jurisdiction.
8. States fishing on the high seas shall regularly inform other interested States, 
either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management 
organizations or arrangements, or through other appropriate means, of the measures 
they have adopted for regulating the activities of vessels flying their flag which fish for 
such stocks on the high seas.
PART III
MECHANISMS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION CONCERNING 
STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS
Article 8
C ooperation for con serva tion  and m anagem ent
1. Coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in accordance with the 
Convention, pursue cooperation in relation to straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional 
fisheries management organizations or arrangements, taking into account the specific 
characteristics of the subregion or region, to ensure effective conservation and 
management of such stocks.
2. States shall enter into consultations in good faith and without delay, particularly 
where there is evidence that the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
concerned may be under threat of over-exploitation or where a new fishery is being 
developed for such stocks. To this end, consultations may be initiated at the request of 
any interested State with a view to establishing appropriate arrangements to ensure 
conservation and management of the stocks. Pending agreement on such
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arrangements, States shall observe the provisions of this Agreement and shall act in 
good faith and with due regard to the rights, interests and duties of other States.
3. Where a subregional or regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement has the competence to establish conservation and management 
measures for particular straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks, States 
fishing for the stocks on the high seas and relevant coastal States shall give effect to 
their duty to cooperate by becoming members of such organization or participants in 
such arrangement, or by agreeing to apply the conservation and management 
measures established by such organization or arrangement. States having a real 
interest in the fisheries concerned may become members of such organization or 
participants in such arrangement. The terms of participation in such organization or 
arrangement shall not preclude such States from membership or participation; nor shall 
they be applied in a manner which discriminates against any State or group of States 
having a real interest in the fisheries concerned.
4. Only those States which are members of such an organization or participants in 
such an arrangement, or which agree to apply the conservation and management 
measures established by such organization or arrangement, shall have access to the 
fishery resources to which those measures apply.
5. Where there is no subregional or regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement to establish conservation and management measures for a particular 
straddling fish stock or highly migratory fish stock, relevant coastal States and States 
fishing on the high seas for such stock in the subregion or region shall cooperate to 
establish such an organization or enter into other appropriate arrangements to ensure 
conservation and management of such stock and shall participate in the work of the 
organization or arrangement.
6. Any State intending to propose that action be taken by an intergovernmental 
organization having competence with respect to living resources should, where such 
action would have a significant effect on conservation and management measures 
already established by a competent subregional or regional fisheries management 
organization or arrangement, consult through that organization or arrangement with its 
members or participants. To the extent practicable, such consultation should take place 
prior to the submission of the proposal to the intergovernmental organization.
Article 9
Subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements
1. In establishing subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or in 
entering into subregional or regional fisheries management arrangements for straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, States shall agree, inter alia, on:
(a) the stocks to which conservation and management measures apply, taking 
into account the biological characteristics of the stocks concerned and the nature of the 
fisheries involved;
(b) the area of application, taking into account article 7, paragraph 1, and the 
characteristics of the subregion or region, including socio-economic, geographical and 
environmental factors;
336
(c) the relationship between the work of the new organization or arrangement 
and the role, objectives and operations of any relevant existing fisheries management 
organizations or arrangements; and
(d) the mechanisms by which the organization or arrangement will obtain 
scientific advice and review the status of the stocks, including, where appropriate, the 
establishment of a scientific advisory body.
2. States cooperating in the formation of a subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement shall inform other States which they are 
aware have a real interest in the work of the proposed organization or arrangement of 
such cooperation.
Article 10
Functions of subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and
arrangements
In fulfilling their obligation to cooperate through subregional or regional fisheries 
management organizations or arrangements, States shall:
(a) agree on and comply with conservation and management measures to 
ensure the long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks;
(b) agree, as appropriate, on participatory rights such as allocations of allowable 
catch or levels of fishing effort;
(c) adopt and apply any generally recommended international minimum 
standards for the responsible conduct of fishing operations;
(d) obtain and evaluate scientific advice, review the status of the stocks and 
assess the impact of fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species;
(e) agree on standards for collection, reporting, verification and exchange of 
data on fisheries for the stocks;
(f) compile and disseminate accurate and complete statistical data, as 
described in Annex I, to ensure that the best scientific evidence is available, while 
maintaining confidentiality where appropriate;
(g) promote and conduct scientific assessments of the stocks and relevant 
research and disseminate the results thereof;
(h) establish appropriate cooperative mechanisms for effective monitoring, 
control, surveillance and enforcement;
(i) agree on means by which the fishing interests of new members of the 
organization or new participants in the arrangement will be accommodated;
(j) agree on decision-making procedures which facilitate the adoption of 
conservation and management measures in a timely and effective manner;
(k) promote the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with Part VIII;
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(I) ensure the full cooperation of their relevant national agencies and industries 
in implementing the recommendations and decisions of the organization or 
arrangement; and
(m) give due publicity to the conservation and management measures 
established by the organization or arrangement.
Article 11 
New members or participants
In determining the nature and extent of participatory rights for new members of 
a subregional or regional fisheries management organization, or for new participants in 
a subregional or regional fisheries management arrangement, States shall take into 
account, inter alia:
(a) the status of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and 
the existing level of fishing effort in the fishery;
(b) the respective interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices of new and 
existing members or participants;
(c) the respective contributions of new and existing members or participants to 
conservation and management of the stocks, to the collection and provision of accurate 
data and to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks;
(d) the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on 
fishing for the stocks;
(e) the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly 
dependent on the exploitation of living marine resources; and
(f) the interests of developing States from the subregion or region in whose 
areas of national jurisdiction the stocks also occur.
Article 12
Transparency in activities of subregional and regional fisheries management
organizations and arrangements
1. States shall provide for transparency in the decision-making process and other 
activities of subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements.
2. Representatives from other intergovernmental organizations and 
representatives from non-governmental organizations concerned with straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks shall be afforded the opportunity to take part in 
meetings of subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements as observers or otherwise, as appropriate, in accordance with the 
procedures of the organization or arrangement concerned. Such procedures shall not 
be unduly restrictive in this respect. Such intergovernmental organizations and non­
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governmental organizations shall have timely access to the records and reports of such 
organizations and arrangements, subject to the procedural rules on access to them.
Article 13
Strengthening of existing organizations and arrangements
States shall cooperate to strengthen existing subregional and regional fisheries 
management organizations and arrangements in order to improve their effectiveness in 
establishing and implementing conservation and management measures for straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
Article 14
Collection and provision of information and cooperation in scientific research
1. States shall ensure that fishing vessels flying their flag provide such information 
as may be necessary in order to fulfil their obligations under this Agreement. To this 
end, States shall in accordance with Annex I:
(a) collect and exchange scientific, technical and statistical data with respect to 
fisheries for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks;
(b) ensure that data are collected in sufficient detail to facilitate effective stock 
assessment and are provided in a timely manner to fulfil the requirements of 
subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements; and
(c) take appropriate measures to verify the accuracy of such data.
2. States shall cooperate, either directly or through subregional or regional 
fisheries management organizations or arrangements:
(a) to agree on the specification of data and the format in which they are to be 
provided to such organizations or arrangements, taking into account the nature of the 
stocks and the fisheries for those stocks; and
(b) to develop and share analytical techniques and stock assessment 
methodologies to improve measures for the conservation and management of 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
3. Consistent with Part XIII of the Convention, States shall cooperate, either 
directly or through competent international organizations, to strengthen scientific 
research capacity in the field of fisheries and promote scientific research related to the 
conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
for the benefit of all. To this end, a State or the competent international organization 
conducting such research beyond areas under national jurisdiction shall actively 
promote the publication and dissemination to any interested States of the results of that 
research and information relating to its objectives and methods and, to the extent 
practicable, shall facilitate the participation of scientists from those States in such 
research.
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Article 15
Enclosed and semi-enclosed seas
In implementing this Agreement in an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, States 
shall take into account the natural characteristics of that sea and shall also act in a 
manner consistent with Part IX of the Convention and other relevant provisions thereof.
Article 16
Areas of high seas surrounded entirely bv an area under the national jurisdiction
of a single State
1. States fishing for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in an 
area of the high seas surrounded entirely by an area under the national jurisdiction of a 
single State and the latter State shall cooperate to establish conservation and 
management measures in respect of those stocks in the high seas area. Having regard 
to the natural characteristics of the area, States shall pay special attention to the 
establishment of compatible conservation and management measures for such stocks 
pursuant to article 7. Measures taken in respect of the high seas shall take into account 
the rights, duties and interests of the coastal State under the Convention, shall be 
based on the best scientific evidence available and shall also take into account any 
conservation and management measures adopted and applied in respect of the same 
stocks in accordance with article 61 of the Convention by the coastal State in the area 
under national jurisdiction. States shall also agree on measures for monitoring, control, 
surveillance and enforcement to ensure compliance with the conservation and 
management measures in respect of the high seas.
2. Pursuant to article 8, States shall act in good faith and make every effort to 
agree without delay on conservation and management measures to be applied in the 
carrying out of fishing operations in the area referred to in paragraph 1. If, within a 
reasonable period of time, the fishing States concerned and the coastal State are 
unable to agree on such measures, they shall, having regard to paragraph 1, apply 
article 7, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, relating to provisional arrangements or measures. 
Pending the establishment of such provisional arrangements or measures, the States 
concerned shall take measures in respect of vessels flying their flag in order that they 
not engage in fisheries which could undermine the stocks concerned.
PART IV
NON-MEMBERS AND NON-PARTICIPANTS
Article 17
Non-members of organizations and non-participants in arrangements
1. A State which is not a member of a subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or is not a participant in a subregional or regional fisheries 
management arrangement, and which does not otherwise agree to apply the
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conservation and management measures established by such organization or 
arrangement, is not discharged from the obligation to cooperate, in accordance with the 
Convention and this Agreement, in the conservation and management of the relevant 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
2. Such State shall not authorize vessels flying its flag to engage in fishing 
operations for the straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks which are 
subject to the conservation and management measures established by such 
organization or arrangement.
3. States which are members of a subregional or regional fisheries management 
organization or participants in a subregional or regional fisheries management 
arrangement shall, individually or jointly, request the fishing entities referred to in article 
1, paragraph 3, which have fishing vessels in the relevant area to cooperate fully with 
such organization or arrangement in implementing the conservation and management 
measures it has established, with a view to having such measures applied de facto as 
extensively as possible to fishing activities in the relevant area. Such fishing entities 
shall enjoy benefits from participation in the fishery commensurate with their 
commitment to comply with conservation and management measures in respect of the 
stocks.
4. States which are members of such organization or participants in such 
arrangement shall exchange information with respect to the activities of fishing vessels 
flying the flags of States which are neither members of the organization nor participants 
in the arrangement and which are engaged in fishing operations for the relevant stocks. 
They shall take measures consistent with this Agreement and international law to deter 
activities of such vessels which undermine the effectiveness of subregional or regional 
conservation and management measures.
PART V 
DUTIES OF THE FLAG STATE
Article 18 
Duties of the flag State
1. A State whose vessels fish on the high seas shall take such measures as may 
be necessary to ensure that vessels flying its flag comply with subregional and regional 
conservation and management measures and that such vessels do not engage in any 
activity which undermines the effectiveness of such measures.
2. A State shall authorize the use of vessels flying its flag for fishing on the high 
seas only where it is able to exercise effectively its responsibilities in respect of such 
vessels under the Convention and this Agreement.
3. Measures to be taken by a State in respect of vessels flying its flag shall 
include:
(a) control of such vessels on the high seas by means of fishing licences, 
authorizations or permits, in accordance with any applicable procedures agreed at the 
subregional, regional or global level;
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(b) establishment of regulations:
(i) to apply terms and conditions to the licence, authorization or permit 
sufficient to fulfil any subregional, regional or global obligations of the 
flag State;
(ii) to prohibit fishing on the high seas by vessels which are not duly 
licensed or authorized to fish, or fishing on the high seas by vessels 
otherwise than in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence, 
authorization or permit;
(iii) to require vessels fishing on the high seas to carry the licence, 
authorization or permit on board at all times and to produce it on 
demand for inspection by a duly authorized person; and
(iv) to ensure that vessels flying its flag do not conduct unauthorized 
fishing within areas under the national jurisdiction of other States;
(c) establishment of a national record of fishing vessels authorized to fish on the 
high seas and provision of access to the information contained in that record on 
request by directly interested States, taking into account any national laws of the flag 
State regarding the release of such information;
(d) requirements for marking of fishing vessels and fishing gear for identification 
in accordance with uniform and internationally recognizable vessel and gear marking 
systems, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
Standard Specifications for the Marking and Identification of Fishing Vessels;
(e) requirements for recording and timely reporting of vessel position, catch of 
target and non-target species, fishing effort and other relevant fisheries data in 
accordance with subregional, regional and global standards for collection of such data;
(f) requirements for verifying the catch of target and non-target species through 
such means as observer programmes, inspection schemes, unloading reports,
supervision of transhipment and monitoring of landed catches and market statistics;
(g) monitoring, control and surveillance of such vessels, their fishing operations 
and related activities by, inter alia:
(i) the implementation of national inspection schemes and subregional 
and regional schemes for cooperation in enforcement pursuant to
articles 21 and 22, including requirements for such vessels to permit 
access by duly authorized inspectors from other States;
(ii) the implementation of national observer programmes and subregional 
and regional observer programmes in which the flag State is a
participant, including requirements for such vessels to permit access by 
observers from other States to carry out the functions agreed under the 
programmes; and
(iii) the development and implementation of vessel monitoring systems, 
including, as appropriate, satellite transmitter systems, in accordance 
with any national programmes and those which have been
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subregionally, regionally or globally agreed among the States 
concerned;
(h) regulation of transhipment on the high seas to ensure that the effectiveness 
of conservation and management measures is not undermined; and
(i) regulation of fishing activities to ensure compliance with subregional, regional 
or global measures, including those aimed at minimizing catches of non-target species.
4. Where there is a subregionally, regionally or globally agreed system of 
monitoring, control and surveillance in effect, States shall ensure that the measures 
they impose on vessels flying their flag are compatible with that system.
PART VI
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
Article 19
Compliance and enforcement bv the flag State
1. A State shall ensure compliance by vessels flying its flag with subregional and 
regional conservation and management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks. To this end, that State shall:
(a) enforce such measures irrespective of where violations occur;
(b) investigate immediately and fully any alleged violation of subregional or 
regional conservation and management measures, which may include the physical 
inspection of the vessels concerned, and report promptly to the State alleging the 
violation and the relevant subregional or regional organization or arrangement on the 
progress and outcome of the investigation;
(c) require any vessel flying its flag to give information to the investigating 
authority regarding vessel position, catches, fishing gear, fishing operations and related 
activities in the area of an alleged violation;
(d) if satisfied that sufficient evidence is available in respect of an alleged 
violation, refer the case to its authorities with a view to instituting proceedings without 
delay in accordance with its laws and, where appropriate, detain the vessel concerned; 
and
(e) ensure that, where it has been established, in accordance with its laws, a 
vessel has been involved in the commission of a serious violation of such measures, 
the vessel does not engage in fishing operations on the high seas until such time as all 
outstanding sanctions imposed by the flag State in respect of the violation have been 
complied with.
2. All investigations and judicial proceedings shall be carried out expeditiously. 
Sanctions applicable in respect of violations shall be adequate in severity to be 
effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and 
shall deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. Measures
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applicable in respect of masters and other officers of fishing vessels shall include 
provisions which may permit, inter alia, refusal, withdrawal or suspension of 
authorizations to serve as masters or officers on such vessels.
Article 20
International cooperation in enforcement
1. States shall cooperate, either directly or through subregional or regional 
fisheries management organizations or arrangements, to ensure compliance with and 
enforcement of subregional and regional conservation and management measures for 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
2. A flag State conducting an investigation of an alleged violation of conservation 
and management measures for straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks 
may request the assistance of any other State whose cooperation may be useful in the 
conduct of that investigation. All States shall endeavour to meet reasonable requests 
made by a flag State in connection with such investigations.
3. A flag State may undertake such investigations directly, in cooperation with 
other interested States or through the relevant subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement. Information on the progress and outcome of 
the investigations shall be provided to all States having an interest in, or affected by, 
the alleged violation.
4. States shall assist each other in identifying vessels reported to have engaged in 
! activities undermining the effectiveness of subregional, regional or global conservation
and management measures.
5. States shall, to the extent permitted by national laws and regulations, establish 
arrangements for making available to prosecuting authorities in other States evidence 
relating to alleged violations of such measures.
6. Where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a vessel on the high 
seas has been engaged in unauthorized fishing within an area under the jurisdiction of 
a coastal State, the flag State of that vessel, at the request of the coastal State 
concerned, shall immediately and fully investigate the matter. The flag State shall 
cooperate with the coastal State in taking appropriate enforcement action in such 
cases and may authorize the relevant authorities of the coastal State to board and 
inspect the vessel on the high seas. This paragraph is without prejudice to article 111 
of the Convention.
7. States Parties which are members of a subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or participants in a subregional or regional fisheries 
management arrangement may take action in accordance with international law, 
including through recourse to subregional or regional procedures established for this 
purpose, to deter vessels which have engaged in activities which undermine the 
effectiveness of or otherwise violate the conservation and management measures 
established by that organization or arrangement from fishing on the high seas in the 
subregion or region until such time as appropriate action is taken by the flag State.
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Article 21
Subregional and regional cooperation in enforcement
1. In any high seas area covered by a subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement, a State Party which is a member of such 
organization or a participant in such arrangement may, through its duly authorized 
inspectors, board and inspect, in accordance with paragraph 2, fishing vessels flying 
the flag of another State Party to this Agreement, whether or not such State Party is 
also a member of the organization or a participant in the arrangement, for the purpose 
of ensuring compliance with conservation and management measures for straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks established by that organization or 
arrangement.
2. States shall establish, through subregional or regional fisheries management 
organizations or arrangements, procedures for boarding and inspection pursuant to 
paragraph 1, as well as procedures to implement other provisions of this article. Such 
procedures shall be consistent with this article and the basic procedures set out in 
article 22 and shall not discriminate against non-members of the organization or non­
participants in the arrangement. Boarding and inspection as well as any subsequent 
enforcement action shall be conducted in accordance with such procedures. States 
shall give due publicity to procedures established pursuant to this paragraph.
3. If, within two years of the adoption of this Agreement, any organization or 
arrangement has not established such procedures, boarding and inspection pursuant 
to paragraph 1, as well as any subsequent enforcement action, shall, pending the
I establishment of such procedures, be conducted in accordance with this article and the 
basic procedures set out in article 22.
4. Prior to taking action under this article, inspecting States shall, either directly or 
through the relevant subregional or regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement, inform all States whose vessels fish on the high seas in the subregion or 
region of the form of identification issued to their duly authorized inspectors. The 
vessels used for boarding and inspection shall be clearly marked and identifiable as 
being on government service. At the time of becoming a Party to this Agreement, a 
State shall designate an appropriate authority to receive notifications pursuant to this 
article and shall give due publicity of such designation through the relevant subregional 
or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement.
5. Where, following a boarding and inspection, there are clear grounds for 
believing that a vessel has engaged in any activity contrary to the conservation and 
management measures referred to in paragraph 1, the inspecting State shall, where 
appropriate, secure evidence and shall promptly notify the flag State of the alleged 
violation.
6. The flag State shall respond to the notification referred to in paragraph 5 within 
three working days of its receipt, or such other period as may be prescribed in 
procedures established in accordance with paragraph 2, and shall either:
(a) fulfil, without delay, its obligations under article 19 to investigate and, if 
evidence so warrants, take enforcement action with respect to the vessel, in which 
case it shall promptly inform the inspecting State of the results of the investigation and 
of any enforcement action taken; or
(b) authorize the inspecting State to investigate.
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7. Where the flag State authorizes the inspecting State to investigate an alleged 
violation, the inspecting State shall, without delay, communicate the results of that 
investigation to the flag State. The flag State shall, if evidence so warrants, fulfil its 
obligations to take enforcement action with respect to the vessel. Alternatively, the flag 
State may authorize the inspecting State to take such enforcement action as the flag 
State may specify with respect to the vessel, consistent with the rights and obligations 
of the flag State under this Agreement.
8. Where, following boarding and inspection, there are clear grounds for believing 
that a vessel has committed a serious violation, and the flag State has either failed to 
respond or failed to take action as required under paragraphs 6 or 7, the inspectors 
may remain on board and secure evidence and may require the master to assist in 
further investigation including, where appropriate, by bringing the vessel without delay 
to the nearest appropriate port, or to such other port as may be specified in procedures 
established in accordance with paragraph 2. The inspecting State shall immediately 
inform the flag State of the name of the port to which the vessel is to proceed. The 
inspecting State and the flag State and, as appropriate, the port State shall take all 
necessary steps to ensure the well-being of the crew regardless of their nationality.
9. The inspecting State shall inform the flag State and the relevant organization or 
the participants in the relevant arrangement of the results of any further investigation.
10. The inspecting State shall require its inspectors to observe generally accepted 
international regulations, procedures and practices relating to the safety of the vessel 
and the crew, minimize interference with fishing operations and, to the extent 
practicable, avoid action which would adversely affect the quality of the catch on board. 
The inspecting State shall ensure that boarding and inspection is not conducted in a 
manner that would constitute harassment of any fishing vessel.
11. For the purposes of this article, a serious violation means:
(a) fishing without a valid licence, authorization or permit issued by the flag 
State in accordance with article 18, paragraph 3 (a);
(b) failing to maintain accurate records of catch and catch-related data, as 
required by the relevant subregional or regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement, or serious misreporting of catch, contrary to the catch reporting 
requirements of such organization or arrangement;
(c) fishing in a closed area, fishing during a closed season or fishing without, or 
after attainment of, a quota established by the relevant subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement;
(d) directed fishing for a stock which is subject to a moratorium or for which 
fishing is prohibited;
(e) using prohibited fishing gear;
(f) falsifying or concealing the markings, identity or registration of a fishing
vessel;
(g) concealing, tampering with or disposing of evidence relating to an 
investigation;
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(h) multiple violations which together constitute a serious disregard of 
conservation and management measures; or
(i) such other violations as may be specified in procedures established by the 
relevant subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement.
12. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this article, the flag State may, at any 
time, take action to fulfil its obligations under article 19 with respect to an alleged 
violation. Where the vessel is under the direction of the inspecting State, the inspecting 
State shall, at the request of the flag State, release the vessel to the flag State along 
with full information on the progress and outcome of its investigation.
13. This article is without prejudice to the right of the flag State to take any 
measures, including proceedings to impose penalties, according to its laws.
14. This article applies mutatis mutandis to boarding and inspection by a State 
Party which is a member of a subregional or regional fisheries management 
organization or a participant in a subregional or regional fisheries management 
arrangement and which has clear grounds for believing that a fishing vessel flying the 
flag of another State Party has engaged in any activity contrary to relevant 
conservation and management measures referred to in paragraph 1 in the high seas 
area covered by such organization or arrangement, and such vessel has subsequently, 
during the same fishing trip, entered into an area under the national jurisdiction of the 
inspecting State.
15. Where a subregional or regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement has established an alternative mechanism which effectively discharges 
the obligation under this Agreement of its members or participants to ensure 
compliance with the conservation and management measures established by the 
organization or arrangement, members of such organization or participants in such 
arrangement may agree to limit the application of paragraph 1 as between themselves 
in respect of the conservation and management measures which have been 
established in the relevant high seas area.
16. Action taken by States other than the flag State in respect of vessels having 
engaged in activities contrary to subregional or regional conservation and management 
measures shall be proportionate to the seriousness of the violation.
17. Where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a fishing vessel on the 
high seas is without nationality, a State may board and inspect the vessel. Where 
evidence so warrants, the State may take such action as may be appropriate in 
accordance with international law.
18. States shall be liable for damage or loss attributable to them arising from action 
taken pursuant to this article when such action is unlawful or exceeds that reasonably 
required in the light of available information to implement the provisions of this article.
Article 22
Basic procedures for boarding and inspection pursuant to article 21
1. The inspecting State shall ensure that its duly authorized inspectors:
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(a) present credentials to the master of the vessel and produce a copy of the 
text of the relevant conservation and management measures or rules and regulations 
in force in the high seas area in question pursuant to those measures;
(b) initiate notice to the flag State at the time of the boarding and inspection;
(c) do not interfere with the master’s ability to communicate with the authorities 
of the flag State during the boarding and inspection;
(d) provide a copy of a report on the boarding and inspection to the master and 
to the authorities of the flag State, noting therein any objection or statement which the 
master wishes to have included in the report;
(e) promptly leave the vessel following completion of the inspection if they find 
no evidence of a serious violation; and
(f) avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to ensure 
the safety of the inspectors and where the inspectors are obstructed in the execution of 
their duties. The degree of force used shall not exceed that reasonably required in the 
circumstances.
2. The duly authorized inspectors of an inspecting State shall have the authority to 
inspect the vessel, its licence, gear, equipment, records, facilities, fish and fish 
products and any relevant documents necessary to verify compliance with the relevant 
conservation and management measures.
3. The flag State shall ensure that vessel masters:
(a) accept and facilitate prompt and safe boarding by the inspectors;
(b) cooperate with and assist in the inspection of the vessel conducted pursuant 
to these procedures;
(c) do not obstruct, intimidate or interfere with the inspectors in the performance 
of their duties;
(d) allow the inspectors to communicate with the authorities of the flag State 
and the inspecting State during the boarding and inspection;
(e) provide reasonable facilities, including, where appropriate, food and 
accommodation, to the inspectors; and
(f) facilitate safe disembarkation by the inspectors.
4. In the event that the master of a vessel refuses to accept boarding and 
inspection in accordance with this article and article 21, the flag State shall, except in 
circumstances where, in accordance with generally accepted international regulations, 
procedures and practices relating to safety at sea, it is necessary to delay the boarding 
and inspection, direct the master of the vessel to submit immediately to boarding and 
inspection and, if the master does not comply with such direction, shall suspend the 
vessel’s authorization to fish and order the vessel to return immediately to port. The 
flag State shall advise the inspecting State of the action it has taken when the 
circumstances referred to in this paragraph arise.
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Article 23
Measures taken bv a port State
1. A port State has the right and the duty to take measures, in accordance with 
international law, to promote the effectiveness of subregional, regional and global 
conservation and management measures. When taking such measures a port State 
shall not discriminate in form or in fact against the vessels of any State.
2. A port State may, inter alia, inspect documents, fishing gear and catch on board 
fishing vessels, when such vessels are voluntarily in its ports or at its offshore 
terminals.
3. States may adopt regulations empowering the relevant national authorities to 
prohibit landings and transhipments where it has been established that the catch has 
been taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of subregional, regional or 
global conservation and management measures on the high seas.
4. Nothing in this article affects the exercise by States of their sovereignty over 
ports in their territory in accordance with international law.
PART VII
REQUIREMENTS OF DEVELOPING STATES
Article 24
Recognition of the special requirements of developing States
1. States shall give full recognition to the special requirements of developing 
States in relation to conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks and development of fisheries for such stocks. To this end, States 
shall, either directly or through the United Nations Development Programme, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other specialized agencies, the 
Global Environment Facility, the Commission on Sustainable Development and other 
appropriate international and regional organizations and bodies, provide assistance to 
developing States.
2. In giving effect to the duty to cooperate in the establishment of conservation and 
management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, 
States shall take into account the special requirements of developing States, in 
particular:
(a) the vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the 
exploitation of living marine resources, including for meeting the nutritional 
requirements of their populations or parts thereof;
(b) the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, 
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers, as well as 
indigenous people in developing States, particularly small island developing States; 
and
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(c) the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly 
or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States.
Article 25
Forms of cooperation with developing States
1. States shall cooperate, either directly or through subregional, regional or global 
organizations:
(a) to enhance the ability of developing States, in particular the least-developed 
among them and small island developing States, to conserve and manage straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and to develop their own fisheries for such 
stocks;
(b) to assist developing States, in particular the least-developed among them 
and small island developing States, to enable them to participate in high seas fisheries 
for such stocks, including facilitating access to such fisheries subject to articles 5 and 
11;and
(c) to facilitate the participation of developing States in subregional and regional 
fisheries management organizations and arrangements.
2. Cooperation with developing States for the purposes set out in this article shall 
include the provision of financial assistance, assistance relating to human resources 
development, technical assistance, transfer of technology, including through joint 
venture arrangements, and advisory and consultative services.
3. Such assistance shall, inter alia, be directed specifically towards:
(a) improved conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks through collection, reporting, verification, exchange and analysis 
of fisheries data and related information;
(b) stock assessment and scientific research; and
(c) monitoring, control, surveillance, compliance and enforcement, including 
training and capacity-building at the local level, development and funding of national 
and regional observer programmes and access to technology and equipment.
Article 26
Special assistance in the implementation of this Agreement
1. States shall cooperate to establish special funds to assist developing States in 
the implementation of this Agreement, including assisting developing States to meet 
the costs involved in any proceedings for the settlement of disputes to which they may 
be parties.
2. States and international organizations should assist developing States in 
establishing new subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or 
arrangements, or in strengthening existing organizations or arrangements, for the
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conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks.
PART VIII
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 27
Obligation to settle disputes bv peaceful means
States have the obligation to settle their disputes by negotiation, inquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
Article 28 
Prevention of disputes
States shall cooperate in order to prevent disputes. To this end, States shall 
agree on efficient and expeditious decision-making procedures within subregional and 
regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements and shall strengthen 
existing decision-making procedures as necessary.
Article 29 
Disputes of a technical nature
Where a dispute concerns a matter of a technical nature, the States concerned 
may refer the dispute to an ad hoc expert panel established by them. The panel shall 
confer with the States concerned and shall endeavour to resolve the dispute 
expeditiously without recourse to binding procedures for the settlement of disputes.
Article 30
Procedures for the settlement of disputes
1. The provisions relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part XV of the 
Convention apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute between States Parties to this 
Agreement concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement, whether or 
not they are also Parties to the Convention.
2. The provisions relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part XV of the 
Convention apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute between States Parties to this 
Agreement concerning the interpretation or application of a subregional, regional or 
global fisheries agreement relating to straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish 
stocks to which they are parties, including any dispute concerning the conservation and 
management of such stocks, whether or not they are also Parties to the Convention.
351
3. Any procedure accepted by a State Party to this Agreement and the Convention 
pursuant to article 287 of the Convention shall apply to the settlement of disputes under 
this Part, unless that State Party, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Agreement, 
or at any time thereafter, has accepted another procedure pursuant to article 287 for 
the settlement of disputes under this Part.
4. A State Party to this Agreement which is not a Party to the Convention, when 
signing, ratifying or acceding to this Agreement, or at any time thereafter, shall be free 
to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the means set out in 
article 287, paragraph 1, of the Convention for the settlement of disputes under this 
Part. Article 287 shall apply to such a declaration, as well as to any dispute to which 
such State is a party which is not covered by a declaration in force. For the purposes of 
conciliation and arbitration in accordance with Annexes V, VII and VIII to the 
Convention, such State shall be entitled to nominate conciliators, arbitrators and 
experts to be included in the lists referred to in Annex V, article 2, Annex VII, article 2, 
and Annex VIII, article 2, for the settlement of disputes under this Part.
5. Any court or tribunal to which a dispute has been submitted under this Part shall 
apply the relevant provisions of the Convention, of this Agreement and of any relevant 
subregional, regional or global fisheries agreement, as well as generally accepted 
standards for the conservation and management of living marine resources and other 
rules of international law not incompatible with the Convention, with a view to ensuring 
the conservation of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
concerned.
Article 31 
Provisional measures
1. Pending the settlement of a dispute in accordance with this Part, the parties to 
the dispute shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature.
2. Without prejudice to article 290 of the Convention, the court or tribunal to which 
the dispute has been submitted under this Part may prescribe any provisional 
measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the 
respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent damage to the stocks in 
question, as well as in the circumstances referred to in article 7, paragraph 5, and 
article 16, paragraph 2.
3. A State Party to this Agreement which is not a Party to the Convention may 
declare that, notwithstanding article 290, paragraph 5, of the Convention, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea shall not be entitled to prescribe, modify or 
revoke provisional measures without the agreement of such State.
Article 32
Limitations on applicability of procedures for the settlement of disputes
Article 297, paragraph 3, of the Convention applies also to this Agreement.
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PART IX
NON-PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
Article 33 
Non-parties to this Agreement
1. States Parties shall encourage non-parties to this Agreement to become parties 
thereto and to adopt laws and regulations consistent with its provisions.
2. States Parties shall take measures consistent with this Agreement and 
international law to deter the activities of vessels flying the flag of non-parties which 
undermine the effective implementation of this Agreement.
PART X
GOOD FAITH AND ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Article 34
Good faith and abuse of rights
States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this 
Agreement and shall exercise the rights recognized in this Agreement in a manner 
which would not constitute an abuse of right.
Part XI
RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY
Article 35
Responsibility and liability
States Parties are liable in accordance with international law for damage or loss 
attributable to them in regard to this Agreement.
PART XII 
REVIEW CONFERENCE
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Article 36
Review conference
1. Four years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations shall convene a conference with a view to assessing the 
effectiveness of this Agreement in securing the conservation and management of 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. The Secretary-General shall 
invite to the conference all States Parties and those States and entities which are 
entitled to become parties to this Agreement as well as those intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations entitled to participate as observers.
2. The conference shall review and assess the adequacy of the provisions of this 
Agreement and, if necessary, propose means of strengthening the substance and 
methods of implementation of those provisions in order better to address any 
continuing problems in the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks.
PART XIII 
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 37 
Signature
This Agreement shall be open for signature by all States and the other entities 
referred to in article 1, paragraph 2(b), and shall remain open for signature at United 
Nations Headquarters for twelve months from the fourth of December 1995.
Article 38 
Ratification
This Agreement is subject to ratification by States and the other entities referred 
to in article 1, paragraph 2(b). The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 39 
Accession
This Agreement shall remain open for accession by States and the other 
entities referred to in article 1, paragraph 2(b). The instruments of accession shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 40
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Entry into force
1. This Agreement shall enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the 
thirtieth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State or entity which ratifies the Agreement or accedes thereto after 
the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification or accession, this Agreement shall 
enter into force on the thirtieth day following the deposit of its instrument of ratification 
or accession.
Article 41
Provisional application
1. This Agreement shall be applied provisionally by a State or entity which 
consents to its provisional application by so notifying the depositary in writing. Such 
provisional application shall become effective from the date of receipt of the 
notification.
2. Provisional application by a State or entity shall terminate upon the entry into 
force of this Agreement for that State or entity or upon notification by that State or entity 
to the depositary in writing of its intention to terminate provisional application.
Article 42
Reservations and exceptions
No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Agreement.
Article 43
Declarations and statements
Article 42 does not preclude a State or entity, when signing, ratifying or 
acceding to this Agreement, from making declarations or statements, however phrased 
or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with 
the provisions of this Agreement, provided that such declarations or statements do not 
purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Agreement in 
their application to that State or entity.
Article 44 
Relation to other agreements
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1. This Agreement shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which 
arise from other agreements compatible with this Agreement and which do not affect 
the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their 
obligations under this Agreement.
2. Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending 
the operation of provisions of this Agreement, applicable solely to the relations between 
them, provided that such agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from 
which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of this 
Agreement, and provided further that such agreements shall not affect the application 
of the basic principles embodied herein, and that the provisions of such agreements do 
not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of 
their obligations under this Agreement.
3. States Parties intending to conclude an agreement referred to in paragraph 2 
shall notify the other States Parties through the depositary of this Agreement of their 
intention to conclude the agreement and of the modification or suspension for which it 
provides.
Article 45 
Amendment
1. A State Party may, by written communication addressed to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, propose amendments to this Agreement and request 
the convening of a conference to consider such proposed amendments. The Secretary- 
General shall circulate such communication to all States Parties. If, within six months 
from the date of the circulation of the communication, not less than one half of the 
States Parties reply favourably to the request, the Secretary-General shall convene the 
conference.
2. The decision-making procedure applicable at the amendment conference 
convened pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be the same as that applicable at the United 
Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 
unless otherwise decided by the conference. The conference should make every effort 
to reach agreement on any amendments by way of consensus and there should be no 
voting on them until all efforts at consensus have been exhausted.
3. Once adopted, amendments to this Agreement shall be open for signature at
United Nations Headquarters by States Parties for twelve months from the date of
adoption, unless otherwise provided in the amendment itself.
4. Articles 38, 39, 47 and 50 apply to all amendments to this Agreement.
5. Amendments to this Agreement shall enter into force for the States Parties 
ratifying or acceding to them on the thirtieth day following the deposit of instruments of 
ratification or accession by two thirds of the States Parties. Thereafter, for each State 
Party ratifying or acceding to an amendment after the deposit of the required number of 
such instruments, the amendment shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following 
the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession.
6. An amendment may provide that a smaller or a larger number of ratifications or
accessions shall be required for its entry into force than are required by this article.
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of amendments in accordance with paragraph 5 shall, failing an expression of a 
different intention by that State:
(a) be considered as a Party to this Agreement as so amended; and
(b) be considered as a Party to the unamended Agreement in relation to any 
State Party not bound by the amendment.
Article 46 
Denunciation
1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, denounce this Agreement and may indicate its reasons. Failure to 
indicate reasons shall not affect the validity of the denunciation. The denunciation shall 
take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification 
specifies a later date.
2. The denunciation shall not in any way affect the duty of any State Party to fulfil 
any obligation embodied in this Agreement to which it would be subject under 
international law independently of this Agreement.
Article 47
Participation bv international organizations
1. In cases where an international organization referred to in Annex IX, article 1, of 
the Convention does not have competence over all the matters governed by this 
Agreement, Annex IX to the Convention shall apply mutatis mutandis to participation by 
such international organization in this Agreement, except that the following provisions 
of that Annex shall not apply:
(a) article 2, first sentence; and
(b) article 3, paragraph 1.
2. In cases where an international organization referred to in Annex IX, article 1, of 
the Convention has competence over all the matters governed by this Agreement, the 
following provisions shall apply to participation by such international organization in this 
Agreement:
(a) at the time of signature or accession, such international organization shall 
make a declaration stating:
(i) that it has competence over all the matters governed by this 
Agreement;
(ii) that, for this reason, its member States shall not become States 
Parties, except in respect of their territories for which the international 
organization has no responsibility; and
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(iii) that it accepts the rights and obligations of States under this 
Agreement;
(b) participation of such an international organization shall in no case confer any 
rights under this Agreement on member States of the international organization;
(c) in the event of a conflict between the obligations of an international 
organization under this Agreement and its obligations under the agreement 
establishing the international organization or any acts relating to it, the obligations 
under this Agreement shall prevail.
Article 48 
Annexes
1. The Annexes form an integral part of this Agreement and, unless expressly 
provided otherwise, a reference to this Agreement or to one of its Parts includes a 
reference to the Annexes relating thereto.
2. The Annexes may be revised from time to time by States Parties. Such 
revisions shall be based on scientific and technical considerations. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of article 45, if a revision to an Annex is adopted by consensus at a meeting 
of States Parties, it shall be incorporated in this Agreement and shall take effect from 
the date of its adoption or from such other date as may be specified in the revision. If a 
revision to an Annex is not adopted by consensus at such a meeting, the amendment 
procedures set out in article 45 shall apply.
Article 49 
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the depositary of this 
Agreement and any amendments or revisions thereto.
Article 50 
Authentic texts
The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this 
Agreement are equally authentic.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly 
authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement.
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OPENED FOR SIGNATURE at New York, this fourth day of December, one 
thousand nine hundred and ninety-five, in a single original, in the Arabic, Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish languages.
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ANNEX I
STANDARD REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COLLECTION AND SHARING OF DATA
Article 1 
General principles
1. The timely collection, compilation and analysis of data are fundamental to the 
effective conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks. To this end, data from fisheries for these stocks on the high seas and those 
in areas under national jurisdiction are required and should be collected and compiled 
in such a way as to enable statistically meaningful analysis for the purposes of fishery 
resource conservation and management. These data include catch and fishing effort 
statistics and other fishery-related information, such as vessel-related and other data 
for standardizing fishing effort. Data collected should also include information on non­
target and associated or dependent species. All data should be verified to ensure 
accuracy. Confidentiality of non-aggregated data shall be maintained. The 
dissemination of such data shall be subject to the terms on which they have been 
provided.
2. Assistance, including training as well as financial and technical assistance, shall 
be provided to developing States in order to build capacity in the field of conservation 
and management of living marine resources. Assistance should focus on enhancing 
capacity to implement data collection and verification, observer programmes, data 
analysis and research projects supporting stock assessments. The fullest possible 
involvement of developing State scientists and managers in conservation and 
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks should be 
promoted.
Article 2
Principles of data collection, compilation and exchange
The following general principles should be considered in defining the 
parameters for collection, compilation and exchange of data from fishing operations for 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks:
(a) States should ensure that data are collected from vessels flying their flag on 
fishing activities according to the operational characteristics of each fishing method 
(e.g., each individual tow for trawl, each set for long-line and purse-seine, each school 
fished for pole-and-line and each day fished for troll) and in sufficient detail to facilitate 
effective stock assessment;
(b) States should ensure that fishery data are verified through an appropriate 
system;
(c) States should compile fishery-related and other supporting scientific data 
and provide them in an agreed format and in a timely manner to the relevant
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subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement where one 
exists. Otherwise, States should cooperate to exchange data either directly or through 
such other cooperative mechanisms as may be agreed among them;
(d) States should agree, within the framework of subregional or regional 
fisheries management organizations or arrangements, or otherwise, on the 
specification of data and the format in which they are to be provided, in accordance 
with this Annex and taking into account the nature of the stocks and the fisheries for 
those stocks in the region. Such organizations or arrangements should request non­
members or non-participants to provide data concerning relevant fishing activities by 
vessels flying their flag;
(e) such organizations or arrangements shall compile data and make them 
available in a timely manner and in an agreed format to all interested States under the 
terms and conditions established by the organization or arrangement; and
(f) scientists of the flag State and from the relevant subregional or regional 
fisheries management organization or arrangement should analyse the data separately 
or jointly, as appropriate.
Article 3 
Basic fishery data
1. States shall collect and make available to the relevant subregional or regional 
fisheries management organization or arrangement the following types of data in 
sufficient detail to facilitate effective stock assessment in accordance with agreed 
procedures:
(a) time series of catch and effort statistics by fishery and fleet;
(b) total catch in number, nominal weight, or both, by species (both target and 
non-target) as is appropriate to each fishery. [Nominal weight is defined by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as the live-weight equivalent of the 
landings];
(c) discard statistics, including estimates where necessary, reported as number 
or nominal weight by species, as is appropriate to each fishery;
(d) effort statistics appropriate to each fishing method; and
(e) fishing location, date and time fished and other statistics on fishing 
operations as appropriate.
2. States shall also collect where appropriate and provide to the relevant
subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement information 
to support stock assessment, including:
(a) composition of the catch according to length, weight and sex;
(b) other biological information supporting stock assessments, such as
information on age, growth, recruitment, distribution and stock identity; and
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(c) other relevant research, including surveys of abundance, biomass surveys, 
hydro-acoustic surveys, research on environmental factors affecting stock abundance, 
and oceanographic and ecological studies.
Article 4
Vessel data and information
1. States should collect the following types of vessel-related data for standardizing 
fleet composition and vessel fishing power and for converting between different 
measures of effort in the analysis of catch and effort data:
(a) vessel identification, flag and port of registry;
(b) vessel type;
(c) vessel specifications (e.g., material of construction, date built, registered 
length, gross registered tonnage, power of main engines, hold capacity and catch 
storage methods); and
(d) fishing gear description (e.g., types, gear specifications and quantity).
2. The flag State will collect the following information:
(a) navigation and position fixing aids;
(b) communication equipment and international radio call sign; and
(c) crew size.
Article 5 
Reporting
A State shall ensure that vessels flying its flag send to its national fisheries 
administration and, where agreed, to the relevant subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement, logbook data on catch and effort, including 
data on fishing operations on the high seas, at sufficiently frequent intervals to meet 
national requirements and regional and international obligations. Such data shall be 
transmitted, where necessary, by radio, telex, facsimile or satellite transmission or by 
other means.
Article 6 
Data verification
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States or, as appropriate, subregional or regional fisheries management 
organizations or arrangements should establish mechanisms for verifying fishery data, 
such as:
(a) position verification through vessel monitoring systems;
(b) scientific observer programmes to monitor catch, effort, catch composition 
(target and non-target) and other details of fishing operations;
(c) vessel trip, landing and transhipment reports; and
(d) port sampling.
Article 7 
Data exchange
1. Data collected by flag States must be shared with other flag States and relevant 
coastal States through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management 
organizations or arrangements. Such organizations or arrangements shall compile data 
and make them available in a timely manner and in an agreed format to all interested 
States under the terms and conditions established by the organization or arrangement, 
while maintaining confidentiality of non-aggregated data, and should, to the extent 
feasible, develop database systems which provide efficient access to data.
2. At the global level, collection and dissemination of data should be effected 
through the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Where a 
subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement does not 
exist, that organization may also do the same at the subregional or regional level by 
arrangement with the States concerned.
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ANNEX II
GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF PRECAUTIONARY REFERENCE 
POINTS IN CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH 
STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS
1. A precautionary reference point is an estimated value derived through an 
agreed scientific procedure, which corresponds to the state of the resource and of the 
fishery, and which can be used as a guide for fisheries management.
2. Two types of precautionary reference points should be used: conservation, or 
limit, reference points and management, or target, reference points. Limit reference 
points set boundaries which are intended to constrain harvesting within safe biological 
limits within which the stocks can produce maximum sustainable yield. Target 
reference points are intended to meet management objectives.
3. Precautionary reference points should be stock-specific to account, inter alia, 
for the reproductive capacity, the resilience of each stock and the characteristics of 
fisheries exploiting the stock, as well as other sources of mortality and major sources of 
uncertainty.
4. Management strategies shall seek to maintain or restore populations of 
harvested stocks, and where necessary associated or dependent species, at levels 
consistent with previously agreed precautionary reference points. Such reference 
points shall be used to trigger pre-agreed conservation and management action. 
Management strategies shall include measures which can be implemented when 
precautionary reference points are approached.
5. Fishery management strategies shall ensure that the risk of exceeding limit 
reference points is very low. If a stock falls below a limit reference point or is at risk of 
falling below such a reference point, conservation and management action should be 
initiated to facilitate stock recovery. Fishery management strategies shall ensure that 
target reference points are not exceeded on average.
6. When information for determining reference points for a fishery is poor or 
absent, provisional reference points shall be set. Provisional reference points may be 
established by analogy to similar and better-known stocks. In such situations, the 
fishery shall be subject to enhanced monitoring so as to enable revision of provisional 
reference points as improved information becomes available.
7. The fishing mortality rate which generates maximum sustainable yield should be 
regarded as a minimum standard for limit reference points. For stocks which are not 
overfished, fishery management strategies shall ensure that fishing mortality does not 
exceed that which corresponds to maximum sustainable yield, and that the biomass 
does not fall below a predefined threshold. For overfished stocks, the biomass which 
would produce maximum sustainable yield can serve as a rebuilding target.
